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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

January 1955

Vol. 7 No. 1

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

The Colombo Plan Conference

THE 1954 annual meeting of the Consultative Committee on Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia was held in Ottawa from October 4 to October 9. This event was remarkable in that it brought to Canada for the first time representatives of all the countries with which Canada is co-operating under the Colombo Plan. The Canadian Government and people were given an unusual opportunity to be hosts to a distinguished group of delegates from all the countries of South and South-East Asia, from most of the Commonwealth countries, and also from Japan and the United States.

As the meeting of the Consultative Committee was preceded by a two-week meeting of officials from member countries, the conference lasted three weeks in all. During the peak period more than ninety visiting delegates were in Ottawa, some of them accompanied by their wives. At the conclusion of the conference a large number of the delegates joined tours, arranged by the Canadian Government, which extended their stay in Canada by one to two weeks. Thus many Canadians, both in Ottawa and in several other cities, had opportunities to meet the delegates and to learn more about conditions of life and ways of thinking in their countries. The press and radio interviews given by many of the delegates and the articles and programmes about the Colombo Plan and the Colombo Plan countries which were featured in the press and on radio and television during the conference, brought an even larger number of Canadians into indirect contact with the conference and the people who participated in it.

At the same time, the delegates, most of whom had never before been in Canada, were able to learn more about this country and about the Canadian way of life. While in Ottawa they visited the National Gallery, the National Research Council, the Experimental Farm, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and the atomic energy plant at Chalk River. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources arranged an evening on northern Canada. Some of the delegates saw a hockey game and a football game, and they all had opportunities to listen to Canadian music or music performed by Canadians and to see a play performed by Canadian actors. Many of the delegates went on tour following the conference and thus saw other parts of Canada.

Countries Represented

The countries represented at the conference were Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom (with its dependent territories in South-East Asia), the United States and Viet-Nam.* The Director of the Colombo Plan Bureau for Technical Co-operation and the senior officer

* The following were the leaders of the delegations:

Australia: Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs

Burma: Sao Hkon Hkio, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cambodia: Mr. Phlek Phoeun, Director of National Planning

Canada: Hon. Walter Harris, Minister of Finance (in the absence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Ceylon: Hon. M. D. H. Jayawardene, Minister of Finance

of the Colombo Plan Information Unit, both of whom have their headquarters in Colombo, were present throughout the conference. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East were represented by observers, and the Chairman of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board attended some of the meetings.

Delegates to the preliminary meeting of officials began arriving in Ottawa toward the end of the week of September 13. They quickly became at home in their new surroundings and Ottawa citizens soon became used to seeing friends from the four corners of the world moving casually through the shopping districts or walking to and from the meetings on Parliament Hill. The conference was held in the Railway Committee Room. Mr. K. W. Taylor, Deputy Minister of Finance and leader of the Canadian delegation to the official meetings, was elected Chairman at the first session. On the afternoon of the first day Mr. Nik Cavell formally opened the Colombo Plan Exhibition, prepared by the Exhibition Commission of the Department of Trade and Commerce, which had been set up in the west lobby of the Centre Block. During the ensuing three weeks a large number of visitors, including school children, saw this exhibition. It graphically depicted the growth and operation of the Colombo Plan in the countries of South and South-East Asia.

Preparation of Draft Report

The main task of the officials was to prepare for the consideration of Ministers a draft report reviewing progress under the Colombo Plan and assessing future prospects. Although the Consultative Committee had first met in 1950 and several Asian countries had by that time made some progress in economic development, the early meetings were organizational, and it was not until June 1951, that the Plan formally commenced. It was envisaged as covering a six-year period running to June 1957. When the Ottawa meetings began two annual reports had already been produced covering the first two years of the Plan. The task of the Ottawa meetings was to review progress over the three-year period from June 1951, to June 1954, with the main emphasis on what had been achieved since the 1953 report was drawn up.

After holding several plenary sessions the officials continued their work in subcommittees set up to work on separate chapters of the draft report. At the same time a drafting committee was appointed to take in hand the draw-

India: Hon. C. D. Deshmukh, Minister of Finance

Indonesia: H.E. Dr. Sunario, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Japan: H.E. K. Matsudaira, Ambassador of Japan in Canada

Laos: H.E. Ouyot R. Souvannavong, Minister of Laos to the United States

Nepal: Major-General Maahabir Rana, Minister of Planning, Development, Industry and Commerce

New Zealand: H.E. T. C. A. Hislop, High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canada

Pakistan: Hon. Chaudri Mohammed Ali, Minister of Finance

The Philippines: Congressman Ferdinand E. Marcos

Thailand: H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakan

The United Kingdom: The Most Honourable the Marquess of Reading

Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Member for Local Government, Housing and Town Planning, Federation of Malaya (Ministerial Representative for the United Kingdom Territories in South East Asia)

Hon. C. C. Tan, Government of Singapore (Ministerial Representative for the United Kingdom Territories in South East Asia)

The United States: Hon. Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Viet-Nam: H.E. Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam to the United States



—Capital Press

COLOMBO PLAN EXHIBITION

Standing before a row of flags of Colombo Plan countries at the Colombo Plan Exhibition held on September 20, 1954, in the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, are, left to right: M. S. M. Koreshi, Secretary of Pakistan delegation; Dr. S. Gupta, First Secretary, Office of the High Commission for India in Canada; Dr. Usman Sastroamidjoyo, Indonesian Ambassador to Canada; Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell, Dept. of Trade and Commerce, Canada; Mr. Ismail Bin Mohammed Ali, Federation of Malaya; Mr. C. V. Narasimhan, Joint Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, India; Mr. Prem Narain, India.

ing up of the report as a whole. The chapters under discussion included an introductory chapter dealing with the general economic and financial background of current Colombo Plan operations, a chapter devoted to each of the Asian countries, a chapter on the contributions being made by member countries, a chapter on technical assistance and a final chapter to contain a summary and conclusions. The work of the committees was carried on in the smaller committee rooms in the Centre Block or in the offices there which had been assigned to delegations.

The officials, often working until the early hours of the morning, completed their draft and their other recommendations in good time for the commencement of the Ministerial meeting on October 4. On the morning of that day, as the Ministers, accompanied by their officials, drove up to the Parliament Buildings for the opening session, the flags of member countries were flying in front of the Centre Block and the Dominion Carillonneur was playing a medley of their national anthems. The Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House of Commons received the delegates in the Speaker's Chambers. After the delegates had chatted for a while in the delegates' lounge, they moved into the House of Commons Chamber for the first session, which was

open to the public. The galleries, and part of the floor of the House, were very nearly filled with distinguished guests, including members of the diplomatic corps, and interested members of the public. Press, television and newsreel cameramen covered the session.

Meeting Opened by Prime Minister

The Prime Minister opened the meeting with an address of welcome in which he paid tribute to the Colombo Plan and to its Asian members. He laid stress on the human values which the Plan is designed to serve, and he expressed satisfaction with the increasing knowledge which the people of Asia and the people of the West are gaining of each other's aspirations and ways of life. The parts of his speech which were spoken in French were particularly appreciated by the delegates from Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The Prime Minister was followed by Mr. Deshmukh of India, Lord Reading of the United Kingdom, Dr. Sunario of Indonesia and Mr. Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, all of whom gave thoughtful expression to their countries' attitude toward the Colombo Plan and to their hopes for the meeting and for the future of the Plan.

During the ensuing five days the Ministers and their advisers met continuously to consider the draft report and to discuss common problems. Outside the meetings the delegates and their wives were appropriately entertained by the Canadian Government and by the heads of missions of Colombo Plan countries. Among the Canadian hosts were His Excellency the Governor General, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Senate, Mrs. L. B. Pearson, and Mrs. Hugh O'Donnell, daughter of the Prime Minister. Mayor Charlotte Whitton visited one of the meetings and presented the delegates with a scroll of welcome on behalf of the City of Ottawa.

The atmosphere in the meetings was unspectacular but cordial. Many of the Ministers and officials who were present had attended previous meetings of the Consultative Committee and had come to know one another well. The discussions were at all times pervaded by a spirit of friendly informality which reflected the ease with which all member countries fit into the free association of the Colombo Plan. It is not the practice of the Consultative Committee to make policy decisions which are binding on members but it is the aim of the Committee, when it meets, to reach agreed judgments regarding the progress being made under the Colombo Plan. All delegation leaders participated in the discussion of this subject. Valuable contributions were also made by the observers representing the three United Nations agencies.

Most delegates, recognizing that the Colombo Plan had passed the half-way point of the period covered in the first report, seemed to feel that it has reached a transition stage in its development. There were frequent references in the meetings to the fact that the Plan was at its mid-point or moving into the final stages of at least the first planning period. Some delegates suggested that a "new spirit" was evident in the Consultative Committee; the exact nature of this new spirit was not defined but the suggestion seemed to reflect a feeling that the Committee's capacity for constructive co-operation in a mutually understanding atmosphere was increasing.

There was a further indication that the Colombo Plan is in transition. During the Ottawa meetings the membership of the Consultative Committee was

enlarged to include Japan, which had not previously been associated with the Plan, and Thailand and the Philippines, which had been represented by observers at previous meetings and which had sent observers to the Ottawa meetings. The new members were cordially welcomed by the older members who were glad to have their circle enlarged to include all the countries of South and South-East Asia (the area which the Plan is designed to serve) and Japan, an important Asian country which already has economic relations with the countries of the Colombo Plan area and which should be able to make a useful contribution to their economic development.

Membership Expands

While the Colombo Plan was originally a Commonwealth response to the economic development needs of South and South-East Asia and while the only governments which contributed data for the Plan as it was drawn up in 1950 were the governments of the Commonwealth countries of South and South-East Asia and of the United Kingdom territories in that area, it was recognized from the beginning that other countries of the area, and some countries outside it which were interested in helping to develop it, would be welcome as members. It was on this basis that Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal and Viet-Nam, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, had previously joined the Plan. There were therefore solid precedents for the expansion which took place during the Ottawa meetings.

The United States has been a full member of the Consultative Committee since 1951; its contributions to economic development in South and South-East Asia have regularly been taken into account by the Committee in assessing the progress being made under the Plan, and its representatives have consistently played a constructive part in the deliberations of the Committee. This year the United States sent a strong delegation to all of the meetings, and Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Mr. Harold Stassen, attended for the last few days.

The true spirit of the Colombo Plan was especially in evidence at the farewell dinner which the Prime Minister held for all delegates at the Country Club. A most friendly atmosphere prevailed throughout the evening, and both the Prime Minister, who spoke informally at the conclusion of the dinner, and Mr. Deshmukh of India, who was chosen to reply, aptly expressed the cordial feelings of the delegates.

The Annual Report

In the report of the conference the delegates expressed in more formal terms their current assessment of the Colombo Plan and the progress which is being made under it. The report,* which has been released in the capitals of several of the Colombo Plan countries, contains much valuable information and statistical data on economic trends in the countries of South-East Asia and in the area as a whole. It also describes in specific terms the development programmes in each of the countries, the progress made in implementing these plans, and the contributions of member countries. The concluding chapter, en-

* "The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South East Asia—Third Annual Report of the Consultative Committee—Ottawa, October, 1954" (The Queen's Printer, Ottawa—Price 50¢).

titled "Summary and Conclusions", reviews the progress being made in particular fields such as food production; production of other commodities such as jute, rubber, tea and tin; manufacturing; and public utilities and services. It discusses the financial problems faced by the Asian members in connection with economic development, the external grants and loans available to them, and the importance of technical assistance. Finally it surveys the task ahead.

The report contains many encouraging examples of projects completed or well on their way to completion in the countries of South and South-East Asia. These include such projects as the Thal Development project in Pakistan; the Mayurakshi dam, the Sindri fertilizer plant and community development projects in India; the Gal Oya hydro-electric project in Ceylon; the Taungpulu dam in Burma; water reservoirs in Indonesia; and the establishment of a Rural and Industrial Development Authority in Malaya. These are but random examples which could be multiplied several times but which demonstrate that, in varying degrees, the countries of South and South-East Asia are actually achieving concrete results in their efforts to make the benefits of modern techniques available to an ever-increasing number of their people. Actually, at this stage, the rate of development is difficult to assess in physical terms because many of the important projects take years to complete and will yield returns only gradually. Also, much of the progress being made is in fields where results are not easily measurable such as health, education and improved technical capacity. On the other hand, the heaviest task in these fields still lies ahead and, in another less tangible field—that of employment—the situation is still serious in some countries.

The report records that, in the area as a whole, total development expenditure increased by 27 per cent during the past year and is expected to increase by 31 per cent in the current year. The current food supply of the area has been improved; food production has increased in several countries; and continuing heavy investments in agriculture should ensure a rising volume of food production and a higher measure of economic stability for the whole area. There has been expansion in manufacturing and in public services such as power and transport during 1953-54.

Financial Problems

The report states that the financial problems of the Colombo Plan countries, relative to their development needs, are most serious, and that, although important steps have been taken to use domestic capital more effectively, the low level of average individual incomes makes it difficult to mobilize sufficient domestic resources for a rapid rate of development. Note is taken of steps which certain Colombo Plan countries have taken to enlist the co-operation of private enterprise in the economic development field, and of measures to encourage the investment of private capital from abroad. However, the report states that new private investment has been small and that, in the main, economic development in the area will probably be carried on within the framework of public planning for some time to come.

The report indicates that the amount of grant aid known to be available for the coming year will be about the same as in the recent past, supplemented, as heretofore, by loans. It states that the countries of the Colombo Plan area are aware that the main burden must be borne out of their own resources, al-



—NFB

COLOMBO PLAN MEETING

Delegates to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meeting held in Ottawa October 4-8, 1954, are grouped on the steps before the main entrance to the Parliament Buildings. Front row, left to right: Mr. Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Federation of Malaya; Hon. C. C. Tan, Singapore; Prince Wan Waithayakan, Thailand; His Excellency, Tran Van Chuong, Viet Nam; Hon. C. D. Deshmukh, India; Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Australia; Hon. Samuel C. Waugh, United States; Hon. James Sinclair, Canada; Hon. Walter B. Harris, Canada; Marquess of Reading, United Kingdom; Hon. Chaudri Mohammed Ali, Pakistan; His Excellency T. C. A. Hislop, New Zealand; His Excellency Dr. Sunario, Indonesia; Hon. M. D. H. Jayawardene, Ceylon; His Excellency Dr. Koto Matsudaira, Japan; Major-General Maahabir S. J. B. Rana, Nepal; Mr. Phlek Phoeun, Cambodia.

though external aid can do much to smooth and to accelerate progress toward a higher standard of living. The report concludes: "But they (the countries of the Colombo Plan area) have come through the initial difficulties, and not as isolated entities but as members of a great and growing partnership animated by a common purpose and increasingly conscious of each other's problems and aspirations."

When the conference was over many of the delegates proceeded homeward, or to other destinations, but about half of them participated in a post-conference tour to Montreal, Kingston, Toronto and Niagara Falls. Travelling by bus, car and special train, they visited universities, industrial plants and hydro-electric installations. In each city they were cordially received and entertained by civic, provincial or university authorities. The tour was arranged to allow free time in the evenings, when the delegates were able to attend the theatre or accept invitations to private homes. The final evening, on which most of the delegates dropped into a top-floor suite at the General Brock Hotel

to chat and look at the illuminated spectacle of Niagara Falls, was a particularly happy occasion.

Following the main tour, a small group of delegates proceeded in aircraft provided by the Department of Transport to Arvida, where they were entertained at lunch and saw an aluminum plant in operation. Bad weather prevented the party from reaching their second objective, Knob Lake, where they were to inspect an iron mine.

At the same time a larger group set out by train on a tour of Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton and Vancouver. "Hurricane Hazel" delayed rail traffic for thirteen hours on the first leg of the journey and, as a result, the Winnipeg programme unfortunately had to be cancelled. In other cities, where they were hospitably received, they visited grain elevators, farms, refineries, oil fields and logging, lumbering, mining and fishing operations. They also met several representative groups including the Cabinets of Saskatchewan and Alberta. On their final evening in Vancouver they were the guests of a Chinese Canadian who took them to dinner in a Chinese restaurant. From Vancouver most of them proceeded homeward over the Pacific.

A Memorable Experience

In retrospect the Canadians who took part in the Colombo Plan conference look back on it as a memorable experience. They feel it was no small thing to have, sitting around the same table, the representatives of seventeen countries which, among them, account for about one third of the world's population. Their common objective—the raising of the living standards of some 600,000,000 people whose destiny is of the greatest importance to the future of mankind—is one they are proud to share. It is also a source of satisfaction that the Canadian Government and people were given an opportunity to repay, in like terms, the warm and generous hospitality accorded to the members of the Consultative Committee at previous meetings in Karachi, New Delhi, Colombo, London and Sydney.

Next year the Consultative Committee will meet again in Asia—this time in Singapore. All those concerned with the Colombo Plan look forward to being able at that time to review continued substantial progress and to a further meeting of good friends who are co-operating in one of the most significant joint enterprises of modern times.

NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1954

THE North Atlantic Council held a Ministerial meeting in Paris on December 17 and 18, the third this year (previous ones having been held on April 23, prior to the Geneva Conference on Far Eastern Questions, and on October 22, to discuss arrangements for associating the German Federal Republic with the West). Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the Foreign Minister of Greece, was Chairman, and Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of NATO, was Vice-Chairman. Canada was represented by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, and the Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Mr. L. D. Wilgress.

The text of the Communique issued at the end of the meeting is given in full below.

A "Stock-taking" Meeting

This was one of the regular annual "stock-taking" meetings whose purpose is to review what has been done so far to prepare against any threat to the security of the member countries and to decide what has to be done next to continue defence preparations. On this occasion ministers had an eventful year behind them, which had seen improvements in NATO's position on both the military front (the strength and efficiency of NATO forces had increased) and the political front (the vacuum left by the demise of the European Defence Community had been filled by the London and Paris agreements, which offered good hope of an enduring settlement).

Ministers had before them a report on the 1954 Annual Review, prepared by a subordinate committee of the Council with the assistance of the NATO civilian Secretariat and the NATO military authorities and in the light of comprehensive information supplied by member countries on their military, financial, and defence production plans. On the basis of the recommendations in this report, ministers agreed upon the level of NATO forces to be achieved and maintained over the next three years, the goals for 1955 being firm commitments, and those for the two subsequent years being provisional and planning goals. The levels accepted for 1955 are to be about the same as those for 1954 in numbers, but there are to be further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness. It has been assumed that there will also be added to these forces the German defence contribution envisaged in the Paris agreements. It was a source of satisfaction to the Council that many member countries have been able to combine their defence efforts with an expansion of economic activity and an improvement in general welfare.

The ministers exchanged views, with complete unanimity, on international questions of common concern, including the trends and implications of recent Soviet policy. It was agreed that since the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy had shown more flexibility than previously but that its direction remained



—NATIS

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, left, and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. R. O. Campney at the December 1954 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

unchanged. It was still aimed at weakening and dividing the non-communist world and it was backed by increasingly formidable military power. The Soviet leaders had spoken of coexistence but had not so far put forward any constructive proposals for the promotion of international peace and security. However, there was agreement in the Council that, once the Paris agreements were ratified, the Western powers should be ready to negotiate whenever the Soviet Union gave tangible evidence that negotiations could be fruitful. Such evidence might be given with respect to any of the outstanding European problems, for example, or to the United Nations' efforts to achieve a general agreement on the limitation and control of armaments.

Military Committee Report Approved

On the military side the Council considered and approved a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO defence over the next few years, taking into account the most modern military developments. This report was the first of a series of studies that had been authorized by the Council to review the whole concept and organization of NATO defences in the light particularly of the effect of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, there had been before the Ministerial meeting a great deal of unfounded and misleading speculation in the press suggesting that there was a serious conflict among the NATO countries on this matter. The fact is that the point at issue in this first

report was not whether nuclear weapons should be used by NATO in the event of war, but what assumptions should be used by the NATO military authorities in revising their defence plans. In approving this report the Council made it clear that it was merely agreeing to the planning assumptions suggested by the NATO military authorities and was not in any way delegating the political responsibility of governments for making final decisions to put plans into operation in the event of hostilities. The military assumptions which were approved for planning purposes are, of course, secret, but it can reasonably be expected that they take into account the fact that, if the Soviet Union were to launch an overt aggression against the West, the NATO forces should have made such preparations as would permit them to defend themselves with all necessary means at their disposal.

The Council also took note of progress reports by both the Secretary-General and the Military Committee. The former dealt with the activities of the civilian Secretariat and agencies of NATO, while the latter summarized the progress made during the past year in NATO military planning and organization. This latter report was introduced by brief statements from the NATO Supreme Commanders: Admiral Wright, (the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), Admiral Creasy (the Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Southern North Sea), and General Gruenther (the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe). General Gruenther emphasized in particular the need for greater efforts to inform public opinion of the importance of NATO.

Finally, ministers were invited by the Greek Foreign Minister to hold their next meeting in Athens some time in April. It was left to the Permanent Representatives to consider this invitation in more detail in the light of whatever administrative difficulties might be involved.

Final Communiqué

(Approved by the North Atlantic Council on December 18, 1954)

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial Session under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, completed its work today. It was attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Economic Affairs and Defence Production.

2. The Council noted the Progress Report by the Secretary-General covering activities and developments in the Organization during the past twelve months.

Ministers welcomed the extension of political consultation within the Council.

They noted with interest the steady progress in the infrastructure programmes and in emergency planning in the civil field, and recommended the continuation of these studies and of this work, in particular in civil defence.

The Report referred to the dissemination of information about NATO and to the forthcoming publication of the Secretary-General's Five-Year Report. It also emphasized the value of the visits of Parliamentarians, of the development of voluntary organizations interested in NATO, and of the tours of journalists to member countries.

3. In accordance with its regular practice, the Council exchanged views on matters of common concern in the international situation.

The Council welcomed the efforts being made under the aegis of the United Nations for a world-wide agreement for a general limitation and control of armaments.

4. The Council agreed that Soviet policy, backed as it is by ever-increasing military power, continues, in spite of some outward signs of flexibility, to be directed towards weakening and dividing the Western nations. Soviet policy contributes no constructive solution for ensuring world security and for maintaining the freedom of peoples. It provides no ground for believing that the threat to the free world has diminished.

The Council reaffirmed its will to build for peace on solid foundations of unity and strength. The Council noted with satisfaction the progress which has been made towards bringing into effect the Paris Agreements which it regards as an essential contribution to the unity of Europe, to the security of the free world, and thereby to the cause of peace.

5. The Council took note of a Progress Report submitted by the Military Committee. It noted with satisfaction that a request by SACEUR had led to negotiations between the Netherlands and the United States, the recent completion of which will permit the establishment of a SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre in The Hague at which scientists of all member nations will be able to contribute to the development of air defence. The Council also noted that the NATO Defence College, now in its fourth year, has made a valuable contribution of qualified personnel to staffs and agencies of NATO and of member governments.

6. The Council considered a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength over the next few years, taking into account modern developments in weapons and techniques. It approved this report as a basis for defence planning and preparation by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.

7. The Council considered the Report on the Annual Review for 1954, which sets forth the co-ordinated NATO defence programmes for the next three years. The Review was based on the Council directive adopted in December, 1953, that it would be necessary for member countries to support over a long period forces which, by their balance, quality and efficiency, would be a major factor in deterring aggression.

The Ministers considered and accepted as military guidance a report by the Military Committee giving its comments on the 1954 Annual Review. This report stressed that the level of forces for the defence of the NATO area should be maintained as planned.

The Council noted that there had been an increase in the strength of NATO forces and further steady improvement in their efficiency over the past year. This improvement in quality resulted primarily from the large-scale combined exercises held by NATO land, sea and air forces, from the increases in operational and support units and from the supply of large quantities of new equipment.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the expansion of European production of defence equipment as well as the continued provision of North

American equipment, and urged continued co-operation in research and development.


Following the recommendations made in the Annual Review Report, the Council adopted firm force goals for 1955, provisional goals for 1956 and planning goals for 1957. The force goals agreed upon for 1955 are of about the same numerical strength as those for 1954, but further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness are provided for. The German defence contribution under the Paris Agreements remains, in the opinion of the Council, an indispensable addition to the defence effort of the West.

8. The Council noted with satisfaction the encouraging economic developments in many member countries over the past year and particularly the expansion of production in several European countries. The additional resources thus made available have enabled further improvements to be made in general welfare and social progress, while at the same time permitting a continued contribution towards increases in the strength and effectiveness of NATO forces. The Council recognized that further steady growth in the economic strength of the Alliance as a whole is essential in order to preserve and increase the well-being and security of all member countries, and that to this end it is necessary to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries.

Palais de Chaillot,

Paris, XVIe.

20th December, 1954.



NEW CHARGÉE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

Miss Elizabeth MacCallum, the new Chargée d'Affaires of the Canadian Legation at Beirut, Lebanon, takes leave of the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, H. E. Alfred Naccache, on the occasion of the presentation of her credentials.

UNESCO Conference—Report of the Canadian Delegation

THE eighth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was held at Montevideo, Uruguay, from November 11 to December 10, 1954. The Canadian delegation consisted of: Mr. S. D. Pierce, Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, Chairman; Mr. Bona Arsenaault, M.P., Vice-Chairman; Mr. C. W. Carter, M.P., Delegate; Dr. Philippe Panneton, Delegate; Dr. Garnet T. Page, Delegate; Mr. F. K. Stewart, Alternate Delegate; Dr. A. Vibert Douglas, Alternate Delegate; Mr. Fulgence Charpentier, Alternate Delegate; Mr. M. N. Bow, Adviser; Mr. C. F. W. Hooper, Secretary.

The extent of the progress made by the Conference can only be properly assessed when action to implement the Conference's decisions has been taken and the results have been evaluated.

There were three principal areas of achievement:

- (a) An easing of tension and a degree of rapprochement (in matters within the competence of UNESCO) between the delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the United States was apparent;
- (b) A substantial increase in UNESCO's programme of activities and in the budget provided to finance this programme was approved;
- (c) A more responsible attitude of member states toward UNESCO and of individual representatives toward their governments was evident as the Organization approached universal membership.

UNESCO General Conferences are held every two years and the ninth General Conference will be held at New Delhi, India, in 1956. At that time the consequences of these developments may be more apparent.

Historical Notes

UNESCO was founded in 1945, and the first General Conference was held in Paris in November 1946. In its early years UNESCO's energies were directed toward post-war rehabilitation but in 1948 the Organization turned toward the task of eradicating ignorance and illiteracy. Dr. Jaime Torres-Bodet, of Mexico, an international authority on mass education, was appointed Director-General. He envisaged an expanding programme and budget for a sustained attack on urgent international problems, but he resigned in 1952 when the General Conference did not approve the increased programme and budget which he presented. In July 1953, Dr. Luther H. Evans, of the United States, was elected Director-General of UNESCO. One of his first endeavours was a re-orientation of the Organization's programme. It was proposed that 1955 and 1956 should be transitional years and that a remodelled programme should come into force in 1957. In 1954 the entry to UNESCO of the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine and Byelorussia and the return of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to active participation brought the total membership to 72 nations.



UNESCO CONFERENCE AT MONTEVIDEO

The eighth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization was held at Montevideo, Uruguay from November 11 to December 10, 1954. Above, a portion of the Canadian Delegation, right to left: Mr. Bona Arsenault, M.P., Vice-Chairman of the Delegation; Dr. Garnet T. Page; Mr. Fulgence Charpentier; Mr. C. W. Carter, M.P.; and F. K. Stewart.

Easing of Tension

On the first day of the Conference the Soviet delegation unsuccessfully urged the admission to UNESCO membership of Roumania and Bulgaria and rejection of the Nationalist Chinese credentials. The comparatively restrained and moderate statement of the Soviet spokesman was indicative of the attitude taken by the U.S.S.R. throughout the session. The United States also scrupulously avoided provocation and concentrated on supporting increased technical aid to under-developed countries. Under these circumstances, the two leading participants were disposed to be reasonable, even conciliatory, toward each other.

The debate on obligations and rights of UNESCO staff members which involved three United States' citizens who had declined to answer questions concerning alleged communist associations, illustrated these attitudes. Some European countries were prepared to make this an issue of civil liberties, individual freedom and the independence of international civil servants. The United States said that the whole future of UNESCO was at stake and it was obvious that a major propaganda debate could be precipitated. Because of the reticence of the principals a major clash was avoided and the Conference approved the Director-General's recommendations which were designed to bring UNESCO staff regulations into conformity with those of the United Nations.

Three resolutions on atomic energy offered another opportunity for political argument on such questions as banning atomic weapons, disarmament, the harmful effects of radiation and the control of nuclear energy. However, thanks to the co-operative spirit of all concerned, it was possible to combine

the three resolutions into one which authorized the Director-General to extend full co-operation to the United Nations on questions concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The joint resolution was approved unanimously.

A Soviet resolution on "Measures to prevent the use of means of mass communication for the propaganda of war" seemed certain to create trouble until the Soviet joined Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States in sponsoring an alternative resolution on "Freedom of Information". The resolution was approved unanimously but the variation of interpretations of the operative paragraph which invited member states "to take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of expression and to remove barriers to the free flow of undistorted information" somewhat circumscribed the enthusiasm with which this Soviet concession had been greeted.

Expansion of the Programme and Budget

Throughout the Conference there was an insistent demand from under-developed countries for a substantial extension of UNESCO's programme and a large increase in the budget. The crisis of 1952 did not recur because the contributions of new members provided additional revenue and made expansion of the programme and budget possible without any increase in the individual contributions of member states. By an overwhelming majority vote the Conference approved an assessment level of \$20,000,000 for 1955-56, an increase of approximately \$2,000,000 over 1953-54. Redistribution of contribution percentages as new members joined UNESCO caused Canada's percentage to decline from 3.54 to 2.77. The amount of the Canadian contribution for 1955-56 will be approximately \$554,000 compared with more than \$600,000 in 1953-54.

The under-developed countries obtained approval of a resolution calling for a study of the possibility of establishing an educational, scientific and cultural development fund. They explained that western-trained experts on educational and cultural development were ineffective because of differences in languages, educational methods, cultural conceptions, etc., and that they preferred a development fund from which loans could be obtained for building schools, libraries and laboratories and for financing fellowships to train their own nationals.

The programme proposed by the Director-General and the Executive Board was approved with minor alterations.

Attitude of Responsibility

The decisions to remodel UNESCO's programme and change the structure of the Executive Board to provide for representation of governments rather than of individuals competent in the areas of UNESCO activity are developments to be welcomed as they bring the Organization closer to the governments that contribute to it.

At the last two UNESCO Conferences proposals to alter the structure of the Executive Board were defeated, although in 1952 a Canadian compromise proposal received more sympathetic consideration and a decision on it was postponed. At the recent Conference a United States resolution to change the composition of the Executive Board encountered stiff opposition. However,

when the operative paragraph of the Canadian compromise was inserted, the Conference voted by a large majority to elect an Executive Board of government representatives to "...exercise the powers delegated to them by the Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole." Nevertheless, when the new Executive Board of 22 members was elected many of the same individuals and the same countries that had served in 1953-54 were returned to office, and it is unlikely that the attitude of these representatives or their governments will alter immediately.

Recommendations concerning remodelling UNESCO's programme were approved unanimously but this decision appeared to be something of a paradox in view of more than 100 new resolutions, many of which would detract attention and resources from concentration on major projects of international importance. The net effect was therefore: unanimous agreement in principle on concentration of the programme, but in practice a tendency to continue the wide diffusion of activities.

Conclusions

The easing of tension at the Conference was a consequence of a series of compromises and concessions. At the next General Conference at New Delhi, India, in 1956, an evaluation of the results of compromise resolutions may reveal whether further steps in the same direction would be profitable.

(Continued on page 30)



CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

—State of Israel

The new Canadian Ambassador to Israel, Mr. T. W. L. MacDermot, presented his credentials on November 24, 1954, to His Excellency Y. Ben Zvi, President of Israel.

Canada and the United Nations

Korea

During its ninth session, the General Assembly, having considered the factors which had made for failure at Geneva to unify Korea peacefully, did not favour a renewal of negotiations at a time when there had been no change in those factors.

The Political Committee of the General Assembly, which began consideration of the Korean item on December 1, dealt first with the procedural question of which non-member states should be invited to participate in the debate. Three draft resolutions were tabled, one by the Soviet Delegation calling for North Korean and Peking representation, one by the Thai Delegation for South Korean representation and a third by the Syrian Delegation, by which North and South Korea would have been invited to appear. In the event the Thai resolution was adopted by a vote of 43 in favour (including Canada), five against (the Soviet bloc), and 10 abstentions. The Representatives of the Republic of Korea were invited to take their places with the Committee.

U.N. Objectives in Korea

One of the substantive draft resolutions submitted to the Committee was sponsored by the fifteen member states which had participated in the United Nations action in Korea and had attended the Geneva Conference. On November 11, these countries had transmitted to the Secretary-General a report on the Korean phase of that conference. The report pointed out that by June 15, they had concluded that further consideration of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose because the Communist Delegations would neither recognize the legitimacy of the United Nations mission in Korea nor accept a Korea unified on the basis of free elections under the supervision of an international agency acceptable to the United Nations. The resolution called for the Assembly to approve this report, to reaffirm that the United Nations objectives in Korea remained the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of Government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area, to express the hope that progress towards these objectives might be made soon and to request the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the Provisional Agenda for the next session. An Indian draft on the same lines, but not expressing approval of the report, was also tabled.

The Soviet Delegation sponsored two resolutions, one asking the Assembly to convene in the nearest future a conference of the states concerned to settle the Korean problems and the other, which would have resulted in the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). It subsequently withdrew the former.

On December 8, the Political Committee adopted the 15-power resolution by a vote of 50 in favour (including Canada), five against (the Soviet bloc), with four abstentions. The Indian Delegation withdrew its draft. The Soviet

resolution concerning UNCURK was rejected by five votes in favour (the Soviet bloc), 51 against (including Canada), with one abstention. On December 11, the General Assembly meeting in plenary approved the 15-power resolution by a vote which followed the pattern set in Committee.

West New Guinea

On November 23 the Political Committee began the debate on the West New Guinea item. It had for consideration a resolution sponsored by the Indonesian Delegation calling on the parties to the dispute to "resume negotiations as provided for by the Round Table Conference Agreement". This dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the status of West New Guinea turns on the interpretation of the Round Table Conference Agreement, signed at The Hague in 1949, which noted that a dispute existed and provided for negotiations to take place between the parties. Although negotiations were carried on until 1952, it was not found possible to reconcile the conflicting views of the Dutch and Indonesians. In the First Committee the Canadian Delegation spoke against the Indonesian resolution and *inter alia* made the suggestion that the present dispute, being largely a legal one concerned with the interpretation of an agreement, might be referred to the International Court of Justice rather than to the General Assembly. This resolution was withdrawn, however, after a new resolution calling on the parties to continue their endeavours to find a solution to the dispute, sponsored by eight countries, including India, obtained the required two-thirds majority in Committee.

The Canadian Delegation abstained in the Committee vote on this resolution, solely because it had not had sufficient time to study it. When it was found upon examination that it contained the same objectionable implications as the original Indonesian resolution, the Canadian abstention was changed to a negative vote in plenary on December 10. In a part by part vote, none of the parts received a two-thirds majority in plenary, with the result that the resolution as a whole was not carried.

Question of Captive U.S. Airmen

On December 4, the United States Delegation requested the inscription on the General Assembly agenda of an item concerning the detention and imprisonment by Communist Chinese authorities of United States military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The 11 airmen, whose case gave rise to the item, were on a B-29 aircraft which was attacked 15 miles south of the Yalu River on January 12, 1953, and shot down. All of the men on the aircraft were in uniform and the aircraft itself bore United States Air Force markings.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, addressed the Assembly on December 8, when the inscription of the item on the agenda was under discussion. He said that the Armistice Agreement clearly covered these men and that communist spokesmen had made it clear that the agreement applied to prisoners accused of crimes. He recalled the need to protect the interests of prisoners and the previous General Assembly discussion and Armistice negotiations to this end. He said that the action of the Chinese communists in sentencing the U.S. airmen served only to increase international tension and to make difficult the solution of outstanding issues. The Soviet representatives

in the Assembly supported the Communist Chinese action and maintained that the 11 men were rightly convicted of espionage in the courts.

A resolution which was sponsored by a number of countries with forces in Korea, including Canada, was adopted by the Assembly on December 10, by 47 votes for, seven abstentions and five votes against. The resolution declared the detention and imprisonment of United Nations Command personnel to be a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and requested the Secretary-General to seek the release of personnel so detained. In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, left for Peking on December 30 to discuss this matter with the Communist Chinese authorities.

Two Soviet Items Concerning China

In the course of the Assembly session, the Soviet Union placed on the agenda two items concerning China. The first item dealt with alleged acts of aggression against the Peoples' Republic of China and the responsibility of the United States Navy for those acts. The Soviet Delegation submitted a resolution which was strongly anti-American and propagandist in tone. The resolution was considered in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and after a short discussion, it was rejected by five votes in favour, 39 (including Canada) against seven abstentions. One paragraph of the preamble concerning the possibility of the reduction of international tension received considerably more favourable votes.

The second item was a complaint of the violation of the freedom of navigation in the China Seas. This was also discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee which adopted a resolution introduced by the United States, Cuba and the Philippines referring the documents of the case to the International Law Commission. This was adopted by 35 votes (including Canada) in favour, five against and 15 abstentions.

In both cases, the plenary Assembly endorsed the decisions of the Committee.

Cyprus

On December 15 and 17 the General Assembly dealt with the Cyprus item which had been proposed by the Government of Greece.* In the First Committee New Zealand introduced a resolution by which the Assembly would decide "not to consider further" this issue which had already had undesirable consequences on the relations between Greece and the United Kingdom and between Turkey and Greece. Briefly stated, the New Zealand argument was that the matter should not be considered further because no benefit but much harm might result from a full-dress debate by the Assembly.

Colombia and El Salvador proposed an amendment which in effect recognized that "for the time being" it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on Cyprus. This amendment was accepted by the majority of the Committee, and the New Zealand resolution passed by a large majority. In plenary

* *External Affairs* for November 1954 reviews the inscription of the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the ninth session.

session the vote was fifty in favour, none against, with eight abstentions (Australia, Chile, South Africa and the Soviet bloc).

Notwithstanding its procedural nature, the debate afforded an opportunity for the delegations immediately concerned and others to express their views on the Cyprus issue. In explanatory statements on December 17, both the United Kingdom and Greek delegates expressed satisfaction about the outcome of the Assembly proceedings. The former hailed the vote on the procedural resolution as a victory for common sense which supported the United Kingdom view that a full-scale debate could achieve no useful purpose and could only serve to damage the free world; the Greek representative declared that the adoption of the resolution on Cyprus meant that the United Nations recognized the issue as an international problem and that if nothing were done to implement the Cypriots' right of self-determination, the question would be reintroduced in the United Nations.

Canada voted with the majority in favour of the amendment and the main resolution. In a very brief intervention the Canadian representative said that what he had heard during the debate "only served to confirm" the arguments which had prompted the Canadian Delegation to vote against the inscription of the Cyprus item on the Assembly agenda.

Morocco and Tunisia

The Tunisian and Moroccan questions were discussed for the first time at the seventh session of the General Assembly in 1951 and since then have been included, as separate items, in the agendas of the successive sessions. A number of African and Asian states had shown an increasing interest in the cause of self-government for Morocco and Tunisia, and disturbances in the two French Protectorates induced them to submit the question to the attention of the United Nations. From the start the French contended that the Assembly was debarred from considering these questions under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, and French Delegations have been absent when either question has been discussed.

Tunisian Question

The first resolution on this question was adopted by the Assembly in 1952. It was the result of a compromise between conflicting tendencies, one denying the right to interfere and the other suggesting a Committee of good offices. The resolution expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government in Tunisia, and appealed to the parties to refrain from any action likely to aggravate tension. In 1953, the General Assembly failed to adopt a resolution.

This year the question came up for discussion in the First Committee on December 16 against a background of considerable progress towards self-government. The Tunisian Nationalist groups had accepted the proposals made by the French Government for internal autonomy as an intermediary step, while France was to retain its authority and control over defence and foreign affairs. A new Tunisian government had been formed and negotiations with the French authorities were well under way. A decree of 1938 declaring the nationalistic Neo Destour Party illegal had been revoked. Under promises of amnesty both by the Tunisian and French authorities, the *fellaghas* who

had been causing considerable trouble had started to turn over their arms. The French Prime Minister, in a speech to the General Assembly on November 22, had refused to admit that there was no solution and had reiterated his faith in the future of a liberal policy of mutual understanding and political, economic and social progress.

Under these circumstances, it was apparent that a discussion at the United Nations could not be useful and a resolution calling for the postponement of the consideration of the item was tabled by the Afro-Asian Delegations. After some delegations had suggested that no resolution at all be adopted, and others that any words implying criticism be dropped, a resolution for postponement which noted with satisfaction that the negotiations were taking place and expressed confidence that the negotiations would bring about a satisfactory solution was adopted in plenary by a vote of 54 in favour (including Canada), none against and three abstentions.

Moroccan Question

In 1952 Canada voted in favour of a resolution expressing the hope that both parties would continue negotiations with a view to developing free political institutions.

Again in 1953, the question of Morocco was discussed at the Assembly against a troubled background. The Sultan, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, had been deposed as the spiritual and temporal leader of Morocco, and had been replaced by Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa. An atmosphere of suspicion prevailed in Morocco and the authorities had resorted to severe police measures. In the Assembly, a number of African and Asian delegations failed to obtain support for a resolution recommending complete independence within a limited time, the removal of oppressive measures and the establishment of democratic institutions. A milder Bolivian resolution recommending the development of free political institutions failed in plenary to obtain a two-thirds majority vote. When the question was discussed this year at the Assembly, circumstances had changed. M. Mendès-France had proposed reforms which included the progressive management by the Moroccans of their own affairs and the establishment of local assemblies with authority over economic and social matters to be followed later by the creation of central elected assemblies. All reforms were to be achieved on recommendations from round-table conferences to be attended by French and Moroccan representatives. In the course of the debate at the Assembly, the African and Asian delegations, while declaring that they had no desire to create trouble for France, asked for the return of the former Sultan and the recognition of Moroccan independence and sovereignty. The resolution which they first introduced recommended negotiations between the "true representatives" of the Moroccan people and the French Government. However, they later submitted a new text under which the Assembly, noting that negotiations between France and Morocco would be initiated, decided to postpone for the time being the further consideration of the question. The resolution was adopted in Committee by a vote of 39 in favour, 15 against and four abstentions (including Canada). When the matter came up for discussion in plenary, the Dominican Republic submitted an amendment expressing confidence that a satisfactory solution would be achieved. The resolution, as amended, was approved by a vote of 55 in favour, including Canada, none against, and four abstentions.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Speech from the Throne

Delivering the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Second Session of the Twenty-Second Parliament on January 7, 1955, the Governor General said in Part:

Since you last met, the people of Canada have been given an opportunity of extending once more an affectionate welcome to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother. They have also had the pleasure of greeting again the consort of our Sovereign, the Duke of Edinburgh, who came to attend the British Empire and Commonwealth Games held in Vancouver during the summer and to visit northern parts of Canada.

While there is hopeful evidence that the increasing strength of the free world has lessened the likelihood of aggression, the terrible destruction that war would bring to North America and indeed to all mankind has been magnified by the increase in the number and effectiveness of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.

My Ministers are convinced that, while the resources of diplomacy must never be neglected in the search for peace, the efforts of the free nations in building their deterrent forces must be maintained. To this end, Canada was represented at the London and Paris Conferences which formulated an alternative to the European Defence Community and provided for the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. You will be asked to approve the agreements reached at those meetings.


Our country continues to give full support to the United Nations. The Canadian delegation took an important part in the deliberations of the recent meeting of the General Assembly in New York. It is earnestly hoped that the adoption of the resolution on disarmament introduced in the Political Committee by the Canadian delegation may lead to agreement on an effective system of international safeguards.

While no final settlement has been reached in Korea, the lessening of the threat of renewed aggression in that area has made possible the withdrawal of a substantial portion of the Canadian forces.

At the invitation of the Geneva Conference Canada has accepted the heavy responsibility of serving on the Armistice Commissions which have been formed to supervise the restoration of peace in the Associated States of Indo-China.

Last autumn our nation was the host at the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan. You will be asked to approve Canada's continued participation in the Plan as well as in the United Nations' Technical Assistance Programme.

A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers will be held in London at the end of this month to consider a number of problems affecting the peoples



—NFB

SECOND SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND PARLIAMENT OPENS

His Excellency the Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, delivered the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the new session of Parliament. Seated at his right is the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Louis S. St-Laurent, and on the left is the Leader of the Government in the Senate, the Honourable William Ross Macdonald.

of this great association of nations. My Prime Minister plans to attend this conference.

During the summer arrangements were completed to permit the navigational facilities of the St. Lawrence River to be enlarged and a hydro-electric project to be undertaken in the International Rapids Section.

Work on these two projects has already begun and my Ministers are convinced the stimulus to the national economy resulting from their construction will be shared in all parts of the country.

. . . Amendments to the Electricity and Fluid Exportation Act and a measure to control works which affect the normal flow of rivers which cross the international boundary will be proposed for the purpose of ensuring that natural resources are developed in the best interests of the Canadian public.

You will be asked to consider a measure to implement a convention between Canada and the United States relating to fisheries research on the Great Lakes.

. . . You will be asked to approve a convention signed by the members of the International Civil Aviation Organization which fixes the responsibility for damage caused to third parties by foreign aircraft . . .

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

Issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, on December 31, 1954

The year now ended has been an eventful one for those engaged in the search for peace and security.

During 1954 there have been important successes. There have also been days when the western democracies have had to face disappointments and setbacks. More serious and disturbing than the actual disappointments themselves, however, is the lack of cohesion that they have sometimes revealed between the democracies. On occasions during the past year the essential unity of our partnership, on which the security of the free world rests, has been threatened by tendencies of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic to find for frustration and failure an easy release in mutual recrimination and exasperation.

There have been days, during 1954, when many in the free world have been disquieted by fears that governments might be provoked into hasty or ill-considered action with results which would inevitably commit us all. Others have feared that we might be lulled into an unrealistic and dangerous complacency of the kind that proved so costly to Europe in the 1930's.

Need for Unity Essential

Meanwhile the steadily increasing power of weapons and the advancing techniques for their delivery have made the prospect of war more terrifying and, to prevent it, unity, calm, and steady strength more essential than ever.

A few months ago, Sir Winston Churchill pictured us today as from time to time "peering around the rim of hell". Certainly there have been moments during the past twelve months when a consideration of international issues has involved more than a glance in that direction. No one can truthfully assert that we have yet achieved a situation of international order and confidence where this hell of a thermonuclear war is unthinkable.

It is salutary, therefore, to be reminded of the dangers that we face: that of disunity on the one hand, which could lead without physical hostilities to defeat in the cold war; and that of the outbreak of cataclysmic destruction which could come either through miscalculation or through deliberate aggression.

We can, however, take comfort from the fact that the critical periods through which we have passed during the year now ended have proved, on the whole, sobering, rather than shattering to our coalition. Where there have been set-backs, these have been accepted and plans made to recover from them. As the year ends, our coalition for peace seems, I think, stronger than it was at the beginning. We are learning to live with the situation that exists, without panic but without illusions.

There have also, we must not forget, been significant successes during the year. In Korea, though it has not proved possible to advance from truce to a political agreement for peace, the armistice has been maintained and a withdrawal of United Nations troops, including Canadian, has begun. Agreement was reached at Geneva last summer which stopped the fighting in Indochina. The settlement there has involved heavy new responsibilities for Canada. To assist in the difficult task of pacifying that area, Canada was asked, with India and Poland, to undertake the onerous and complex duties of membership on three International Supervisory Commissions. These responsibilities were certainly not sought by us but we could not refuse them.

And so today, Canadians in the service of their country and of peace are seeing the old year out and the new year in not only in diplomatic missions throughout the world, not only in garrisons and airfields in Western Europe and outposts on hilltops in Korea, but also in patrols along the jungle paths of Indochina.

Another important Asian development during the past year was the decision of a number of countries located in or with particular historic interests in South-East Asia, to develop in SEATO collective defence arrangements somewhat analogous to those developed in NATO for the North Atlantic region.

Equally important, a group of South Asian countries, which has come to be known as the Colombo powers, has also met to consider the contribution which they can make to peace in that area.

The further development and extension of membership in the Colombo Plan for economic development of that region is also noteworthy. We were happy to be host in Ottawa in the autumn to Ministers from Colombo Plan countries at their annual consultative meeting.

Association of Germany with NATO

In Europe the most important political events in the international field have been connected with the plan, worked out at conferences in London and Paris in the early autumn, for the association of a free, democratic, sovereign Germany with NATO and the Western European Union. The programme of debates in our various capitals, on the ratification of these arrangements, has called forth from the Kremlin a remarkable mixture of blandishments and threats; of "sticks and carrots". Their obstructive purpose is obvious and it is to be hoped it will not be achieved.

This time last year we were still wondering to what extent the new masters of the Soviet

Union proposed to follow in the footsteps of the old. During the year we learned that there were to be some interesting and important variations in tactics, although in strategy and in the basic aims of policy Mr. Malenkov and his associates do not appear thus far at least to have abandoned the dangerous paths of Marshal Stalin.

Until recently we have had to face a heavy-handed Soviet policy of intimidation and threats. This has often had the useful result of consolidating the western world in resisting crude Soviet demands. It seems that now the men in the Kremlin are becoming more astute, and may be seeking to undermine democratic unity and to sap our strength by gestures for what they call peaceful co-existence⁷.

Perhaps this adventure of Moscow into more beguiling tactics is an acknowledgement on their part that the West was not to be intimidated. It is to be hoped that it will soon be realized also that we are not to be cajoled by words alone.

What we must still hope and work for, is a realization on the part of the Soviet leaders that words divorced from deeds will not do; that while we are neither to be frightened nor lulled into an abandonment of policy or principle, we are always prepared to consider at the conference table or through the normal diplomatic channels any legitimate and sincere proposal from them which might strengthen peace and security in the world.

Prepared to Consider Sincere Proposals

It would be dangerous for the West not to be prepared for deceit, but it would be stupid not to take advantage of every reasonable opportunity for sincere negotiation. We cannot, even if we wanted to, wipe out our memories of Soviet obstruction to the humanitarian work of economic assistance since the end of the war; nor of the U.S.S.R.'s more open and forceful activity in the Berlin blockade; nor of its expansion and the overthrow of liberty all over Eastern Europe. But though we have learned to be cautious, we must never forget that the ultimate goal that we must continue to seek must involve not only

coexistence, but the constructive co-operation, of all men.

Throughout the year, as previously, the United Nations has remained the basis of Canada's policy for seeking with other states solutions to international problems, just as NATO has been the foundation of our policy for collective defence.

Apart from these larger associations, we have had occasion more than once during the year in Canada to appreciate the value of our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, an important part of which is its role in facilitating close and friendly relations with new democracies in Asia.

We have also had cause during the year to be thankful for the good neighbourhood between the United States and Canada, and for the continuing closeness and friendliness of our relations with France and the other free countries of Western Europe.

Some Progress Made

The year now ending has seen final solutions to very few of the problems that we face. But in several of them it has taken us forward, and kept open the road to further advances toward genuine peace. It has seen at least the partial realization of some of the plans and hopes of earlier years. These very achievements have, of course, brought with them new problems on which we must now set to work in the hope that a few years hence we may look back without reproaching ourselves for lost opportunities or lack of foresight. In world affairs it is rarely possible to say that an issue is settled and the books closed. Diplomacy is a continuing process; with the end of one problem often becoming the beginning of another. Our purpose should be to ensure that the process at least moves in the right direction! I think that in 1954 we have on the whole been doing that.

May 1955 bring to all of us real happiness, and may we make during the next twelve months genuine and steady progress towards an assured peace on earth to all men of goodwill.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. D. S. Cole was appointed Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, effective November 1, 1954. Mr. Cole left Ottawa November 20, 1954.

Mr. H. F. B. Feaver was appointed Canadian Minister to Denmark, effective November 1, 1954. Mr. Feaver left Ottawa November 17, 1954.

Mr. P. E. Renaud was appointed Canadian Ambassador to Chile, effective November 15, 1954. Mr. Renaud left Ottawa November 24, 1954.

The Hon. R. W. Mayhew, former Canadian Ambassador to Japan, retired from the diplomatic service effective November 23, 1954.

- Mr. R. B. Edmonds was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective November 26, 1954.
- Mr. A. A. Day was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective November 29, 1954.
- Mr. G. K. Grande was posted from home leave (Athens) to Ottawa, effective November 29, 1954.
- Mr. P. Dumas was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, effective December 18, 1954.
- Mr. J. R. Plourde was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective December 28, 1954.
- Mr. A. W. Mathewson was appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective December 1, 1954.



The Department regrets to announce the deaths of two members of the Service. Mr. J. H. Thurrott, Adviser to the Canadian Commissioner, Laos, was killed in an automobile accident in Vientiane on December 24, 1954; Mr. George F. Power died in Ottawa on January 8, 1955, after a brief illness.



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 54/46 — *Statement on Disarmament*, statement made on October 22, 1954, by the Canadian Permanent Representative, Mr. David Johnson, in the First Committee of the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.
- No. 54/47 — *The Challenge of Co-existence*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Economic Club, Detroit, Michigan, November 8, 1954.
- No. 54/48 — *United Nations Day*, statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, on United Nations Day, October 24, 1954.
- No. 54/49 — *Should Canada Recognize Red China?*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the "Peoples School", St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S., November 7, 1954.
- No. 54/50 — *International Co-operation in Developing the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*, a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, November 5, 1954.
- No. 54/52 — Statements by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, on the article "Expanding the United Nations Community" by Dr. van Wagenen, in the November 1954 issue of the "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science".
- No. 54/55 — *Reflections on Neighbourhood*, an address to the Central Council of Canadian Red Cross Society, at Toronto, Ontario, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Arnold Smith, on November 22, 1954.
- No. 54/56 — *Christian Foundations for World Order*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Assembly of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Boston, Mass., December 2, 1954.
- No. 54/58 — *The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, at a meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at Geneva, December 6, 1954.
- No. 54/59 — *Complaint of Detention and Imprisonment of United Nations Military*

Personnel in Violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made

in a plenary session of the General Assembly on December 8, 1954.

No. 54/61 — *New Year's Message* by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, December 31, 1954.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 54/51 — *Canadian Mining Outlook*, a speech by the Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Mr. Marc Boyer, to the American Mining Congress, at San Francisco, September 23, 1954.

Lesage, to the Canadian Club of Toronto, November 22, 1954.

No. 54/53 — An address by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, to the Humanities Research Council of Canada, at Ottawa, November 19, 1954.

No. 54/57 — *The Pattern of Canadian Investment and Trade*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Investment Bankers Association Convocation, at Hollywood, Florida, December 2, 1954.

No. 54/54 — *The Trend is to the North*, an address by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean

No. 54/60 — *Canada's Economy in 1954*, a statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, issued on December 26, 1954.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Second Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. A/2719. New York, 1954. 121 pp. \$1.50. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 16.

Korean Reconstruction Agency). 459 pp. (Printed April 1954).

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Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1953. ST/STAT/SER.G/4. New York, August 1954. 481 pp. \$4.50. Sales No.: 1954:XVII:3. (Prepared by the Statistical Office of the U.N., Department of Economic Affairs).

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency—Financial Report and Accounts for the year ended 30 June 1954 and Report of Board of Auditors. A/2757. New York, 1954. 17 pp. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 6 C.

ICJ—*Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*. "I.C.J. Pleadings, United Nations Administrative Tribunal". 451 pp. Sales No.: 126. (bilingual).

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accounts for the financial year ended 30 June A/2760. New York, 1954. G.A.O.R.: Ninth 1954 and Report of the Board of Auditors. Session, Supplement No. 6 B. 19 pp.

Some problems in the Organization and Administration of Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field. ST/TAA/M/7, 28 July 1954. (U.N. Technical Assistance Administration). 87 pp. Sales No.: 1954.II.H.1 (Documents selected from the material prepared for a U.N. Seminar held in Ragoon from March 15th to 26th, 1954, under the Auspices of ECAFE, the UNTAA, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences).

International Co-operation in a Latin American Development Policy. E/CN.12/359. New York, September 1954. 147 pp. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1954.II.G.2.

ILO—*Vocational Guidance in France*. Geneva, 1954. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 39). 134 pp. \$1.00.

An Economic Programme for Korean Reconstruction (Prepared for the United Nations

Year Book of Labour Statistics 1954 (Fourteenth Issue). Geneva, 1954. 397 pp. \$5.00 (English-French-Spanish).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

Adult Education Towards Social and Political Responsibility. (UNESCO Institute for Education Publications, No. 1). 143 pp. 75 cents. UNESCO Institute for Education, Hamburg, 1953.

XVIIth International Conference on Public Education 1954. Paris 1954. 147 pp. \$1.25. IBE, Publication No. 159.

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The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Sociology, Social Psychology and Anthropology. (Teaching in the social Sciences). Paris, September 1954. 252 pp. \$1.75.

Culture and Human Fertility by Frank Lorimer and others. (Population and Culture Series). Paris, October 1954. 514 pp. \$4.50.

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WHO — *Seventh World Health Assembly*, Geneva, 4 to 21 May 1954. Resolutions and Decisions, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records, Committees, Minutes and Reports, Annexes. Geneva, November 1954. 512 pp. \$2.75. Official Records of the WHO, No. 55.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments relating to the legal status of Aliens (UNIDROIT — International Institute for the Unification of private law):

CANADA—ST/LSA/13, Rome February 1954. 134 pp.

AUSTRALIA—ST/LSA/11, Rome, April 1954. 77 pp.

NEW ZEALAND—ST/LSA/14, Rome, April 1954. 75 pp.

UNESCO CONFERENCE—REPORT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION

(Continued from page 18)

The Director-General and the Secretariat have the difficult assignment of attempting to reconcile the Conference's decision to remodel UNESCO's programme toward concentration on a few major projects and its approval of a large number of new activities. The Director-General will require strong support from member states who wish to see UNESCO established on a progressive and stable basis.

The next two years will be of great importance in the responsible development of UNESCO. It is by endeavouring to secure popular participation in its activities on a well-organized national basis that the Organization can probably acquire greater strength and stability.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
“.....	Commercial Secretary.....	Melbourne (83 William St.)
“.....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Austria.....	Minister (Absent).....	Vienna 1 (Strauchgasse 1)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Forescom Bldg.)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (35, rue de la Science)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
“.....	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, Rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	High Commissioner.....	Colombo (6 Gregory's Rd., Cinnamon Gardens)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Avenida General Bulnes 129)
Colombia.....	Ambassador.....	Bogota (Edificio Faux, Avenida Jimenez de Quesada No. 7-25)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida Menocal No. 16)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krakovska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Trondhjems Plads No. 4)
Dominican Republic.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Ciudad Trujillo (Edificio Copello 410)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Calle El Conde)
Egypt.....	Ambassador.....	Cairo (6 Sharia Roustom, Garden City)
Finland.....	Minister (Absent).....	Helsinki (Borgmästarbrinken 3-C. 32)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris xvi (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Ambassador.....	Bonn (Zitelmann Strasse, 22)
“.....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Perthshire Block, Olympic Stadium (British Sector) B.A.O.R.2)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 avenue Vassilissis Sofias)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (28, 5a Avenida Sud)
Haiti.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Port-au-Prince (Route du Canape Vert, St. Louis de Turgeau)
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
“.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Indonesia.....	Ambassador.....	Djakarta (Djalan Budi Kemuliaan 6)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Israel.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Tel Aviv (Farmers' Bld., Dizengoff Rd.)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Bldg.)
Japan.....	Ambassador.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)
Lebanon.....	Minister (Absent).....	Beirut (Immeuble Alpha rue Clemenceau)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)
Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)

Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza, Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Ayala Bldg., Juan Luna St.)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (31 Ulica Katowika, Saska Kępa)
Portugal.....	Minister (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Lisbon (Avenida da Praia da Vitoria)
Singapore.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room F-3, Union Building)
Spain.....	Ambassador.....	Madrid (Edificio Espana, Avenida de José Antonio 88)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvägen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Ambassador.....	Berne (88 Kirchenfeldstrasse)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (Colonial Bldg.)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (Müdafaai Hukuk Caddesi, No. 19, Cankaya)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (Suite 65, Kerry Bldg., 238 Vermeulen St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Bldg.)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok)
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
“ “	Consul General.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Los Angeles (510 W. Sixth St.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	New Orleans (215 International Trade Mart)
“ “	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
“ “	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (443 Congress Street)
“ “	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Seattle (Tower Bldg., Seventh Avenue at Olive Way)
Uruguay.....	Ambassador (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Montevideo (Calle Colonia 1013, piso °7)
Venezuela.....	Ambassador.....	Caracas (2° Piso Edificio Pan-Ameri- can, Puente Urapal, Candelaria)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Proliterskih Brigada 69)
North Atlantic Council.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (Canadian Embassy)
*OEEC.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Representative.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
“ “	Permanent Delegate..... Deputy Permanent Delegate	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Canadians in Indochina*

(Notes by an Eye-Witness)

IN INDOCHINA today some 160 Canadians are doing their best to help bring peace and stability to that troubled peninsula. They are to be found in Viet Nam, in Laos and in Cambodia, for it is misleading to lump these states together as Indochina. The three states differ in race, in size, in history and in the nature of the problems that confront them. How did these Canadians come to be where they are, in an area with which Canada has had little direct connection? Living conditions and the climate are difficult, the work is hard and at times dangerous; the Department of External Affairs mourns the death of one of its able young officers, J. H. Thurrott, killed in a jeep accident on December 24 in Vientiane.

The Geneva Agreements

On July 20, three Agreements were signed in Geneva, after long negotiations, bringing an end to hostilities in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Just as the problems facing the three countries are different, so the Agreements are different, but a good many provisions are common to the three; the most important of these relates to the way in which the Agreements are to be carried out. In each case, the two parties to the dispute—the recent belligerents—were given the responsibility of executing the Agreement, and an International Commission was set up to supervise the proper execution by the parties of its provisions. The Commission's job was to observe, to supervise, to mediate, to interpret and in general to help the two parties iron out any difficulties that might arise. This is where Canada comes in.

As noted above, the Agreements were signed on July 20. On July 21 the Canadian Government received an invitation from the co-Chairmen of the Geneva conference, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, to accept membership on the three international commissions. Canada had not taken part in the Geneva Conference on Indochinese problems, and certainly did not seek the heavy responsibility of assisting in supervising the settlement. But things by then had reached the point where the Agreements had been signed, stating baldly "An International Commission shall be set up . . . It shall be composed of representatives of the following states: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India."

The Department of External Affairs was thus under an urgent obligation to provide the Government with material on which to base a decision, and in particular to find out what duties and responsibilities would be involved if Canada became a member of the three international commissions. The texts of the agreements were not yet available. A good deal of hasty telegraphing to and fro produced these, and a careful study of them was made. On July 28, a week after the invitation had been received, the Government announced its decision to accept membership on the Commissions. It is not proposed to comment here on the problems of policy involved, but some account of the

* See also "External Affairs", August 1954, p. 257, and September 1954, p. 299.

practical problems which had to be dealt with quickly may convey an idea of the complexity of the operation.

The matter was of great urgency, and everything had to be done quickly. While the Canadian Government was considering the invitation, the Government of India announced its acceptance and further informed us that, as the country providing the chairmen of the three commissions, it was prepared to call a preliminary conference in New Delhi on August 1, if Canada and Poland decided to accept membership. The Department of External Affairs, therefore, while clearly having to avoid any action which would seem to anticipate the decision of the Government, had to be ready to move rapidly should it be decided that Canada would send representatives to the international commissions.

A study of the Geneva agreements made it evident that the bulk of those sent to Indochina would have to be provided by the armed forces, particularly by the army. The chief demand for personnel arose from provisions in the agreements specifying a number of points at which there would be fixed inspection teams composed of equal numbers of officers from Canada, India and Poland. An unspecified number of mobile inspection teams was also required by each agreement. Only the army could supply and maintain the Canadian members of these teams. For its part, External Affairs would have to provide a number of foreign service officers and clerks to serve as advisers and as staff for the Commissioners, and would have to organize and administer the various headquarters offices. Both National Defence and External Affairs began considering immediately where they could hope to obtain these officers, if needed. There was also the more immediate problem of designating representatives who would be ready to go to the preliminary conference at New Delhi; this meant among other things that they must be inoculated against enough diseases, if not to protect their health fully, at least to comply with international quarantine requirements.

New Delhi Conference

On July 28 the Government announced its decision to accept the onerous but honourable responsibility and that evening Mr. R. M. Macdonnell took off for New Delhi with two officers from National Defence, to assist the High Commissioner at the preparatory conference. In New Delhi, these were joined by the military attaché from Tokyo who had been hurriedly assigned to the Indochina operation for an indefinite period, so that when the talks opened on August 1, a well-balanced delegation was ready to start work. It is always interesting to compare efficiency of the democracies' procedures with those of the countries beyond the curtain. While Canada had people from Ottawa at New Delhi for the opening meeting, the Polish representatives from Warsaw did not turn up for several days, and Poland was in consequence represented by its Ambassador in New Delhi. As he had little in the way of instructions and was not in a position to take decisions it was necessary to postpone decisions until the arrival of the Warsaw contingent, though this did not result in any real delay.

The task before the New Delhi conference was primarily an administrative or housekeeping job. It was known what the three international commissions were to do, since this was clearly defined in the Geneva Agreements.

But none of the Canadians or the others knew anything very precise about such things as working and living conditions, communications, transport and so on in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The orderly way of proceeding would have been to send an advance party to investigate conditions on the spot, discuss administrative questions with the local authorities, and to report their recommendations. This would at least have provided a few facts. But there was no time for such leisurely methods. The Agreements called for each commission to begin its work on August 11, ten days after the opening of the New Delhi conference; and even this fact was not clearly established until after the New Delhi talks began. Some people had interpreted the Agreements to mean that since there were various dates for the cease-fire—ranging from July 27 to August 11—so the commissions would come into being on successive dates. A closer examination of the texts revealed, however, that all three commissions must be open for business on August 11, at 8.00 a.m. Peking mean time.

What had to be done in New Delhi, therefore, was to construct a rather elastic administrative framework, which—it was hoped—could be made to fit whatever differing conditions might be encountered. The three delegations, Canadian, Indian and Polish, worked in complete harmony on these practical problems. Tentative establishments were drawn up for the secretariats, and for the national delegations to each commission. Rough tables of accommodation required for offices and living quarters were prepared, even although what might be available was not known. Transport and communications and security were considered together with all the manifold administrative problems that must be solved if the communications were to work properly. Most of this could be only guesswork, but it represented the best guesses of experienced foreign service and military officers, and in the result it proved a very useful basis for the administrative structure of the commissions.

Administrative Plans Drafted

After five days' hard and very hot work, the administrative plans were roughly sketched out, and it was time to move on to Indochina. It had long since become clear that the three governments would scarcely be able to have their eventual commissioners on hand on August 11; time was required to appoint people and to extricate them from their present jobs. In fact, it would be a considerable achievement if there could be on hand a few people at each of the headquarters—Hanoi for Viet Nam, Vientiane for Laos and Phnom Penh for Cambodia—on August 11. The problem was least acute for the Indians, who were relatively close to the area of operations; the Poles and ourselves had very few people in this far-eastern region.

Despite various difficulties the three commissions were established on the required date. For the Canadian task, a group of army officers who came by air on short notice from Korea provided much of the initial strength. In Cambodia, Brigadier Morton, later to serve as Senior Military Adviser in Laos with the rank of Major-General, was named to act as Commissioner for the time being with a staff of two army officers. To Laos were sent two more army officers with Mr. Frank Ballachey, a Foreign Service Officer posted to Indochina as a Political Adviser, acting as Commissioner. Mr. Macdonnell was designated to serve as Canadian Commissioner in Viet Nam and started work with two army officers and the added luxuries of a senior clerk from External Affairs and an NCO. The Indian Air Force flew the Commissioners and staffs



—Government of India

INDOCHINA SUPERVISORY COMMISSION MEETS

Members of the International Armistice Supervisory Commission for Indochina held a preliminary meeting in New Delhi in August. Present at the inaugural meeting, left to right: Air Commodore H. H. C. Rutledge, Canada; Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada; the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. E. M. Reid; Mr. Jerzey Grudzinski, Polish Ambassador to India; Mr. H. Joreszek, First Secretary, Embassy of Poland; Sri Badahur Singh, Conference Secretary; Sri I. S. Chopra, Chief of Protocol; Sri M. K. Vellodi, Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Sri R. K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary; Sri V. K. Krishna Menon; the Prime Minister, Sri Jawaharlal Nehru; Sri N. R. Pillai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs; Sri S. Dutt, Secretary, Commonwealth Relations; and Sri T. N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

from New Delhi to Indochina, and on August 11 the three commissioners held their first meetings.

What does an international commission do when it hangs out its shingle and declares itself open for business? At least in Indochina it hopes that its collective strength and digestive capacities will hold out from one day to the next. The following observations on activities during the first few days of the International Commission for Viet Nam will indicate the number and variety of things that had to be done, and may suggest that diplomacy is not invariably an ivory-tower occupation.

At 8.00 a.m. on August 11, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement, the International Commission for Viet Nam held its first meeting. The locale was the one available public room in the Hotel Metropole in Hanoi, and the Commission sat down a little self-consciously under the eye of the press to announce its entry into the world of international affairs. It went through various formalities, such as adopting provisional rules of procedure which had been drawn up and agreed on in New Delhi; and it adjourned. Not much of a day's work, perhaps, but this was only the beginning.

In order to waste no time, the International Commission had arranged a meeting that morning with the Joint Commission, and this may require a word

of explanation. Under each of the Geneva Agreements, the two parties, whether in Viet Nam, Laos or Cambodia, were made responsible for the execution of the Agreement, and a Joint Commission representing the two sides was set up in each country to work out details of such things as re-groupment of forces and the exchange of prisoners of war. Thus in Viet Nam there was a Joint Commission representing the high command of the forces of the French Union and the high command of the forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam—familiarily known in International Commission circles as the DR and often referred to as the Viet Minh. To reach the headquarters of this Joint Commission, the International Commission had to use no fewer than three forms of transportation. First there was a trip by car to one of the Hanoi airports. Then there was a flight of about twenty minutes by light aircraft, flown by the French Air Force, Canadian Beavers, incidentally, to a pasture in a demilitarized zone. Finally came a ride in brand new Russian-built jeeps belonging to the Democratic Republic; in the days that followed the Canadians got to know every pot-hole in that five-mile jeep ride—got to know them well if not favourably.

In passing it might be observed that the headquarters of the Joint Commission displayed an interesting mingling of oriental and occidental influences. The huts in which business was conducted had half-walls of woven straw and roofs of corrugated iron. The combination did little to mitigate the effects of the tropical sun beating down on a shadeless patch of the Tonkin delta. Further, the conference tables were covered with a singularly abrasive type of army blanket; and there for several sweating hours on that first day the Canadians and their colleagues waded into the problems which the International Commission had to take up with the Joint Commission.

Help Arrives

On getting back to the hotel in Hanoi for a very late lunch, the Canadians found that welcome reinforcements had arrived. Mr. T. R. G. Fletcher, the Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, had arrived from the north for briefing on his way to fill in as Commissioner in Cambodia for a month; and two more army officers had turned up from the south to make themselves useful. There was never any advance notice of arrivals in those days, because of the almost paralytic slowness of the local telegraph service. Instead of the rest after lunch which is almost obligatory in such climates if health is to be maintained, a daily delegation meeting was held at which reports were made by each member on what he had been able to achieve; and decisions were taken as to what was to be done next. This delegation meeting was followed by the International Commission's second meeting of the day and, when it concluded as the afternoon began to wane, a stream of callers descended—a group of Canadian Redemptorist fathers come to pay their respects, the British Consul, two press correspondents, one from the United States and one from France, and finally the head of the French liaison mission and a member of his staff.

The problems of getting organized,—finding offices, building up secretariats, arranging adequate communications, and so forth—were formidable. They were surmounted eventually—and in trying conditions of great heat. In the early days the Commissions got through their business with a minimum of organization and a maximum of improvisation—brilliant or otherwise—made possible by hard work and a co-operative attitude on the part of all national

delegations. Not only did they have to grapple with the administrative problems mentioned, but there were substantive questions arising out of the Geneva Agreements that had to be dealt with. Moreover, it was not enough merely to get the three headquarters into working shape. It was essential to get the fixed and mobile inspection teams on the ground as soon as possible.

While the few Canadians were battling with administrative and other problems in Indochina, the Department of National Defence at home in Ottawa was selecting officers for duty and arranging for them to be brought together, briefed and despatched to Indochina by air. As a result, on each of four successive days, from September 1 to 4, there arrived in Hanoi an RCAF North Star bringing a group of officers and much-needed supplies and equipment. Thanks to quick but careful planning and the smooth operations of the RCAF, Canada was the first of the powers serving on the Commissions to have a full complement of personnel for the inspection teams ready for duty in Indochina. In particular, the Canadians were far in advance of the Poles, who chose to send their officers by air only as far as Peking, transferring them there to trains running to a point north of the border between China and Viet Nam, and leaving them to make their way to Hanoi by motor transport over extremely indifferent roads. For some time they seemed to the Polish members of the Commission to have disappeared into the void.

It is not intended here to say a great deal about the work of the Commissions, much of it of a delicate nature, but something can be mentioned of the first problem to come before the Viet Nam Commission. The first problem is always a test, and if it is surmounted successfully, the way is easier in the future.

Prisoner-of-War Problem

Within a few days of its arrival in Hanoi, the International Commission was informed by the two sides that they were having difficulty in agreeing on methods of exchanging prisoners-of-war. By using its good offices informally, the Commission was able to get discussions resumed and the exchange proceeded. But within another ten days new difficulties arose and the two sides had reached a complete deadlock on how, when and where prisoners were to be exchanged and in what numbers. Each side had a long list of complaints against the other, and each charged the other with being unreasonable. It was not surprising that there should be difficulties. The release of prisoners-of-war gave rise to acute emotional and political tensions. The two sides had ceased fighting each other only a fortnight earlier and the atmosphere, not surprisingly, was edgy. The Joint Commission, which was dealing with the problem, was working long hours every day, in great heat and without proper rest. In such circumstances, it was understandable that friction should develop.

The International Commission had been created to deal with just such a question as this. It had no powers of enforcement and could issue no orders. It had to rely on its moral authority and by mediation, persuasion and recommendation, to find a solution which the two sides would accept as fair and just. On a given day in August the International Commission spent the morning going over such facts and figures as the two sides had presented, discussing possible ways of getting around the difficulties. In the afternoon, the Commission went to the headquarters of the Joint Commission and heard each side

state its case separately. This was a fairly lengthy business, for each side had a great deal to say and further time was required for translation into and out of Vietnamese, French and English.

When the two sides had finished arguing their cases, the International Commission held a private meeting to analyze further the causes of friction and to see whether proposals could be framed that would be fair and would at the same time satisfy each side that its particular worries could be met. As the evidence and the arguments were reviewed, the outlines of a solution began to emerge, drafts on various points were hastily scribbled in various hands, and revised until they seemed satisfactory. At length the two sides were called in and the Commission's proposals were put to them by the Chairman. After brief study they were accepted, and an awkward corner had been turned. As a result of a 5½ hour meeting—from 3.30 till 9.00—a deadlock had been broken and the two sides expressed their appreciation to the International Commission for doing what they themselves had been quite unable to do. The Commission acquired both prestige and self-confidence in the process.

Change-over of Hanoi

Another good example, a little later, of the role of the Commissions occurred at the time of the handing over of Hanoi from the French Union side to the side of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The agreement provided that the French Union forces were to withdraw from Hanoi by a given date and the two sides got together and worked plans. The International Commission of course was not given the responsibility for putting the plans into effect. That responsibility rested clearly with the two sides. It was for the International Commission to supervise, to observe, to mediate if necessary and to try to smooth over difficulties. For the transfer of Hanoi, an extremely detailed plan was worked out by the two sides and with very little reference to the Commission as far as the purely military aspects were concerned.


There were some difficulties, however, with regard to the civil aspects. The two sides could not agree on how, for example, the handing over of public utilities should be managed, and there the commission was able to offer suggestions that were accepted by the two sides, and allowed for the handing over without any interruption of the water works, the power plant, and so on.

The change-over started early in the morning of October 9 and Hanoi was handed over sector by sector. The town had been divided into a great many sectors of perhaps four or five city blocks each. At a given moment, as laid down in the plan an officer from the D.R. and an officer from the French Union would get together. They checked their watches, their maps. The French officer would obtain a receipt and off he would go with his vehicles and a column of DR vehicles would move in. This took place throughout the day as the movement converged on the big bridge that crosses the Red River. By the end of the day the last French forces had moved out. While this was going on, the International Commission had a number of mobile inspection teams going through the city in white jeeps to be on hand if any difficulties should arise, and to indicate that in a sense the eyes of the world were on this exercise.

The members of the Commission themselves spent a good deal of time observing various stages of the transfer and were present when the French Union forces left the city. The change-over at Hanoi was perhaps the most

dramatic single incident in the early life of the International Commissions. It is not easy for two armies which have been fighting for eight years to work out a withdrawal of that size. The assistance of the Commission was available to the two sides in the negotiations and its teams were on hand to prevent difficulties if possible, or to smooth them out if necessary. The movement went off without any real friction or difficulty.

These notes have dealt largely with the Viet Nam Commission, but the Commissions in Laos and Cambodia were going through similar stages of growing pains, doing their best to get established, and at the same time to do the work for which they had been created. Everywhere the inspection teams were being set up as soon as accommodation could be found for them, often in remote, inaccessible and unhealthy locations. The Canadian officers serving on those inspection teams, despite living conditions which often were pretty formidable, went to work cheerfully and quickly to learn their jobs and to find the best ways of carrying them out. They used tact and judgment in meeting difficult problems and displayed those qualities of initiative and inventiveness which we like to think are characteristic of Canadians. They are doing a job of which this country can be proud, and in their remote, thankless but highly important responsibilities, they are only too apt to be forgotten.



—Fotobureau Friezer

FIRST SOD TURNED

The first sod on the site of the new Canadian Chancery at The Hague, the Netherlands was turned on January 25, 1955, by the two Netherlands Foreign Ministers, Mr. J. W. Beyen and Mr. J. M. A. H. Luns. The shovel used in the ceremony was made of Canadian aluminium. Above, left to right: Mr. Luns; the Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. T. A. Stone; and Mr. Beyen.

Canada and the United Nations

Freedom of Information

A draft convention on freedom of information was prepared as long ago as 1948 by the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information. The text was revised in 1951 by a special committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations which reported to the Economic and Social Council. Since that time, ECOSOC has not recommended any further action on the proposed convention. At the ninth session of the General Assembly, the subject was discussed in the Third Committee, which adopted a motion requesting the Economic and Social Council to formulate recommendations on the draft convention in time for the General Assembly to discuss them not later than at the eleventh session in 1956. Canada abstained on the motion.

At the same time, a resolution was tabled by the U.S.S.R. Delegation advocating the transfer to the United Nations of the responsibilities assigned to the League of Nations by the "International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace". Canada was not a party to this Convention, which was signed in 1936. After discussion, the motion was modified by an amendment asking the General Assembly to recommend that members which were parties to the Convention state "whether they wished" the transfer to be made. A further amendment, adopted against the vote of the Soviet Delegation, suggested the inclusion of a new article providing that each contracting party should not interfere with the reception, within its territory, of foreign radio broadcasts. The resolution thus amended was adopted without opposition, though some countries abstained, including the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Canada voted for these amendments and the resolutions and also concurred in the adoption of another resolution calling on the Secretary-General to assist member states in promoting freedom of information by rendering services which do not fall within the scope of objectives of existing technical assistance programmes. Canada's vote on this resolution was based on the understanding that no substantial increase of expenditure was involved. These three resolutions were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.

International Code of Ethics for Information Personnel

On December 16, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to seek the opinion of a number of information enterprises and national and international associations on the advisability of organizing an international non-governmental conference to prepare the final text of an International Code of Ethics for the Use of Information Personnel. According to the Secretary-General's report of August 16, 1954, the various enterprises and associations which favour the organization of such a conference do not appear to constitute a sufficiently representative group. Consequently the resolution adopted by the Third Committee and ratified by the General Assembly stated that no further action should be taken at the present time.

Economic Questions

General

At the ninth session, as in previous years, the Second Committee had under consideration a wide range of economic subjects, some of which had been reviewed by the Economic and Social Council subsequent to the eighth session. Discussion in the Second Committee revolved almost entirely around questions affecting economic progress in under-developed countries. The subjects considered included the question of the establishment of a special United Nations Fund for economic development, the establishment of an International Finance Corporation, United Nations technical assistance programmes, the international flow of private capital, the question of the establishment of a world food reserve, land reform, and United Nations reconstruction and relief programmes in Korea.

In the general debate on the question of economic development of under-developed countries, representatives of these countries pointed out that the rate of economic growth in the less developed parts of the world is not keeping pace with that of the wealthier areas. Considering this a dangerous situation, they stressed the need for outside capital, both public and private, to accelerate progress in under-developed areas. Spokesmen for industrialized and capital-exporting countries agreed that the problem of financing economic development in less developed areas is an important one. They pointed out, however, that there are practical limitations affecting the flow of both public and private capital to under-developed countries. Considerations such as defence, domestic economic development and the needs of dependent territories must be taken into account by the countries which are called upon to make the largest contributions to United Nations programmes. It was further pointed out that the main responsibility for development rests with the under-developed countries themselves, and that sound internal fiscal and administrative policies are of great assistance in attracting outside capital, either from governments or from private interests.

The statements of representatives of the Soviet bloc were on the whole restrained. One of their main objectives seemed to be to promote the idea of East-West trade and of trade between the Soviet countries and the under-developed countries. They were strong in their support of the technical assistance programmes.

Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)

At the eighth session the members of the United Nations had joined in a declaration that they stood ready to ask their peoples, when sufficient progress had been made in internationally supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings therefrom to an international fund, within the frame work of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developed countries. Consideration of this question at the ninth session resulted in the unanimous passage of a resolution which requested Mr. Scheyven, a past President of the Economic and Social Council, who had reported comments obtained from members since the eighth session, to prepare a further report giving "a full and precise picture of the form or forms, functions and responsibilities" which the Fund might have if established. Spokesmen for Canada and other industrialized countries (which had indicated in

their comments that they would not contribute to such a Fund at the present time) made it clear that they did not regard the resolution as giving Mr. Scheyven a mandate to draw up draft statutes for the proposed Fund. The Canadian spokesman pointed out that Canada is already making a substantial contribution to the development of under-developed countries through its subscription to the International Bank, through the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, and through capital and technical assistance under the Colombo Plan.

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

The proposed International Finance Corporation, which has also been under consideration in the United Nations for a considerable time, moved a stage closer to realization at the ninth session. The function of the Corporation would be to help to finance productive private enterprise in under-developed countries without the necessity of government guarantees. The Canadian Government has adopted a generally favourable attitude toward this proposal in the past. When it seemed likely (following an announcement last November that the United States Administration would support it) that adequate capital would be forthcoming, the Canadian Government reaffirmed through its representative at the United Nations that it was prepared to support the proposed Corporation.

In December, the General Assembly adopted, by 50 votes in favour, none opposed with five abstentions (Soviet bloc), a resolution requesting the International Bank to draw up draft statutes for the Corporation. In his statement on the resolution (which Canada co-sponsored) the Canadian representative indicated that the Canadian Government believes that the Corporation will fill an important gap in the existing machinery for financing economic development, and that it hopes that it will encourage a greater flow of private capital to under-developed countries. He expressed the belief that, in establishing the Corporation, there would be no need to set up new international machinery of an elaborate and costly kind and that the Corporation would be able to draw on the present managerial and technical staff of the International Bank. When the Bank has drawn up draft statutes and ascertained the degree of support which may be expected from member countries, it will make a further report to the Economic and Social Council which will probably report on the matter to the tenth session of the General Assembly. It is expected that contributions will be proportionate to the subscriptions of member countries to the International Bank.

Technical Assistance

The Second Committee's consideration of technical assistance matters covered both the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, which is controlled by the Economic and Social Council and financed through voluntary contributions from governments, and the "regular programmes", which are financed from the regular budgets of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. A considerable part of the general debate was devoted to discussion of administrative and financial aspects of the Expanded Programme, which had been under consideration in the Economic and Social Council. There was a general feeling that much progress had been made in promoting greater operating efficiency, that more remains to be done in this field, and that lines

along which the Economic and Social Council is working in this connection are sound. A resolution on administrative and financial aspects of the Expanded Programme was adopted unanimously. The general debate was essentially constructive and non-controversial and indicated broad support for the programme. In a brief statement in the course of the discussion the Canadian representative said that the Canadian Government believes that the United Nations programmes, as well as those under the Colombo Plan, are making a positive and fruitful contribution toward the improvement of living standards throughout the world.

At the pledging conference which followed the Canadian representative announced that it is the intention of the Canadian Government to seek Parliamentary approval of a contribution of \$1,500,000 for the 1955 Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. He added that an offer of this size by Canada was based on the assumption that contributions of other countries would be on a scale which would permit of an effective programme.

International Flow of Private Capital

After a relatively non-contentious debate the General Assembly passed two resolutions dealing with the international flow of private capital based on recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The first, which was passed by a vote of 48 in favour (including Canada), none against with 8 abstentions, calls upon countries seeking to attract private foreign capital and countries able to export capital to take steps to improve the investment climate and to stimulate the flow of private capital. The second, which was passed by a vote of 51 in favour, none against with five abstentions (Soviet bloc), requests the Secretary-General to continue his studies of double-taxation problems, particularly as they affect investments in under-developed countries.

World Food Reserve

The Canadian Government has adopted a cautious attitude toward proposals for a world food reserve; while believing that international action to make the best use of food supplies and to bring a measure of stability to agricultural producers is worthwhile, the Government has considered that commodity-by-commodity approach to such problems would be desirable and that any international agency which might be set up should not compete with, or replace conventional arrangements. At the ninth session Canada voted in favour of a resolution inviting the Food and Agriculture Organization to prepare a report on what is being done in the field of international co-operation on food problems, though abstaining on one part of the preamble which seemed unclear and possibly inaccurate. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 43 in favour, none against with 1 abstention (the United States).

Land Reform

The Canadian delegation voted in favour of a resolution on land reform which recommends various measures which, it is hoped, will make land reform measures more effective. The vote on the resolution was 51 in favour, none against with five abstentions (Soviet bloc).

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)

The Second Committee also discussed briefly the annual report of the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. The representatives of the United States and Commonwealth governments, which have been the largest contributors to the UNKRA relief and rehabilitation programmes, commended the Agent General on progress achieved so far and invited member governments to make initial or additional contributions to enable the Agency to carry out its approved programmes for 1955. In this connection, the United States Representative announced that his Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada were prepared to contribute a further \$13.5 million to the Agency. The Soviet Representative on the other hand criticized the work of the Agency, declaring that it had achieved nothing substantial in South Korea and existed only to serve the interests of the United States. Both the Soviet and Polish Representatives compared the situation in South Korea with that in North Korea where they claimed that assistance given by the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries had achieved notable progress in reconstruction and rehabilitation. At the conclusion of the debate, the Committee adopted a resolution by a vote of 38 in favour, five against (Soviet bloc) with no abstentions commending the Agent General for the excellent progress made by the Agency and urging all governments to provide the necessary financial support for the continuation of the Agency's programmes.

Other Questions

During the Committee's consideration of Chapters II and III of the Report of the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet Delegation submitted two draft resolutions, the first relating to "measures to reduce unemployment and to increase employment", and the second concerning "removal of measures of discrimination applying to international trade". Both these draft resolutions were rejected by the Committee which subsequently endorsed resolutions previously adopted by ECOSOC dealing with full employment and expansion of international trade.

Conclusion

On the whole, debate in the Second Committee at the ninth session was constructive and restrained. Representatives of industrialized countries endeavoured to show understanding of the problems of the under-developed countries, and the representatives of these countries, while pressing for prompt action by the industrialized nations, displayed an awareness that the latter face serious problems of their own.

Speaking at the end of the session, Sir Douglas Copland of Australia, Chairman of the Second Committee, said that, if the Committee could continue, over a period of years, to work in the same atmosphere which had marked the session just concluded, the world might come closer to find a basis on which an expanding world economy could be sustained.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

North Atlantic Treaty

Approval of Protocol on Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany

A debate on the proposed accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty took place in the House of Commons on January 20 and 21, 24 and 25 and concluded on January 26.

The debate opened with the moving of the following resolution by Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Resolved, that it is expedient that the Houses of Parliament do approve the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Canada at Paris on October 23, 1954, and that this House do approve the same.

Mr. Pearson said:

... I doubt whether any matter placed before the House this session will have greater long-range implications for our country and for peace. Because of its importance I should like to examine this particular protocol in its context.

What is that context? Part of it is the series of related agreements which were worked out at the London and Paris meetings last autumn, and which with this particular protocol make up a co-ordinated programme. But more fundamentally the context in which we should consider this protocol is, I think, nothing less than the present position of the cold war and our chances of peace.

Fundamental Problems

Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermonuclear one. We know that such a war, of course, would threaten the very existence of every nation, indeed of the whole human race. The supreme task of statesmanship today, therefore, is to act so that the fantastic physical power which scientists are placing at man's disposal will be used not for warfare but for welfare.

Related to this danger of thermonuclear war or thermonuclear annihilation is the

problem posed by totalitarian imperialism. The communist dictators have already dragooned hundreds of millions of men into highly centralized empires which deny the dignity and worth of the individual except as a creature of the state. This imperialist and materialist conspiracy has recruited its dupes in the rest of the world and organized them into fifth columnists. It thereby seeks, through propaganda and subversion, to foster disunity in the non-communist world while it expands the area of its own direct control by coup d'état or military forces around its periphery in Europe and in Asia.

Disarmament

Facing up to these fundamental problems, there are three main areas in which we must seek to advance. The first area involves a search for agreement of effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. But such a programme must be carefully balanced to avoid creating the incentive to aggression, and with reliable safeguards, inspections and controls to guarantee that it will be carried out.

For years the Canadian Government has taken an active part in the search for

such an agreement. Last autumn at the United Nations Assembly the Canadian Delegation, I think it is fair to say, took the lead in submitting proposals of certain principles and procedures with a view to further negotiations on this vital matter. These proposals, after arduous negotiations conducted on the Western side, under the skilful and devoted leadership of my colleague, the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), won the unanimous approval of all the governments represented at that world organization. We will continue to do all we can to pursue agreement on effective disarmament.

As I see it, there is nothing inconsistent between this policy and the agreements I am about to discuss. Indeed, if the communist powers would accept the level of armaments, as well as the limitations and controls, in these agreements, we would be well on our way to universal United Nations disarmament treaty which would make limited defence arrangements such as NATO and those under the Western European Union unnecessary. The limitations on national prerogatives involved in the provisions of the relevant Paris agreements, dealing with the maximum size of forces, with international inspections, controls and deployments are, I suggest, significant as a development illustrating to the world at large that international supervision and control of national armaments is possible, granted a genuineness of desire and willingness on the part of nations effectively to harness and check the destructive potential of national forces.

Defensive Strength

It is true that the Paris agreement apply only to a limited group of nations. They are however, not only consistent with but may some day be recognized as a useful precedent for an effective universal system. Meanwhile, pending agreement on such a universal and therefore a better system, an essential step in maintaining peace lies in building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression. That, I suggest, is the second area in which we must move forward.

International Co-operation

The third area in which progress is essential, and this area is the most fundamental of all, lies in improving relations between states; in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples. We cannot do very much to promote this idea amongst the unfree. It involves patient efforts to heal national rivalries, to heal the causes and tensions of war, and to bind the peoples together. Yet we cannot afford to be naïve or unrealistic; so while we must do everything we can to make war impossible, through trying to resolve issues that divide, and promote co-operation through the United Nations and elsewhere and through seeking effective disarmament, we must, as I have just said, consolidate our deterrent strength and by removing the greatest temptation of all to aggression which, in the present circumstances, is weakness, strengthen the chances of peace.

I believe that our activities in the development of the North Atlantic community are a vitally important contribution to this specific purpose. For the time being at least, in this tense and dangerous world, the unity and strength of the North Atlantic nations unquestionably provide the most important and immediate existing guarantee of peace. But the North Atlantic community—this has been said many times before—is potentially far more than a military alliance. These other non-military aspects of the development of NATO will, I think, grow more important as the military danger recedes, as we must hope it will in the course of time. The attitudes and agencies of co-operation among these free nations which NATO fosters can then remain to chart the way to a better state of society long after the present danger of military aggression has passed into the limbo into which history eventually tosses all tyrannies.

Communist Propaganda

So I am asking the House today to approve the adherence of the Federal German Republic, not only to the North Atlantic defensive alliance but also to

this North Atlantic community which we are seeking to develop, and to which the free and democratic Germany of today has the right to belong. The Soviet government and its satellite governments are seeking to prevent this development by an unparalleled campaign of intimidation, of cajolery and distortion, by the exertion of every kind of pressure through the lure of promises and the threat of punishment. In our own country the communists are doing all they can, of course, to further this campaign, but a propaganda barrage focusing on the statement that a vote for this protocol is merely a vote for German rearmament. Such an over-simplification is grossly misleading. It is, indeed, the most insidious type of distortion, a fractional truth.

Communists themselves, as agents of Moscow, have so far abandoned intellectual integrity and simple honesty that it is futile to try to enlighten them by discussing their charges. But in this case their campaign unquestionably strikes some response in the hearts of many honest and sincere Canadian patriots, who have good reason to remember and fear the dread effect of German arms. It must therefore be objectively and exhaustively examined.

Significant Features of Agreements

There are several significant features of the Paris agreements which we have to consider today. It is I think reasonable to expect that in the long run the most fundamental and durable of these features will be, first, the restoration of German freedom and sovereignty—that is, freedom and sovereignty to the people of West Germany; second, acceptance of the voluntary adherence of these people to the western coalition. Those two features, as I see it, are fundamental.

The third feature of course is the provision that is being made for the Federal German Republic, in the exercise of the first right of sovereignty, to bear a fair share of the common burden of defence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the Western European Union.

Attitude of Germans

In this connection I think hon. members would delude themselves if they con-

ceived of the people of the German Federal Republic today as a nation of militarists straining at the leash for freedom to rearm, to tax themselves for weapons, and to conscript themselves for military service.

The fact is that in Germany, as elsewhere, there is revulsion against war and militarism from which Germans as well as the rest of us have suffered so much and so recently. In the Federal Republic of Germany as elsewhere in free countries, rearmament, when it is supported—and there is a strong body of opinion in Germany which does not support it, some from good motives and some from bad motives—but where rearmament is supported in Germany today, as it is supported by the freely elected government of that country, it is generally regarded at best, as indeed it is here, as a tragic necessity.

In Germany as elsewhere moods and attitudes can change; but at present the situation is, I think, as I have described it. West German policies are of a kind which merit our support, and West German leadership is of a character that we should encourage. Indeed if that leadership had been in existence in Germany in 1914 and 1939 we would have avoided, I think, two world wars. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more calculated to discourage the development of healthy political forces in Germany; or to encourage a dangerous relapse into narrow nationalism and disillusionment with democracy, and ultimately into dangerous militarism, than a rejection by the parliaments of the West of the plans worked out by the democratic government of Germany and other western democracies for the integration of that people into the West European and North Atlantic communities, where they can play a proper and worthy role.

Strength of Communist Forces

It is also a gross distortion to represent the London and Paris agreements as an aggressive move which threatens the people of Russia. It is too late in the day to be surprised by the falsity and hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda in this matter, but I am still sometimes astonished by the continuing gullibility of some who are taken in by it.

So let us not forget, and let us keep on emphasizing, that the defence policies of the west in EDC or in NATO or in these Paris agreements are not the cause but the result of the aggressive policies of Russian imperialism, and of the huge communist armies backing those policies; of aggressions in Berlin, Czechoslovakia and Korea. It was all this, with the fear that followed it, that forced the world reluctantly to regather some of the strength it had thrown away in 1945, while Russia remained under arms on land, on sea and in the air.

It is also worth recalling in particular that the Russians began the rearmament of Germans in the Eastern Zone as long ago as 1948, when there was not a soldier in the Federal German Republic. The communists have made a transparent effort to disguise this by calling the armed forces in East Germany, which they had organized, barrack police. Quite apart from some 80,000 frontier and civil police, there are almost 100,000 more of these barrack policemen organized into army corps and divisions, and into air force and naval formations of Soviet lines. The East German army units have some 600 tanks, 250 self-propelled guns and 1,700 other pieces of artillery. Any ex-Nazi who wishes to sell himself to communism is welcomed into these forces and into their leadership. Their strength would be even greater if the communist masters felt that they could count on the reliability of more of their German subjects, if they were given arms.

For many years the Russians have also been organizing military forces in other European nations, including those who were our fascist enemies in the last world war and are supposed now to be disarmed by treaty. There are, for example, about a quarter of a million Bulgarian troops, over 225,000 Hungarian troops and some 350,000 in the Roumanian forces. There are in all, 75 satellite divisions, some of them armoured, and over 2,500 planes. All are under complete Russian control, and in Poland that control has been carried to the point where the Defence Minister in that country is a Soviet marshal. But far more important even than these are some 500,000 Soviet troops in occupied Europe west of the Soviet

frontiers, no less than 400,000 of whom are stationed in Eastern Germany, where they are European spearhead of the 175 divisions of the Soviet army.

So much, then, for the absurd contention that the present Western defence programme is a hostile, aggressive move which threatens the Russians and their peace-loving friends, who have never had any policy or any plan, so we are told, except peaceful coexistence in a world without arms.

German Unification

We should also examine the false assertion that the adherence of the Federal German Republic to the West European and North Atlantic communities would make the west responsible for perpetuating a partition of Germany, which the Soviet Union would like to see ended. It is worth recalling in this connection that the original plan, which was agreed to at Potsdam in 1945 among the four victorious allies, called for a peace treaty with a democratic, freely elected all-German government. Hon. members will recall, I am sure, the frustrating years when, despite Western efforts to implement the Potsdam agreement in this regard, the Soviet Government refused to allow their zone to co-operate economically or otherwise, with the three other zones of Germany. The Soviet rulers had decided that unless and until they could ensure a united Germany which would do their bidding, they would make of East Germany a communist puppet state, which of course they have done. And so it was this policy that resulted, in September 1949, in the creation of the German Federal Republic, in order to achieve the maximum degree of democratic unity which was possible in the circumstances.

There are those today who are saying, some with sincerity but others, the communists, with calculated deceit, "Why do we not have one more conference with the Soviet on German unification and on a peace treaty before taking the final step to ratify these agreements?" I would remind those persons that from October 1950, until the present time there have been at least 16 occasions on which France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the occupying powers of

Western Germany, have in notes to the Soviet Government or the Government of the German Federal Republic, in notes to the authorities of East Germany, proposed, as a basic condition of agreement on German unification, the holding of free elections under a form of international supervision which would ensure that those elections were honestly carried out.

One of those occasions was the conference in Berlin among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, which took place less than a year ago. For 25 days every possible avenue of approach to a mutually acceptable solution of the problems of German reunification, and peace treaties for Germany and Austria, was exhaustively examined, but all to no avail. Surely that conference exposed in a clear-cut and unmistakeable way the obstinate refusal of the Soviet Government to allow any settlement of the German and Austrian problems except on terms which, regardless of the wishes of the peoples themselves, would in effect guarantee the continuation of Soviet control of those countries equal to, if not exceeding, that already obtaining in the areas which they were occupying. There is no reason I can see to believe that this attitude has now suddenly changed, in spite of the honeyed but ambiguous words which are now issued from the Kremlin and other communist centres.

A reason for, if no justification of, the adamant stand of the Soviet against German unity on the basis of free elections is shown by the results of two recent elections in Germany and Austria. In certain Austrian areas under Soviet army occupation—and this of course is very significant—our type of free election took place in August 1954, and the result was a resounding repudiation of the Communists; right under the intimidating shadow of Russian military might. In the Austrian provinces, all or partially within the Soviet zone, the communist party won only 6 out of 100 seats in Vienna and 3 out of 56 in lower Austria. The overwhelming majority of seats were divided fairly evenly between the two government coalition parties. In the two other provinces where elections were held the communists candidates failed to gain any seats at all. In

West Berlin only a month or so ago, in elections for the Berlin House of Representatives, the Communists, under free elections, again could do no better than poll 2.7 per cent of the vote. They got about 41,000 votes against 684,000 for the Social Democrats, 446,000 for the Christian Democrats and 190,000 for the Liberal Democrats. No wonder the Communists shudder at the prospect of free elections.

The Berlin Conference then made it quite clear that an honourable and acceptable basis for German unity could not be found. Therefore surely the only possible course that offered any hope of progress was for the West to make its own arrangements with the German Federal Republic, without losing sight of the essential objective of unification, because Germans rightly insist—and we certainly should support them in this—that unification must remain the essential goal of German policy.

Conference With Russia

It is well to keep this background clearly in mind now that we are being urged in some quarters to scrap our present policy and agree to another conference with the Russians immediately; a conference designed by Moscow not, I suggest, so much to achieve constructive results as to delay and prevent the ratification of these agreements, and to divide and disunite the West.

Experience surely shows that we should refuse to be lured into this false course, but should follow through with the policy charted in the Paris agreements for the restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic, the integration of this sovereign Germany into the Western community, and the appropriate participation of Germany in that community's common defence effort to deter aggression. Once that has been done conferences or diplomatic discussions with the Soviet union on Germany, on Austria or on any other subject can be resumed and the west can then talk from strength and unity.

Collective European Security

It was hoped about a year ago that we would implement this policy of German

association with the west through the European Defence Community. Those hopes, of course, have been destroyed. We supported the European Defence Community. We supported it in this house two years ago. So it was with deep concern that we watched the dramatic developments of last summer when Mr. Mendès-France undertook to obtain at a special conference in Brussels the agreement of the other signatories to the modification in the EDC treaty which he claimed would be necessary if that treaty, after two years of indecision, was to be approved by the French Parliament.

As we all know, the Brussels conference did not succeed, and soon after EDC was rejected entirely. The resulting dangers were great. Western solidarity and unity of purpose were shaken. The hopes which EDC has aroused for closer European unity and Franco-German co-operation and friendship were in danger of being replaced by disillusionment and despair. In the German Federal Republic the unceasing effort of Chancellor Adenauer to rally the German people to support a close and lasting alliance with France and with her other free European neighbours might soon be lost in cynical and destructive nationalism. The danger also existed that the allies, short of patience and dismayed by the difficulties entailed in devising a new European system, might try to disregard France and work out separate agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany.

During those months which saw the end of the European Defence Community, and indeed in recent weeks also, there has been talk of a European and Atlantic security system functioning without France. In my view this is careless talk, or worse, as it ignores the great importance of France politically, strategically and industrially. I do not think any Atlantic or European system of security really could be satisfactory or effective to which France did not willingly contribute.

The importance of France to collective European security is not restricted to its strategic or economic role. We should be poorer culturally and weaker spiritually if we had to attempt to arrange our own defences or those of our civilization without

the participation of the country to which we owe so much. Therefore a Western alliance which excluded France or which was forced on France against the wishes of the majority of the population is not, as I say, a prospect which would be faced with any satisfaction by the Canadian government or people.

Continental Defence Not Enough

At this time it is well to remember that the danger last summer was not limited merely to the exclusion and possible isolation of France, fateful as that might have been. The very existence of NATO, the whole North Atlantic concept, was threatened. Just as there has been among some sections of Europeans an understandable, but in my opinion a superficial and mistaken, tendency toward what I might call continental neutralism or isolationism, so there has been among some North Americans a tendency to move toward either bilateral or continental defence arrangements. There was developing a few months ago a "go it alone" psychology in this part of the world, due in part to impatience with allies but rationalized by strategic theories, based on impregnable continental defences coupled with almost exclusive reliance for victory against aggression on massive retaliation by long range planes and missiles of the intercontinental or global range. Certainly, as we all know, continental defences for North America are vitally important and may well become more important, but any implication that in themselves they would ever be an adequate basis for security is quite another matter.

I ventured to point out in an address to the National Press club in Washington last March that in my view any idea that the great coalition which we have formed for peace should be replaced by an entrenched continentalism would make no great appeal to Canadians as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression. Nor would it be likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian co-operation.

Indeed the idea of continental self-sufficiency, in the military as in the economic or political fields, makes no appeal, I suggest, either to our sense of reality or to

our deepest Canadian instincts as exemplified over the whole of our history. In 1914 and 1939 Canadians were quick to recognize that a threat to the democracies of Western Europe was a threat to their own freedom; and subsequent events confirmed rather than upset this deep-seated conviction that it would not be safe or ultimately possible for us on this continent to stand aside from events in Europe. And so NATO, with the United Kingdom, the United States and France in it, is for us an indispensable instrument both for co-operation and defence. But last autumn NATO was in danger of being lost.

I may appear to be digressing, but certainly these thoughts were very much in the minds of those of us who had the responsibility for action on behalf of the government during the rapidly moving events of last summer and last autumn. I think it is well that these considerations should be put on the records of this House.

London and Paris Conferences

In this situation so full of danger which followed the French rejection of the projected European Defence Community immediate remedial action was required to weld together the cracks which were appearing in the north Atlantic structure and to continue the progress toward European unity which had been interrupted. It was more important, we felt at that time, to look ahead than to indulge in recriminations as to who was responsible for the set-back. It was in that spirit that we took part in the developments of that time.

The initiative to restore the situation came from the United Kingdom, whose earlier refusal to join the European Defence Community had heightened French distaste for that treaty. Therefore I am sure it was with a profound feeling of admiration and relief that all of us in Canada followed the skilful and untiring effort of the United Kingdom foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, as with the strong backing of the United States secretary of state he gathered support in the main European capitals for a new approach to the problems arising from the failure of EDC.

As we over here watched those developments, while we were happy over the initiative taken in London, we were also concerned that any arrangement to replace the European Defence Community should not impair the strength and unity of NATO as the organization primarily responsible for defence planning and for co-operation in the non-military field, we desired that progress toward European unity should be made within the larger framework of the Atlantic community. We wanted all these things to be done within the framework of our North Atlantic Organization to the greatest extent possible. For this reason we felt, and indeed we suggested, that the new proposals to replace EDC should be submitted initially to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council for consideration. However, that idea did not command general support, and it became clear that the majority of the countries most directly concerned were in favour of the United Kingdom proposal for a conference in London of the countries signatory to the proposed EDC, along with the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

We were glad to support that procedure and to accept an invitation to attend the London conference as a country with a direct and important stake in any arrangement to take the place of EDC, and as a member of NATO with sizeable forces on the European continent itself. As a participant in this conference we endeavoured with some success to stress the importance to NATO of the solutions which were discussed in London, and to ensure as far as we could that these problems should be discussed and solved within the NATO concept.

At these London meetings, which began on September 28, we were able to work out the broad lines of an agreement for associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western community on a basis of equality, the only basis of course which was possible, and to further the aims of Western defence and European unity within the North Atlantic alliance.

Moreover, it was recognized that these historic decisions together formed part of one general settlement which was directly or indirectly of concern to all the members

of NATO. It was therefore agreed that the final act of the London conference, which outlined the main understandings reached, should be put into the form of more detailed agreements which would be submitted later, as appropriate, either to the four powers, the seven Brussels powers, or to the whole NATO council. That was done, and we met in Paris on October 22. All the resulting agreements were signed the next day, October 23.

I approach this result in no defensive, defeatist or apologetic manner. I think it was a great achievement. I can say that with more conviction because it was an achievement which others had far more to do with bringing about than we did. I think it was a great achievement all the greater in view of the price we would have had to pay for the failure to bring it about, a failure which seemed so close only a few weeks before.

Terms of Agreements

... These Paris agreements can be divided, for purposes of consideration, into four parts. There are the four-power agreements signed by the three occupying powers and the West German Government, which provide for restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and for the present and future stationing of foreign forces on the soil of that republic. Then there are a series of seven-power agreements which provide for the reconstitution of the Brussels Treaty Organization to include two new members, namely Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, into a new organization which we now call Western European Union. Then finally there are certain NATO agreements which include the protocol now before the House and certain resolutions designed to strengthen the NATO defence structure.

Restoration of German Sovereignty

So far as the first series of agreements are concerned—and they are of immediate importance to Canada because we have troops in Germany—the special problem of the four powers was to determine how and when the Federal Republic should be given its sovereignty, in a manner which would permit it to function as an equal partner in the western coalition and

which at the same time would not preclude eventual unification of all Germany. In addition, it was necessary to provide a legal basis for the stationing on German soil of foreign forces when the Federal Republic became a member of NATO.

In effect, what was done was to provide that the occupation regime, which was already pretty much of an anachronism, should be ended as soon as possible and that, in the meantime, until that regime ended legally and formally, the occupying powers would act in accordance with the spirit of the agreements under consideration.

Regarding disarmament and demilitarization, however, it was provided that the three powers should continue to exercise certain responsibilities until the Federal Republic became a member of NATO. Also the continuing responsibilities of the three occupying powers with respect to German reunification and a peace treaty are reaffirmed.

To answer the criticisms—and we hear criticisms—of those who might view the agreements as a deliberate step in the direction of the permanent division of Germany, the three powers issued a joint declaration during the London conference—to which later in Paris, Canada and the other NATO members subscribed—which stated among other things:

A peace settlement for the whole of Germany freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their (i.e. the three powers) policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

And further:

The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

That is the policy of the NATO countries. I am sure all hon. members would agree that this statement of policy provides a fairly clear response to any who may maintain that in their efforts to associate the German Federal Republic with the West, the Western Powers had lost

sight of the ultimate aim of a peace treaty for a united Germany.

Western European Union

I now turn to the second series of arrangements, which are intended to associate a sovereign German Federal Republic with NATO and with the move toward European unity which has been interrupted. When these agreements go into effect we shall have a new organization which we now call Western European Union. That new organization is essentially a modified version of the structure based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, with this one important difference which I have already mentioned. To the original members of the Brussels organization are now added Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. So Western European Union can be considered as an alternative method of achieving much the same purposes which the European Defence Community had been designed to achieve.

There are, of course, some differences. There are in particular two main differences: The first difference is the inclusion of the United Kingdom in Western European Union with that historic, courageous and, in my opinion, far-reaching pledge which she gave for the maintenance of four divisions and the second tactical airforce on the continent of Europe for another 44 years. The second main difference is that the European Defence Community placed greater emphasis on supra-national features.

Western European Union will have a permanent council, an assembly and an agency for the control of armaments to be set up by and under the authority of the council. The council will sit in London and the armament control agency is to sit in Paris, where it will work in close co-operation with the NATO secretariat and for carrying out its duties will use to the greatest possible extent NATO personnel.

Control of German Rearmament

I now come to an extremely important part of the WEU agreements, namely that part which gives Germany the rights to rearm. Much attention has been paid to this right which it is now proposed to give, but not so much attention has been

paid to the way in which it is limited and controlled. I should therefore like to put on record what these limitations and controls are.

The first is that the maximum forces to be permitted to Germany under WEU are the same as those which would have been permitted under EDC, namely 500,000 men organized into not more than twelve divisions with 1,350 fighter—that is defensive—aircraft. That number must not be increased except by the unanimous consent of the Western European council. Second, all German forces, if and when they are constituted, are to be brought under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, SACEUR, and are to be integrated into NATO forces. That means that there will be no separate German national army apart from NATO. Nor has Germany, under this agreement, the right to deploy her own forces. That can only be done by SACEUR, subject to political guidance from the NATO council. Furthermore, German forces—and I think this is extremely important—are to be dependent upon NATO rather than upon national logistic support.

It is worth remembering in this connection that the whole system of logistic support for forces in Europe, which includes such vital things as fuel pipe lines, transportation, communication facilities, air fields and other essentials for the conduct of modern war, has been organized on a highly integrated basis under NATO. As such it makes for economy and efficiency. But it would also—and this is probably more important in the context of the matter we are discussing—make it incomparably more difficult for any NATO country to operate its forces separately because they are mixed up, especially in such vital things as logistics, with the other NATO forces. In other words this provision involves important built-in safeguards against purely national action.

Third, Germany agrees unconditionally not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons and guided missiles, mines, warships, except some small ones for coastal defence, or bomber aircraft; and she can only be relieved from these obligations by a request of the supreme allied commander, Europe, which re-

ceived a two-thirds majority of the Western European Union council.

Fourth, certain other types of heavy armaments, a long list in fact, are to be controlled for all members of the Western European Union, including Germany, by the arms control agency of the Western European Union. There are other proposals for limiting and pooling the manufacture of arms which are at the moment under discussion in Paris.

Fifth, and I have mentioned this, there has been set up an arms control agency in Paris to work closely with the NATO authorities and to use NATO inspectors to visit and check national plants for the production of arms whenever they see fit in order to see that the limits accepted are being observed.

Sixth, and finally, there are also certain political controls and limitations written into these agreements. Germany solemnly pledged at the London conference that she would conduct her foreign policy in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular she undertook:

... never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic—and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states.

If Germany should violate these undertakings a special provision contained in the joint declaration of the three powers, to which the other members of the NATO Council later subscribed, would come into play. The pertinent paragraph of that provision, by which we would all be bound, reads as follows:

They —

That means the NATO powers.

— will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three governments —

Now its is 14 governments.

— for their part will consider the offending government —

It might be the German government; it might be any other government.

— as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures —

That is, against the offending member of NATO.

— which may be appropriate.

Now, sir, I submit that it would be difficult to devise a more impressive set of safeguards than these. But I know that when I say this I will be asked what guarantee there is that they will work. Can we expect these limitations and controls that Germany has accepted to be of any value? Will she throw them aside whenever she feels like doing so? We are conscious of the fact that this has been done in the past.

Lesson of History

All international agreements, even those we make with our friends and neighbours, have this element of risk and uncertainty. It is inherent in international arrangements; but some of those who now are stressing that element and challenging the value of these agreements with Germany are, however, quite ready to take the same risk in making another effort to bring about an agreement with Russia which they think would remove all our fears and uncertainties about Germany.

I frankly admit, however, that we have every right to be concerned with German good faith in this series of agreements. Many Canadians, including many of us in this House, and even more of our allies who are taking this decision with us and with all its consequences, bear on their bodies and in their minds scars from the German war machine. We remember how Hitler, with shocking and unscrupulous design, and with Soviet connivance and assistance, started World War II in 1939. We do not forget how the Nazis conducted that war with savage brutality, and how the German people supported it.

While we do not forget that and cannot forget it, it is my considered view that support of these agreements with the safeguards I have described is both wise and far-sighted, and of all the courses that are open to us this is the best course to follow in our effort to shape a better future.

I do not suggest that we should ignore the lessons of the past. Indeed, as George Santayana has said, "Those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it". But we should draw the right conclusions from the past, and we should also not ignore the vision of the future. Indeed, experience of the past teaches us that if a nation only looks backward to justify its fears of the future, it is likely by that very fact to suffer again the same tragedy which in the first place caused that fear. The past must influence but, I suggest, it should not determine and distort the future.

So, Mr. Speaker, it is because of my appreciation of history and not in spite of it that I believe the safeguards which we have worked out in these agreements within our North Atlantic Community Organization against unilateral abuse by Germany, or any other member, are of real value and make even stronger the case for a coalition which will include the Federal Republic of Germany with its sovereignty restored and on an equality with the other members. I also believe that the institutions and habits of co-operation which our Atlantic community is developing, and with which we now desire to associate Germany, may well be of even greater value than military safeguards in removing the risk that might follow from putting arms in the hands of Germans.

In the very nature of things there can never be on this earth, as I see it, absolute assurance or safety for anyone, individual or nation, because the future will depend among other things on attitudes and choices which we shall have to adopt from time to time. But there are good grounds, I think, for reasoned confidence in this matter. Moreover, whether this confidence will be justified will depend upon our own policies as well as upon those of Germany.

Position of Germany

We now have a type of government

and a political system in western Germany which are democratic and European-minded. Surely—and I mentioned this a few minutes ago—we should do what we can to encourage and strengthen that type of government, not weaken it by suspicion, mistrust and rubuff. That government, moreover, is led by a man who believes in freedom, peace and co-operation, a great European and internationalist, Herr Adenauer.

It is also, I believe, reasonable to believe that national self-interest will counsel the Germans to stand by these agreements, which are not imposed on them but which have been freely negotiated with and accepted by the government which they have chosen for themselves. Surely in that respect the situation is very different from that of the 1920's, when relations of the victors in the war with Germany were characterized by uncertainty and vacillation. We never did make up our minds then whether to treat Germany as a new friend or an old foe, and as a result we got the worst of both worlds.

Quite apart from the pressing fact of the Soviet threat to Western Europe it would, I submit, be wrong and foolish to deal with Germany now as a rejected, unequal people in international society. If we do so they will soon conclude that their choice lies only between isolation and a brooding introspection, or seeking domination and aggressive strength on their own. Surely the sensible course, even if the threat of communist aggression were removed, would still be to bring the Germans into the West European Community, which includes the United Kingdom, and into the North Atlantic Organization where they would only be one of 15 members, including the United States, and which they could not hope to dominate. It is precisely by such participation in partnership that nations as well as individuals learn to prefer co-operation and good will to domination and submission.

Though I can certainly understand and deeply sympathize with the hesitation and soul-searching which I know are involved for very many in the issues we face, it is nevertheless my conviction, I repeat, that the course of wisdom is to bring about

German participation in the western coalition where we can work together for the common security and welfare.

Alternatives

I believe I should take enough time to examine another aspect of the matter. What are the alternatives? There is a good deal of criticism of this course, part of it sincere and genuine criticism, but very rarely do I ever read or hear of any satisfactory or better alternative than the one which is before us. What are the alternatives which would produce a better policy?

Well, the first—these are the only ones I have been able to think of, but there may be others—is to keep Germany disarmed and neutralized as at present. This might seem to many people an appealing course, and would indeed be so in a world where all arms were limited and controlled. But it is impossible under present circumstances. It was impossible in the twenties. How then could it be done now, with the victors of the last war divided and bitterly hostile and in the face of the control of a rearmed communist East Germany by an aggressive, mighty Russian imperialist power? Is Russia likely to give up that control for genuine international system of supervision of a disarmed, neutral and united Germany which, in its turn, assumed a situation in which the east and west would work amicably and altruistically together for a common peace-ful purpose?

The question answers itself from the history of the last ten years. Even if it were possible, how long would a dynamic, powerful and proud people like the Germans—fifty millions in the heart of Europe—be willing to accept a position of this kind? In short, the neutralization or disarmament of Germany, as I see it, would be difficult under any conditions, impossible under present conditions. It would, in any event, leave a vacuum right in the heart of Europe. A vacuum may be regarded by nature as something to be abhorred, but it is regarded by the communists as something to be filled.

A second alternative would be to do nothing, continuing as long as possible the present occupation arrangements and hoping that something would turn up. As

I see it, that would be a futile and negative course. What turned up would probably be a Germany increasing in strength, with a growing national feeling, taking advantage of every opportunity to end or whittle away the occupation and determined to remove restrictions or her sovereignty as she grew stronger. At best such a policy would lead to an increasingly resentful and unfriendly Germany. At worst the result would be reminiscent of the thirties, with extremists in control.

A third alternative which has been suggested would be to give West Germany back her sovereignty unconditionally, but without making any arrangements for associating her with the Atlantic system or the Western European Union, and again hoping for the best. That might be followed by a separate alliance between Germany and one or more of those Western powers which desired it; or the Federal Republic of Germany might remain outside any collective arrangement while we merely hoped, in our turn, that if there were aggression against the west she would line up with us. We would also hope, and I do not know what basis there would be for our hopes, that under such circumstances Germany would not move east or, even more likely, play the east and west against each other to her own advantage.

Any of the above courses I believe, especially in view of the declared United States policy, would mean the end of the Atlantic alliance we have been building up and which is now our greatest deterrent aggression. It would also end the move toward European unification, which though these dreary post-war years has been a bright hope for peace and prosperity in free Europe.

We return, then, to the only possible solution in my view, bringing a free Germany into closer association with a group of other free countries in an alliance through which Germany may contribute to collective security, but which will be so constructed that no one member can possibly dominate the others.

Effect of Canadian Policy

Now before I resume my seat, I did indicate that I would say something about

the effect of these agreements more particularly on Canadian policy and what, if any, the effect will be on Canadian commitments or obligations in Europe. I should like to apologize for the length of time I am taking.

So far as the NATO resolution passed last October are concerned, those resolutions have strengthened SACEUR's powers and have increased the mutual inter-dependence of NATO forces. So far as those resolutions are concerned, they will not make any significant change in the position of Canadian forces in Europe, because our forces are already closely integrated with those of other NATO countries. They are subject to the over-all authority of SACEUR in military matters. Their movement in Europe would take place only as part of agreed NATO strategy. Therefore the new arrangements—and they are outlined in the documents before you—merely set down in writing and make generally applicable the arrangements by which we are already bound.

With respect to the new territorial commitment involved in the protocol before us on German accession to NATO, the situation so far as Canada is concerned is similar to that which arose in June 1952, when the House approved the NATO protocol extending to all members of the European Defence Community the assistance guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty. I pointed out in this House then that since the Federal Republic of Germany was the only member of the European Defence Community not a member of NATO the effect of the protocol, if it came into force, would be to extend the obligations which Canada had undertaken under the North Atlantic Treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany.

I emphasized then, as I should mention now, that this extension of our obligations was more theoretical than real, because under article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, by which we are bound, we were already under an obligation to come to the assistance of the NATO forces stationed in the territory of German Federal Republic. The situation then, is substantially the same under the present protocol in so far as extending our territorial guarantee is concerned.

While I am on the subject of commitments—and there has been some discussion about this previously outside the House—I should like to assure the House that the Canadian Government took no new commitments in London or in Paris to keep Canadian forces in Europe at any given level or for any given period. What was emphasized at the conference was our determination to continue to play our full part in the North Atlantic Organization. As I stated to the nine-power conference in London last October—and this statement was made public immediately—

As I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them.

Also at the same time I declared to that conference:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed—

I hope I was correct in saying this; I think I was.

—enduring and whole-hearted support for NATO is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.

As regard the proposals for an arms pool, which by hon. friend from Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up the other day, these proposals, which as I mentioned a minute ago were submitted originally by the French government, are now under active discussion among the European governments concerned. We are being invited to send an observer to those meetings when matters come up which are of interest to us. As this matter is under discussion it would be premature

for me to comment on it now. But our direct interest in the arms pooling proposals would of course relate only to the allocation of Canadian arms made available through our mutual aid programme to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I may say that we are quite satisfied with the present procedure, and we are not anxious to have it changed—the procedure under which recommendations for the allocation of these arms are made by the standing group of the NATO organization. But if a proposal emanated from the conference which concerned our allocation of mutual aid, then of course we would give it consideration.

Soviet Reaction

Now finally—and this is final—I wish to come back just for a moment to the argument, the most impressive one to my mind advanced against this policy, that these agreements will not make for peace but will make for division and controversy and renewed trouble in Europe; that they will provoke the Soviets into violent reaction, and will drive that country into intransigent Stalinism again at a time when its government, under new leaders, seems to be getting somewhat more cooperative and less hostile.

As to the first, I do not think there is cause for undue alarm over Soviet threats to retaliate—and we have heard these threats in strong language—by forming a heavily armed eastern European alliance. While we should never dismiss pronouncements from Moscow as unworthy of serious examination. I do not think we should become unduly worried by Soviet “kicks” any more than we should become unduly elated by Soviet “carrots”. Both are often offered for the same purpose, to weaken our resolve and confuse our purpose.

There is certainly no reality behind the threat of an eastern NATO, because they have now a military alliance system, as I have tried to show, which is already more heavily armed than NATO, and under complete Soviet control. There are certainly no limitations or controls over armaments or men or anything else in that line. They could hardly go any further. As to the second point, there is no possible

validity to the contention that these agreements justify or make inevitable an intensification by the Soviet Union of the cold war, at a time when it seemed to be lessening.

I point this out because in the harsh and unreasonable things which the Soviet government has been saying recently about western policies, there is the constant accusation that western nations respond to offers of peace and friendship from Soviet Union by the warlike action of arming Germans for an eventual attack on the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leaders can make these claims seriously.

The Soviet government has never shown any inclination to discuss these agreements on a rational basis, or to take any reasonable attitude toward Germany or Austria. It has avoided constructive discussion and made no attempt to find out about or to seek reassurance or any point about western policy toward the German Federal Republic which it regarded as menacing to the Soviet Union.

No one of course would deny to the Soviet Union, which suffered so cruelly from German arms, the right to issue warnings about German militarism. But we cannot regard Soviet judgments on this subject as superior to those of other nations, which also suffered from the same source.

The logic of the Soviet position on this matter seems to be either that Germans in the German Federal Republic, regardless of the prior rearmament in East Germany, must never possess the right to carry arms, even within a defensive association which imposes controls, or that any arming of Germany can be carried out only on Soviet terms. Looking back a few years this logic seems pretty strange. According to it the western powers had no right to feel alarmed when the Soviet Government, contrary to agreements with allies about the occupation of Germany and without any regard for the wishes of these people, armed its eastern satellites and bound East Germany into the monolithic unity of communist Europe.

The Soviet Government now claims the right to regard almost as a provocation to war the culminating act of a slow process

whereby the German Federal Republic, with the consent of its freely elected government and that of 14 other free nations, enters into an association which has one of its chief purposes the prevention on a permanent basis of German militaristic nationalism.

So we would be unwise and short-sighted if we yielded to Soviet threats about what will happen if these agreements are ratified. Nor in my view will that ratification provoke warlike retaliation, unless the Soviet government, for other reasons, desires to pursue such a belligerent policy.

Western Aims

I think myself that the chance that such retaliation will happen and war might follow are less now than they were last summer after EDC was rejected. On our part we have made it abundantly clear that NATO policies in Europe are defensive and pacific. Among many others, President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have both recently emphasized that the aim of the West is to be strong enough to defend itself, to be moderate in responding to the provocation of others, and to be active in seeking every means of easing tensions and ensuring peace.

We know that the political and moral values which we cherish and the political system on which we rely do not thrive in conditions of war or continued tension. Our preparations are made for defence only, and war is for us not a means of combatting ideologies which we do not like. Therefore any genuine Soviet move to lessen tension, even if it affects only a

limited area of international relations, should be welcomed by us, and we should be willing to go half way at any time to meet it.

There is, of course, the constant danger of conflict from a misunderstanding on both sides of each others motives. In the West we remain with good reason alarmed by the threatening and aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R. in recent years. In turn I think it is not inconceivable, given the atmosphere of totalitarian isolation and ignorance in Moscow, that the Soviet people, and even certain Soviet leaders, may at times consider—sincerely consider—that they are threatened by the West. One of the great tasks in the next few years in diplomacy is to try somehow to bridge this gap in misunderstanding, to build what His Holiness the Pope recently so aptly described as “a bridge of truth” between East and West.

I wish in closing to reaffirm my confidence that we are on the right path, and that the agreements we drew up in London and Paris will make an important contribution to security and peace. From the foundations of defence strength and constructive unity, which they will provide the West, I sincerely trust that it will now be possible to convince the Soviet leaders of our firm intention, and indeed determined resolution, to defend ourselves without in any way menacing them, or without rejecting any opportunity to ease a state of international tension which is both sterile and dangerous.

For all these reasons I hope this House will give strong support to the resolution which is before it.

The grave importance of the question was appreciated by every member of the House and serious and thoughtful statements were made by the leaders and many members of every party. The only other member of the Government who spoke was the Minister for National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, who brought to the attention of the House the carefully contrived propaganda campaign which has been launched by the communist party in Canada the approval of the protocol. Mr. Martin also spoke about the discussions on disarmament which were held in New York during the recent sessions of the United Nations Assembly, and explained that the proposed strengthening of the NATO defensive alliance was not in any sense incompatible with the efforts for agreement on an effective system of universal disarmament.

The great majority of speakers were in favour of adopting the resolution, but several members of the C.C.F. Party spoke against it, though the leader

of the party, Mr. Coldwell, supported the resolution. Particularly moving speeches were made by two Jewish members of the House, who said that despite the sufferings of their friends and relatives at the hands of the Nazis, they would support the association of Germany with the Western Nations as they believed it offered the best hope of peace.

In his summing up of the debate on January 26, the Secretary of State for External Affairs replied to various questions and criticisms which had been put forward during the debate and gave further explanations of the implications of the association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In conclusion he said:

... I deny these agreements will stop the process of negotiation and bring about war. I think the experience of the last four or five years, as the hon. member for Vancouver-Kingsway (Mr. MacInnis) said last night, bears this out. *The Economist* put it very neatly in this manner.

"Russia wastes no concession on the weak and a policy of negotiating from strength—however fiercely denounced by the Russians—is the one thing that gets results."

As I see it, it is far more dangerous to peace, far more likely to provoke ultimate conflict, if we refuse to accept these agreements.

I wish to conclude by summing up the reasons why I say that, and I hope my remarks will make some impression on those who are opposing these agreements.

My first reason is well expressed by Sir Anthony Eden when he said:

"The only alternative to the Paris agreements would be to plunge the world into confusion and desire."

Would that be a good basis for negotiation? Would it be better to negotiate now and abandon or drop our policies as the Soviet Union is begging us to do? We were asked last night, and indeed during the debate on Thursday and Friday, to look at new Soviet offers and particularly at Mr. Molotov's of January 15. I have looked at it, like the hon. member for Mackenzie (Mr. Nicolson) and others, and I find it a very stale carrot indeed. I am quite sure I am correct in saying that it is a transparent and rather clumsy effort to bring pressure on the Germans on the eve of their debate. It has not deceived the German people, but it may have deceived some hon. members in the house. The hon.

member for Mackenzie at page 488 of *Hansard* referred to this matter. I checked with the text of the proposal and I would like to give a translation of the paragraph on elections which I think, and he agrees, is most important. The translation is as follows:

"The Soviet Government deems it possible in the event of the consent of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic to come to an agreement on appropriate supervision.

This has been interpreted by some as an advance on the part of the Soviet Union. But I would point out that it reads "... in the event of the consent of the government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic . . .", and one is a communist state.

It might give some indication of what German communists and the Russians mean by "appropriate supervision" in this connection if I state what Herr Ulbricht, the communist leader in East Germany, had to say on this issue, almost at the same time. I think it is a lurid commentary on the January 15 offer. He described how the elections should be conducted if they ever got around to holding them. He advised the Communists in East Germany to carry out:

"The setting up of joint lists of candidates for the national front as a preparation for what we wish to extend to the whole of Germany later."

That has a very ominous ring. We have had experience with that kind of procedure in East Germany, in Korea, and in other parts of the world where the communists have been in control or have been trying to get control. The hon. mem-

ber for Mackenzie (Mr. Nicholson)—and he quotes the *London Times* in this respect—feels that this new offer has created a great deal of confusion. I think it has done so; but I think it has created more confusion in some minds in this house than it has created elsewhere.

Then the second reason why I asked for unanimous support of these agreements is that if they were rejected they would be a rebuff to the peaceful democratic forces in Germany which now form a great majority of the members of that legislature. In this respect I cannot refrain from saying that I have been amazed at the attack made on these governing forces in the Federal Republic of Germany at the present time. My friend the hon. member for Yorkton, dealing with this matter, talked about nazi leadership. At page 493 of *Hansard* he is reported to have had this to say:

"I refuse to support a nazi German army forced upon a reluctant German people who know the real nazis."

The same feeling was expressed by the hon. member for Regina City and the hon. member for Nanaimo. Let me quote from someone who knows the government in Germany and these people probably better than most of us know them in this House of Commons. I refer to an experienced and responsible journalist, Mr. Theodore H. White. This is what he has to say—and it was written last week—about the Bonn government:

"There are certain important points to note about Bonn. Here, in the Bundestag, sit 487 representatives of the people, put there by an election in which 86 per cent of all Germans eligible to vote went freely to the polls . . . Yet among all these elected representatives of Germany there is not one latter-day nazi, not one Communist. These men of the Bundestag, together, have given Germans the freest, most decent government in their history."

This is the government that asks to be admitted into our partnership. This is the regime against which remarks are aimed when some of my hon. friends opposite talk about nazi leadership. If we rebuff these forces in Germany and if we dis-

courage and make cynical Herr Adenauer and the men around him, I suggest we shall play right into the hands of the right and left extremists; and there are some of those in Western Germany today.

Who are these so-called nazi leaders responsible for German defence who would organize the Germany army at this time? They would be under the leadership of a great European, as I have characterized him, namely Herr Adenauer, a man who on the S.S. black-list and was arrested by Hitler. The four top men who would have charge of the defence organization they are permitted would be Herr Blank, a trade union leader; Adolf Heusinger, never a nazi; Hans Speidel, a German general who was in the plot against Hitler and who was tortured in nazi prisons; while the officer in charge of military education and indoctrination has been described as a man of "glowing conscience" who truly wants to make a new democratic army that belongs to the people.

My third reason is that if we defeat this measure, the move toward European unity would be stopped and France and Germany would once again drift apart. My fourth reason is that NATO, on which our hopes depend for so much than defence, would be seriously, indeed I think fatally, weakened. I am absolutely convinced of this and not merely, as was suggested last night, because of United States policy in this matter. How could NATO forces remain in Germany indefinitely without that country being a member? How could that country be a member without sovereignty, unless it became a second-class member? And it would rightfully not accept that status. How could it exercise sovereignty if it were refused any share in the collective defence? These are the imperatives of the situation and not, as I say United States pressure.

This is not an act of war but of faith; faith in the better forces in Germany, and that includes the Social Democratic party in Germany; faith in our own increasing strength, under increasing collective controls, used for pacific defence purposes; faith in our ever-widening system of collective action; faith in European union and the Atlantic community. It is also an act of faith that the Soviet Union,

when it faces the reality of our determination to proceed steadily on this course, will decide to negotiate realistically for a solution of those European and world questions which will help to heal some of the ills and evils that now plague our distressed world.

Before I left Paris at the last meeting I had a conversation with a leader of one of the NATO countries, one who had suffered such cruelties from the nazi forces in his country during the war that it would make the blood run cold to hear about them. As we parted I said to him, "In the light of your experience, it is not going to be easy for you personally to support these agreements". His reply was more or less in these words: "Not at all. Indeed, it makes me more anxious than ever to get these agreements through, because I believe they can help to bring

about a European and Atlantic unity in which national madness and cruelty of this kind will be prevented and which will give us a better chance for peace".

A vote against this resolution will not defeat it in this House but it will be a declaration of support for such defeat in other countries as well as in this country, with all the unhappy and dangerous consequences that would, I am certain, flow from that defeat. There may be risk in the course we are advocating. There is risk in every international action. But there is more than risk involved if this were defeated; there is a very real and immediate danger to European unity, Atlantic co-operation and peace in the rejection of this course to which we have set our hand. I therefore hope that no member in this Canadian House of Commons will vote against this proposal.

The resolution was approved by 213 votes to 12.

Formosa

On January 25, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in reply to a question in the House, made a statement on the attitude of the Canadian Government to the Formosa question. The text of this statement will be found on page 65. Because of the seriousness of the Far Eastern situation, the Prime Minister announced in the House on January 27 that the Secretary of State for External Affairs would accompany him to London to take part in the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which was to begin on Monday, January 31.

FORMOSA

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons, January 25, 1955.

In reply to what my hon. friend (Mr. Coldwell) has said, and also in reply to the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), I shall make a statement on this matter now, as follows:

The President of the United States yesterday sent to Congress an important message dealing with the situation in the Formosa straits. The President's proposals in this message are, of course, a matter of United States policy. The United States has particular commitments of its own in this area. These, and the effect of the President's message on them, will now be under consideration by Congress and it would not, of course, be appropriate for me, or for any member of this government, to comment on this aspect of the matter.

Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area, we are of course deeply concerned over the dangerous situation existing there and we, with other free governments, are anxious that steps should be taken to bring an end to the fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast.

In this message the President of the United States referred to the possibility of action by the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire. The United Nations has, in Indonesia, Palestine and in other parts of the world, been successful in bringing to an end fighting which might have had dangerous consequences, and if it could achieve similar results in this case it would be a cause, I am sure, of great satisfaction to us all.

If the question is raised in the United Nations—and there are reports that it will soon be raised—this would presumably take place in the Security Council of which Canada is not at present a member. However, we are being informed of developments in regard to the possibility of such a reference, and we are watching the matter with great interest and concern. Incidentally, an essential party to any cease-fire of this kind would be the communist government of China, which though a non-member of the United Nations, would have to be invited, I assume, to participate in the Security Council deliberations if they were to have any chance of success. Whether this particular government would accept such an invitation in another matter.

While it is not proper for me to comment on United States policy in this matter which is

now being considered by Congress, I think I can say that any move or proposal within the United Nations or through diplomatic channels could serve to achieve the purpose as stated in the President's message "to improve the prospects of peace in the area" will be warmly welcomed by the parliament and by the people of this country.

Before the Korean armistice I expressed on more than one occasion in this house the view of the Canadian Government that Formosa should be neutralized as far as possible while hostilities continued in Korea. We thought then, and we think now, that the final disposition of Formosa should be subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which at that time we thought might be held after the cessation of fighting in Korea. That was the view adopted by the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on January 13, 1951. Despite developments since then, it remains the view of the government that final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by international negotiation, at a conference if you like, on Far Eastern problems, if one could be held. Certainly, in any decision regarding the future of Formosa the wishes of the people there, which are often forgotten in discussions of this matter, should be a primary consideration. Pending such a decision I think that a strong case can be made for the neutralization of Formosa both in order to prevent any assault upon it by communist forces and also so that it will not be used as a base for invasion of the mainland.

In this area of tension and danger a distinction can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the island off the China coast now in Nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had a checkered history before that, are not. I suggest therefore that the considerations which recommend the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores do not necessarily apply to the coastal islands so close to the mainland and a hundred miles or so away from Formosa. Therefore, I welcome that part of the President's message which looks to the redeployment of the Nationalist forces which are now in these islands. "Some of these forces", the President's message states "are scattered throughout smaller off-shore islands as a result of historical rather than

military reasons directly related to defending Formosa”.

My understanding of the basis of a truce or ceasefire is that neither the Nationalists, the Government of China which we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked to give up their claims on the territory now held by the other side. What they would be asked to give up of course is the use of military means to achieve their aspirations. In other words, negotiations for a ceasefire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute; for in our view this is a suitable matter for international negotiation

at a later date through the United Nations or otherwise.

I am sure this House will particularly welcome the closing paragraph of the President's message which is as follows:

“Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if we demarcate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. A. Irwin was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, to duty outside the Department (International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal) effective December 1, 1954.
- Mr. J. B. Seaborn was posted from home leave (The Hague) to Ottawa effective January 3, 1955.
- Mr. J. H. Taylor was posted from duty outside the Department to the Department of External Affairs, effective January 3, 1955.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag was posted on temporary duty to Indochina. He arrived at Hanoi January 6, 1955.
- Mr. G. F. Bruce was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, effective January 13, 1955.
- Mr. J. E. G. Blais was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective January 17, 1955.
- Mr. G. R. Harman was posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective January 17, 1955.
- Mr. G. Ignatieff was posted from duty outside the Department to the Department of External Affairs, effective January 10, 1955.
- Mr. G. V. Beaudry was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Indochina, effective January 19, 1955.
- Mr. J. George was posted from the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York to home leave, effective January 24, 1955.
- Mr. G. G. Riddell was posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective January 24, 1955.
- Mr. P. R. Jennings was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.
- Mr. R. H. Jay was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.
- Mr. S. F. Rae was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Japan

Agreement for Air Services. Signed at Ottawa, January 12, 1955. (Not yet in force).

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated)

Treaty Series 1951, No. 2:—Convention between the Canadian Government and the French Government relating to the terms of compensation of Canadian interests in nationalized gas and electricity undertakings. Signed at Paris on January 26, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 14:—Agreements concerning leased bases in Newfoundland: 1941-1952 Canada-United States. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 22:—Exchange of notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement regarding the leasing of certain lands situated within RCAF station Goose Bay. Signed at Ottawa, December 5, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 1:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement concerning the sealing of mobile radio transmitting equipment. Signed at Washington, March 9 and 17, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 3:—International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo, May 9, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 4:—Final Act of the Third United Nations Technical Assistance Conference. Signed at New York, February 27, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 7:—Agreement between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Paris, March 16, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 8:—Agreement between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to succession duties. Signed at Paris, March 16, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 11:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and Mexico constituting an agreement for air services between and beyond their respective territories. Signed at Mexico, D.F., July 27, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 13:—Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their force. Signed at London, June 19, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 15:—General Agreement between Canada and Belgium concerning the transit through and stationing in Belgium of Canadian forces. Signed at Brussels, March 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 17:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany constituting an agreement giving effect to the Convention between His Majesty and the President of the German Reich regarding legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters signed at London, March 20, 1928. Signed at Bonn, October 30, 1953. English, French and German texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 19:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany constituting an agreement regarding visa requirements for non-immigrant travellers of the two countries. Signed at Bonn, April 10 and 15, 1953. English, French and German texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 21:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement for the establishment of the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers. Signed at Washington November 12, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 5:—Instrument for the amendment of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. Adopted at Geneva, June 25, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/1—*North Atlantic Treaty*: Approval of Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany. Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons January 20, 1955.
- No. 55/2—*Formosa*, statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons January 25, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

United Nations Children's Fund: Report of the Executive Board (9-17 September 1954). E/2662, E/ICEF/276. New York, 1954. 47 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 2.

International Monetary Fund—Annual Report 1954. Washington, D.C. 200 pp. (E/2661, 3 January 1955).

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—Ninth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1953-1954. Washington, D.C. 71 pp. (E/2668, 3 January 1955).

Drug Supervisory Board—Estimated World Requirements of Narcotic Drugs in 1955. E/DSB/12. Geneva, 15 December 1954. 63 pp. Sales No.: 1954.XI.5.

ECE—Growth and Stagnation of the European Economy by Ingvar Svennilson. Geneva, 1954. 342 pp. \$4.50. Sales No.: 1954.II.E.3.

Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945. Documents of the Co-ordination Committee including Documents of the Advisory Committee of Jurists:

Volume XVII—Part 1: Records of Meetings of the Co-ordination Committee. Records of meetings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists. Arrangement of the Charter. Skeleton Charter: First and second drafts. New York, 1954. 583 pp.

Volume XVIII—Part 2: Texts passed by the Technical Committees. Co-ordination Committee: drafts of the Charter and of the Statute of the Inter-

national Court of Justice. Conference Procedure. Guides to Co-ordination Committee documents. New York, 1954. 835 pp.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951. ST/PSCA/1, 6 August 1954 (New York), 514 pp. \$5.00 Sales No.: 1954.VII.1 (U.N. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs).

ILO

European Regional Conference, Geneva, 1955. Report of the Director-General. ILO, Geneva, 1954. 143. pp.

Statute and Rules of Court of the Administrative Tribunal. ILO, Geneva, 1954. 13 pp. (bilingual).

UNESCO

Man Measures the Universe (Scientific exhibition organized by UNESCO). Paris, December 1954. 80 pp.

When the Mountains Move—Technical assistance and the changing face of Latin America. by Daniel Behrman. UNESCO, December 1954. 69 pp.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Commission on International Commodity Trade—Survey of Primary Commodity Markets. (Provisional version). E/CN.13/L.1, 31 December 1954. 120 pp.

UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Systematic compilation of International Instruments relating to the legal status of aliens: United Kingdom. ST/LSA/15, Rome, July 1954. 302 pp.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

April 4 marks the Sixth Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is good at this time to remind ourselves what NATO has meant for the security of our land, for the solidarity of the Atlantic community of nations, and for the peace of the world. With our partners in NATO we have built forces designed to make war unprofitable to any aggressor, we have developed invaluable habits of inter-governmental consultation and co-operation, and we have strengthened Canadian defences against the increasing dangers of direct attack. We have accomplished much, but these are tasks that are never done once and for all. If we would remain free we must pay the price of never-ending vigilance until peace and security are firmly established on a basis of international co-operation and good will.

L. B. Pearson

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting—1955

IT is exciting to leave the biting cold and the looming snowdrifts of Ottawa, to pause briefly at Gander where wind-driven snow whips across the runway, and to find oneself a few hours later in quite a different land where the air is mild, where the grass is green and the fields are open, and where the winter sun struggles valiantly to make its warmth felt through the soft mistiness of a fine winter day. Such in brief was the experience of those who travelled to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting at the end of January. The Canadians were the last to arrive but the welcome accorded us was no less warm on that account.

Nature of the Commonwealth

An appropriate starting point for a piece on the recent Commonwealth Meeting might be a look at the nature of the Commonwealth. The communique describes it as a "unique association" whose countries contain "a fourth of the world's population, embracing peoples of many races and religions". This is not the place for a discussion of Commonwealth constitutional arrangements. But a glance at one or two of its essentials may help to reveal the nature of this flexible political instrument which offers an example to the world of how nations can live and prosper in mutual friendship and respect. Perhaps the point of first importance is that the Commonwealth is a voluntary association; each of the members is free, independent and completely sovereign. None of the members is under compulsion of any sort to agree with any or all of the others. Each government makes its own decisions except in the few cases where the decision may affect the nature of the Commonwealth itself and thus require consideration by all.

What are the positive features which make the Commonwealth such a useful association and which keep it in being? In the formal sense the single common link remaining is recognition of the Crown as the symbol of the free association of its sovereign members. The Head of the Commonwealth is a constitutional monarch but has not the same position in all Commonwealth countries. But the real substance of the association is possession by the members of common ideals, and a common interest in promoting and defending their democratic ways of life. This sharing of ideals is buttressed by adherence to the principles of free parliamentary government and political institutions and governmental practices which are based on the rule of law and respect for the dignity of the individual. They are in fact part of a common political heritage which assures mutual understanding without the necessity of formal instruments of association. And it is this sharing of ideals from which stems the common outlook which despite geography, religion and race gives the Commonwealth its peculiar stability, lends weight and substance to its steady progress towards peace, liberty and human betterment and evokes a broadly similar response to most international problems.

Commonwealth meetings are characterized by friendliness, by free and open discussion, and by informality. There are no rigid or formal procedural rules to limit the range of subjects to be brought before the gathering by any of those present. The meetings are not stereotyped and discussion is not restricted to subjects on an agenda. The Membership of the Commonwealth ensures that matters under discussion are approached from a variety of angles and points of view. This is an enrichment and a source of strength. It is true to say that most problems look different when viewed from the equator than they do from a vantage point near the North Pole. There is great benefit to be gained from an exchange of views with trusted and like minded associates. At the recent meeting, it was particularly important to have views of Asian countries, as the meeting was largely concerned with Asian developments.

The conference met from January 31 - February 8. During this interval there were nine plenary sessions and four meetings dealing with defence questions in various regions. In addition there were *ad hoc* meetings on questions of interest to two or more members. The defence talks were not attended by all of those present at the conference, the membership being governed by specific commitments which countries had undertaken in the areas under discussion.

The plenary sessions were held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street under the eye of the first British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, whose portrait hangs above the fireplace. The informality and friendly family spirit which characterized the meetings were reflected in the fact that no identity cards or passes were issued to delegates. Admittance to the official residence of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom could be gained with ease by a word of explanation to the friendly man on the front door. United Kingdom Ministers were present in strength supported by an equivalent number of senior officials; arrangements for the meeting were in the hands of the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brooks, and his competent Cabinet Office staff. In considerable degree, the meetings followed the pattern of Cabinet discussions save for the fact that officials were present behind those seated around the table.

Emphasis on International Affairs

To a greater extent than most previous meetings the 1955 Conference concerned itself with international affairs. The talks took place in the shadow of the crisis over Formosa and in part this contributed to the emphasis on Far Eastern problems.

Consideration of far eastern affairs including Formosa took up almost half of the plenary sessions. Discussion of these matters was extremely frank. As Mr. St. Laurent emphasized in his report to Parliament, it was of immense value to the Prime Ministers of the western governments to get the point of view of important leaders from Asia on this vital Asian problem and indeed on all the matters before the meeting. Although no joint pronouncement issued from the conference, the very fact that leaders of a number of important nations from all quarters of the globe were assembled at a time of mounting tension, and could discuss dispassionately the issues involved with full knowledge of the gravity of the issues at stake helped to dispel tension and to create an atmosphere of calm and moderation in which a political settlement might be sought by negotiation. This in itself was an important success of the conference.

The meetings were dominated by two outstanding personalities. The conference met under the chairmanship of a great statesman to whom all free men will forever be in debt. Although no longer young, Sir Winston Churchill is possessed of a sweeping imagination whose range and grasp was a source of inspiration to all who heard him. His unequalled experience, his mastery of the subjects of particular interest to him, and the power of his vigorous mind well fitted him to preside over the discussions and to enliven them at intervals by brilliant shafts of wit. His command and love of language was reflected in the zest with which he set to the task of re-drafting and polishing the communiqué.

The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, held a position of special importance as the spokesman for the resurgent nations of Asia which have recently attained full independence or continue to live their revolution. His exposition of the Asian point of view, based on rational argument moderately expressed, flowed inevitably from his analysis of the basic factors shaping affairs in Asia. He gave eloquent expression to the hopes and aspirations of the Asian peoples.

No Discussion on Constitutional Aspects of Commonwealth

The conference was notable for the fact that it was the first within living memory in which there was no discussion of the constitutional aspects of the Commonwealth or questions of Commonwealth organization. Proposals for the creation of additional machinery for formal consultation, suggestions that Commonwealth policy be co-ordinated and concerted through a permanent secretariat which have exercised Commonwealth leaders at previous meetings played no part in the proceedings. The one exception was Pakistan's request to be accepted as a continuing member of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic. In broaching this matter at the fifth plenary session, Mr. Mohammed Ali emphasized that there was no desire in Pakistan to weaken the link with the Commonwealth. The satisfaction of the desire of his people for a republican form of government would only strengthen Pakistan's determination to co-operate with the other members. The people of Pakistan would retain their loyalty, admiration and devotion to Her Majesty even though it flowed through an elected President rather than an appointed Governor General.

The decision that a nation of 80 million people should cease to owe allegiance to the Queen was not taken without a sense of the drama involved and a feeling of emotion. There was ready agreement that it was for Pakistan to decide what form of constitution she should have, and the Prime Ministers unanimously welcomed Pakistan's wish to continue her close attachment to the Commonwealth. The declaration recording this constitutional change which will enable Pakistan to establish a relationship similar to that of India will be found at the end of this article.

One of the most successful features of the conference was its function as a meeting ground for leaders of free Asian countries as well as of free nations from the West. In this sense, it made possible not only an exchange of views around the conference table but provided opportunities for informal private discussions in restricted groups which is essential to that meeting of minds so necessary if the Commonwealth is to fulfil its role as a bridge between East and West.



THE QUEEN AND THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS

Her Majesty the Queen with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth who were in London attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Left to right: Sir Godfrey Huggins (Rhodesia and Nyasaland); Mr. Mohammed Ali (Pakistan); Mr. R. G. Menzies (Australia); the Hon. C. R. Swart (South African Minister of Justice, deputizing for the South African Prime Minister); Sir Winston Churchill, K.G. (United Kingdom); Her Majesty the Queen; Mr. S. G. Holland (New Zealand); Mr. L. S. St-Laurent (Canada); Mr. Nehru (India); and Sir John Kotelawala (Ceylon).

Another aspect of the meeting which reflects the air of trust and understanding so characteristic of this friendly association and which augurs well for the future was the easy acceptance of the right of groups of members to discuss questions of mutual concern privately. This was particularly evident in respect of the regional discussions on defence matters about which all members had been informed in advance.

All delegations are indebted to the United Kingdom for the trouble which it had taken to ensure the comfort and convenience of visitors, and the smooth functioning of the meetings. Incoming parties on arriving at hotels where they were to stay found offices organized for them complete with desks, filing cabinets, and telephone switchboards. In keeping with the tradition of close and informal exchange of information, which is such an important part of the functioning of the Commonwealth, while in London Prime Ministers had access to information available to United Kingdom Ministers and were enabled to continue to follow developments throughout the world without interruption. The arrangements for recording the conference proceedings were handled with commendable efficiency.

As is customary at Commonwealth gatherings the Prime Ministers and delegates were entertained at a series of colourful and impressive social functions. These ranged from large formal receptions commencing with Viscount Swinton's party at Lancaster House on the opening day, and a joint reception

by Commonwealth High Commissioners at Guildhall to smaller and less formal dinners and luncheons at Downing Street, Chequers, and the residences of Sir Anthony Eden, other United Kingdom Ministers and High Commissioners. The Prime Ministers and Ministers dined with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. Delegation members of less senior rank enjoyed an informal evening party given by Her Majesty and the Duke of Edinburgh. Prince Charles and Princess Anne were present for a short time and were one of the centres of attention. And advantage was taken of the occasional opportunity to escape from the round of official and private functions for an enjoyable evening at the theatre, the opera, or a football match.

Freedom of City of London Accorded to Mr. St. Laurent

The conference was the occasion for a ceremony of dignity and splendour at Guildhall when Mr. St. Laurent was accorded the freedom of the City of London. In accordance with ancient custom, after subscribing to the Oath, the Prime Minister was admitted to the band of freemen in the presence of the Lord Mayor, the Sheriffs and members of the Common Council resplendent in their traditional robes of scarlet and mazarine before an assembly of Commonwealth statesmen, civil and military leaders and persons prominent in business and cultural circles. The Prime Minister spoke impressively of the ties which link Canadians with the people of Britain, and of the value of cherishing ancient customs and traditions which make for stability and continuity amid the change and bustle which is so characteristic of the modern world. Here, and at the luncheon which followed in Mansion House, the forms of ancient custom gained life and warmth from the dignified yet friendly courtesy of the chief participant whose sincerity in thanking those assembled for the honour they had bestowed on him, and through him, on the people of Canada, was a memorable experience for Canadians present and formed a fitting climax to a splendid occasion.

ANNEX

Declaration

The Government of Pakistan have informed the other Governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Pakistan people that under the new Constitution which is about to be adopted, Pakistan shall become a sovereign, independent Republic. The Government of Pakistan have, however, declared and affirmed Pakistan's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The Queen as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth. The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ceylon, the basis of whose membership is not hereby changed, accept and recognize Pakistan's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this Declaration. The Government of India, the basis of whose membership is also unaltered, similarly recognize Pakistan's continuing membership.

In notifying the other Prime Ministers of Pakistan's intention, Mr. Mohammed Ali reaffirmed his country's steadfast adherence to the Commonwealth. The other Prime Ministers, in accepting this proposal, welcomed Pakistan's continued association and co-operation as a member of the Commonwealth and assured Mr. Mohammed Ali that the friendship and goodwill of their countries towards Pakistan would remain unaffected by this constitutional change.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare, as they did in 1949 when a similar decision was taken in respect of India, that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

COMMUNIQUE

The Governments of the member nations of the Commonwealth are resolved to do their utmost to ease international strain. It is their aim, not only to bring any open hostilities to an end, but to promote conditions in which real peace can grow and thrive so that freedom and plenty may be enjoyed by all peoples.

Since the last Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1953, agreements have been reached in various parts of the world which have had the effect of removing differences and widening the area of understanding among Governments and peoples. The Prime Ministers welcomed the settlement of the Trieste dispute. They recorded their satisfaction that, in the Middle East, the United Kingdom's differences with Egypt and Iran had been resolved. They looked forward to closer collaboration between all the countries of that area so that its economic development and the welfare of its peoples could be advanced. They welcomed, in South-East Asia, the end of hostilities in Indochina and stressed the need for strict adherence to the conditions of the Geneva Agreement and for increased welfare and stability in that area.

The Prime Ministers were informed that the Commonwealth countries associated with the North Atlantic Treaty were convinced that the early ratification of the Agreements reached in London and Paris and the acceptance of Federal Germany into the community of the Western nations would mark an important advance towards the security and cohesion of Western Europe.

The Prime Ministers met at a time of tension in the Far East. In view of developments which occurred during their meeting, their discussions of this problem assumed a special significance. They were united in their conviction that it was necessary that incidents should be avoided while means were sought for a peaceful outcome. They were confident that the intimate and personal discussions which they had held at this Meeting would be a vulnerable foundation for future consultations, with one another and with other countries directly concerned, and for the development of their policies on this question.

The Prime Ministers noted the improvement in the outlook for world trade and prosperity which had taken place since the Commonwealth Finance Ministers met at Sydney in January 1954. They recognized that Commonwealth countries had made a substantial contribution to this by maintaining the stability of their currencies, by continuing their development programmes, in which the Colombo Plan had played its part, and by expanding their production. They had also continued their progressive approach towards the widest practicable system of trade and payments, which best serves the interest of the sterling area and Canada.

The Prime Ministers affirmed their determination to continue these policies of economic progress. They agreed, in particular, that all Commonwealth countries should strive to develop further their resources and their earning power. By these means they could best consolidate their strength and make an increased contribution to economic stability throughout the world.

The Prime Ministers gave anxious thought to the problems of nuclear energy. The latest discoveries confront humanity with a force which is almost beyond the capacity of man's brain to comprehend or measure. They present a choice and a challenge. Is this vast power to be developed for the benefit of man, or is it to be used to bring ruin upon the human race?

The Prime Ministers once again declare that their countries will never embark upon aggression. Indeed, it is their hope that, when the peoples of the world understand the magnitude of the disaster which world war would bring, all nations will shrink from violence and follow peaceful means of settling their differences. The annihilating power of the new weapons renders it imperative that sanity should prevail and that war should be prevented.

It is the aim of the Commonwealth countries to work for a disarmament agreement which includes forces and weapons of all kinds and is both comprehensive and effective. Commonwealth Governments have already devoted much time and thought to producing and furthering practical plans to achieve this purpose, and two of the Commonwealth countries are members of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

With international accord on disarmament, it would become possible to turn the vast resources of atomic energy increasingly into channels which benefit mankind. The Prime Ministers were informed of the progress made by the United Kingdom Government in the use of atomic energy for industrial and other peaceful purposes. They looked forward to the prospects of continued close co-operation between the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in the development of the civil uses of atomic energy.

In the course of the Meeting, the Prime Minister of Pakistan informed the other Prime Ministers that Pakistan was about to adopt a republican form of constitution but desired to remain a member of the Commonwealth. They were assured that the people of Pakistan were resolved to maintain, despite this constitutional change, their steadfast adherence to the Commonwealth and their recognition of the Crown as the Symbol of the free association of its sovereign members. In a declaration issued on February 4 they signified their agreement that Pakistan should continue on this basis to be a full member of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic. All the Prime Ministers re-affirmed that their countries would remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

The Commonwealth is a unique association. Its countries contain a fourth of the world's population, embracing people of many races and religions. Among its members are countries of importance in all quarters of the globe. Its strength and influence in the world today are derived from this and from a common outlook which, in spite of differences of geography, religion and race, evokes a broadly similar response to most international problems of the day.

The Commonwealth countries do not pursue any selfish purpose. They seek no aggrandisement and will always oppose aggression. In concert with all who share their ideals, they are resolved to do their utmost to further the cause of peace throughout the world.

London, S.W.1.

8th February, 1955.

REGIONAL DEFENCE DISCUSSIONS

While the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were in London the opportunity was taken to hold a series of additional meetings on regional defence problems. These meetings covered the main areas in which the forces of Commonwealth countries may have to be deployed in the event of war. Each was attended by representatives of those Commonwealth countries whose forces might in war be operating in the particular area under discussion. Their purpose was to enable the representatives of those countries to join together in reviewing the plans for the defence of each area.

The representatives of the Commonwealth countries concerned with these regional defence plans recognized that the advent of thermonuclear weapons involves fundamental changes in the strategic approach to defence problems. They agreed that the overwhelming superiority of the Western Powers in nuclear weapons offers at the present time the most effective and practical assurance that world peace will not be disturbed by any deliberate act of aggression. They agreed that their defence policies should be founded on the principle that world war can be prevented if the free democracies are resolved to maintain in readiness forces sufficiently strong to deter any potential aggressor.

In Europe great progress has already been made in building up the defensive shield provided by the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers; and the Commonwealth representatives who took part in these discussions welcomed the steps which are being taken to increase the strength of those forces by a military contribution from Western Germany. The defence problems of the Middle East were reviewed in the light of recent developments and agreement was reached on the basis for a new approach to defence planning in this area. Discussion of the defence problems of South-East Asia covered plans to help the countries in that area, not only to resist aggression, but also to strengthen their internal security. The four Commonwealth countries which are signatories of the Manila Treaty took this opportunity of reviewing, in preparation for the forthcoming conference at Bangkok, progress in making that Treaty an effective instrument for these purposes.

The opportunity was taken to discuss, as one element in the defence of the Manila Treaty area, the security of Malaya, which is regarded by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand as of vital importance. The strategic position of the area was clarified by these discussions and it was considered that, in future, joint planning among the three Governments and discussion with other participants in the Manila Treaty would go forward more effectively.

Throughout these regional defence discussions it was accepted that military plans must be concerted with other countries involved in the defence of these areas. The Commonwealth countries concerned also recognized the need for the closest association with the United States in all defence measures. They agreed that on this basis regional defence planning can afford a solid foundation for the preservation of peace.

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base

THE Middle East affords the most important land bridge in the world, linking as it does the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. Through the area pass the shortest sea and air traffic routes linking Europe with Africa and Asia. Moreover, it is a major oil producing area, containing 40 per cent of the world's known resources of oil. The peace and security of the Middle East is therefore of vital importance not only to peoples in the area but to all free nations.


The experience of two world wars showed the value of having defence facilities available in the Middle East prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Easily the most important of these installations before the Second World War was the military base in the Suez Canal zone. It was a vital factor both in halting the German and Italian thrusts on Egypt and the Sudan and, later, in the successful campaigns which resulted in the liberation of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Syria. The Suez Canal base also served as the supply centre for military operations which preserved Iraq from Axis domination and for the resistance movements in Greece and Crete. In the course of these operations the base supported the equivalent of about forty-one army divisions of which thirteen were armoured, air forces totalling about sixty-five squadrons and a substantial naval force.

Treaty of 1936

Before and during the Second World War the United Kingdom occupied the Suez Canal base by virtue of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936. The main articles of that Agreement provided for the termination of United Kingdom military occupation of Egypt and the establishment of a permanent alliance, for mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Egypt should either become involved in hostilities, and for the abolition of the régime of capitulations. Under Article 8 the United Kingdom was authorized to maintain a limited number of troops in the Suez Canal zone "until such time as . . . the Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of the navigation of the Canal". The duration of the Treaty of 1936 was fixed for twenty years but after ten years the Parties might with mutual consent negotiate a revision.

Between 1946 and 1952 the popular demand in Egypt for a revision of the Treaty of 1936 grew in intensity. It was an integral part of the Egyptian nationalist awakening and linked in the public mind with other political, economic and social conditions in the country. This nationalist movement proved irresistible and wrought important changes in Egypt which, although for a time they blocked efforts to bring about a new Anglo-Egyptian accord, ultimately resulted in an atmosphere favourable to that end. In particular, the Council for the Revolutionary Command was able to establish a stable government in Egypt and to make a fresh approach to the problems which had soured its relations with the United Kingdom.

By 1954, moreover, new factors were affecting the technical aspects of security. The development of the power of nuclear weapons and their availability to potential aggressors, had necessitated a general re-thinking of defence



strategy. A strategic review carried out by the United Kingdom had implications for its policy in the Middle East. Some indications of this re-assessment were given by the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Anthony Head, in the United Kingdom House of Commons on July 29, 1954, in the debate on the Heads of Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom: The advent of the hydrogen bomb, together with other thermo-nuclear weapons, had put a premium on dispersion and was very much against the concentration of military forces and material. The ability to equip, train and maintain overseas, at long distances from the United Kingdom, large numbers of troops would be restricted. Moreover, the growing strength of Turkey and its membership in NATO improved the chances of a successful defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus the United Kingdom was more likely to take part in defensive strategy on Turkey's right flank, an area from which Egypt was relatively remote. These and other considerations enabled the United Kingdom Government to modify its approach to the negotiations with Egypt.

After informal discussions during the autumn of 1953, formal negotiations between Egypt and the United Kingdom were resumed on July 10, 1954 which led to the initialling of the Heads of Agreement on July 27. After a further period of negotiating the details the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base was signed in Cairo on October 19, 1954. The Agreement envisaged

that United Kingdom troops would be withdrawn from the Suez Canal zone within twenty months from the date of signature, that specified installations in the existing base would be maintained by civilian technicians on behalf of the United Kingdom Government for the remainder of the seven year term of the Agreement, and that the base would only be placed on a war footing in the event of an attack by an outside power on an Arab League state or Turkey. The United Kingdom and Egypt would consult if there was a threat of such an attack.

Provisions of the Agreement

The Agreement was necessarily complicated and for this reason its contents were broken down into a Main Agreement of thirteen Articles, two lengthy Annexes, sixteen Exchanges of Notes and an Agreed Minute. All of these were equally integral parts of the Agreement, as was made clear in the main document. The provisions in these documents fall into three categories:

- (a) those affecting the military withdrawal;
- (b) those establishing the base on a civilian footing; prescribing which installations should be given into the charge of civilian contractors, which should be maintained by the Egyptian Authorities and the conditions under which the installations should be so run; and
- (c) those relating to problems which arose during the existence of the military base and prior to the signature of the Agreement.

These three elements had financial implications which were also dealt with in the Agreement.

The withdrawal of the 83,000 British troops was provided for in Article 1 of the Main Agreement and Part A of Annex I, which laid down the phases of withdrawal in percentages of troops to be withdrawn by specific dates. By June 19, 1956 the withdrawal is to be complete. Articles 4 and 5 of the Main Agreement provide for the reactivation of the base in the event of an armed attack by an outside power or any country which is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo April 13, 1950, or on Turkey. In the event of the return of British forces to the Suez Canal base, they will be withdrawn immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities. In the event of the threat of an armed attack there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Article 3 of the Main Agreement provides that the base should be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions for its re-activation. The organization of the base under civilian contractors is dealt with in detail in Annex II. The installations which the United Kingdom government have the right to maintain and operate include the base workshops, ordnance depots, vehicle depot and power station at Tel el Kebir; the base ammunition depot and power station at Abu Sultan; the engineer stores base depot, base workshops, spare parts depot and power station at Fayid and Fanara; a number of petrol and oil installations, storage tanks and pumping stations at Agrud, Fanara, Nefisha and Suez. The Government of Egypt is required to maintain in good order other installations, which will be available to the United Kingdom government on re-activation of the base and which include filtration plants, airfields, power stations, a Royal Air Force maintenance unit, hospitals, railway workshops, sidings and certain road

and land links, and a base ordnance depot. A number of other installations and equipment were to be transferred to Egyptian ownership on completion of the withdrawal, including all airfields and certain naval installations at Adabiya and Port Said. Specific provisions have been made for the British technicians who will maintain the base and for the companies which employ them.

Article 9 of the Main Agreement deals with the United Kingdom's right to move at its discretion any British equipment into or out of the base. The level of stores to be maintained is fixed in accordance with Part C of Annex II. These stores include 50,000 tons of ammunition, 300,000 tons of ordnance and engineering equipment, 2,000 vehicles, 30 locomotives and 100 railway cars. Unless both the contracting governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement, it will terminate seven years after the date of signature and the government of the United Kingdom will take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the base.

The preceding paragraphs describe briefly the highlights of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Both parties have expressed satisfaction about the Agreement which in the words of the Preamble meets their desire "to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship." In addition to this improvement in the relations between the parties, the Agreement has been widely hailed at providing a basis for better understanding between Egypt and the Western democracies as a whole. At the same time it ensures that in the event of outside aggression in the region of the Middle East a substantial base will be available to meet the emergency.



CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

The new Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. K. P. Kirkwood, presented his credentials to Colonel Abdul Nasser, Premier of Egypt on December 27, 1954. At the right of Colonel Nasser is Wing Commander Hassan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Republican Affairs.

The International Control of the Military Uses of Atomic Energy

THE ramifications of this subject are considerable. In order to focus attention on some of the more important problems which arise in trying to bring the military uses of atomic energy under international control, the subject will be treated under three main divisions. First, the technical background of the control problem will be discussed, with special reference to the increased potential destructiveness of atomic weapons and to the current armaments race. Secondly, the efforts made by direct and indirect approaches in search of a negotiated agreement on disarmament will be reviewed. Thirdly, there follows an analysis of some of the major questions which arise when one tries to form a judgment as to the prospects of success of this search, which continues.

Technological Background

It has been said that "the subject of atomic energy is dynamite". That is perhaps as good a starting point as any in the consideration of what atomic weapons can do. For as with dynamite, we are concerned with explosions. An explosion by definition is a sudden and violent release of energy in large amounts. The scientific discoveries of nuclear physics and the development of technology have put at man's disposal the capacity of making explosions on a revolutionary scale of magnitude and this capacity has been continually increasing.

President Eisenhower has spoken of the "awful arithmetic" of the atomic bomb. Reviewing just the published material, one can get some idea of the advance in the destructive power of these weapons.

It is now almost ten years ago that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the end of the last war, and the beginning of the atomic age. The explosive energy released in the first of these atomic bombs was equal to approximately twenty thousand tons of T.N.T., or twenty kilotons. This, as it were, "model T-bomb" has since been used as a yardstick, against which all progress in destructive power has been measured, and for this reason it is usually referred to as the "nominal bomb".

Now this nominal atomic bomb already represented a tremendous advance in destructive power over the weapons hitherto employed in bombing, for the release of explosive energy in the nominal bomb was already about one thousand times as much as that of the block-busters of the last war. President Eisenhower, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, revealed that the atomic bombs have since become "twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned".

But an even more revolutionary development in the destructive power of the individual weapons was achieved in the so-called hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb. By fusing or binding the elements of light atomic weight such as hydrogen, instead of splitting the heavier elements such as uranium or plutonium, it was found that a far greater release of energy could be obtained.

Thus, in the first test of this type of weapon which was carried out by the United States Government at Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands in November 1952, energy equivalent to between five to seven million tons of T.N.T. (or five to seven megatons of T.N.T.) was released. In a later test carried out at Eniwetok last year, the energy released, according to newspaper reports, was again at least doubled. Thus, in the first decade of the atomic age, the already tremendous destructive power of the uranium bomb has been dwarfed almost a thousandfold by the power of the hydrogen weapon.

One of the important consequences of this rapid multiplication of the destructive power of these new weapons, is that an economy can be made in accomplishing a given amount of destruction with nuclear fire power as compared with conventional fire power, despite the high cost of the weapons and the equipment required to produce them. Representative Sterling Cole, then Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, illustrated this point in the following statement made in a speech in New York on April 29, 1954: "Today a single plane . . . on a single mission, can carry more destructive cargo than the total carried by the combined air forces of all the allies and all the Axis nations through all the six years of World War II."

Effects of the Latest Weapons

There is not much detailed public information available on the effects of these latest weapons,* although there has been considerable speculation in the press on what this might be in contrast to the effects of the nominal atomic bombs. However, we have it on the authority of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (President Eisenhower's press conference, March 31, 1954) that these hydrogen weapons can be made as large as military requirements demand and that any city in the world could be destroyed—in the sense of "being put out of commission"—by one such weapon.

Apparently, the radius of destruction from blast does not in fact increase proportionately with the amount of energy released in the explosion. The scientists tell us that the radius of damage from a big explosion increases as the cube root of the energy released. Thus with a bomb about one thousand times more powerful than the nominal atomic bomb, the radius of damage would be about ten times greater. Since the radius of complete destruction at Hiroshima was about one mile, the corresponding radius for a hydrogen bomb one thousand times as large, would be approximately ten miles.

There are other damage effects from atomic weapons, such as flash-burns and the effects of radiation. With the hydrogen bomb explosions, there is also the phenomenon of "fall-out", that is the sucking up of earth and water particles by the explosion and the subsequent falling out of heavy particles. This significantly increases the lethal range of these weapons, as the experience of the crew of the Japanese fishing boat during last year's Eniwetok test dramatically illustrated.

But the "awful arithmetic" of atomic weapons is not limited to the increase in the destructive power of individual weapons. There is also the accumulation of destructive power in the growing stockpiles of bombs. Improvements are

* This was written before the Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission on High-yield Nuclear Explosions was released in Washington on February 15, 1955.

also continually being made in the capacity to deliver these weapons to their targets, through the development of carriers of longer range and greater weight-carrying capacity, including manned and unmanned aircraft, missiles and projectiles fired from cannon.

This growing capacity in atomic destructive power is not limited to the United States. The United Kingdom is producing atomic bombs too, but on a lesser scale. More important from its impact on the control problem, is the growing atomic capacity of the Soviet Union. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1953, President Eisenhower emphasized this fact when he said: "If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly has ceased to exist some years ago".

The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in a test in August 1949. Since then, this capacity has been growing and now is taken to include the hydrogen bomb. In August 1953, the Soviet Government officially announced that a hydrogen bomb had been successfully tested in Siberia. In a description of this test published in the Red Army newspaper "The Red Star" of March 26, 1954, the effect of this explosion was likened to the impact of a tremendous meteorite of a weight of not less than half a million tons that fell in Siberia in 1908.

Thus, within the first decade of the atomic age, we find a combination of the following technological factors which obviously have far-reaching political, economic and social, as well as military implications. These factors are: (a) a tremendous increase in potential destructiveness of atomic weapons, particularly with the addition of thermonuclear weapons; (b) improvements in the means of delivery of these weapons; and (c) the growing Soviet atomic capability with its consequent effect upon the race in armaments between the Communist and non-Communist powers.

Search for a Negotiated Agreement on Disarmament

So far we have been considering the destructive power of atomic weapons in terms of broad orders of magnitude. These weapons exist as the product of advances in science and technology. Their tremendously destructive power could be used. The political question arises whether the political framework of society—internationally as well as nationally organized—will permit them to be used.

Efforts to assert international checks and restraints on the use of these weapons began with the dawn of the atomic age. Within a matter of months after the bombs were dropped on Japan, a Commission was set up in the United Nations to study the whole question of the international control of atomic energy and to see whether a system acceptable to all countries concerned could be devised which would "ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only".

These words, quoted from the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, are important because all efforts to work out a system of control have to be based on the premise that the peaceful uses of atomic energy are inseparable from the risks of war at least as long as the underlying impulses to international conflict persist. This is so because the raw

materials used, the processes of production and the processed material are largely interchangeable between military and peaceful uses. Thus control to be effective, has to cover the raw material, the processed or fissile material, the atomic plants or reactors, as well as the stockpiles of atomic materials and bombs.

System of Control

The first scheme of control which emanated from the United Nations Commission, involved the setting up of an international monopoly over all large-scale atomic industries. At that time, (i.e. before 1949), the United States enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons and the large-scale industry required to maintain their production. The United States Government in proposals put before the United Nations, offered to give up this monopoly by transfer to an international authority, on condition that there were adequate safeguards against any nation being able to produce atomic weapons.

To ensure that this internationalization would be fully effective, and that in any dispute between any national government and the international authority, the will of the latter would prevail, it was proposed that the ownership of raw materials, as well as the ownership and operation of all but laboratory and similar non-dangerous atomic energy activities, would be vested in this international agency or trust.

Production of materials would be strictly limited to consumption, so that there should be no accumulation of stockpiles which might be siphoned off for secret national atomic activities. As the United States was the only possessor of atomic stockpiles, which were not substantial at that time, the difficult technical problems of making an inventory of existing stockpiles and of checking them by inspection were comparatively less formidable than they would be today. The problem of safeguards at that time was therefore primarily related to the productive processes and the handling of the raw material.

It was contemplated that this system of control by monopoly would be set up step by step. Only after the international authority was fully in operation, the manufacture of atomic weapons by the United States would cease, the bombs would be banned, and the stocks of fissile material held by the United States would be transferred to the authority, and put to peaceful purposes only.

This scheme of control which was deemed quite feasible from a technical standpoint by the experts, ran into difficulties on political grounds. The United States conception of control and atomic disarmament was that security should be established first, in the form of an international authority and the far-reaching controls and safeguards which it would administer. The Soviet Government had a different conception. What they evidently had in mind was that priority should be given to the establishment of a position of equality with the United States in atomic weapons, by their prohibition and total elimination. Security, in the form of guarantees against the production of atomic weapons, was to be left to later negotiations.

The Soviet Government proposed that as a first step there should be a pledge to outlaw the atomic bomb. The Soviet representatives never really got around to spelling out exactly what would constitute their conception of

security. The Soviet representatives insisted that safeguards against the violation of the pledge of prohibition, could be achieved by the international inspection of national atomic plants and activities, which the national government would declare to the international agency.

The main objection from the standpoint of the Western Powers to this Soviet insistence upon first achieving a parity—at the point of zero—with the United States in atomic weapons, was that it would have left the Soviet Union with a great preponderance in military power by reason of its marked superiority in conventional arms and forces, without the offsetting advantage in security of an effective system of international control.

The weakness of the Soviet approach to the problem of international control was its dependence for effectiveness on the will of the national authority to co-operate loyally with the international authority, including the granting of the right to international inspectors to move freely in and out of the country and to move about anywhere where they might choose in order to assure themselves that in fact no secret atomic activities for military purposes were going on.

Thus the negotiations for atomic disarmament became stalled mainly over the argument of whether security through international control was to come first, or whether equality in the balance of atomic power, was to come first, through the elimination of United States atomic capability. Underlying this argument was, of course, the conflict of aims and power between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular, and between the Communist and non-Communist nations in general. This basic underlying conflict was recognized as a major obstacle to an agreement on international control in the second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, when it had to acknowledge failure to reach agreement.

The New Approach to the Disarmament Problem

Such was the position of stalemate in the negotiations on the international control of the military uses of atomic energy until last year, when a new approach was tried in the light of the radically new circumstances. The Soviet Union now had developed an atomic capability, and the vastly increased destructive power of the hydrogen weapons had to be reckoned with.

Even less than before could the United States, or the Soviet Union, be expected to base their atomic disarmament merely on the faith that the other side had disclosed all its stockpiles, without having this fact carefully established by check. The problem of security against atomic attack is therefore now tied more closely than ever with the international inspection of the stockpiles of atomic weapons and materials and with their disposal. Moreover, with such very potent weapons in the scales, it is more important than ever to maintain a balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers throughout the process of disarmament. In view of the marked superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies in traditional weapons and manpower, in addition to its atomic capability, the elimination of atomic weapons has to be tied in with a balanced reduction in conventional war potential, if the total balance of military power in the world is not to be dangerously disturbed.

When at the end of 1953, the General Assembly had received another disappointing report on the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, it

directed the United Nations Disarmament Commission to set up a sub-committee of the five powers which would be principally concerned with this problem, including the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K., France and Canada, to explore the issues in private sessions. These meetings, which took place in London in May and June of last year, at first traversed the unprofitable arguments of previous disarmament discussions including the question of which was to come first, the pledge to ban nuclear weapons or the machinery of control.

Basis of Compromise

But just before the end of these meetings the British and French Governments, with the support of Canada and the United States, put forward a memorandum on June 11 designed to try to bring the two sides closer together. The basis of compromise was to make disarmament a gradual process, i.e. to implement the pledge of prohibition of atomic armaments by stages, to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces by stages, as well as introduce the controls which are to ensure the execution of these measures in good faith.

Thus the proposals of the Western powers envisaged an immediate agreement that under the terms of the United Nations Charter, the parties should regard themselves as being prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons, except in defence against aggression. Then the first step in the disarmament programme would be the creation of a control organ.

Following the creation and positioning of the international control organ, the first step in the Disarmament Programme would be the freezing at levels existing on December 31, 1953 of military budgets covering expenditures on atomic as well as non-atomic weapons and manpower, as soon as this organ were in a position to enforce the implementation of this measure.

After the freeze would come a gradual reduction. As soon as the control authority was capable of enforcing this reduction, a two-phase programme of disarmament would begin. In the first phase, half of the agreed upon reductions in conventional arms would take place. Then as soon as the control organ was prepared to enforce the next phase, the second half of the agreed reductions in conventional arms would occur. The ban on the manufacture and use of atomic weapons would also become effective in this later stage, and all atomic materials would be converted to peaceful purposes.

The aim of this phased disarmament programme as a whole, would be to bring armaments on both sides of the Iron Curtain gradually down to the level strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of United Nations Charter obligations, and to maintain these levels balanced, under a system of strict international control.

At first, these proposals were turned down by the Soviet Government. However, at the session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last fall, Mr. Vychinsky sprang a surprise. In a speech on September 30, which in other respects did not seem to strike a compromising note, he proposed that the British-French memorandum of June 11 be taken as the basis for negotiating a disarmament convention, on the condition that certain "basic provisions" put forward by the Soviet Government were also included.

These Soviet provisions differ from the Western proposals in a number of particulars. They do not provide, for instance, for an initial freeze on military

budgets and manpower levels before the phased reductions begin. Instead, they envisage a two-step reduction plan, with a time limit of six months to a year for each step. In the first stage, conventional armaments are to be reduced from their December 31, 1953 levels, by 50 per cent of levels to be agreed to. In the second stage, the other 50 per cent of reduction of conventional weapons is to be carried out and the production of atomic weapons is to cease. Atomic materials are to be converted to civil uses. So far the two sets of proposals bear a certain resemblance.

On the nature of controls, the differences between the Soviet proposals and those of the Western powers are more marked. While the Western proposals make the start of each phase of disarmament dependent on the readiness of the control organ to carry out its responsibilities for seeing that the implementation of the undertakings are carried out in good faith, the Soviet plan apparently contemplates that the control bodies would be created during the phase which they are supposed to police.

The first phase under the Soviet plan would be supervised by a "temporary International Control Commission" established under the Security Council. The second of the Soviet phases would be supervised by a "Standing International Organ".

Not only the process of establishing controls, but also the powers to be given to these international bodies under the Soviet plan require clarification. Apparently their powers are not to extend beyond "the power of inspection on a continuing basis to ensure implementation of the convention by all states". What the powers of an international inspectorate would amount to in practice when matched against the powers of a totalitarian national state, and what influence the Security Council may have in putting pressure on a national government which refuses to co-operate, are the kind of important questions which will have to be explored.

Disarmament Negotiations Continued

These moves from both sides in the direction of compromise raised hopes sufficiently in the United Nations that it was possible to witness the rare spectacle of a resolution adopted by unanimity in the last General Assembly to continue negotiations on disarmament.

The Canadian Delegation played an important part in bringing about this display of unanimity. Earlier in the debate in the General Assembly, the Canadian Delegation had introduced a resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to reconvene the five-power sub-committee and, in the light of these new proposals, to seek agreement on "comprehensive proposals" for the "regulation, limitation and major balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;" and the "total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes".

This resolution also provided that "effective international control" was to be established through a "control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance" of the agreement; and "the whole programme" was to be "such that no state would have cause to fear that its security was endangered". This resolution received the support and co-

sponsorship of the other Western powers. Then after some days of suspense and of patient negotiation by the Canadian Delegation with that of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. joined as a fifth co-sponsor and the resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.

Indirect Approaches

While efforts continue on the basis of this resolution to negotiate an agreement on a comprehensive scheme of disarmament, including the elimination of atomic weapons, mention should also be made of some indirect approaches to the question of controlling the military uses of atomic energy.

President Eisenhower's "Atomic Pool Plan", for instance, though not intended as a scheme of disarmament, seeks to get international co-operation started in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The essence of the scheme put forward by the President about a year ago and since unanimously approved in principle in the United Nations, is that there should be an international agency which would try to equalize the beneficial use of atomic energy by encouraging research and development activities, facilitating arrangements to supply fissile material, to set up research reactors and to train technical personnel in all countries that may be interested.

Since international control involves voluntary co-operation between nations, as well as the imposition of checks and restraints, co-operation even though not related directly to the military uses of atomic energy, might help to create goodwill, and might develop into a habit. It is also not without some utility that at least some fissile material, which would otherwise go into the military stockpiles, might find an outlet in peaceful uses.

Attempts to Ban Nuclear Tests

Because of the violence of thermonuclear explosions in the tests conducted in the Marshall Islands in 1953 and last year, and especially because of the alarming aftermath in the injury caused to Japanese fishermen by the "fall out" of radioactive particles, an attempt has been made particularly by India to put an end to further atomic tests in the Pacific. Since the Marshall Islands group (the scene of these U.S. tests), was transferred to United States administration under the authority of the United Nations Trusteeship Council as a former Japanese mandate, an effort was made to have that body order a ban on further tests. In the event a resolution was passed to the effect that if tests were continued, the United States should take precautions to prevent the exposure of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands to the radioactive particles. In the last tests apparently some of these islanders were exposed to radioactivity, but all recovered.

A standstill on tests might be technically enforceable by an international monitoring agency and might contribute to relaxation of international tensions. To have this limited effect, it would have to apply to all tests, Soviet, British as well as those of the United States. However, this might prove unacceptable to the Soviet Union if they believe that such a ban might be prejudicial to their efforts to catch up with the United States in atomic technology. For similar reasons, it might put the United Kingdom, also a late starter, at a disadvantage. In any case, it would not offer a solution to the main problem of accumulating atomic stockpiles.

Control of Means of Delivery

Another indirect approach might be the abolition, or at least limitation of the means of delivering atomic explosives including manned and pilotless aircraft, guided missiles and projectiles fired from cannon. It is another symptom of the armaments race, that efforts to extend the range and load carrying capacity of atomic carriers or vehicles are continually being made on both sides. Elaborate controls would be necessary to check on compliance, and it is hardly to be expected that carriers, as distinct from their lethal charge, would be singled out for control. Both carriers and their charges are of course to be covered in the comprehensive disarmament scheme under discussion in the United Nations.

Major Questions

Rather than attempt to forecast the results of these efforts to reach agreement on disarmament, perhaps it would be more useful to analyze some of the major questions which arise when one tries to form a judgment about the prospects of success of these efforts.

The first such question might be: Is it possible to put an end to the atomic armaments race in any way other than by international agreement?

Ruling out preventive atomic war as a possible deliberate choice on the part of the Western Powers, the answer could hardly be to stop the race, merely by having the United States or Britain drop out. This would leave the field of atomic military power free to the Soviet Union and would in effect amount to unilateral disarmament. So long as Soviet aims and policies remain hostile and aggressive, such a course would be unthinkable. Unilateral disarmament was tried between the two World Wars and brought the democratic nations to the brink of disaster. If the alternatives represented by the two extremes of preventive war and unilateral disarmament are both ruled out, there are still the alternatives of going on with the armaments race indefinitely, or of continuing to try for a negotiated agreement on disarmament.

If the atomic armaments race goes on is it possible to rely on atomic retaliation alone as a restraint against the use of atomic weapons?

Some have argued that with the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, having the capacity of atomic retaliation and with the added frightfulness of the hydrogen bomb, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would risk mutual catastrophe in atomic war. Captain Liddell Hart, the well-known British analyst of military affairs, put the issue in a recent letter to the *London Times* in the following terms: "The supreme fact of the hydrogen bomb era is that war has become palpably suicidal".

The deterrent effect of the atomic weapons cannot be denied. President Eisenhower recently said: "War would present to us only the alternatives in degrees of destruction; there could be no successful outcome". The former Soviet Premier Malenkov is on record as saying about a year ago: "A third world war would mean the destruction of world civilization".

But to be effective as a deterrent, certain conditions require to be fulfilled. For instance, it is necessary that each side should equally believe that there is at least a high probability that atomic weapons would in fact be used in certain circumstances; as for example, if continued national existence or some essential principle were at stake.

The handling of this issue of the deterrent has posed a special problem for NATO, through which the Western powers have principally organized their collective defensive and deterrent strength. At the last Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council held last December, approval was given to a report of the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO defence over the next few years, taking into account the effect of nuclear weapons. In approving this report, the Council made it clear that it was merely agreeing to certain planning assumptions which had been suggested by the NATO military authorities and was in no way delegating the political responsibility of governments for making final decisions in the event of hostilities. Now these military assumptions which were approved for planning purposes are, of course, secret, but it can be clearly implied from statements made by the military chiefs of NATO, General Gruenther and Field Marshal Montgomery, that if the Soviet Union were to launch an overt aggression against the West, the NATO forces would be justified in defending themselves with all the necessary means at their disposal.

To be effective as a deterrent also, it must be reasonably clear to each side that neither is so vulnerable to the other, that a mortal blow could be struck, before the retaliation to such an attack could be effective. Put in another way, reluctance to attack may be induced not only by the risk of receiving retaliation, but also by the prospect that an atomic attack may not succeed in inflicting a knock-out blow, or at least a mortal hurt to the atomic military potential of the victim, before the full might of retaliation takes effect on the country that strikes the first blow. The reduction of vulnerability to atomic attack of course involves the whole range of activities connected with continental air defence, as well as civil defence.

The Risk of War Developing Unintentionally

There is also the grave risk that atomic war might develop unintentionally. If the penalties for using total atomic force may have become too horrible, the possibility of aggressors using limited or conventional force cannot be ruled out. This risk will presumably continue as long as there is a cold war. The Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to this risk when he said in the course of a speech in the House of Commons on January 20 (on the approval of the protocol covering the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO): "Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermo-nuclear one".

A conflict which starts out as a limited war may involve the major security interests or resources of one of the powers possessing nuclear weapons. Imperceptibly perhaps, such a power may be drawn into a position where it may decide to use atomic weapons.

As Mr. Pearson indicated in his speech there are three main areas in which efforts must be made to reduce this type of risk of a limited conventional war turning into a total atomic war. "The first area", he said, "involves a search for agreement on effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction". The second lies in "building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression". The third area, (and this the Minister said was the most fundamental of all) lies in "improving relations between states: in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples."

Feasibility of International Control

Has the technical feasibility of the international control of atomic weapons been effected by the accumulation of atomic stockpiles on both sides and the addition of hydrogen weapons?

Reference has already been made to the fact that when the initial efforts of reaching international agreement on the control of atomic energy began in 1946, the problem of disposing of the stockpiles was comparatively simple, for the disposal of stockpiles involved only the limited amounts held by the United States. Now this issue has been complicated both by the build-up of the Soviet stockpiles, as well as by the increasing magnitude and power of the accumulation on both sides.

This issue involves some highly technical considerations as well as some interesting political ones. It is necessary, for instance, to establish an accurate inventory of the stockpiles and to check these by inspection. This is a technical problem. But in order that both sides should have faith in the results, it is also necessary that the international inspectors should have the power to investigate for the existence of undisclosed stocks, as well as checking the materials, that the national government may declare. This, of course, raises the whole question of the diverse conceptions held by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on the nature of the international control organs and their powers of inspection.

The question of technical feasibility also arises in relation to the disposal of nuclear explosives. Both the Western and the Soviet proposals for disarmament envisage as the final stage of disarmament, the conversion of existing stocks of atomic material to peaceful purposes. How is this to be done? The answer apparently involves some way of denaturing the nuclear explosives by turning them into economic fuel elements for power reactors, while rendering them unusable for weapons, except after further processing.

It is for the technological experts to say how effective it would be as a safeguard. The importance of the issue may be judged from the fact that pending such conversion, atomic armaments, in the form of explosives readily convertible into bombs, would continue to exist in stockpiles even though their manufacture might have been banned by the pledge of prohibition. Thus atomic disarmament cannot be regarded as fully effective,

until there are guarantees to both sides that all stockpiles, disclosed and undisclosed have been accounted for, and that conversion has actually been carried out. There must also be an assurance against the reconversion of the denatured explosives which might be concealed, or siphoned from the pipe-line of fissile material intended for peaceful uses.

This consideration, together with the added destructive power of hydrogen bombs, also emphasizes the importance of insisting upon effective international control being coupled with a parallel balanced reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces, if the international balance of military power is not to be dangerously disturbed.

In trying to find a way out of the vicious circle of the armaments race, the question is sometimes raised; which should come first, disarmament or a political settlement of the underlying causes of conflict? Those who contend that a political settlement must come first, argue that men do not fight because they have arms; they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight on account of some unresolved political, economic, or social conflict. Pursuing this reasoning, they also say that the elimination of certain types of weapons, such as atomic bombs, would in itself have no influence upon the incidence of war; it could at best affect only the technology of warfare and the way hostilities would be conducted.

Certainly historical experience tends to support this line of reasoning. There is, for instance, the familiar example of the Rush-Bagot agreement, providing for naval disarmament in the Great Lakes. The success and permanence of this agreement is no doubt based on the permanent absence of any competition for power between the United States and Canada, which might transform itself into armed conflict. Contrariwise, the arguments between the Soviet and Western representatives over atomic disarmament in the United Nations have reflected the continuing underlying conflict in power and aims between the communist and non-communist world.

This is a version of the old dilemma of the "chicken and the egg"—which has to come first—a political settlement or the disarmament negotiations? Even granting that the existence of underlying political conflicts does represent a most serious obstacle to agreement on disarmament, so long as there is even a gleam of hope that some progress might be made, there are good grounds for continuing to persevere in the reduction of areas of disagreement both for its own sake—in the hope of achieving a balanced reduction and control of all armaments and armed forces both atomic and non-atomic—as well as for the sake of reducing international tensions.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. W. Duchastel retired from the Diplomatic Service effective December 13, 1954.
- Mr. H. B. O. Robinson was transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective January 20, 1955.
- Mr. D. Stansfield was transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to the Canadian Embassy, Athens, effective February 7, 1955.
- Mr. V. C. Moore was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, Germany, to home leave effective February 10, 1955.
- Mr. G. J. L. Choquette was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective February 18, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Statistical Yearbook 1954 (Sixth Issue). New York, 1954. 594 p. (bilingual). Sales No.: 1954.XVII.5.

Non-Self-Governing Territories — Summaries and analyses of information transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1953. ST/TRI/SER.A/8, 9 May 1954. 293 p. Sales No.: 1954.VI.B.2.

ILO—Systems of Social Security: United States. Geneva, 1954. 106 p.

UNESCO

Compulsory Education in Indonesia by M. Hutasoit. (Studies on compulsory education—XV). Paris, December 1954. 111 p.

The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Law. (Teaching in the Social Sciences Series). Paris, November 1954. 133 p. (Report prepared by Charles Eisenmann, Professor at the University of Paris for the International Committee of comparative law).

Social Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation. (Tensions and Technology Series). (A report by Morris E. Opler of a conference held jointly by the U.N. and UNESCO). Paris, April, 1954. 79 p.

Development of Public Libraries in Africa —The Ibadan Seminar. (UNESCO Public Library Manuals—6). 155 p.

Egypt—Paintings from Tombs and Temples. Introduction by Jacques Vandier. (UNESCO World Art Series). 32 full

page colour reproduction. Published by the New York Graphic Society by arrangement with UNESCO.

Index Translationum—International bibliography of translations. No. 6. Paris 1954. 567 p. (bilingual). \$10.00.

International Directory of Photographic Archives of Work of Art. Volume II. Paris, 1954. 70 p. (bilingual).

WHO—Proposed Programme and Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1 January–31 December 1956 with the proposed programme and estimated expenditure for technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries. Geneva, December 1954. 323 p. Official Records of WHO, No. 58.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Report on the Administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste for the period of 1 January to 31 December 1953 by Major General Sir John Winterton, KCMG, CB, CBE.) Report Number 13). S/3353, 26 January 1955. 43 p.

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments Relating to the legal status of aliens: Union of South Africa. (UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). ST/LSA/16, Rome, November 1954. 51 p.

Resolutions of the Eighth Session of the General Conference of Unesco. 8C/Resolutions, Chapters I to VI. Paris, 13 January 1955.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Peru

Agreement for Air Services. Signed at Lima, February 18, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally February 18, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged February 17, 1955.

Entered into force definitely February 18, 1955.



NOTE

In its December 1954 issue, *External Affairs* published an article entitled "Slavonic Studies in Canadian Universities" contributed by Dr. J. St. Clair-Sobell of the Department of Slavonic Studies, University of British Columbia. The Director of the *Centre d'Études Slaves* of the University of Montreal, Dr. Theodore F. Domaradzki, has drawn the attention of the Department to what he considers may be a misunderstanding on the part of the author of the ends which the *Centre d'Études Slaves* has set itself to achieve. Dr. Domaradzki stresses that the Centre has by design been established as principally a graduate school in Slavonic and Eastern European studies and that it has attracted and aims to continue to draw its student population not only from the foreign born but from the autochthonous Canadian population.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

The Gaza Incident

Report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff

Major-General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, attended a meeting of the Security Council in New York on March 17, 1955 to present his report concerning the incident of February 28, 1955 near Gaza, which involved a clash between the military forces of Israel and Egypt. General Burns, who is on leave from his post as Deputy Minister of the Canadian Department of Veterans' Affairs, became Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in September 1954. Following is the text of his report without appendices, as it appeared in United Nations document S/3373 of March 17, 1955.

The Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, at an emergency meeting held on March 6, 1955, found that on the night of February 28, 1955 at 20:30 local time, a force of the Israeli Army estimated at two platoon strength, crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line east of Gaza, advanced more than three kilometres inside Egyptian-controlled territory, and, using mortars, anti-tank projectiles, hand grenades, bangalore torpedoes and heavy explosive charges, attacked an Egyptian military camp, the Gaza stationmaster's house and a concrete water-pump house supplying part of the Gaza area. The water-pump house, a stone military building and four Nissen huts were completely destroyed. Another group of the Israeli Army crossed the Demarcation Line six kilometres south-east of Gaza and ambushed a military truck carrying a lieutenant and thirty-four other ranks, who were moving from the south to reinforce the garrison of the Egyptian camp near the railway station. This attack was carried out on a highway south of Gaza and three kilometres within Egyptian-controlled territory.

The casualties on the Egyptian side were found to be 36 military personnel and two civilians killed, 29 military personnel and two civilians wounded.

Violation of Agreement

The Mixed Armistice Commission decided that this attack was a violation of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, Article II, paragraph 2, and Article V, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement.

An Israeli complaint dealing with the same incident was considered by the MAC. The complaint alleged that at about 21:00 local time an Israeli patrol was ambushed inside Israeli-controlled territory by an Egyptian armed force and that as a result a running fight, starting in Israel and carried on into Egyptian-controlled territory, ensued between the Egyptian force and the reinforcements brought to assist the Israeli patrol. The draft resolution submitted by the Israeli delegation was not adopted by the MAC.

In this draft resolution, the Israeli authorities reported that eight of their soldiers were killed and thirteen wounded in the ambush and in the subsequent fight. The reports of the United Nations observers on the investigation

of the Egyptian and Israeli complaints are attached to this report as Appendices I and II. The draft resolutions adopted and rejected, in their full text, are attached as Appendix III.

Serious Clash

The character and extent of the operations, the damage done and, above all, the heavy casualties which must be a subject of the deepest regret, make this the most serious clash between the two Parties since the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

I shall attempt to set forth the state of affairs on the demarcation line between Egyptian-controlled territory in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-controlled territory surrounding it, in the several months preceding the actual event. In my opinion, it is most important to assess the causes contributory to this very grave incident, with a view to persuading the Parties to modify their attitudes and so prevent still further deterioration of the situation.

In a previous report to the Security Council (S/3319) I submitted a number of tables containing the complaints received from the Egyptian and the Israeli delegations during the months of September and October 1954.

The tables (Appendices IV, V and VI) annexed to the report which I have the honour to submit today contain a complete list of the complaints lodged by both Parties during the last four months. Out of 99 Israeli complaints 80 alleged infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory, 10 crossing of the demarcation line by armed groups, 4 firing across the line, 3 crossing the line by an armed unit. Out of 36 Egyptian complaints, 9 alleged firing across the line, 9 overflights of Egyptian-controlled territory, 6 crossing of the line by armed groups, 3 crossing of the line by an armed unit. The number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflects the comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line during the greater part of the period November 1954 - February 1955. According to the complaints received from both sides there were during these four months: 4 Israelis killed and 4 Israelis wounded; 1 Egyptian killed and 7 Egyptians wounded. There were more casualties among Arab infiltrators into Israel territory: 8 were killed, 2 wounded and 13 captured.

It would be a difficult task to assess the relative importance of alleged incidents if the Parties themselves—by requesting an emergency meeting of the MAC in certain cases, an investigation but not an emergency meeting in other cases, and neither an emergency meeting nor an investigation in a third category of cases—did not indicate that, in their opinion, there are major and minor incidents. We may consider that the major incidents are those which are dealt with in emergency meetings of the MAC, while the other incidents are placed on the agenda of the regular monthly meetings.

It must be added that a study of the major incidents alone does not give an adequate picture of the situation, since repeated minor incidents contribute to creating a state of tension. Infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory has not been the only cause of present tension, but has undoubtedly been one of its main causes.

Incidents Dealt with by Emergency Meetings

The following are the incidents which have occurred since November first and have been dealt with in emergency meetings:

November fifth: the MAC condemned Egypt for the penetration of three men from Egyptian-controlled territory deep into Israel, where they blew up two houses in the village of Patish on November first. The MAC condemned Israel for the penetration of three Israelis up to about three kilometres inside Egyptian-controlled territory and their firing at the guards of a water tower on November first.

November tenth: the MAC condemned Israel for an attack carried out by a group of Israelis on a Bedouin tribe at Ein Quedis, three kilometres inside Egypt (2 Bedouins were kidnapped, camels and sheep were stolen).

Between the first of November and the 24th of December, there was only one incident for which an emergency meeting was requested. Israel requested an emergency meeting for the blowing up of a water pipeline leading to a *kibbutz* south of Faluja. The Chairman did not agree to an emergency meeting, as the alleged tracks led in a direction away from the Gaza Strip.

The incident which took place on December 24 was easily settled. Israel had complained that on that day an Egyptian military unit had crossed the international frontier and taken position within the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja. The MAC condemned Egypt for this violation of the Armistice Agreement. The Egyptian delegation stated that the unit which, according to the reports of the United Nations observers, did not exceed the strength of a platoon, had been removed. Both Parties agreed to call upon the Sub-Committee of the MAC to mark the international frontier on the ground, including the area where the incident had taken place. I have been informed that the Egyptian authorities are now opposed to a joint marking of the frontier and intend to mark it themselves.

Another incident relating to the area of the Auja Demilitarized Zone took place on December 29. Egypt presented a complaint and Israel a counter-complaint. The Egyptian delegation requested the condemnation of Israel, alleging that armed Israelis in vehicles coming from the Demilitarized Zone had approached the international frontier and shot at an Egyptian check-post. The Israel delegation alleged that an Egyptian military unit, after crossing the international frontier into the Demilitarized Zone, had opened fire, inside the Zone. No decision was taken by the MAC, the Chairman having abstained both on the Egyptian and the Israeli draft resolutions.

No incidents for which emergency meetings were held took place between the end of December 1954 and January 21, 1955. On the morning of that day an Egyptian military patrol attacked an Israeli post manned by three soldiers of whom one was killed, and the other two wounded. Egypt was condemned for that attack. The Egyptian delegation had requested a condemnation of Israel, alleging that Israeli soldiers had opened fire from an ambush upon an Egyptian patrol across the demarcation line. The Egyptian draft resolution was not carried, the Chairman having abstained from voting.

On the same day (January 21) at about 23:30, armed infiltrators from Egyptian-controlled territory attacked two Israelis of Ein Hashlosa settlement, six kilometres from the Demarcation Line, while they were ploughing their fields with a tractor. One was killed, the other was wounded. Two attackers were killed. The MAC condemned Egypt for this attack. The attack created much emotion in Israel and the draft resolution moved by the Israel delegation was couched in very strong terms. It noted with grave concern the serious



—United Nations

PALESTINE TRUCE SUPERVISION CHIEF ARRIVES AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS

Major-General E. L. M. Burns, of Canada, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, right, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld.

situation prevailing along the Gaza Strip resulting from what it referred to as "these repeated attacks". It noted "once again with extremely grave concern that, despite the obligation imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement and a number of MAC resolutions, these penetrations and killings of Israeli citizens have not been terminated". It called upon the Egyptian authorities to put an immediate end to such aggressive acts. The Chairman voted for the resolution moved by the Israel delegation and the Egyptian delegation abstained.

On the afternoon of February 1, an exchange of fire took place across the Demarcation Line between an Israeli patrol and an Egyptian military position. The Israelis used automatic weapons and 3" mortars. One Egyptian soldier was killed, two were wounded. One Israeli soldier was wounded. By adopting the resolution moved by Egypt, then the resolution moved by Israel, the MAC divided responsibility between the two Parties. The MAC is often criticized for such judgments. It has been argued that it should state which side started the shooting. However, in the absence of a neutral eye-witness observer in the immediate vicinity, the contradictory evidence collected from the two sides rarely permits responsibility for the first shot to be assessed. Patrols in command cars drive a few meters from the demarcation line, close to the outposts on the other side and in a period of tension an incident may easily occur.

I should point out in this connexion that on February 25 and again on March 9, the Chairman of the MAC had to draw the attention of the Israel

delegation to the fact that Israeli patrols had provoked the Egyptians by cursing them in Arabic or shouting and laughing at them. The danger of such provocations, especially in present circumstances, need not be emphasized. On both sides, elements guarding the border should observe strict military discipline.

There was another exchange of fire on the morning of February 22 when according to the Egyptian resolution submitted to the MAC, an Israeli patrol fired with automatic weapons and mortars at an Egyptian military position in the Rafah area, wounding four Egyptian soldiers. According to the draft resolution submitted by the Israel delegation, when an Israeli patrol approached infiltrators who were cutting grass on the Israel side of the demarcation line, it was fired upon by the infiltrators and by the Egyptian military position. The latter used automatic weapons and mortars. There were no Israeli casualties. As in similar cases of exchange of fire, the MAC adopted both the Egyptian and the Israeli resolutions and the two Parties were condemned for having violated the General Armistice Agreement.

This was the latest shooting incident along the demarcation line prior to the Gaza incident six days later. From the Egyptian point of view the firing by the Israeli patrol at an Egyptian military position was one more hostile act against Egypt. From the Israeli point of view there was in the incident on February 22 both one more instance of the illegal activities in Israel of infiltrators crossing illegally from the Gaza Strip and one more hostile act against Israel.

The Bat Galim Case

The recurrence at more or less frequent intervals of shooting incidents along the demarcation line, the much more frequent cases of crossing of the line by infiltrators and their activities in Israel helped to maintain a state of greater or lesser tension, which was increased by the emotion created in Israel by the Bat Galim case and, in January, by the trial in Cairo of Jews charged with espionage and the condemnation to death of two of the defendants.

The tension following the Cairo trial was marked by the fact that the Israel delegation henceforth would agree to meet the Egyptian delegation only in emergency meetings of the MAC. By the end of February, however, there was some hope that the regular monthly meetings and also informal meetings might be resumed.

I have endeavoured to find out whether there had been a special, immediate cause for the Gaza incident on February 28. It must be noted that on the morning of March 1, the Israeli newspapers which had gone to press before the Israeli army spokesman issued his communiqué on the incident, reported extensively the information given by the same army spokesman concerning the alleged activities of a group of three armed men from the Gaza Strip. According to the English language Israeli newspaper "Jerusalem Post", the army spokesman explained that on the night of February 23, the three men had broken into an Israel Government building near Rishon Le Zion (some fifty kilometres from the Demarcation Line) and stolen official documents. Two days later, near Rohobot, 40 kilometres from the Demarcation Line, a cyclist was murdered allegedly by the same group (on March 7, the MAC condemned Egypt for this murder).

The Israel army spokesman's statement in the Israeli press on March 1 went on to say that when, on the morning of February 26, the three men who had allegedly committed those crimes in Israel crossed into the Gaza Strip, they were fired upon by an Israel patrol and they had to abandon their loot, including a telephone stolen from the Israel Government building on February 23. At the same time another alleged Egyptian group was operating in another area. An Israel unit patrolling on February 25 in the vicinity of Yad Mordechai, near the Demarcation Line, encountered two armed Egyptian agents and killed one of them. On the body was found a report of the movement of military vehicles in the south of Israel during February 24 and 25.

These incidents were connected by the Israel Army spokesman with previous activities of the Egyptian intelligence service during the past year. He claimed that Egyptian agents had been caught by the Israel army and sentenced to prison terms; ten had been killed in clashes with Israel patrols, five had escaped. The army spokesman added that the Egyptian military authorities in the Gaza Strip were conducting spying and sabotage operations in Israel territory.

The above officially-released information about Egyptian intelligence patrols was supplemented in the Hebrew newspapers of March 1 by details on alleged Egyptian espionage and intelligence activities since January 1954. Appendix VII to this report contains a translation of the most complete list published to my knowledge in a Hebrew newspaper—viz., the list published in *Lamerhav*. It refers to thirteen cases for the thirteen months January 1954 - February 1955.

The Gaza incident could appear in this context as retaliation for the spying, sabotage and murders for which the Egyptian military intelligence service was said to be responsible.

It had several times been intimated to me by the Israel military authorities that they had evidence proving such Egyptian activities. However, the evidence was not shown to me, presumably because the methods of espionage and counter-espionage are highly secret. Nor had Israel referred to Egyptian intelligence activities in any complaint lodged with the Mixed Armistice Commission except in two cases. On May 3, 1954, a complaint was submitted alleging that on May 1 there had been a clash between an Israeli patrol and five armed spies sent by the Egyptian authorities. Two of the spies were killed. On one of them was found a report concerning the traffic on the Faluja-Beersheba road on April 30 and May 1, 1954. Another Israeli complaint, dated November 22, 1954, alleged that, nearly two months earlier, on September 29, a clash had occurred between the Israeli police and an armed group of four men who had crossed the demarcation line. One of the men was wounded and taken prisoner. The complaint stated that the group had committed acts of violence in Israel territory from September 19 to 29. A United Nations Observer interrogated the prisoner, an Arab from Gaza, who stated that he was an Egyptian agent.

Lacking, except in these two cases, formal complaints to the MAC by Israel linking sabotage and murders in Israeli-controlled territory with the Egyptian military intelligence service, and lacking other evidence on which I could make formal representations directly to the Egyptian authorities, I was only able to inform them of Israeli suspicions. The position of the Egyptian

authorities was that persons committing murders and sabotage were being inspired, paid and equipped by political elements in Egypt inimical to the Government, and desirous of aggravating the border situation.

I may add that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission reported to me on November 5, 1954 that according to the Egyptian authorities, armed Israeli groups had been carrying out repeated reconnaissances deep into the Gaza Strip during the preceding three weeks.

There is no peace between the two countries and a request that they should curb the activities of military intelligence in obtaining information through agents would have been of little use. However, persons who might kill or sabotage have to cross the demarcation line to do so and a close guarding and patrolling on both sides of the line would hamper such activities, as well as those of ordinary thieves and marauders. The willingness of the Parties to co-operate effectively in such guarding and patrolling could, to a degree, indicate whether they really desire to keep the border area quiet.

Report to Security Council

On November 11, 1954, I reported to the Security Council on the situation as between Egypt and Israel, in the area of the Gaza Strip (S/3319). For some weeks prior to that report there had been much comment in the Israeli press on the deteriorating situation and hints that if it were not improved it would be impossible for Israel to remain passive.

With a view to decreasing tension along the Demarcation Line, I suggested in that report that the two parties should examine in an informal meeting the possibility of agreeing on certain measures. These were:

- (a) Joint patrols along sensitive sections of the Demarcation Line;
- (b) Negotiation of a Local Commanders' Agreement;
- (c) A barbed wire obstacle along certain portions of the Demarcation Line;
- (d) Manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israeli troops.

On November 14, I had a preliminary discussion on these matters with the Director of the Palestine Affairs Department of the Egyptian Ministry of War; and I discussed them on November 24 with the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces. Both these Officers agreed that the proposals should be further considered. The Israeli Chief of Staff, however, stressed his opinion that it was essentially Egypt's responsibility to prevent infiltration. Owing to the Bat Galim negotiations and other difficulties, it was not until January 6 that I could arrange a joint discussion on a Gaza arrangement. The following is a summary of the results of that meeting:

- (a) The Israeli representative did not consider that the institution of joint patrols by the two Parties along the Demarcation Line would serve a useful purpose at this time. I pointed out that such joint patrols, while they might not be effective against infiltration, would prevent the recurring incidents in which fire was opened by Egyptians on Israeli patrols or by Israelis on Egyptian positions, and the mining of patrol vehicles. All of these types of incident have been the subject of

complaints in the past and occurred in the period preceding the Gaza incident.

- (b) After considerable discussion, it was agreed that an arrangement for the control of infiltration and incidents in the Gaza area might be made between the two Parties, on the general line of the proposed Jerusalem Area Commanders' Arrangement, and that the Parties would consider a draft which I would prepare.
- (c) Both parties felt that in principle it was desirable that those entrusted with security duties in a zone on either side of the Demarcation Line should be either regular military forces or full-time police forces.
- (d) The representatives considered the erection of physical obstacles to prevent infiltration, namely, barbed wire fences with mines and under observation. The Egyptian representative was not prepared to agree to a joint effort for the erection of such an obstacle, but had no objection to Israel putting one up, if it were desired.

The Israel representative has since informed me by letter dated January 19 that "we (Israel) did not, and cannot, agree to any joint responsibility regarding infiltration since, as there is no infiltration from our side, the responsibility lies solely with Egypt".

Draft Proposal

On January 12, I sent a draft of a proposed "Arrangements for the Purpose of Preventing Incidents in the Gaza Area" to both Parties for their comments. I received some comments from the Egyptian representative, but by the end of January, Israel had not yet replied. As a result of the Egyptian representative's comments and further examination, a second draft (copy attached as Appendix VIII) was despatched to both Parties on the first of February under a covering letter which suggested a meeting to arrive at a final agreed text.

On the eve of my departure for New York, on March 12, I received a letter from the Israel representative in which he confirmed his agreement expressed in the informal meeting of January 6, to conclude an Area Commanders' Arrangement in the Gaza Strip area for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the Demarcation Line and other breaches of the General Armistice Agreement. A draft incorporating the Israeli proposals for an Arrangement was attached to the Israel representative's letter.

I am still of opinion that if an agreement were effected between the two Parties on the lines I have suggested, and if an honest attempt to fulfil the conditions were made by both Parties, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance, a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable so long as there are vast numbers of poverty-stricken refugees on her borders—more than 200,000 in the Gaza Strip alone. Moreover, if such incidents were presented to the public by publicity media in proportion to their intrinsic importance, tendencies to demand retaliatory action could be restrained.

On the other hand, though I am aware that stealing—retaliatory or not—has not been limited to one side, especially in the case of cattle, the Egyptian authorities should take appropriate measures against theft and the sale of

goods such as irrigation pipes, produce, nursery stock, etc., stolen by infiltrators from Israeli settlements. The Egyptian authorities should apply strictly the severe penalties provided by Egyptian ordinances against illegal crossing of the Demarcation Line, take the measures necessary to ensure that no arms or explosives are in possession of unstable elements and, especially, give adequate publicity to punishments meted out for theft or illegal crossing. Such publicity should include notification to the MAC. Otherwise, it is understandable that seeing no news of infiltrators being punished, the Israelis refuse to believe that a serious attempt is being made to prevent the depredations which eventually build up tension to a dangerous point.



—Capital Press

FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM VISITS OTTAWA

Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak visited Canada from February 24 to March 2. He spent several days in Ottawa as the guest of the Governor General and had discussions with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and met members of Parliament. The latter part of his visit he spent in Montreal when he was entertained by the Mayor, visited McGill University and the University of Montreal, and was the guest of honour at functions organized by the International Civil Aviation Organization and by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Above, Mr. Spaak, right, is received at Rockcliffe Airport by Mr. Pearson.

The GATT To-day

The Origins of the GATT

A characteristic feature of the early post-war period was an effort to renew peacetime endeavour and to establish international machinery to supplement national activities and to make it possible for national aspirations to be pursued in relation to the needs of the world community. The basic concept was that, by accepting the obligations of membership in international organizations, participating countries would receive compensating benefits—generally out of the security afforded by internationally accepted codes of conduct, and specifically out of attention to their particular needs when these could be established as deserving special consideration.

In the economic and social field this objective found expression in the setting up of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, with its subsidiary commissions, and in the formation of the Specialized Agencies. In addition, many existing arrangements which before the war had proved valuable in particular fields were again set in motion, and new arrangements were made to tackle the immediate problems of certain areas.

The main new economic agencies established immediately after the war were the Breton Woods twins: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At that time it was recognized that these financial institutions would not be wholly effective until international agreement was secured on trade matters as well. To meet this need broad international discussions were initiated under the auspices of the United Nations as early as 1946. These discussions led to the completion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the autumn of 1947 and to the preparation of the draft charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) in the spring of 1948.

Significant Features

One of the most immediately significant features of the GATT was the fact that it embodied the results of extensive tariff negotiations, and provided that these reduced tariffs would be stabilized for a fixed period (subsequently renewed to June 30, 1955) and generally made applicable to all the contracting parties in accordance with the "most-favoured-nation" principle. The agreement also contained complex provisions relating to the other barriers to multilateral trade which many governments had found it necessary to introduce—import quotas, measures discriminating against or in favour of particular countries or areas, special taxes, export subsidies, and the like. The broad aim of the GATT in relation to such barriers to normal trade was to provide for their progressive elimination and to bring their operation in the meantime under the surveillance of the contracting parties to the agreement in the light of the generally accepted "rules of the road" or "code of conduct".

For reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter here the ITO was never ratified, and the GATT, although only a provisional agreement, continued to operate as the principal instrument for collectively reducing tariff barriers and for regulating international trading practices. Two further rounds of tariff

negotiations were held under the GATT, one in Annecy, France, in 1949, and the other in Torquay, England, in 1950-51. By this time the membership of GATT had expanded from the original twenty-three to thirty-four countries, and the goods covered by the GATT tariff schedules represented more than 80 per cent of the world's trade. Tariff reductions under the GATT, covering about 50,000 tariff items, were made possible by the readiness of the contracting parties to negotiate but it would also be fair to say that the such progress would have been extremely difficult if the United States, implementing its Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, had not at this time been prepared to join actively in seeking to lower tariffs on a mutually advantageous basis.

Between 1947 and 1954 the contracting parties to the GATT met, about once a year, to attend to normal business. This business consists chiefly of such matters as consideration of requests from contracting parties—perhaps for permission to renegotiate bound tariff items under special circumstances; questions relating to customs administration; consultations with respect to the balance-of-payments positions of particular countries or with respect to other matters as provided for in the Agreement; the hearing of complaints from contracting parties which consider they have suffered damage as a result of actions taken by other contracting parties; and other matters of this kind. From time to time, too, amendments have been made to the Agreement but, until the most recent session, these were of a fairly routine nature.

The Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties

The ninth session, which was held in Geneva from late October 1954, until early March 1955, had not only to deal with matters of ordinary business but also to deal with three special matters. In October 1953, the contracting parties had agreed to allow Japan to participate in their sessions pending her accession to the GATT. At the ninth session arrangements were made for tariff negotiations involving Japan so that that country, with the agreement of the contracting parties, might eventually adhere to the Agreement. These tariff negotiations, in which Canada is participating, are now going on in Geneva.

The second special matter dealt with at the ninth session was a review of the Agreement which it was decided to undertake in order to bring its provisions more into line with present-day trading conditions. It was thought that the time might have arrived when the binding of tariff schedules might be arranged on a more permanent basis. Also, the improvement in the balance-of-payments positions of most member countries, and the growing possibility of convertibility, made it desirable to consider some tightening up in the "trade rules" governing the use of quantitative restrictions; and the underdeveloped countries wished to have their special problems more specifically recognized. For these and related reasons it was decided that as envisaged in the original agreement, there should be a thoroughgoing review of all the provisions of the Agreement at the ninth session.

The third special matter was the drawing up of an agreement on an organization which, coupled with the revised GATT, would transform the embryo organization already embodied in the GATT into a permanent international institution. The contracting parties decided to do this because they felt it was time that the GATT lost its provisional character and became established in a suitable form as a feature of international life.

With all these matters to attend to, it is not surprising that the contracting parties were in session for just over four months. Delegates attended from the thirty-four member countries, from Japan, from ten observer countries and from international organizations.* Mr. L. D. Wilgress of Canada was Chairman of the Ninth Session. Working parties and panels were set up to deal with both the ordinary business and the review of the Agreement; most working parties had several sub-groups to deal with selected segments of their work.

Canadian Participation

The Minister in charge of the Canadian delegation was the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, who attended the GATT session in December. The Canadian delegation, under the leadership of Mr. Wilgress, was represented on the working party dealing with customs administration and played an active part in the work of most of the other working parties dealing with the regular business of the session.† There was a Canadian representative on three of the four working parties set up to review the Agreement, and Canadian delegates also participated in the work of the fourth of these working parties.‡ The Canadian delegation provided the Chairman of the Working party on Organizational and Functional Questions which, among its other responsibilities, had the task of drawing up the agreement for the new Organization for Trade Co-operation.

The Results of the Ninth Session

The main results of the ninth session may be most conveniently summarized by treating together questions decided in the course of regular business and matters dealt with during the review of the Agreement.

* *Member countries:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay.

Participating in the ninth session: Japan.

Observer countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Portugal, Switzerland.

International organizations in attendance: The United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Council of Europe, Customs Co-operation Council, European Coal and Steel Community.

† The Canadian delegation consisted of the following:

Representative: Mr. L. D. Wilgress, Canada's Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation; *Alternate representatives:* Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre, Department of Finance; Dr. C. M. Isbister, Department of Trade and Commerce; Mr. L. E. Couillard, Department of External Affairs; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; Mr. A. W. Brown, Department of National Revenue; Mr. B. G. Barrow, Department of Trade and Commerce; Mr. C. A. Annis, Department of Finance; Mr. M. Schwarzmann, Department of Trade and Commerce; *Secretary:* Mr. W. Lavoie, Department of Trade and Commerce.

In the course of the session, Dr. Isbister, Mr. Plumptre, Mr. Brown and Mr. Barrow returned to Ottawa and Mr. M. W. Sharp, Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. S. S. Reisman of the Department of Finance and Mr. L. C. Howie of the Department of National Revenue joined the delegation.

‡ The following working parties were set up to review the General Agreement: Working Party I on Quantitative Restrictions, Working Party II on Tariffs, Schedules and Customs Administration, Working Party III on Barriers to Trade other than Restrictions or Tariffs, and Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions.

Stability of Tariff Schedules

In the field of tariffs the contracting parties drew up a declaration on the continued application of tariff schedules which, when accepted by governments, will provide for the continuing firm validity of schedules until the end of 1957, with automatic three-year extensions thereafter. (Previous agreements to maintain tariff levels had been for single periods only, sometimes for less than three years.) There is provision for renegotiation of bound items toward the end of each period in the event that contracting parties find this necessary. This is consistent with the provisions of the present Agreement, under which a limited number of renegotiations are now going forward relating to the period of binding which was due to expire on June 30, 1955. These negotiations are on a small scale and will have very little effect on the main structure of the tariff schedules. The contracting parties decided to set up a working party to consider the possibility of another round of tariff negotiations the object of which, if held, would be to further reduce tariffs on a multilateral basis.

The "Rules of Trade"

It had been hoped that, because of the improved economic positions of most GATT countries, it would be possible to strengthen the "trade rules" of the GATT in a way which would provide for the fairly rapid elimination, of remaining quantitative restrictions and discriminatory treatment of various kinds. It was found, however, that many countries were not prepared to contemplate early removal of all such restrictions. Consequently the "tightening up" agreed upon by the contracting parties took a somewhat different form.

No change was made in the basic principle of the Agreement that contracting parties which maintain quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons have to eliminate them as soon as they can no longer be justified for balance-of-payments reasons. But in order to make this principle more effective in practice, and particularly in order to adapt it to a period when the major currencies may become convertible, it was proposed that, soon after entry into force of the amendments, the Organization will review all quantitative restrictions still maintained for balance-of-payments reasons. Thereafter a system of annual consultations with contracting parties still applying restrictions of this type would come into effect and these countries would be required to justify each year the restrictions still being maintained.

The "Hard-Core Waiver"

In association with the proposed new system of control on the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, the contracting parties took a decision, with immediate effect, to assist in resolving the problems faced by contracting parties in eliminating the so-called "hard-core" of their import restrictions. These are restrictions whose sudden removal, when no longer justified for balance-of-payments reasons, would result in a serious injury to a domestic industry or branch of agriculture, to which they have afforded protection. The decision granted a temporary waiver from the obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions in such circumstances subject to the concurrence of the contracting parties in each case. The contracting parties may impose such conditions and limitations as they determine to be reasonable and neces-

sary and the obligation is laid on the applicant to eliminate the quantitative restrictions in question over a comparatively short period of time. The application of these "hard-core" restrictions and the progress made towards eliminating them will be reviewed by the contracting parties annually.

The "United States Agricultural Waiver"

In connection with the review of quantitative restrictions, the contracting parties, by a separate decision, dealt with the conflict which occasionally arises between action required under United States legislation and the provisions of the GATT which deal with quantitative restrictions and additional charges on imports. The contracting parties adopted a Decision, effective forthwith, which recognizes the difficulties arising from the terms of Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act, permits the United States to apply measures under this legislation, but at the same time preserves the right of a contracting party whose trade is damaged by import restrictions or additional charges imposed under that Act to have recourse to the procedures of the Agreement for adjusting the balance through negotiation. The contracting parties will review annually action taken by the United States under this legislation, and the United States Government has given assurances that before taking any new action it will consult with substantially interested countries and will terminate any restriction imposed under the legislation as soon as it is no longer required.

Canada and many other countries were concerned over the United States' request for this "blanket" waiver which does not provide for close supervision by the contracting parties as does the "hard-core" waiver. Canada, and most countries which export agricultural products to the United States, opposed the waiver and voted against it. Of course, the fact that the United States has been granted a waiver from its obligations with respect to import restrictions on agricultural products does not mean that the United States is about to impose new and severe restrictions on imports from Canada. And Canada has, of course, retained its rights under the GATT to take whatever action would be appropriate if the United States were to embark on such a course.

Assistance for Economic Development

Many of the countries which participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are among the economically under-developed countries of Asia and Latin America. These countries face real difficulties, which are recognized by the other contracting parties. These countries are not going to be able, at an early date, to participate fully in the reduction of trade barriers and the attainment of the convertibility of world currencies. Most of them are still in need of sympathetic aid and assistance in the solution of their own problems. It is in the interest of more advanced countries like Canada to meet them in this spirit. The contracting parties did this, in effect, by writing a GATT within a GATT to deal with their special problems. Each of these under-developed countries, however, will find that its own situation will be improved, in the future, when convertibility of the major world currencies, and the dismantling of import restrictions currently being imposed by some of the major trading countries, have been achieved. The problems which to-day create difficulties for them will then be much easier to solve.

Miscellaneous Matters of Importance:

Export Subsidies, Problems of Commodity Trade, etc.

The contracting parties dealt with a great many miscellaneous matters important to their trading arrangements. Provisions, additional to those already in the Agreement, were drawn up to limit the harmful effect of export subsidies. In the field of primary products contracting parties would be under an obligation not to use subsidies which increase exports so as to obtain for themselves more than a fair share of world trade. In the field of non-primary products no new or increased export subsidies would be permitted. The contracting parties agreed that there should be a re-examination to determine before the end of 1957, whether existing export subsidies on non-primary commodities can be abolished or whether the maintenance of the standstill should be extended for a further period.

The contracting parties adopted a resolution providing that if a contracting party decides to liquidate any agricultural surpluses it should do so in such a way as to avoid unduly provoking disturbances on the world market that would adversely affect other member countries. They recommend "that when arranging the disposal of surplus agricultural products in world trade, contracting parties should undertake a procedure of consultation with the principal suppliers of those products and other interested contracting parties, which would contribute to the orderly liquidation of such surpluses including, where practicable, disposals designed to expand consumption of the products, and to the avoidance of prejudice to the interests of other contracting parties, and that they give sympathetic consideration to the views expressed by other contracting parties in the course of such consultations".

The contracting parties also recommended that, whenever practicable, any contracting party intending to liquidate a substantial quantity of strategic stocks of primary commodities should give advance notice and should consult fully with any contracting party which considers itself substantially interested and requests such consultations.

During the course of the Review the contracting parties established a working party to consider a proposal for a convention which might govern international action on problems arising in the field of international trade in primary commodities. The working party, acting in the capacity of an expert group, concluded that it could not put its recommendations into final form until the interested governments had studied its preliminary views. It was decided therefore that the working party will meet again in the summer of 1955 after receiving the views of governments.

The Organization for Trade Co-operation

For the past seven years the GATT has been administered in an ad hoc manner. The main work has been done at the sessions of the contracting parties, with assistance from a small secretariat and from an international committee meeting in advance of the main meetings. One of the major objectives of the ninth session was to lay a foundation for a permanent organization which would administer the GATT and conduct its business.

The contracting parties drew up an Agreement which, when it comes into force, will establish the Organization for Trade Co-operation. The Agreement

contains the basic provisions relating to the structure and functions of the Organization. There would be an Assembly, and Executive Committee and a secretariat headed by a Director-General. The main function of the Organization would be to administer the General Agreement. In addition, the Organization would be able to sponsor international trade negotiations and to serve as an intergovernmental forum for the discussion and solution of other questions relating to international trade. The Agreement will enter into force, among the governments that have accepted it, after it has been accepted by countries which account for 85 per cent of the total external trade covered by the Agreement.*

Present Status of the General Agreement

The results of the ninth session covering revision of the Agreement and the proposed Organization for Trade Co-operation are now before member governments for consideration.†

The Revised GATT

The revised General Agreement is not markedly different from the agreement now in effect. In some respects it has been strengthened, chiefly by providing for closer and more continuous consultation designed to reduce barriers to trade. Another stabilizing feature of the revised agreement is the provision for indefinite continuation, with appropriate arrangements for adjustment, of the tariff schedules negotiated by the contracting parties. Another major step in the direction of permanence and stability for GATT is the proposed Organization for Trade-Co-operation, which is to come into force when it has been ratified by countries accounting for 85 per cent of the trade of the GATT countries.

* The following table indicates the percentage of the trade of the GATT countries accounted for by each of them considered separately:

<i>Contracting parties on March 1, 1955</i>		<i>%</i>	
Australia	3.1	Haiti	0.1
Austria	0.9	India	2.4
Belgium-Luxembourg	4.3	Indonesia	1.3
Brazil	2.5	Italy	2.9
Burma	0.3	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	4.7
Canada	6.7	New Zealand	1.0
Ceylon	0.5	Nicaragua	0.1
Chile	0.6	Norway	1.1
Cuba	1.1	Pakistan	0.9
Czechoslovakia	1.4	Peru	0.4
Denmark	1.4	Rhodesia and Nyasaland	0.6
Dominican Republic	0.1	Sweden	2.5
Finland	1.0	Turkey	0.6
France	8.7	Union of South Africa	1.8
Germany, Federal Republic of	5.3	United Kingdom	20.3
Greece	0.4	United States of America	20.6
		Uruguay	0.4
			<u>100.0</u>

† These documents are: (1) Protocol Amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement (2) Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement (3) Agreement on the Organization for Trade Co-operation (4) Protocol of Organizational Amendments to the General Agreement (which amends the General Agreement to take account of the Organization for Trade Co-operation when it comes into force). Another instrument (5) which has also been opened for signature by member governments, is the Declaration on Continued Application of Schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which will extend the assured life of the tariff schedules from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1957. The Canadian authorities have under consideration a proposal to publish the revised General Agreement, and related documents, in a form in which they can easily be examined by those wishing to make a detailed study of the subject.

Attitude of Canadian Government

The present attitude of the Canadian Government toward the GATT has been indicated in general terms in recent statements by Canadian Ministers. On March 8 the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, informing the House of Commons of the conclusion of the ninth session stated: "I think I should make it clear at this time that the GATT will go on. We already have an agreement which is being provisionally applied by the member governments, and this agreement will continue. In regard to amendments that have been proposed, I have only one remark to make at this time. This is to say that while they do not add up to as strong and effective a GATT as I had hoped last October when the review began, they do add up to a more satisfactory agreement than I had feared when I returned from Geneva last December. The result is not as good as it might have been, but it might have been much worse. It will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to the GATT."

On March 21, the day that the results of the ninth session were released to the press, Mr. Howe said in a speech to the Canadian Club of Montreal:

"This (the decision to establish the GATT) marked a great step forward. For the first time in history, there came into being a commonly accepted code of commercial behaviour, applicable to all except a minor fraction of world trade. For the first time in history, the major trading nations got together for the express purpose of reducing the level of tariff barriers.

"That is why the Canadian Government has been such a strong supporter of the strongest possible GATT. We are a trading nation. In a literal sense we live by trade. It is in our interest to support international efforts to reduce barriers to trade, and to give leadership in that direction when opportunity arises. This is not impractical idealism. For a country like Canada, it is the most practical kind of realism and common sense.

"Admittedly the GATT is not a perfect instrument from our point of view, or from any country's point of view. Any trade agreement, acceptable to a large number of countries, must involve compromises amongst different points of view. While none of the participating countries can be completely satisfied with it, it has undoubtedly performed a useful job for all concerned. I think there is a wide measure of agreement in all countries that the world is richer, and standards of living are higher than they would have been, had there been no GATT. Certainly Canadian trade has benefited from the major tariff reductions that have been negotiated, particularly with the United States, as have we benefited by the existence of a code of trading rules . . .

"You will understand . . . why I said in Parliament that it will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to the GATT. It can be argued, I know, that one of the principal results of this recent session has been to relieve other countries of their obligations without corresponding relief for Canada. I am not much impressed by that kind of argument. Surely our essential interest lies not in weakening the GATT by asking for special exemptions or special treatment. Surely it lies in continuing to support the efforts of those in all countries who are striving to base international trade on a sound and sure foundation of sensible rules."

On April 5 the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Harris, stated in the course of his budget speech in Parliament:

Our trade relations with most of the outside world continue to be governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This Agreement, I believe, serves our interests far better than a series of separate international trade agreements with all the other contracting parties and it is, of course, infinitely better for us than the chaotic trade warfare that might take place if there were no trade agreements at all. The articles of the General Agreement were the subject of close scrutiny during a long conference this winter in Geneva and a number of amendments were provisionally agreed upon there.

These negotiations were under the personal direction of my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe), and I am sure we all agree that there is no one better qualified to conduct such negotiations on behalf of Canada. He has reported to the House that the revised GATT is greatly to be preferred to no agreement at all, and that it will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to it. In this connection I can now announce that we propose to join with others in the general rebinding of tariff schedules as from July 1 of this year.



—Capital Press

PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA ARRIVES AT OTTAWA

The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Robert Gordon Menzies, visited Canada from March 7 to March 13. For the first two days of his visit he was the guest of the Governor General at Government House. Mr. Menzies, who was accompanied by members of his Government and senior advisers, had meetings with members of the Canadian Government and attended a number of dinners and receptions held in his honour. On March 11 Mr. Menzies visited Montreal when he was given an honorary degree by McGill University. On March 13 he left Ottawa by air for Washington. Mr. Menzies, left, is shown above being received by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, at Uplands Airport, Ottawa.

Canada and the Specialized Agencies

A review of the work of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, released by the Organization's Department of Public Information, shows that many of the Agencies are co-operating in the campaign of the United Nations against starvation, poverty, disease and ignorance in the economically under-developed areas of the world. The Canadian Government, as well as individual Canadians, are lending support to the Agencies engaged in the campaign. In 80 countries and territories, seven of the Agencies aided governments through the U.N. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, financed by a special fund of voluntary contributions pledged by 74 countries. A recent survey showed that more than 700 experts sent by the Specialized Agencies were at work in the field and some 350 fellows were receiving advanced training in special skills needed for economic and social development. In addition, a number of the Agencies provided technical assistance under their regular budgets.

The Specialized Agencies' regular programmes are carried on under budgets financed by assessed contributions of member governments. The net 1954 budgets of the seven Agencies engaged in technical assistance work—the International Labour Office (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)—totalled \$34,708,759. Canada's total assessment amounted to \$1,387,000. Two other Specialized Agencies—the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—derive their budgets from income or earnings from capital made available by member countries, including Canada. They co-operate with the Programme but finance their technical assistance solely from their own budgets.

U.N. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance

The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance is carried out through the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) in co-operation with the Specialized Agencies. The TAA, headed since its inception in 1950 by a Canadian, Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, was established as an Agency of the United Nations to provide technical assistance in the industrial and related fields which were not within the scope of the existing Specialized Agencies. The Technical Assistance Board (TAB), which operates under the Economic and Social Council, co-ordinates and reviews the activities carried out under this programme, and administers the annual allocation of Expanded Programme funds to the participating Agencies. In 1954 \$25,342,501 was made available for the Expanded Programme by member Governments on a voluntary contribution basis. Canada's contribution of \$1.5 million was third largest, following those of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Canadian participation in the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations is not limited to financial support. The Technical Co-operation

Service of the Department of Trade and Commerce which administers the Canadian Government's activities in the field of technical assistance, assists the TAA and several of the Specialized Agencies in locating Canadian consultants and technicians and arranging Canadian facilities for their trainees. Other Specialized Agencies, such as WHO and FAO, often deal direct with other Canadian Government Departments or institutions for this purpose.

Canadian Experts Abroad

In all, as of December 31, 1954, there were 70 Canadian experts serving abroad under the TAA and the Specialized Agencies in 28 countries. Under UNESCO's Technical Assistance, there were in December 1954, Canadian experts in science teaching, documentation, adult education and the production of teaching films in Burma, Jordan, India and Thailand. Under WHO's programmes as of December 31, Canadian scientists, medical doctors and nurses were serving in Bolivia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nationalist China, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak; and under FAO, Canadian experts in farm machinery, agricultural engineering, range management, land use and farm management, irrigation and drainage engineering, forestry, home economics and cotton growing in Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Two examples of Canadians whose expert knowledge in diverse fields is being put to use under Technical Assistance are Dr. A. E. Hardy, Professor of Agricultural Engineering at the University of Saskatchewan, and Dr. Gustave Gingras of the Montreal Institute for the Rehabilitation of Invalids. Dr. Hardy, one of this continent's leading agricultural engineers, has served abroad from February 1951, since November 1954 as Chief of FAO's mission in Ceylon. Dr. Gingras was earlier instrumental in establishing, under the auspices of the TAA, an Institute for the Rehabilitation of Invalids in Venezuela, and is now engaged in similar work in Uruguay. A preliminary step will be to bring doctors and nurses from Uruguay to Montreal and Toronto for special training.

This training will be part of the technical assistance programme under which the Department of Trade and Commerce and other government departments co-operate with the TAA and the Specialized Agencies in organizing the visits of "fellows" or trainees from other countries. From 1950 to December 31, 1954, with generous co-operation from the provincial authorities, private industry and the universities, the Technical Co-operation Service had already placed 264 persons from 59 countries and territories. These trainees have been making practical studies, mainly in such fields as public administration and finance, engineering, agriculture, social welfare, railroads, education, co-operatives and marketing, hydro-electricity, mining, smelting and oil production. There have, for instance, been trainees from Mexico studying foreign capital investment, from Korea studying local government and from Hong Kong studying federal government administration.

Canadian participation in the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations is additional to Canada's share in the Programme for Technical Co-operation under the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which was originated by Commonwealth countries, including Canada. Under the Colombo Plan Canada co-operates actively with the United Nations Agencies on many of their projects.

Current Activities of the Specialized Agencies

FAO

Technical Assistance is being given by FAO in 55 countries. More than 300 final reports of FAO experts have been transmitted to governments, and 270 fellows have finished their studies and returned home. Much of FAO's effort in South and Southeast Asia had been devoted to increasing the production of rice, and optimistic reports of the results of new measures introduced were given in Tokyo last October at a meeting of the International Rice Commission (which is sponsored by FAO). FAO's international action against the desert locust in the Middle East has reportedly "prevented any serious loss to food production" in the past three years. The comprehensive operational plan for the 1954-55 anti-locust campaign throughout the Arabian peninsula is expected to provide a blue-print for similar international campaigns in areas affected by this pest. Canada has agreed to provide, under the Colombo Plan, a portion of the equipment to be used in this campaign. In individual countries, FAO carried on programmes to control livestock diseases, improve the quality and cut the costs of rubber production, improve fishing methods, and other special projects. Because surpluses of certain foods have been developing despite a continued low consumption in many areas, FAO has been urging "selective expansion" of agricultural production and consumption, and has sent experts to Latin America, the Near East and Asia to advise on the production of non-surplus foods and the increased use of products which are plentiful in the area.

WHO

The World Health Organization reports encouraging developments in the field of health—including control of malaria and of the disfiguring tropical disease of yaws, a sharp drop in infant mortality rates, "remarkable progress" in combating tuberculosis, and a "sanitary awakening" in Southeast Asia during the past year. In India, Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa, WHO has achieved striking results in reducing malaria. The first continent-wide campaign to wipe out malaria started in the Western Hemisphere has been initiated this year under the sponsorship of WHO's Regional Office for the Americas. WHO reports that there is "reason to believe that co-ordinated action" by all governments will make possible "the eradication of malaria in the Americas" in less than five years. In this and other campaigns, there has been close co-operation between WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

UNESCO

By the end of 1954, some 350 UNESCO experts had been sent to member states, and projects in education and science were under way in 36 countries. Twenty-eight projects had been completed and the governments concerned were continuing the work launched by the UNESCO teams. UNESCO has been placing special emphasis on assistance to member states in public school education, helping 19 countries in reorganizing their educational systems. For example, 18 of the 21 Latin-American countries were represented at a UNESCO-aided regional training centre for fundamental education in Mexico. 159 students have completed the 19-month course and are now being used by their governments as leaders in national fundamental or rural education programmes. The attention being given by governments to this problem is indi-

cated by India's report that within the past seven years 5,000,000 more children have been placed in primary schools; high school enrollment has risen from three to six million; the number of schools has more than doubled, and the national budget for education has been raised from 45 million dollars to 300 million in the same period. In the field of natural sciences the most significant development for UNESCO last year was the coming into force of a UNESCO-sponsored convention setting up a European Centre for Nuclear Research. The Convention has been ratified and the Centre set up by 10 European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, the German Federal Republic, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In addition, Italy and Yugoslavia have signed the Convention. Scientific documentation centres, through which research workers will be kept abreast of scientific news from all over the world, have been turned over to the governments of Mexico, India, Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Egypt.

ILO

More than half the technical assistance funds available to ILO in 1954 were spent to increase workers' productivity and total production through the use of modern techniques. By the spring of 1954, more than 4,000 supervisors in four Asian countries—Ceylon, India, Pakistan and the Philippines—had received instruction in institutes started by ILO. In all, ILO had 105 technical assistance projects in hand in 45 countries, and at the end of the year 88 ILO experts and instructors in the field. National productivity centres were set up in India and Egypt with ILO aid during the year. What proved a "most valuable form of technical assistance" is the worker-trainee programme under which workers have been sent abroad from Bolivia, Columbia, Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia and other countries for advanced industrial experience. After their return to their own jobs, their employers have reported increased productivity, improved quality of goods, and promotion of the workers. In June 1954, ILO's 37th General Conference adopted a formal recommendation that employed persons with certain exceptions be entitled to an annual paid vacation of not less than two working weeks for a year's service. At a meeting in Rome in November the Governing Body placed the question of forced labour on the 1956 Conference Agenda.

ICAO

On December 7, 1954, ICAO observed the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Having drawn up standards of air navigation and regional plans for navigation facilities and services on the world's airways, ICAO has been concentrating on ensuring that they are put into effect by each of its 65 member states. ICAO reports from its Montreal headquarters that the statistics of international scheduled airline operations show that, as a result of this change in emphasis, a great proportion of the "serious deficiencies" which existed throughout the world in the provision of air navigation facilities have disappeared. Under U.N. technical assistance, more than 100 ICAO experts have helped under-developed countries expand air transport services needed for economic progress. Approximately 1,000 students have been enrolled in ICAO-established classes for radio operators, radio maintenance mechanics, air traffic controllers, weather observers and forecasters and other specialists, and more than 100 advanced students have received fellowships for training abroad.

ITU

Under the ITU technical assistance programme, 14 experts have helped under-developed countries, chiefly in the Middle East and southern Asia, improve their telecommunication systems in the past year. In addition, 12 telecommunication specialists from under-developed countries have been granted fellowships for advanced study abroad. Three technical committees of ITU—composed of experts in telegraphy, telephony and radio—have co-operated in the development of a General Switching Programme for linking major international telecommunication lines in Europe and the Mediterranean Basin to countries of the Middle East and southern Asia. ITU has continued co-ordinating the assignment of frequencies to various radio services, and marked progress was reported in 1954 in the preparation of new plans for high-frequency broadcasting and in carrying out plans to increase the effectiveness of aeronautical and maritime radio communications.

WMO

A main objective of WHO in the past year has been to increase the contribution of meteorology to the solution of economic problems such as the creation of new natural sources of power, an increase in agricultural output, development of water resources and the fight against locust and insect pests. In Libya, Syria, the Dominican Republic and Jordan, WMO under its Technical Assistance programme has provided assistance in setting up national weather services and in training local students in weather-observing practices.

International Bank

By the end of the calendar year 1954, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had made 112 loans totalling approximately \$2,064,000,000 for use in 36 countries and territories. A good proportion of this was applied to electric power development in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Austria, the remainder being devoted to such basic projects as highway construction in Ecuador and El Salvador to benefit agricultural areas, railway modernization in Mexico and French West Africa, provision of farm machinery for Peru and Colombia, port development in Turkey, waterways development in Belgium, the expansion of Norway's merchant fleet, construction of a natural gas transmission line in Pakistan and general economic development in Australia.

The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

In the field of atomic energy, first steps were taken to implement a resolution of UNESCO's General Assembly in November, 1954 instructing the Director-General to study "measures of international scope to facilitate the use of radio-isotopes in research and industry", to co-operate fully in the United Nations programme of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to disseminate objective information on the dangers and practical uses of atomic energy. Canada was represented at a meeting of experts called together by WHO in December to explore constructive uses of atomic energy in medicine, biology and public health—for example, in the diagnosis, treatment and control of diseases—and to study problems of health protection. Member governments were earlier asked to send in copies of any regulations in force on the protection of technical workers against radiation from X-rays

and radio-active isotopes. The World Meteorological Organization has asked member states to provide all available information on the possible effects of atomic explosions on the weather, and at the annual meeting of its Board of Governors in September, 1954, the International Bank was urged by the Governor from Pakistan to help in the harnessing of nuclear power for economic development projects.

These actions by the Specialized Agencies were in harmony with a resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations last December which called for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency and the holding of an international technical conference. The Canadian Government has already accepted the invitation of the Director-General of the United Nations to participate in the Technical Conference to be held in Geneva from August 8 to August 20, 1955, and is represented on the committee preparing for it. The purpose of the Conference will be "to explore means of developing peaceful uses of atomic energy through international co-operation, and, in particular, to study the

(Continued on page 130)



—*Capital Press*

The Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. John Foster Dulles paid an official visit to Ottawa from March 17 to March 19, staying at Government House as the guest of the Governor General. During his visit Mr. Dulles had discussions with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other members of the Cabinet, and attended a special meeting of the Standing Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs. At a press conference on March 18, Mr. Dulles stressed the importance to his Government of close co-operation with Canada on all matters of foreign policy and defence. Above, Mr. Dulles is greeted on his arrival at Uplands Airport by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

External Affairs Debate

In an address in the House of Commons on March 24 the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the policy of the Canadian Government on a number of international questions. As the House had recently had a full discussion of European affairs during the debate on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, (reported in the February issue of *External Affairs*) Mr. Pearson spoke mainly about the situation in Indochina, Korea and Formosa.

Mr. Pearson referred to the increase in Canada's international responsibilities and this country's special and close relationship to London and to Washington which enabled it to exert on occasion a special influence on those capitals and thereby influence the course of events. Our effectiveness in this regard, however, the Minister pointed out, would depend not only on the way in which we accepted and discharged our own international responsibilities, but also on the reputation that we acquired and maintained for sound and objective judgment and action.

The Far East

Turning to the areas of tension in the Far East, Mr. Pearson pointed out that the most significant of all the political developments of the past decade or indeed of the past quarter century, has been the national awakening of the hundreds of millions in these nations and their insistent demand for economic, social and political progress towards a better life. While Canada welcomed the growth of national freedom and democracy among the people of Asia, the spread of communism in China and in other parts of Asia and the actions of the Peking regime had caused deep and understandable anxiety in Canada and in the whole of the non-communist world.

It was important, the Minister told the House, to try to understand the origins and purposes of communism in Asia and to discover the basis of its support. He said:

The communist movement in Asia is not simply a conspiracy of evil and alien forces seeking power and domination; unfortunately it is more than that. It has secured too many followers who see in it, at least until they have acquired some experience of its workings in government, a means of improving the welfare and happiness of their own people and ensuring their freedom from western pressure and control. Therefore I feel we shall not make much appeal to the peoples of Asia unless we make clear to them that while we denounce communistic doctrines and methods we wholeheartedly support the ideals of these people for liberation from hunger, misery and outside domination.

Mr. Pearson went on to say that because of their past experience Asians were preoccupied with the question of colonialism and imperialism. We should understand their view point that self government is more important even than good government. We should understand also the mistrust and suspicions of those who for years had felt themselves to be the victims of prejudice and at times of racial arrogance. If we remembered these things we might be able better to understand why so many nations failed to see as clearly as we do the gulf which divides communism from democracy and why they are so reluctant to join our side without reservation.

Mr. Pearson noted that increasing attention is being paid to the social and economic sources of communism. The various programmes of economic and technical assistance in under-developed countries were intended to help to reduce the impulse towards communism by raising the standard of living and by proving that it is possible to do it without a loss of political freedom and under a democratic system. The Minister went on:

But, I suggest that we should not forget that these social and economic aspects are only one element of this complex problem. I think there is a danger of oversimplifying the issues in Asia in these terms. Confronted by the appalling defence and political problems involved in the emergence of a free Asia, it is easy to lapse into the comfortable belief that we can save Asia—and that is how it is often put—with economic aid alone; that we can buy off communism and purchase peace for ourselves merely by stepping up our economic assistance.

That, as I see it, is unhappily nothing but a comforting illusion; and in saying that I do not minimize the importance of such economic assistance. What we are seeking to do, of course, in the Western world is help the Asian people to help themselves. That continent, I make bold to say, will not be saved or even, in the long run, helped by aimless assistance or by making political support a condition for such assistance, or by westerners attempting to assume the direction of political and economic forces in these Asian states, however benevolent their intentions. The danger to Asia comes from weaknesses which will not be removed merely by dumping in millions and millions of dollar or sterling aid for projects not carefully enough planned.

The west can help in this way, of course; but the west can help even more by co-operating in a partnership of mutual understanding, respect and support with genuine leaders of the Asian peoples. Democracy—and it does not necessarily need to be our type of Parliamentary democracy—can be established in those areas only by the efforts of the people themselves. Therefore, as I see it, the main problem at this time for Asians is to organize, as some Asian states have done, governments and administrations which are strong enough, free enough and incorruptible enough to make use of western assistance and support in helping to establish the conditions of law and order, freedom and prosperity which alone can counter the appeal of communism.

Indochina

A most significant effort to work out these problems, said Mr. Pearson, was being made in Indochina, in which Canada had a particular interest because of her participation with India and Poland in the supervision of the cease-fire agreements. The settlement reached at Geneva in July 1954, provided for the establishment of three separate international supervisory commissions, each made up of representatives of India, Pakistan and Canada and each charged with the task of supervising the carrying out of the cease-fire agree-

ment for the particular country to which it was assigned, Viet Nam, Laos or Cambodia.

Viet Nam

The Minister referred to the varying degrees of success that the Commission in Viet Nam had had in supervising the regrouping of military forces on both sides, in checking the introduction on either side of new military forces or supplies and in facilitating the movement of refugees. He noted that it was expected that the Commission will be asked to supervise the elections which are to take place in due course in Viet Nam.

Laos and Cambodia

The main problem facing the Commission in Laos, explained Mr. Pearson, had been to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the northern provinces between the communist Pathet Lao forces and the Royal Laotian forces. There had been a number of incidents which because of communist obstruction it had not always been possible to investigate properly or thoroughly, but on the whole the military provisions of the Laotian Agreement had been fairly satisfactorily carried out. In Cambodia the most important problem has been the reintegration into the national community of the indigenous resistance forces which had also received communist support. Mr. Pearson expressed the hope that Canada, as a member of the Supervisory Commission in Cambodia, would be able to help pave the way to a prosperous and peaceful future in that country. Referring to the recent abdication of the King of Cambodia, the Minister denied that there had been any unwarranted interference of any kind by the Commission in the domestic affairs of that country.

Before going on to other matters, Mr. Pearson paid a tribute to

... the very fine and unselfish work which is being done by our people in Indochina, not only by the chief commissioner, a very distinguished Canadian who has served his country so well both in peace and war, Mr. Sherwood Lett, and the other Canadian commissioners who are members of the External Affairs Department, but by all the members of our armed services and our foreign service, numbering now something over 160, who are in these three countries. Many of them have to work and live under conditions of discomfort, hardship and even danger. They are, however, carrying out their difficult assignments with resourcefulness, with devotion, with patience and skill. Theirs is an important contribution to the maintenance of peace in Indochina, and they are making a fine impression wherever they work as representatives of Canada.

Korea

The Minister referred to the failure of the Geneva Conference to reach any agreement for the peaceful unification of Korea and to the resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations reaffirming the United Nations' objectives. He stated that further negotiations to unify Korea peacefully would have to include the governments of North Korea and communist China, which are not members of the United Nations.

Formosa

Coming to the Formosan question, Mr. Pearson said that there had been certain new developments since he last spoke to the House on this subject

(see *External Affairs*, February 1955, p. 65). It was reassuring that the evacuation of thousands of civilians and soldiers from the Tachen and Nankishen Islands had taken place without any serious incident. There was however, much concern as to what the Chinese communists have in mind regarding Formosa and the few coastal islands which still remain in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists. It was to be hoped that the Chinese communists would not by use of force renew the war over these islands, the consequences of which might spread further, but given the combination of national revolutionary fervour and the messianic delusions of communist ideology, it was not possible to count on wisdom or restraint on the part of the Peking regime. The Minister told the House:

We cannot ignore in this connection the communist intention, loudly and frequently proclaimed, to attack and occupy Formosa and the islands. We can, however, having regard to declared United States policy to help in the defence of Formosa, retain strong doubts about their capacity to achieve this objective in the near future by any direct assault. To maintain an amphibious or airborne attack 100 miles across the Formosa straits would be a hazardous operation for a land power like Communist China and would certainly strain its as yet limited resources, much more than did the operations in Korea.

The Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, was asked in an interview a few weeks ago what he thought of the Chinese communists' ability to carry out their threat to, as they put it, liberate Formosa. Admiral Radford's reply was:

"They cannot do it at this time. They just do not have the military capability to carry out an amphibious operation of the scale required, particularly in view of the announced United States position and the immediate availability of United States naval and air forces to counter such an operation."

That was Admiral Radford's conclusion, and that same conclusion has led many to doubt that the communists have in mind an invasion of the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a prelude to or part of an attack on Formosa. In any event, it would be tragic if widespread hostilities, or indeed hostilities of any kind, were to develop over the possession of these two islands which are, in effect, part of the Chinese mainland, and the strategic role of which would seem to be more important in the defence of that mainland against attack than in offensive action against Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. Pearson emphasized that this problem of Formosa and the coastal islands was one of the most difficult which the free world has to face at this moment. It was one on which it was possible for friends and allies to honestly hold different opinions. Formosa was considered by many to be one of the positions of tactical and strategic advantage in the struggle with communist aggression and imperialism which could not be lightly abandoned in the face of communist threats. There was also the political problem arising out of the bad effect on morale in Formosa and in the neighbouring free Asian states if further losses or retreats took place in the face of joint communist attack or pressure or both. Furthermore, the people of Formosa have a claim to consideration, both in respect of the proposals to hand them over to the communist regime against their will and in respect of the proposals to involve them in a Chinese civil war without any regard to their own wishes but the Minister emphasized that doubts or divisions on these problems must not be allowed to spread or seriously weaken the non-communist peace coalition.

Mr. Pearson pointed out that the United States was committed to the defence of Formosa by a treaty with the Nationalist Chinese Government and that President Eisenhower, whom he described as a "man of character and integrity with a passion for peace" had the responsibility of deciding whether an attack by the Peking Government on the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu should be considered as a stage in an assault on Formosa itself. On their part, the Chinese communists insist that the islands are part of the Chinese mainland and that if Chiang-Kai-shek's troops do not evacuate them they will be driven out.

Canadian Position

The Canadian position in this matter, said Mr. Pearson, was as follows:

We have accepted no commitment to share in the defence of either Formosa or the coastal islands, or to intervene in any struggle between the two Chinese governments for possession of these off-shore islands. Our obligations in this matter arise only out of our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, and I have stated in this House what those are. We also think that a distinction, politically and strategically, can be made between Formosa and the coastal islands; also indeed between Formosa and Korea. Nevertheless, the fact that we have no commitments certainly does not mean that we have no concern. We have a deep and abiding concern because of considerations which make isolation from these questions wellnigh impossible.

There is first our general concern with peace and anything that might threaten it. Then there is our special concern with United States policy from the consequences of which Canada, a North American country, cannot escape. Finally there is our close concern with anything that weakens—as this question may—that coalition the strength and unity of which, under the leadership of the United States is at present the strongest deterrent against communist aggression and war.

Mr. Pearson repeated his view that it would be impossible for either the United States or Canada to be neutral if the people of another country were engaged in a major war in which their very existence was at stake. This was one of the facts of our international life. The interdependence of our foreign defence policies with those of the United States was accepted by the people of Canada because we believed that any war in which we were jointly engaged would be a defensive one, and because the only aggressive force that threatens us today is communist imperialism, which if victorious, would end everything that makes for free and decent existence.

Our inevitable co-operation with the United States means "as the United Nations and NATO mean," said Mr. Pearson, "that our right to be neutral has been limited by our desire to strengthen the security of our country and to protect the peace. It does not mean, although I have heard it mentioned in these terms, that whenever the United States is engaged in any kind of war we are at war".

It certainly did not mean, he continued, that we must participate in limited or peripheral wars, although we were naturally concerned with preventing the outbreak of any local conflicts which might spread and cover the world.

After referring to the recent visit to Ottawa of Mr. Dulles, United States Secretary of State, who had emphasized that the United States Government

valued the support of Canada in international affairs, Mr. Pearson went on to say:

While believing strongly in the view that the destinies of our two countries are intertwined . . . I want to reaffirm my view that we could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the people of the United States; but I must add in all frankness that I do not consider a conflict between two Chinese governments for possession of these Chinese coastal islands, Quemoy or the Matsus, to be such a situation, or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. That view has already been made known more than once to our friends in Washington.

Canada was deeply concerned with this particular issue lest a limited intervention by the United States might start a chain reaction as a result of which a little war might spread and "become literally the little war before the last". Mr. Pearson expressed his hope that it would still be possible to find a solution of the Formosan dispute by means of direct diplomatic negotiations, in spite of the obvious difficulties of getting the two Chinese governments to deal directly with each other.

Disarmament

At the conclusion of his statement to the House, Mr. Pearson said a few words about the disarmament discussions which were taking place in London. A subcommittee of five powers, of which Canada was one, were meeting in accordance with the United Nations Assembly resolution to discuss the limitation of arms that are now ironically called both conventional and atomic weapons. The Minister did not report any details of these discussions which were still being held in confidence, although he mentioned that the main problem was to reach agreement on an acceptable system of inspection and control. Mr. Pearson concluded:

The stakes are too high in this matter to call any discussions off quickly. We are told by scientists there is no means of ensuring complete or even adequate defence against these nuclear weapons and the means of carrying and dropping them on great masses of people. Therefore we must concentrate more than ever not only, I suggest, on the limitation of armaments, important though that may be, but in the search for measures which will prevent war itself. What is certain is that the control of our power to destroy ourselves is a subject of such desperate importance that if either side should use it as a means of propaganda or counter propaganda it would be utter folly and might be supreme tragedy.

There are some who get comfort out of the conclusion that those new weapons are so annihilating that no side will dare use them if it is certain that the other side will retaliate and has preserved the means to do so against surprise destruction. It was said by an authority whose words we always respect, I refer to Sir Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons in London the other day:

"It was an ironic fact that we had reached a stage where safety might well be the child of terror and life the twin brother of annihilation."

In other words, according to this view, peace instead of resting on a balance of power now rests on a balance of terror. I think that in one sense it is true that the greatest deterrent against a general war, although not against a limited one, is the certainty of nuclear retaliation. In present circumstances that may be our

best safeguard. If that is true it may give us some time which can and must be used for continuing the persistent and patient search for the solution to international problems and for the easing of international tensions. If we do not find such agreement and understanding then peace, such as it is, will be balanced on a hydrogen bomb or, to use the words which Mr. Nehru used a few weeks ago in London:

"Mankind would be doomed to hover indefinitely on the brink of catastrophe."

To avoid such a fate demands, and I know it will receive, all the support, all the strength, the energy, wisdom and faith of every member of this House.

Ireland

On March 10 there was a discussion in the House of a proposed agreement between Canada and Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation during which the Secretary of State for External Affairs made a statement on the constitutional position of Ireland. An amendment had been made that the Bills covering the agreement should be altered to describe the other contracting party as "the Republic of Southern Ireland".

Mr. Pearson said that the adoption of an amendment of this kind would make extremely difficult, if not impossible, the negotiation and signing of agreements with that country. He said:

To support that position, Mr. Speaker, I must put on the record what I think is the factual situation with regard to the designation of this state with which we are negotiating this agreement. As my hon. friend who has just spoken has pointed out, it is true that between 1921 and 1937 the 26 countries of southern Ireland were known as the Irish Free State. It is also true that the Irish constitution, adopted in 1937, stated—I think it is article 4—that the name of the state is Eire, or in the English language, Ireland. That is how these people have designated their own state in their own constitution. I submit that is the proper designation because it is the constitutional one.

Article 2 of this constitution states that the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland; but article 3 in the constitution provides that pending—and I think these are the words of the article—reintegration of the national territory as so described, the laws enacted by the Irish parliament are to be limited in application to the area of the 26 counties.

Then in 1949 Ireland severed her last remaining link with the crown by a statute which is named, it is true, the Republic of Ireland Act. It is also true that that act declared that the description of the state shall be the Republic of Ireland. However, I believe that this does not change the name of the state as established by the constitution, which could only be changed by a constitutional amendment.

I therefore submit, Mr. Speaker, that the description of Ireland in this treaty is the proper one. If it were to be altered, it would be extremely difficult indeed for us to negotiate agreements with a country in a name which that country does not accept for itself. I also submit that the correct form of address for the head of the Irish state is the President of Ireland. But when we use this word "Ireland" or the expression "President of Ireland"—certainly this is our understanding—that use carries no territorial or political implications of any kind. I therefore feel that the wording of the agreement is the proper one and that it would be most unfortunate if it were changed, and I submit that this amendment should not be adopted.



—Capital Press

His Excellency Mario Scelba, Prime Minister of Italy, being greeted at the Union Station, Ottawa, by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent. In the background is His Excellency Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador to Canada. Mr. Scelba visited Canada from March 24 to March 27, spending one day in Montreal and two days in Ottawa. In Montreal Mr. Scelba was given an honorary degree by the University of Montreal. In Ottawa Mr. Scelba, who was accompanied by a number of senior advisers had discussions with Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson as well as with other Ministers on defence and political matters related to the partnership of Canada and Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information

The Department of External Affairs announced on April 13 that the North Atlantic Council has recommended to member governments the signature of an Agreement for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information. It is expected that the Agreement will be signed within the next two months when the Governments of the NATO countries have indicated their readiness to do so.

The draft agreement proposed by the Council will, when concluded, make it possible for the United States to make available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its civil and military agencies and commands, atomic information which the Government of the United States of America deems necessary to the development of defence plans, the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons, and the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons. The draft agreement also provides that the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, other than the United States, will, to the extent they deem necessary, make available to NATO information in the same categories under conditions similar to those which will apply with respect to the United States.



CANADA AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

(Continued from page 121)

development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection, and fundamental science—in which international co-operation might most effectively be accomplished.”

In accordance with the General Assembly's resolution, the competent Specialized Agencies, in particular FAO, WHO and UNESCO, are being consulted on the plans for the Conference. Meanwhile, negotiations are continuing with the U.S.S.R. and among a group of 8 atomic powers, including Canada, to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency as proposed by President Eisenhower in December 1953. It is the hope of the Canadian Government that this Agency will include all countries in a position to contribute materials and experience in this field, and that the Agency when established will become closely related with the United Nations, perhaps as a new Specialized Agency.

TREATY INFORMATION

Multilateral

Ocean Weather Stations:

Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Signed at Paris, February 25, 1954.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited July 13, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955.

Bilateral

Egypt:

British Commonwealth—Egypt War Graves Agreement. Signed at Alexandria, June 8, 1952.

Entered into force February 28, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During its Ninth Session, 21 September - 17 December 1954. A/2890. G.A.O.R., ninth session, supplement No. 21. 56 p.

United Nations Administrative Tribunal Statute and Rules (Second revision). A/CN.5/2/Rev. 2. N.Y., January 1955. 12 p. Sales No.: 1955.X.1.

Resolutions Adopted by the Economic and Social Council During its Eighteenth Session (resumed), 5 November - 16 December 1954. E/2654/Add.1. 4 p. ECOSOC Official Records: 18th session (resumed) Supplement No. 1A.

Processes and Problems of Industrialization in Under-developed Countries. E/2670, ST/ECA/29. N.Y. 1955. 151 p. \$1.50. Sales No.: 1955.II.B.1.

United Nations Children's Fund. Report of the Executive Board, 17 December 1954. E/2676, E/ICEF/280. 3 p. ECOSOC Official Records: 19th Session, Supplement No. 2A.

Foreign Capital in Latin America. E/CN.12/360, ST/ECA/28, November 1954. 164 p. \$1.75. Sales No.: 1954.II.G.4.

Economic Survey for Europe. E/ECE/194, Geneva, 1955. 315 p. \$2.50. Sales No.: 1955.II.E.2.

Guide to the Charter of the United Nations (Fourth Edition). 48 p. Sales No.: 1955.I.II (Department of Public Information).

International Directory of Schools of Social Work. ST/SOA/20, December 1954. 127 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1955.IV.2.

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Volume I—The Statistics. ST/SOA/SER.A/13. 137 p. \$1.50. Sales No.: 1954.IV.7.
Volume II—Biological, social and economic factors. ST/SOA/SER.A/13/Add. 1. 44 p. Sales No.: 1954.IV.8.

International Review of Criminal Policy (English, French, Spanish). January 1954. ST/SOA/SER.M/5. 171 p. \$2.00.

ICJ—Index to the Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 1954. Pp. 115-175 (bilingual). Sales No. 129.

UNESCO

Variations Abroad, Vol. VII, 1955. Paris 1955. 179 p. (English-French-Spanish).

Inventories of Apparatus and Materials for Teaching Science, Volume III: Technical Colleges; Part 5: Medical Sciences. Paris (UNESCO) December 1954, WHO, Geneva. 191 p.

WHO—Executive Board, Fifteenth Session, Geneva, 18 January - 4 February 1955. Part I: Resolutions; Part III: Organizational Study. Annexes. Geneva, March 1955. 148 p. \$1.25. Official Records of the WHO, No. 60.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/3 — *Canada's Atomic Energy Programme*, an address by the President, Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, Mr. W. J. Bennett, to the Toronto Board of Trade, January 24, 1955.
- No. 55/4 — *"Nations Business" Broadcast* (Comments on the debate in the House of Commons regarding the approval of the Paris Agreements under which the Federal Republic of Germany would be invited to join NATO; and the current situation in Formosa.) A radio broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered in the "Nations Business" series over the CBC, January 28, 1955.
- No. 55/5 — *Education, Foreign Policy, and the Hydrogen Bomb*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Ontario opening of the Canadian Education Week, Ottawa Technical School, March 6, 1955.
- No. 55/6 — *The Commonwealth of Nations — A Canadian View*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to The Round Table, Palm Beach, Florida, February 21, 1955.
- No. 55/7 — *Nuclear Energy for Peace or War*, an address by the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, Dr. O. M. Solandt, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 7, 1955.
- No. 55/8 — *Some Aspects of Canadian-American Relations*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 14, 1955.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Canadians in India

(Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in India.)

The 900 or so Canadians in India are scattered across the face of the country from the Himalayas to the Cochin coast, and from the great port of Bombay to the hills of Assam. Some are in the big cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Madras, but more than half live in those small towns and villages where eighty per cent of the people of India live and which are the stuff and substance of India.

Missionaries the Largest Element

Missionaries and their families represent the largest element in the Canadian community in India—about 650 of the 900. The business community accounts for about 100, the Canadian Civil Service for about thirty-five. (These figures do not include about a hundred people who are home in Canada on leave.

Members of all the main churches in Canada are working as missionaries in India, most of them as teachers, doctors and nurses. About three hundred and fifty Canadians give full-time to missionary work; others who are wives and mothers of families give part-time. Of the full-time workers about eighty-five are Roman Catholics, about fifty belong to the United Church, and forty-two are Baptists. There are about twenty Anglicans, twenty Presbyterians and fifteen Salvation Army. The India Mission, the Evangelical Alliance, the World Wide Evangelical Crusade and the Mennonites each have about twelve full-time Canadian missionaries in India and the Lutherans and the Apostolic Church of Pentecost about eight each. There are Canadians working for about twenty-five other missionary organizations in India. Each of these twenty-five organizations has one to four Canadians on its staff.

The total amount of educational and health work done by Canadian missionaries in India is very considerable. Thus the missions in India of the Protestant churches of Canada maintain twenty-five hospitals, of which five are for leprosy, five orphanages, thirteen middle schools, twelve high schools and one university college (Indore), in addition to hundreds of village schools. Some of the missions are also doing agricultural extension work in the villages. No comparable statistics can be given for Canadian Roman Catholic Missionaries in India since in most Roman Catholic missionary institutions in India there are missionaries of many nationalities.

The Canadian missionaries in India, like the Canadian community as a whole, are widely scattered. For example, the Capuchin Fathers work in the Gorakhpur District in Central Uttar Pradesh (the former United Provinces), the Jesuits work in the Darjeeling District of West Bengal, and the Fathers of the Holy Cross in Assam. Most of the work of the United Church of Canada is carried on in Central India; the Canadian Baptist missions are located mainly on the Bay of Bengal in Andhra and in Orissa; the Canadian Presbyterian missions in the Jhansi district and the Bhil tribal areas in Central India; and the Anglicans in the Punjab. One of the Anglican Bishops in India is a Can-

adian, the Right Reverend Heber Wilkinson, Bishop of Amritsar, who comes from Toronto. Monsignor Breen, whose home is in St. John, New Brunswick, is Prefect Apostolic of Haflong in Assam, and Monsignor Jerome Malenfant from St. Eloi in Quebec is Prefect Apostolic of Gorakhpur.

The Canadian Jesuit Fathers in the Darjeeling District, together with their colleagues from other countries, conduct two orphanages, five dispensaries, one industrial school, three Indian high schools, three middle schools, seventeen primary schools and one university college. The Jesuit industrial school at Kurseong, near Darjeeling, gives practical training in skills such as woodwork, leather work, carpentry and weaving to the teen-age boys of the Kurseong district. Its success is demonstrated by the fact that all its pupils get jobs. St. Joseph's College in Darjeeling draws its students from Iraq and Iran as well as from all the countries of South and Southeast Asia: Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, India, Burma and Thailand.

Education for all Races and Creeds


The Canadian missionary schools and colleges in India do not cater for Christians alone. They provide an education for all races and creeds. For example, the girls school at Palampur in the Punjab, which is run by Canadian Anglicans, has only about thirty Christian pupils out of approximately 250.

Two Canadians work at the interdenominational Christian Medical Hospital at Vellore in Madras State which is well known in South India for its excellent work, especially in the treatment of lepers. Miss Florence Taylor from Brantford, Ontario, is director of nursing education at this hospital.

One of the Canadian missionaries who has worked longest in India is Miss A. C. Munro of Serango, Ganjam District, Orissa. Miss Munro, who was born in Embro, Ontario and received her nurse's training in Winnipeg, has spent thirty-five years as a Baptist missionary and nurse with the aboriginal Saora tribe in Orissa. She has recently completed a valuable contribution to both the Saoras and to Indian scholarship by devising a Saora alphabet. She is now at work providing the tribe with its first book, a translation of the Bible.

Dr. Robert B. McClure of the United Church of Canada who works at the Ratlam Christian Hospital in Madhya Bharat spent many years with a medical mission in China working as a surgeon and public health organizer. During the last war he was for a time in charge of Red Cross supplies sent over the Burma Road. Since then he has worked in southern Palestine among Arab refugees and also in Egypt where he organized the first large-scale TB survey ever conducted in that country.

Monsignor Malenfant, the Prefect Apostolic of Gorakhpur, is doing valuable work for Indian Christian art. He is the director of an All-India Commission of the Roman Catholic Church which co-ordinates the work of adapting Christian art and liturgy to Indian artistic and cultural traditions. Father Packwood of Gorakhpur, who is from the Gaspé Peninsula, is a leading exponent of the use of Indian music in Christian liturgy. This is typical of the important work which Canadian missionaries of many denominations are doing in India to speed up the process of Indianizing not only the personnel of the Christian Churches in India but also their liturgy, language, religious arts, festivities and customs.



Commerce and Industry

Commerce and industry account for the second largest number of Canadians in India, about 100 in all, including wives and children. Thirty-eight of these live in Bombay and forty-three in Calcutta. Their jobs are in a wide variety of businesses and industries, including oil, insurance, industrial chemistry and tea planting. There are four Canadian tea planters in India—three of them in Assam. Canadians are to be found in many other Indian industries, from tractors and shoes to tobacco, carpets and aluminum.

Three large Canadian companies have subsidiaries or affiliates in India. The Indian Aluminium Company is an affiliate of the Aluminum Company of Canada. The firm was converted into a public limited company in 1954 but it had operated in India for many years before then. In the complex process of making aluminium the company spans four corners of India. It has bauxite mines in Bihar and Bombay, a reduction smelter in Travancore-Cochin, rolling mills at Howrah, near Calcutta and a paste and powder plant near Bombay. The managing director, Mr. J. W. Cameron, was born in Calgary, and has served in various parts of India since 1941. Of the company's 2,722 employees all but seven are Indian citizens. Three are Canadians.

The Massey-Harris-Ferguson Company of India, with headquarters in Bangalore, was formed in 1954 to develop the sales of agricultural equipment throughout India. Until the amalgamation of Massey-Harris and Ferguson the two firms were competitors. Massey-Harris first entered the Indian market in 1948. The new combined firm sells probably 80 per cent of the agricultural equipment which is imported into India. Most of this machinery is manufactured in the United Kingdom. The company is a leader in the work of adapting machinery to both traditional and improved methods of agriculture in India. What is probably the first mechanical equipment for the preparation of wet paddy land prior to transplanting rice seedlings has been developed by the firm, which tests new agricultural methods on its eighty acre farm near Bangalore. Mr. D. A. Trimble who was born in Smiley, Saskatchewan, came out to India four years ago as the principal representative of Massey-Harris and is now the director in charge of sales of the combined firm, which otherwise is almost entirely staffed by Indian citizens. All but six of its fifty-eight employees are Indians.

Although at one time three Canadian life insurance companies conducted business in India, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada is the only one that is now operating. The Sun Life has been established in India for fifty years. It has its head office in Bombay and branches in Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi. The company has the largest share of purely life insurance business of any non-Indian insurance firm. There are four Canadians on the staff of Sun Life in India and six other non-Indians. The remaining 143 employees are Indian citizens.

The Standard-Vacuum Refining Company of India at Bombay is responsible for the presence in India of about twenty-five Canadians, the largest group of Canadians in India associated with one single business enterprise. The Managing Director of the Company is Mr. William A. Williams of Sarnia, Ontario. He has been in charge of the construction and operation of the refinery which the company recently erected at Trombay on the outskirts of Bombay at a cost of about \$30 million. This is the first large modern oil refinery to be

constructed in India. Mr. Williams has nine Canadians on his staff. The majority of them have their families with them and most of them live at the Standard-Vacuum housing colony near the refinery which as a result has a definite Canadian atmosphere. Most of these Canadians will be temporary residents of India since it is the company's intention to Indianize their senior staff as quickly as possible, and they are training Indians to fill the posts held by Canadians and other Westerners. It is expected that in six years' time the number of non-Indians in the company will be reduced from 55 to 44.

The Arts and Professions

The Canadians in India are also represented in the arts and professions by one painter, one sociologist, one cabaret artist, one dentist, one doctor and two nurses (not counting missionary doctors and nurses or those employed by the World Health Organization). Dr. M. L. Freeman from Montreal is a Canadian of long standing in Madras where he has practised dentistry for 40 years. Dr. (Miss) A. D. Ross, who is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology of McGill University, has spent the last year in Bangalore studying changes in the structure of the urban Hindu family. Miss Corinne Robertshaw who graduated from the University of British Columbia in 1954 is the only Canadian university student in India. She has been studying at the University of Delhi. Miss Robertshaw was the first Canadian holder of a World University Service exchange scholarship between Canada and India.

A distinguished Canadian educationalist is Miss Dorothy Pearson from Mount Forest, Ontario, who has been in India for twenty years and is now a professor of nutrition at the Women's Christian College in Madras. Miss Pearson is an outstanding pioneer in the Home Service field in India. Another Madrassi by adoption is Mr. Wallace Forgie from Ottawa who has been engaged in boys' work in India for the last thirty years. He is now the director of a camp at Avadi outside Madras where camping groups of all kinds are accommodated on a splendid site and the camp leaders trained by Mr. Forgie. Two more Canadians who have recently been playing an active role in Indian life are Mr. and Mrs. David Hopper from Ottawa who have for eighteen months been living in a mud house in the village of Senapur about twenty miles from Banaras. Mr. Hopper was conducting an economic research project on the problems of productivity in the rural Indian economy, while Mrs. Hopper applied her Canadian nursing training at a clinic for the villagers.

Then, of course, there are the civil servants. They with their dependents number thirty-four. Five are connected with the Trade Commissioner's office in Bombay and twenty-nine with the High Commissioner's Office in New Delhi. The High Commissioner's Office constitutes the largest single group of Canadians in India and also the most transient, since most serve for only two or three years. Some of them will, however, return for a second posting to India. Others have entered another statistical group which consists of thirty-four Canadian housewives married to non-Canadians in India.

The Canadian experts of all kinds who come to India under the Colombo Plan are another transient group. One of the recent arrivals was Miss M. E. Yamanaka from Toronto who is spending two years in India as a nursing arts instructor at the Osmania School of Nursing in Hyderabad. She was the first of six Canadian public health nurses to come to India in 1954-55 under the Colombo Plan.



—Indian Express

CANADIANS IN INDIA

During his visit to India early in 1954, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, centre, greets a four-year old Canadian boy held in the arms of Miss Dorothy M. Pearson of the Women's Christian College in Madras. To the left rear of Mr. St. Laurent is the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott Reid and Mrs. Reid.

Canadians are to be found too among the international civil servants in India. There are in India nine Canadian employees and dependents of WHO and the UN Technical Assistance Board. Mr. J. N. Corry from Fernbank, Ontario, is the representative in India of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board. Dr. Olivier Leroux from Hawkesbury, Ontario, is the World Health Organization representative for India. He spent about ten years before and during the last war in the Army Medical Corps in India before going back to Canada to work for the Department of National Health and Welfare in Ottawa. Now he has returned to India with his wife and the youngest of his five children.

Other Canadians on international service in India are six reserve Army officers who are members of the United Nations Military Observer group in Kashmir. The observers serve for one year and divide their time between India and Pakistan. Lt. Col. J. R. Paquin who is the senior Canadian officer in the United Nations group feels at home in the hills of Kashmir. He is from the Laurentian Mountains of Quebec. Another Canadian soldier in India is Major Alfred Robbins, who is spending one year's exchange duty at the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington in the south of India.

Soldiers, priests and merchants have been the traditional explorers of new worlds. The Canadian soldiers, priests and merchants in India today are explorers from the New World of North America to the new world of independent India. Together with the 2,500 Canadians of Indian origin in Canada they are ambassadors of goodwill between India and Canada.

Reconstruction in South Korea

Building a Text-Book Printing Press

By B. E. ROTHWELL, Printing Consultant, UNKRA

The United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Agency was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950 in order to assist in the restoration and rehabilitation of the Korean economy which was shattered by the war. The prolongation of hostilities, however, prevented the Agency from undertaking large-scale operations until the latter part of 1952. The Agency's programme is concerned with long-range reconstruction, particularly in the fields of agriculture, education, industry and fisheries. The Canadian Government has contributed \$7,250,000 to UNKRA and has also supplied a number of experts to assist the South Korean Government in the reconstruction of their country. Mr. B. E. Rothwell, a member of the staff of the Government Printing Bureau in Ottawa, spent over a year in South Korea, from August 1953, constructing a large modern printing plant for the production of school text-books and has written the following account of his experiences.

To print thirty million school text-books for the children of war-ravaged South Korea was the problem which confronted the writer early in June 1953. And all this without a printing plant and without printers, skilled or unskilled. Such was the problem confronting the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. In this dilemma the Agency asked to have a technician go out from Canada, construct a plant and train a staff to get it into operation. To do the job in any modern printing establishment, under the most favourable conditions, with supplies, equipment and personnel readily available, would require plenty of thought and planning. To do it in a war-torn country where none of these items were available was something else again.

An appeal was made to Mr. Edouard Cloutier, Queen's Printer, by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, through our External Affairs Department, to have a technician sent out to take charge of this project. I was honoured in being chosen to do this job in one year in a country unknown to me.

Challenge Accepted

Having accepted the challenge, I landed in Tokyo, Japan, on August 10, 1953. It was originally planned that I was to remain in Japan for some time to study printing techniques and equipment in order that I might have some knowledge of how to go about the proposition in Korea, but on arrival at UNKRA Headquarters there I received an urgent cable to come directly on to Pusan, Korea, and have a conference with the Government of South Korea and UNKRA officials. The reason for this was to have an exchange of ideas as to how best to proceed with the project.

My arrival in Pusan was on one of their national holidays. I think it commemorated the ill-fated attempt by the Koreans to drive the Japanese invaders out some thirty years ago.

I will never forget my first glimpse of Pusan with its great natural harbor. It was one of the hottest days of the year, and it seemed to me that all the people in the world had congregated there. It seemed that nearly the whole population of South Korea had been evacuated to the Pusan area and the congestion was a swarming human hive. People were living under the most awful conditions, in sheds, in cardboard shacks, and in shacks that had beer cans nailed to the roofs and sides. They had taken the tops and bottoms off of the cans and flattened the sides out and nailed them on to roofs and sides. It was originally a city of 500,000, but the population had overflowed to about two million.

To get to Hialeah compound, where I was to be quartered, was really something. The smell of the open sewers on a hot day was an olfactory experience I will never forget. The compound was a barbed-wire enclosure under the control of the U.S. Army and we were assigned to rooms in quonset huts which were equipped with military cots and facilities for washing and shaving. In the centre of the compound was a large mess hall where our meals were cooked and served by Korean personnel. The food was supplied by the Army.

Preliminary Survey

Because of the chaotic condition prevailing with the Government trying to get re-established in Seoul, I could not get to see any of the officials. I decided therefore to see some of the printing plants in and around Pusan. This I did with the aid of an interpreter. These were little corner holes in the wall. Some did not have any floors, and the equipment was very obsolete. Some of the presses were 50 and 60 years old and were mostly of Japanese and German manufacture. How they ever produced school books in any quantity under such conditions was a mystery. There was one plant that had quite recently been established for printing currency which had several presses and was doing a fairly good job, but the paper was ordinary printing paper and when put into circulation had no durability.

The United Nations Agency was constantly keeping in touch with the Government of the Republic of Korea for me, and in a few days I got orders to report to the Minister of Education in Seoul. My first trip to Seoul was my introduction to riding on military planes. I was given a parachute by a sergeant to strap on my back. I did not know how it was done and the crew of the plane did not have the time to bother with me. But after watching some of the others who had been up before, I finally got the hang of it and to me it seemed to weigh a ton. It takes about three hours by plane from Pusan to Seoul and about eleven to twelve hours by rail.

At that time there were no regular airports in Korea except those established by the U.S. Army. The run-ways were perforated steel sections which are laid down temporarily, and they felt really bumpy when you landed. The air fields are called K-9, K-16, K-10, etc.

My first glimpse of Seoul was a city which had been almost levelled to the ground. There was hardly a building which had not been burned or bombed. It had been fought over three times and the smashing it had received was fantastic.

There were very few people on the streets except soldiers and nothing whatever in the stores. I could see that it had once been a very beautiful city.



—United Nations

KOREA'S NEW TEXTBOOK PRINTING PLANT

An interior view of the new textbook printing plant, with the books coming off the automatic sorting and stitching machine.

Then I was taken to the U.S. Embassy Compound, where living conditions were quite good. The mess hall was somewhat similar to Pusan and food cooked and served by Korean personnel.

I finally got an interview with the Minister of Education, Mr. Kim Bup Rin, a very impressive and intelligent official, and had many talks with him and his staff. He insisted that I take an office adjoining his, and fitted it up with drawing boards, office equipment, etc. He had been educated at the Sorbonne in Paris and spoke French fluently and a little English. At one time he had also been a Buddhist priest.

At that time, they were not quite sure whether the government would remain in Seoul, and the Minister asked me if I would look over some possible sites for the plant with him in the cities of Taijon, Taegue and Pusan before reaching a decision as to where the plant should be located. At all these places we were met by the Mayors and City Councils and well received. They were all anxious to rebuild their cities and would do almost anything to get the plant located there. They showed me some very good sites and offered the land free. But in all those cities the problem of water supply was a gib factor. None of them at that time could promise any quantity.

I was convinced that, for all practical purposes, the plant should be located as near Seoul as possible because it was the seat of government and I had to work directly with the Minister and the R.O.K. Cabinet. It would have been

difficult to be located at some distant city. Also I envisaged that at some future time there would come a saturation point in the demand for school text-books, and when that time came it could be used as a Government Printing Plant. As a matter of fact, before I left we were accepting a few jobs from the National Assembly when we had extra capacity on the presses. The quality of printing was a revelation to them and they were lavish in their praise of the new plant.

Site Chosen

I talked the matter over with the Minister of Education several times and he finally agreed with me that it was the logical thing to do. Consequently, we looked over many sites in and around the city of Seoul, and finally decided on a location just outside the city at a suburb called Yong-Dong-Po on the other side of the Han river about 20 minutes' drive from the centre of the city.

The next step was to draw up the design and specifications for the building. I knew this would be a problem, but it was pretty well settled in my own mind that to produce 30 million text-books it would have to be of one-floor construction to lend itself to straight line production, low cost maintenance, and inexpensive construction.

Through the Minister, we engaged a young Korean architect who had studied at the University of Tokyo and who could speak a little English. He was a very smart boy but as I said it was a problem to sell them on the idea of this type of building because it was altogether different from Eastern architecture in Korea. I had not seen anything remotely resembling a modern design of this kind. After a lot of persuasion I sold Kim Tai Shik, the architect, on the idea, and then left it to him to sell the Minister and the Cabinet. They were continually remarking that they would like to adapt themselves to Western ideas and Western methods and that was my trump card in getting the type of building I wanted.

The size of the building was the next question to be decided. The property was ample enough for a good sized building, but there was no point in putting up a large sprawling building just for the sake of occupying all the property. The essential factor was the work it was required to produce without crowding, and with ample provision for paper stores, moveability, storage and office space.

I had been getting all the catalogues I could from Japan on what they had in the way of printing equipment, and had given a great deal of study to what type of equipment would do the job required and the space occupied by the equipment. Before definitely deciding on the equipment, I made my first trip to Japan towards the end of October to assess the equipment and find out what printers were using there. The first thing to do was get the names and addresses of leading printing firms. In this I had a stroke of luck. They publish a monthly bulletin somewhat similar to our "printing trade magazines" which listed all the leading printing firms. The chap who was editor of the magazine somehow got word that I was over there to buy printing equipment. Don't ask me how he found out. I still don't know, but that is one of the mysteries of the East. I never did find out, but I suggest it was through one of the natives employed by UNKRA at their Tokyo Headquarters. From there on, it was just a case of checking the equipment they were using as to performance, production, quality of printing, etc., and the status of the firms which I considered prospective suppliers.

They were all polite,—painfully so at times. It is a fact, that the more important a buyer is, the lower the bow and the more polite they are. Well, I was there to buy and they were most eager to sell, so I got my full share of those real long, low bows.

My first trip took about three weeks. At the end of that time I had decided what equipment should be purchased. I returned to Seoul with blueprints and detailed specifications as to sizes, etc. From there on, it was a question of making paper templates of every piece, placing it in position and thereby determining the size of the building. This procedure paid off eventually when it came time to set up the equipment.

The main building, heating plant and auxiliary power plant contained approximately 40,000 square feet and having decided this point, I got together with the architect and showed him pictures of some of our modern plants here and in the United States and I must say he was quick to adopt the idea.

We finally ended up with about 25 full scale plans of the building, the electric work, plumbing, heating plant and auxiliary power plant. Before calling for tenders, we had to get the approval of the UNKRA Housing Commission but nothing was changed after giving them a full explanation of all the details. The most difficult part for me was to work from millimeters and centimeters because inches and feet are practically unknown over there and it would only be confusing to them.

Tenders Called

We finally got to the stage where tenders were called for the grading of the land. There was quite a slope to the property and to level it and raise it up about eight feet it was necessary to get bulldozers from the R.O.K. Army to do this work. I visualized that a one-story building would look squatty unless raised up to a fair level. The contract for grading was let about the end of November and completed towards the end of December. A separate contract was drawn up for the construction of the main building, heating plant and auxiliary power plant and water tank. Tenders were called from among the Korean contractors and the work started in January.

I will say this for the Korean contractors, The Kuck Dong Construction Co., they were smart and knew their job. The work was all hand labour such as the mixing of cement and the making bricks right on the job. No power saws or other labour-saving equipment was used. It is interesting to note that the hand saws they used were shaped like a cleaver—larger at the outer end than at the handle. When they saw a board they do not bear down as we do, but draw the blade towards them. They claim it is more accurate and have been doing it that way for centuries.

They employ more labour on their construction work than we do and the reason for this is that it is so abundant and so inexpensive. We had about 300 employed on construction and among them 25 women. The women over there do manual labour the same as men. These women were engaged in grading gravel by hand and carrying as many as 15 bricks on their heads to the bricklayers. Some of them even had babies strapped on their backs and worked 15 hours per day. This method certainly gives them a wonderful posture and it is a revelation to see how straight they walk.

The men have strapped to their backs what is called an "A" Frame. It consists of two boards joined together and strapped to their backs, with two wooden prongs jutting out from the two cross members. It really is amazing the loads they can carry on this contraption without any seeming effort.

Telling of this "A" Frame reminds me of an experience I had. The man in charge of the Housing Division for UNKRA asked me to go with him one morning and see what I thought of the housing units he was erecting. After we had inspected some of the houses he proudly pointed out some 10 or 12 bright new red wheelbarrows equipped with rubber tires, etc. He called the lieutenant in charge of that particular area and told him to put the Korean labourers to work using the wheelbarrows. The lieutenant saluted and said: "yes, Sir!"

The next morning we were passing and he said: "let's stop for a moment and see what progress has been made with the new equipment". There they stood with not a scratch on them. Well, my friend nearly blew his top and proceeded to give the lieutenant the most artistic bawling out that I had ever heard. When the lieutenant could get a word in edgeways, he said: "Just a minute, Sir". He called to two of the Koreans and told them to load up one of the wheelbarrows. After they had it loaded, instead of wheeling it away, the two of them picked it up, load and all, and placed it on the "A" Frame and trotted away with it! You just cannot change the habits of centuries overnight.

Building Material Shortages

But to get back to the construction of the plant. There were many difficulties and frustrations, mostly in regard to building materials. The country being in such a war-torn condition, it was almost impossible to get supplies and keep the construction going, and I very much doubted at times if I would ever have a building to put the equipment in. However, by begging, borrowing and every other means we did our best to keep the project moving.

The Korean contractor was one of the most resourceful men I have ever met. There is a saying that you can get anything you want in Korea if you know where to go, and this chap really proved that the saying is correct. Construction continued intermittently and by the end of May things began to take shape and the buildings began to look like a real modern printing plant.

In between times I had made frequent trips to Japan to check on the progress of the equipment. Some of the smaller items used in the composing room, photo-engraving and offset plate making divisions were readily available, but for the most part all equipment had to be fabricated at the factories. There had to be a continual follow-up because time over there is not so important as over here, but I was working against time, and wanted to get the job done in one year if possible.

I had made arrangements to have the equipment shipped to Inchon and warehoused there until the plant was ready to receive it. Some of it began to arrive in the early part of February and I think the balance was received early in July.

Not being too familiar with their manufacture, I specified that before acceptance of the larger presses, etc., that test runs be made at their factory



—United Nations

SOUTH KOREA'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AIDED

Mr. B. J. Rothwell, of the Department of Public Printing and Stationery, Ottawa, UNKRA printing consultant, was responsible for the erection of a new printing plant near Seoul, South Korea. Above, Mr. Rothwell examines one of the first four-colour books produced in the plant. With Mr. Rothwell is, left to right, Mr. Kim Do Joon, vice-manager of the plant; Mr. Kim Yung Ju, manager, and an interpreter.

and another at the plant in Korea before final acceptance. A certain amount was of course pledged to them to begin manufacture. This precaution worked out very well and insured proper attention to detail of fabrication, shipping and packing.

Construction by the end of June had been well enough advanced to commence trucking the equipment from Inchon to the plant and start setting it up.

The whole thing was a matter of co-ordination, but at this stage we had a very serious setback. The rainy season set in, and when it rains over there it really rains, day and night, for two or three weeks. Also, the clay in Korea is the gooiest and stickiest clay I have ever seen. You can imagine what it was like trying to get presses weighing as much as 29 tons through that mud. Once again, the Army came to our rescue and supplied us with cranes, wreckers, etc., and virtually lifted trucks and equipment out of the mud. The trucks were mired down to above their running boards.

Those poor Koreans really worked to get the crates into the plant. Bare to the waist and just a pair of trunks on they stayed out in that rain and never complained.

Another bad break happened at Inchon while loading the crate containing the feeder mechanism on one of the two-colour offset presses into a truck. The

cable surrounding the crate slipped sideways and one corner caught against a pile of plywood after it had been raised about eight feet. Down it came, and made an awful mess of the feeder. This called for a quick trip to Tokyo to replace the damaged parts and in two weeks' time these were delivered to the plant.

From there on, the slow process of installing the equipment took place. We had no cranes or gantrys to work with, and it was hand labour all the way in lifting and setting the heavy parts of the presses into position. It was amazing what these Koreans can lift. They put poles across their backs and with heavy ropes they move loads that you would not think possible. We would not attempt it without blocks and tackles. An interesting thing about them is that they sing some kind of chant as they work, and if you watch them closely enough and listen you will detect a kind of rhythm to their movements.

Installation Problems

The problem of setting up the equipment was a real one. We had recruited some technicians who had some previous experience, but for the most part they were untrained. I had taken the precaution to have blueprints made of every piece of equipment and also instruction books printed in both Japanese and English. They could all read and speak Japanese, this helped greatly. On one of my early trips I had taken four Koreans with me to Japan and placed them in the factories to study the equipment and they were of great assistance. It was a terrific job to watch and check every step of the way, but the Koreans were most co-operative and I really liked working with them. They had no fixed ideas and nothing to unlearn which was a big help.

Just imagine the problem it was to have a good sized complete printing plant delivered at your door all in huge cases. The problem of having to open these cases, clean all the grease off and sort it all out and then begin the job of putting it together was tremendous. I took the precaution of having the cases distinctly marked with the letter corresponding to the division and the number of the case, along with the total number of cases. All told there were around 300 large cases.

An interesting feature regarding the equipment was that it was all painted a light grey colour with all the electrical parts painted yellow, the dangerous moving parts painted red and all oil inlets painted red. The underside was painted a light blue. The cement floor had been painted a tile red. Lights had been placed under the machines to facilitate repairs and greasing. The presses had been mounted high enough to allow a man to get underneath without having to get doubled up like a corkscrew.

It must be remembered that it was taboo to bring Japanese technicians to Korea for obvious reasons. It would have simplified my work somewhat, but as it turned out it was much better to let the Koreans set it up themselves, thereby gaining a knowledge of the adjustments and purpose of each part. If Japanese technicians had been allowed to do the work and things had gone wrong, it would have been an easy "out" for Koreans.

We were fortunate in being able to attract personnel to the plant who had come from very good families but had lost everything during the invasion. Also, through the Minister of Education, we hired a fair proportion of college

graduates. A good many of them had degrees and were glad to get work in this modern printing plant.

Long before coming to the process of setting up the machinery much thought had to be given to the quality, quantity and size of paper for the different machines. Quality, price and delivery date were the determining factors. We had to consider the amount of roll stock required, cover stock flat offset and regular book paper for the cylinder presses. All of which took a great deal of precise calculation. However, the paper question was finally settled and although it gave me many anxious days, it was finally delivered just a week prior to the opening of the plant.

Plant Self-sufficient

I would just like here to explain that the plant itself was totally self-sufficient. By that I mean that it was capable of accepting a job—any job—and turning out the finished product within the plant, even to the extent of engraving their own matrices for casting the type.

A complete list of the many divisions is as follows:

art department; photo engraving; offset plate-making; offset plate-graining; stereotype; electric plating and chrome plating; type casting; composition (photo and hand); benton engraving; presses-rotary; multi-colour offset and automatic cylinder; bindery; shipping; carpenter shop; machine shop; paper storage and supplies storage; executive offices; central heating, auxiliary power and water facilities. The following special features were included: modern cafeteria; rest rooms; shower rooms; first-aid room with nurse in attendance; fluorescent lighting; adequate ventilation; special type of steel window with roll type sliding panes; tennis court at rear of building.

The plant was finally whipped into shape and we decided to have the official opening on September 16, 1954, just thirteen months after landing in Korea.

The Korean personnel really went all out to have their printing plant at its best for the opening. The main entrances were decorated with flags and bunting. On top of the main entrance the flags of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations were flown and looked very impressive.

In attendance at the ceremony were, of course, President Syngman Rhee and his Cabinet; members of the National Assembly; General John B. Coulter, Agent General of UNKRA; Mr. Tyler Wood, Co-ordinator of FOA; General Maxwell Taylor, Commander of the Eighth United States Army; General Frederick Haydon, Commander of K.C.A.C.; the Presidents of several colleges in the Seoul area and many others.

The President made a very fine speech in Korean and English, praising the efforts of UNKRA for such an outstanding contribution to the reconstruction of South Korea and to the children of his country.

It was my great pleasure to show the President through the plant and explain the operation of the equipment which greatly interested him. Before leaving he took great pleasure in planting several trees to mark the occasion.

(Continued on page 167)

North Atlantic Council Meeting

Text of a Statement made by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, Monday, May 9, 1955.

The historic significance of this Council meeting is apparent to us all. The German Federal Republic, as a result of agreements freely concluded, and which have been approved by our legislatures, now becomes a member of NATO—an organization devoted solely to international peace and security and welfare. We warmly welcome Chancellor Adenauer as the first representative of Germany to our Council, and as a man who has already proven his devotion to the ideals we share.

We are here also to examine in confidence and frankness the international situation, particularly in the light of recent developments. That situation, at least in Europe, has improved. This gives us reason for satisfaction, but none for abandoning those policies which have to a large extent been responsible for that improvement.

This Council meeting marks the successful completion of long and patient effort by those around this table and by others who are no longer with us on the Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of our NATO association.

It marks also a new phase in the development of both European unity and the Atlantic community. France and Germany, not because they forget, but because they remember the past, have come together in a Western European Union which includes Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and also Great Britain whose vision across the seas has not prevented the acceptance of a new and indispensable European role. Europe, however, even a united Europe, is not enough, and NATO, the vigorous and hopeful expression of the Atlantic idea, is recognition of that fact.

NATO is growing stronger and free Germany adds to that strength. This strength is, however, merely a means to an end, international peace and security. Therefore we must exploit every genuine opportunity to seek by negotiation solutions for the problems which today keep alive fears and tensions in the world.

This remains our most important NATO task. Only strength and steadiness will see it through to a successful conclusion.

All these things have been said so often by so many so much better than I have been able to do, that I feel almost apologetic for repeating the obvious. I am, however, grateful for the opportunity to reaffirm, and on an occasion of such momentous importance, the loyalty of the government and people of my country to the ideals of peaceful and fruitful co-operation which inspire this great Atlantic Organization, into which we now welcome our German colleagues. The developments which have culminated in this meeting give us greater reason for faith and confidence in the future.



—United Nations

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK

Aerial view of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations, in New York, with the East River in the foreground, and mid-town Manhattan in the background. The three U.N. buildings are, left to right: The Secretariat building; the Conference Area; and the General Assembly building.

Canada and the United Nations — The Record After Ten Years

THE names of Canada and Canadians appear frequently in the record of the first ten years of the United Nations. The history of the world Organization shows that Canada has participated energetically in most of its activities.

Hopes for a new world based on a secure peace, economic and social justice and effective international co-operation were high in the spring of 1945 when delegates of 50 nations assembled in San Francisco in the dying days of World War II to draft the Charter of the United Nations. The ideals and aspirations of the delegates, who represented more than 80 per cent of the world's population, were summarized in the Preamble of the Charter which stated in part:

WE THE PEOPLES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . .


Drafting of Articles

The Chapters of the Charter which follow the Preamble define in 111 Articles the purposes, principles, and methods of the Organization and establish the structure of each constituent part. These Articles were hammered out in final form in San Francisco during two months of intensive negotiations. Twelve technical committees responsible for drafting the various sections held nearly 400 meetings. The results of their efforts inevitably reflected the serious clashes of opinion and divergencies of outlook which might have wrecked the conference if a spirit of conciliation and compromise had not prevailed; but the seeds of later procedural disputes had been sown in a number of the Articles of the Charter. Without the compromise they represented, the Charter could not have been written.

The records of the San Francisco Conference indicate that the Canadian Delegation played an important part in drafting the Charter. The Delegation sought in the debates on security measures to ensure adequate scope for the influence and capacities of the Middle Powers. Largely as a result of Canadian initiative, Article 23 of the Charter provided for the election of non-permanent members with due regard to their contribution to peace as well as to geographical distribution. The Canadian Delegation also was responsible for the

inclusion of Article 44, under which the Security Council is required to invite a member to participate in decisions concerning employment of that member's armed forces. Canada helped to ensure recognition in the Charter for the role of the International Court of Justice; obtained inclusion of Article 109 which provides for the question of review of the Charter to be considered at the 10th session of the General Assembly next September; helped strengthen the international position of the Secretariat and establish relationship of the General Assembly and the Security Council as organizations of varying functions but with equality of status. Among the amendments submitted by the Canadian Delegation to the conference was a complete revision of the important chapter in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal on international economic and social co-operation. Proposals put forward by the Canadian Delegation to strengthen the position of the Economic and Social Council and clarify the relationship between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies were adopted by the Conference. Referring to the role of the Canadian Delegation in the drafting of the chapters on the Economic and Social Council in his book "The Four Cornerstones of Peace", D. M. Dean wrote: "Canada . . . made an outstanding contribution in its carefully thought out proposals for expansion of the functions and authority of the Economic and Social Council."

The record shows that Canadians have served in most of the main offices and organs of the United Nations. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, presided over the Special Session of the General Assembly in



THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ACTION

—United Nations

The Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, addressing a meeting of the General Assembly, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson presiding as President of the seventh session.

1947, and he was the President of the 7th session of the Assembly in 1952. Canada served on the Security Council in 1948-49; was a member of the Economic and Social Council from 1946-48 and 1949-52, and currently holds membership in all the Specialized Agencies. Canada participated in the drafting of the statute of the International Court of Justice—one of the principal organs of the United Nations—and a Canadian, Mr. J. E. Read, has been a member of the Court since its inception. Canadian representatives have served and are serving on many commissions and committees of the United Nations.

Canada as a Mediator

With the Security Council frequently unable to bring force to bear upon the parties to a dispute, the United Nations has gradually developed less forthright and more flexible means of carrying out its responsibilities. In dealing with threats to the maintenance of international peace, there has been effective use of the facilities of the United Nations for promoting discussion, compromise, and mediation. These facilities were helpful in encouraging withdrawal of troops of the U.S.S.R. from the province of Azerbaijan in Iran in 1946, the lifting of the Berlin blockade in 1949, and a settlement of the disputes between Greece and her northern neighbours resulting from aid allegedly provided to Greek guerillas by Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. As a member of the Security Council in 1948-1949, Canada played an active role in mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning Jammu and Kashmir, and in obtaining a settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Late in 1949, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, General A. G. L. MacNaughton was appointed to assist representatives of India and Pakistan in finding a solution to the dispute over Kashmir. His efforts to secure agreement on de-militarization were not successful, but the Security Council adopted a resolution embodying the proposals he had advanced. At a critical stage of negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Canadian Representative on the Security Council proposed a practical course of action which helped the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Representative to work out an agreement on the aspects of the Security Council proposals on which they differed. This led to preliminary talks at Batavia followed by a round table conference at The Hague and ultimately to the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. Canada was represented on the Special Committee on Palestine established by the General Assembly at its Special Session in 1947 and its representative supported the majority plan for the partition of Palestine. Later as a member of the Security Council, Canada helped secure the armistice agreements that terminated hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours. A Canadian, Major General E. L. M. Burns, currently is Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine. A number of Canadian army officers are serving as members of the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and others are attached to the United Nations military observer groups on duty in connection with the Kashmir dispute.

Korea a Challenge

The chronicle of the United Nations shows the greatest challenge to its principles came in 1950 with the invasion of South Korea. The record proves the Organization met its responsibilities promptly and squarely. The boycott of the Security Council maintained at the time by the Soviet Delegate prevented him from vetoing the decision of the Security Council to take collective

action against aggression in Korea. Canada was one of the 16 nations which contributed military forces to the United Nations Command. She was represented in land battles by a specially-recruited army combat unit, at sea by destroyers and in the air by the transport planes which ferried men and munitions across the Pacific towards the war zone. Canada provided the third largest number of armed forces from the outside and many Canadian servicemen gave their lives in the United Nations cause in Korea. In every stage of the difficult negotiations that finally led to an armistice in Korea, Canada tried to show that she recognized all her duties as a member of the United Nations. The significance of the fighting in Korea to Canada was described at the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 19, 1953 by the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Martin:

The United Nations forces have done all they were asked to do by force of arms. It has been the first major application of the principle of collective security by an international organization, and it has been successful. We are thereby marking certainly one of the greatest achievements in human history. Had the United Nations failed to act, or had it acted and failed, not only would a brave and ancient people have lost their freedom, but the United Nations itself would, I fear, already have become the dead husk of another great idea unrealized, not for lack of resolutions but of resolution.

The Korean action made it clear that a Soviet veto could have nullified the determination of other members to resist aggression. A number of member states, including Canada, therefore took action at the 5th session of the General Assembly in 1950 to establish new procedures and machinery through which the Assembly could cope with breaches of the peace or acts of aggression when the Security Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility in such matters. Canada became one of the sponsors at the 5th session of the General Assembly of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which provided for the calling of an emergency session of the Assembly on 24 hour notice, the establishment of a Peace Observation Commission, a request to each member state to maintain elements within their armed forces for prompt use as United Nations units, the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee and a call for intensified respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and social progress. "The Uniting for Peace" resolution in effect authorized the General Assembly to assume the peace-making and peace-safeguarding responsibilities of the Security Council, if the latter were unable to act in a crisis.

Canadian Influence in Disarmament

The record discloses that Canada has played a key role in efforts of the United Nations to promote disarmament. As a member first of the Atomic Energy Commission and later of the Disarmament Commission, which was established in 1952 to combine responsibilities of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, Canada has shared in the wearying quest for a system of control, reduction, and prohibition of armaments that would be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. At the eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada was appointed a member of a five nation Sub-Committee—the United Kingdom, the United States, France, U.S.S.R., and Canada—to negotiate in private on the disarmament question. At the 9th session of the General Assembly, Canadian representatives took the initiative in sponsoring a resolution requesting the members of the Sub-Committee to continue their negotiations. The U.S.S.R. became a co-sponsor of the resolution and it



—United Nations

THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA

Troops guarding the approaches to a Korean pass, one of the first defences put up to halt the attacks by the North Korean forces, reported to the United Nations on June 25, 1950.

was adopted unanimously by the Assembly—the first unanimous vote on an important political question in the history of the Assembly. In a subsequent unanimous vote, the General Assembly endorsed President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace programme, which provided for a conference of scientists on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the establishment of an international agency to promote the sharing of atomic know-how and skills in the interest of humanity. Canada is a member of the committee appointed to organize the conference of scientists.

Economic and Social Problems

While much of her interests and energies in the United Nations have been devoted to the solution of the problems which directly threatened peace, the record shows that Canada has played an active role in the Organization's efforts to promote higher standards of living, improved health, extension of economic co-operation, respect for human rights and recognition of accepted standards of international law. There are three separate but related areas of operation in which an effort is made to carry out a number of these objectives in the Charter:

- (a) programme organized by the Economic and Social Council under which member states combine their resources and knowledge to help less fortunate countries and territories;
- (b) programmes for social progress and the achievement of human rights; and
- (c) widespread operations of the 10 Specialized Agencies which function in close co-operation with the Economic and Social Council.

Canada has taken a prominent part in all of these areas of activity. The major operational undertaking of the Economic and Social Council has been the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. This is an imaginative plan for exchanging technical skills and assisting under-developed countries in the improvement of industry, health, and education. Canada, the third largest contributor, to date has contributed \$4,700,000 for the programme. A Canadian, Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, is Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration. Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan is in accord with ideals and efforts of the United Nations to raise standards of living in under-developed countries. The problem of increasing the flow of public and private capital for financing economic development has been under discussion recently in the Economic and Social Council and in the Assembly. At the ninth session of the latter, Canada supported a resolution providing for the early establishment of an International Finance Corporation to help achieve this objective.

Financial Contributions

Canada, which subscribes 3.63 per cent of the administrative budget of the United Nations, is sixth in the list of contributors. The Canadian Government has contributed \$7,750,000 in cash and \$750,000 worth of Canadian salted cod for United Nations relief and reconstruction programmes in Korea. Contributions in cash and kind totalling approximately \$4,000,000 (U.S.) have been made to the United Nations programmes for the relief of refugees in Palestine. To UNICEF, the United Nations Child Welfare Fund, the Canadian Government has made contributions totalling \$8,826,060 (U.S.). Canada has been a member of the 26 nation UNICEF Executive Board since its inception. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to date has received contributions from Canada totalling \$150,000.

Canada has taken a strong interest in the work of the Specialized Agencies as the instruments for achieving the Charter objectives of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress". Each of the Specialized Agencies carries out specific economic or social activities according to the functional purpose for which it has been created. Each operates on the basis of a separate constitution and independent budget; and each maintains close co-ordination with the Economic and Social Council.

Some of the Specialized Agencies—notably the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)—are mainly functional in their operations. They facilitate commerce and communications amongst nations of the world by establishing uniform practices and removing technical difficulties. The others—the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund—devote themselves primarily to the task of improving the economic and social conditions of the people of the world. The headquarters of ICAO are in Montreal.

Internal Divisions in the United Nations

The record shows that within the United Nations, Canada has endeavoured to reconcile opposing interests and blocs. While most of the more serious



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN OTTAWA

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, left, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, before the Peace Tower in Ottawa.

internal divisions have resulted from East-West tensions, other frictions have reduced the effectiveness of United Nations machinery. Disagreements between anti-colonial countries and those administering dependent territories account for much of the heat and ill-will engendered in debates in the Organization. As a non-administering country which achieved its independence by evolutionary processes, Canada has been well qualified to attempt to mediate differences arising on colonial issues. In these matters, Canada's policy has been to weigh carefully her sympathies with the legitimate aspirations of dependent peoples against the desirability and necessity of recognizing the domestic jurisdiction, the experience and the special responsibilities of the parent states. The unsolved questions of the admission of new members and the right to represent China have weakened the structure of the United Nations. Canadian representatives have participated in efforts at a number of sessions of the General Assembly to break the deadlock on the admission of new members; these efforts have not as yet been successful and the Soviet veto stands up against the admission of most of the 21 present unaccepted applicants. On the question of Chinese representation, Canada has shared the majority view that Communist China has not yet earned the right to be seated. Opinions of the International Court of Justice have been helpful in solving a number of problems that have beset the United Nations.

Canada's Faith in Future

At the opening of the 9th session of the General Assembly in September 1954, Mr. Pearson expressed Canada's continuing faith in the effectiveness and potentialities of the United Nations. He said:

Our direction (for the U.N.) is clearly laid down. It is toward economic and social progress and away from poverty; it is toward full and free self-government and away from dictatorial regimes imposed from inside or from outside; toward the progressive realization of human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person . . . The United Nations serves a more fundamental purpose in providing an efficient framework and endless opportunities for negotiation and conciliation under a system which embraces both sides in what we call the cold war . . . The United Nations is the main highway to international co-operation and unity . . . Mankind is only beginning to develop and use the institutions of inter-dependence of which the United Nations is by far the most important. The work will not be completed in a day. But it will not be completed at all unless we keep everlastingly at the job of building; of correcting those tendencies which have already made the work fore difficult and which may, if we are not careful, stop it altogether.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Conclusion of External Affairs Debate

On April 21 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, concluded the House of Commons debate on external affairs which he had opened with the statement reported in the April issue of *External Affairs*. The Minister replied to questions and commented on points which had been raised in the course of the debate.

The Commonwealth

During the debate several speakers had referred to the valuable part being played in these tense and difficult times by the British Commonwealth of Nations. One member had advocated the strengthening of the Commonwealth through a central secretariat and an intra-Commonwealth defence force. He had asked what was the basic difference between the Commonwealth and, for instance, the United Nations. The Minister suggested that:

The basic difference in the Commonwealth relationship is that it has been formed, has grown up and has been built on the habit and the tradition of co-operation. We have developed within the Commonwealth a feeling of close unity. There is a genuine understanding among its members to work together in peace and in war, and a strong desire to co-operate and to work out agreed policies and agreed solutions to problems, even when it is not always possible to do so. And then of course we have the great advantage of a common head in the Commonwealth, both for the monarchical and the republican members, and also the bond of common Parliamentary institutions and Parliamentary traditions.

If we tried to build up some strong centralized machinery for the Commonwealth, and a centralized defence force, said the Minister, far from strengthening the association it might weaken it to the point where it would disappear. The Commonwealth included within its membership a variety of peoples, at times antagonistic peoples, who could not be brought together in any formal and organized way for defence or exclusive economic co-operation. The concept that the Commonwealth might develop into a third power bloc, powerful enough to act as a counter-balance to the United States and Russia was a dangerous one. It would imply that we in the Commonwealth were separating ourselves from the United States and coming between the United States and the NATO powers on the one hand and the Soviet imperialist communist powers on the other. It was better to stick to the concept of two blocs, two forces in the world—if there had to be two—the forces of peace and the forces that we think threaten the peace.

One specific respect in which the Commonwealth had played a useful part in recent years was in the provision of technical and capital assistance to under-

developed countries, especially those in Southeast Asia under the Colombo Plan. There had been criticism that Canada has not contributed enough to the Colombo Plan. The Minister pointed out that in the four years of the Plan's existence, contributions from outside the countries which are recipient members had amounted to \$1,300,000,000, of which Canada had contributed \$128,400,000. To those who criticized that this was not large in relation to the amounts spent on defence, Mr. Pearson pointed out that some of the countries which we were helping spent one-half of their own budgets on defence.

The Far Eastern Situation

International developments in the Far East had been the main subject of the debate. The Minister said:

Discussion of that subject has, to a very large extent in this debate, revolved around our Canadian relationship with the United States to a point where it has been difficult at times to disentangle the two things. I think it is a normal and healthy sign that we should be so preoccupied in this House in a debate on external affairs with the most important aspect of our foreign relations at the present time, namely our relationship with the United States of America. I think of that relationship, important as it is bilaterally to us, in terms of collective action, in terms of collective defence, not merely as something between Canada and the United States, but as something between Canada, the United States and its friends in NATO and in United Nations. I also try to distinguish in this defence relationship with the United States, the problems which may come from what we have begun to call peripheral conflicts from those which will be posed by a major all-out war of extermination.

There was a danger that war in and around Formosa and the coastal islands might spread to this continent. It might spread, not by any all-out massive attack of some Chinese communist Government on the North American continent, which was not possible under present conditions, but by a reaction on the part of the Chinese Government's allies—the Soviet Union. Mr. Pearson said:

Now, if that reaction took place as a result of a local conflict in China, that would be an aggression; it would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and we would be asked to undertake the commitments which we have accepted as members of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Minister went on to explain that if war over Formosa did spread

and there was a massive aggressive air attack on this continent, a struggle in which the very existence of the people of the United States and of Canada would be at stake, all our continental, all our NATO defence arrangements and our whole system of collective security which we have built up over recent years would come into play. In that kind of situation, and I limit it to that kind of situation, how could we be neutral?

It was not correct to deduce from this hypothesis that Canada would automatically support or be willing to intervene on behalf of or with the United States in any war, major or minor, on the continent of China or any place else where that kind of intervention would take place.

Whether support in those circumstances could be counted on from Canada would depend entirely on whether our commitments under NATO were involved, whether there was aggression under the United Nations Charter.

The Minister emphasized that anything he had said in recent statements on Canada's foreign policy did not mean, nor could it fairly be interpreted as meaning, that whenever the United States was at war we were bound to participate. It did not mean that we had any obligation to participate in any war except a war against aggression within the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Some members had made the criticism that by affirming our support of the United States in such circumstances we weakened our influence in Washington. A sounder verdict, said the Minister, was that of the London *Daily Telegraph* which had said in an editorial:

"The conclusion to be drawn from the interdependence of the two nations in a major war is not, as some of Mr. Pearson's critics have suggested, that the United States can take Canadian support in a circumstance for granted, and therefore may disregard Canadian views. On the contrary, it gives the Canadian government both the right and the duty to warn and to dissuade."

On this the Minister remarked:

That remains our right and I hope that we will exercise it on appropriate occasions in Washington. It is also our duty and I hope that we will discharge it on appropriate occasions. It seems to me that the moral of this position is that if all these dangers surround us, little wars with their obligations, or big wars with all their catastrophes, if we are surrounded by these dangers, then the moral is to do everything we possibly can to stop any war before it starts.

Mr. Pearson quoted the suggestion made during the debate by the leader of the CCF party that the Government should state forthrightly and without equivocation that we would do everything we possibly could to ensure that Canada's influence and Canada's policy, especially in its relations with the United States, would be directed towards the avoidance of conflict, political and economic. Mr. Pearson said that he was happy to repeat that assurance and suggested that if we failed, and we might fail, our policy should be: "When possible, to limit conflicts, to prevent them from spreading, and then to end them."

In reply to criticism that our foreign policy should be made in Ottawa only and not in Washington, the Minister said that the decisions in foreign policy and any other policies had to be made in the Canadian Parliament. That was a very different thing from saying that our policy could only be made in Ottawa and should not be made or even influenced anywhere else.

Foreign policy in this world of interdependence cannot be made in any one country or any one capital no matter how powerful that country or capital may be. We are working together today in a peace coalition, and the very essence of that coalition is that every member of it acts only after discussion and consultation with others. In that sense each member must influence the other members' policy, and I hope it will remain that way, because that is the way it should be. That gives our best chance for peace, by collective policy and collective action. In this respect I am distinguishing between decision and the formulation of policy. Suppose the United States adopted that maxim and made its own policy solely in Washington, or the United Kingdom decided to make its policy solely in London, or the French government solely in Paris; it would not be long before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would itself dissolve. If it dissolved we would not be worrying so much about whether we were

making our own policy; we would be worrying far more about our protection against potential enemies even than we do now.

Mr. Pearson said that it seemed to him that the CCF party took a jaundiced and morbidly suspicious view of everything that went on in the United States or at least in the United States official circles. Their leader had emphasized the danger of being dragged into a war by the policies that were being pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States. The Minister suggested that we were in much more danger of being dragged into war by policies that were being pursued by the Foreign Minister in Peking and by the Foreign Minister in Moscow than we were by the policies pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States.

The leader of the CCF party, Mr. Coldwell, said the Minister, had outlined in four points what his own policy towards China in the present situation would be. The first was that we should exile Chiang-Kai-shek—presumably by force. Mr. Pearson did not know who was anxious to take part in this particular expedition. The second suggestion was that Formosa should be neutralized and placed under a trusteeship. This might turn out to be the wisest solution, but Mr. Pearson pointed out that the Chinese communists and the Chinese nationalists were unanimous in opposing it. Canada had no other commitment in regard to Formosa than that which arose from our membership in the United Nations. We felt that the status of Formosa has not yet been fully determined but we also felt that the communist Government in Peking should not use force to bring about that determination.

The third point made by the leader of the CCF party was that we should seat communist China in the United Nations and he had contrasted our policy unfavourably with that of the United Kingdom. The Minister pointed out that the United Kingdom, while recognizing the Peking Government, has not at any time supported the application of that Government for membership in the United Nations.

The fourth point of the CCF's China policy was that we should not intervene in the struggle between the two Chinese Governments over the off shore islands. Mr. Pearson repeated that it was our policy to stay out of the struggle for these off shore islands and he thought that other governments would be well-advised to adopt the same policy. He was even bold enough to hope that that would be the policy which will be adopted in due course by all the governments concerned.

Lines of Defence

Mr. Pearson referred to the concept of lines of defence which had been raised in the debate—the suggestion that Formosa should be our first line of defence, as it was for the United States. This kind of concept was misleading and dangerous. If Formosa was absolutely vital, it could be argued that the off shore islands should be protected as vital to that first line position and then the coast of China vital to the protection of these islands. It was, however, equally dangerous to suggest that no country in its search for security had any right to establish a line of defence outside its own borders. Our own troops, after all, are stationed in Europe today. Mr. Pearson said:

The fact is, surely that our own line of defence is attacked and our own security is jeopardized whenever a free people anywhere is the victim of aggression.

In fact, our safety is endangered whenever there is any war any place. Our only safe policy is to join with friendly states in maintaining that peace and preventing war by collective action.

Relation with the United States

Concluding his statement, the Minister said he would return almost to where he began. He said:

The subject which has loomed so large throughout this debate has been our relations with the United States and our preoccupation with those relations. This preoccupation, indeed this anxiety, is understandable over our relations economic, our relations political and our relations strategic. I suggest that that relationship, vitally important as it must be to us and as it has been in the past, will be even more so in the future. A relationship to be successful on both sides must be based on mutual respect, a freedom to hold and to express our own views. I assure my hon. friends who have been criticizing the Government because we have not, as they have said, had enough courage to express those views, that they do not feel any more strongly about that than we do. However, we in the Government happen at this time to have some responsibility for the conduct of international relations. It is not always advisable in the conduct of diplomacy and international affairs, even with our best friends, to shout from the housetop and throw our weight about, in order to impress our own people with the fact that we are very independent.

This relationship must also be based on recognition of the fact that if our coalition, which is now headed by the United States, breaks up, then indeed there will be a grave danger to peace and security. I suggest, therefore, that while we must be independent and speak up when it is necessary to do so, we must be sure we do nothing avoidable by our words and by our deeds to further that wrong end of disunity and division. When we do disagree with the United States we must be sure that that disagreement is not only based on a narrow conception of our national interest, but is a disagreement which goes to the very basis of the coalition policy and which we maintain on the highest principles of peace and international security.

It is quite true that there are strains and stresses on the coalition at the present time. There has never been a coalition, even in wartime, which was easy to manage. In peacetime, they are not very often necessary. But in a period such as we have at present, between peace and war, a coalition is not only desperately required, but it is very difficult indeed to manage. So there are stresses and strains now pressing against it, but we will be able to weather them. It is quite true that the greatest of these at the present time is in the Far East. I have not come across a better short expression of the nature and the importance of these Far Eastern strains than I have found in a paragraph in the April 9 edition of the *Economist*. It reads as follows:

"The danger of the next few months is that, confronted by the threat of renewed fighting off the China coast, many otherwise sensible people in Britain—

And the writer could have added Canada.

"—will say that they would rather have peace than the American alliance. Nothing, in fact, could be sillier, for there is no such choice. It is still possible to have both peace and the alliance. It is certainly not possible to have peace for long without it."

We wish to have in this Parliament and in this country both peace and the alliance—not merely the American alliance but an alliance for friendly co-operation with all peace-loving free countries of the world.

Indochina—Statement on Vietnam

On May 3, the Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled in the House of Commons the first interim reports of the International Supervisory Commissions in Laos and Cambodia and the first interim reports of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam. On the same date Mr. Pearson made the following statement concerning freedom of movement for refugees in North Vietnam in response to a question on this subject which had been asked in the House of Commons by Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker on April 29.

Last Friday the hon. member for Prince Albert asked a question concerning freedom of movement in North Vietnam, a matter which has aroused very considerable interest throughout the country, and I should like to make a statement on it now.

The situation with respect to freedom of movement for refugees from Vietnam, which was provided for under article 14(d) of the armistice agreement, is not satisfactory, nor does the international supervisory commission regard it as so; certainly the Canadian member on that commission does not.

The commission announced early in February last that it has found that the procedure to ensure this movement by the issue of travel permits was cumbersome and complicated, and that fears current among the population of North Vietnam had tended to make them reluctant to apply to the authorities for such permits. Action was taken by the commission which it was hoped would facilitate the proper and more effective implementation of this part of the agreement. However, reports to the effect that people in North Vietnam were still being prevented from exercising their rights of freedom of movement have persisted. Therefore the International Commission recently sent three further mobile teams, on each of which of course there was a Canadian, to make a special survey of those areas in North Vietnam concerning which complaints had been made. On the basis of the reports of this survey, the commission is now determining what further action is necessary.

There are, of course, limitations on the effectiveness of international inspection by the commission in this and in other matters. Some of these limitations are inherent in the cease-fire agreement itself. It reflects the fact that the Commission is not a supra-national body, that it does not have any executive responsibilities with respect to the carrying out of the agreement and that its inspection teams do not in any sense constitute international police detachments. The Commission can only operate with the effective co-operation of the parties to the agreement and it does not always receive that co-operation, especially in this question of freedom of movement, from the communist government in North Vietnam, and that is the main reason why in this matter the results have been disappointing, to say the least.

I would not wish anyone to think that our representatives on the International Commis-

sion for Vietnam are satisfied with the way the freedom of movement provisions of the armistice agreement are being carried out. They are not satisfied, and the government fully shares that dissatisfaction. Our views have been stated very clearly in the International commission in Vietnam, and have, I think, had some effect on the decisions of the Commission.

If one of the parties to the agreement is evading its clear obligations and responsibilities with respect to the freedom of movement for civilians, it is not going unnoticed by our representative on the Commission or by the Government. But this is not a situation, I suggest, which will be solved merely by letting off steam. We are convinced that in order to ensure that the provisions of the agreement are carried out to the greatest degree possible in the circumstances, we must continue to work through our representative on the Commission in the same manner as we have done over the last eight months, pressing for better performance in every way possible and exposing violations when they can be detected. That still seems to us to be the most likely method of ensuring that the greatest possible number of people who wish to do so can leave North Vietnam for the south.

There have been suggestions in some quarters that Canada might withdraw from the Commission as a gesture of protest about the way the Commission has been prevented from correcting the situation with respect to freedom of movement. Such a move would, however, prejudice also the fulfilment of the main military provisions of the agreement, thus creating new tensions and possibly jeopardizing the maintenance of peace, not only in Vietnam but also in the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. Nor would our withdrawal be of any assistance whatsoever to those in North Vietnam who want to leave. Indeed, it might eliminate any remaining hope that their lot might be alleviated. We must, therefore, keep our sense of perspective in this matter; but without condoning or forgetting some of the terrible things that are being done.

A question was asked also by the hon. member for Prince Albert the other day as to the possibility that the time for freedom of movement for refugees might be extended beyond the terminal date, which is May 18,

(Continued on page 167)

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. W. F. A. Turgeon was transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, with the rank of Ambassador, effective April 20, 1955.
- Mr. H. W. Walker was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective March 17, 1955.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag was transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective April 5, 1955.
- Mr. C. E. McGaughey was posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective April 25, 1955.
- Mr. Earl Gordon Drake was appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective April 1, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Survey of World Iron Ore Resources. Occurrence, Appraisal and Use. E/2655, ST/ECA/27. New York, 1955. Sales No.: 1954.II.D.5. 345 pp. \$3.50.

Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1954. Bangkok, 1955. 223 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: 1955.IIF.3. (Also issued as Vol. V, No. 4 of the Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East).

Demographic Yearbook 1954 (Sixth Issue). New York, 1954. 729 p. (bilingual). \$6.00. Sales No.: 1954.XIII.5.

Yearbook on Human Rights for 1952. New York, 1954. 490 p. \$5.00. Sales No.: 1954.XIV.1.

Multiple-Purpose River Basin Development. Part I: Manual of river basin planning. Flood Control Series No. 7. ST/ECAFE/SER.F/7. New York, 1955. 83 p. Sales No.: 1955.IIF.1.

Laws Concerning Nationality (United Nations Legislative Series). ST/LEG/SER.B/4 and Add.1. July 1954. 594 p. \$4.00 Sales No.: 1954.V.1.

Study on Expulsion of Immigrants. ST/SEA/22. March 1955. 77 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.6.

Middle East Seminar on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, Cairo, 5 to 17 December 1953. ST/TAA/SER.C/17, 6 August 1954. 97 p. Sales No.: 1954.IV.17.

ICJ Pleadings, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (U.K./France). Judgment of November 17th, 1953. 736 p. (bilingual). Sales number 130.

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St, Ottawa 2, Canada.)

Administrative Practice of Social Insurance. Geneva, 1955. 86 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 40).

Guide for Labour Inspectors. Geneva, 1955. 107 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 41).

ITO (GATT)

Final Act adopted at the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties and Protocol amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement; Protocol amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement; Protocol of Organizational Amendments to the General Agreement; Agreement on the Organizational Trade Co-operation. Geneva, 10 March 1955. 216 p. (bilingual).

Fourth Protocol of rectifications and modifications to the Annexes and to the texts of the schedules to the GATT. Geneva, 7 March 1955. 81 p. (bilingual).

Declaration on the continued application of schedules to the GATT. Geneva, 10 March 1955. 15 p. (bilingual).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

Approved Programme and Budget for 1955-56. Paris, 13 January 1955. 329 p. (re 8C/5 and 8C/5 Corrigenda).

Teaching Abroad. No. 7, February 1955. Paris 1955. 81 p. (bilingual).

Economics and Action by Pierre Mendès-France and Gabriel Ardant. (Science and Society). 222 p. \$3.50. New York, Columbia University Press 1955.

Compulsory Education in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam by Charles Bilodeau, Somlith Pathammavong, Le Quang Hong. 157 p. \$1.25. (Studies on Compulsory Education—XIV).

Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword (A study of the attitudes of youth in post-war Japan) by Jean Stoetzel. 334 p. \$4.00. Columbia University Press/Unesco 1955.

The Cross and the Sword by Manuel de Jesus Calvan. Translated by Robert Graves. (A novel of ruthlessness and intrigue when greed followed in the wake of Columbus and the Indian fought for survival). 366 p. \$3.75.

UNESCO Collection of Representative Works: Latin American Series. Published with the co-operation of the Organization of American States. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1954.

International Yearbook of Education 1954. UNESCO and IBE, Publication No. 161. 409 p. \$3.00.

The Social Sciences. Paris 1955. 64 p. (UNESCO and its Programmes—XII).

WHO

The Work of WHO 1954. Annual Report of the Director-General to the WHA and to the U.N. Geneva, March 1955. 209 p. \$2.00. Official Records of WHO. No. 59.

Executive Board, Fifteenth Session, Geneva, 18 January-4 February 1955. Part II: Report on the proposed programme and budget estimates for 1956. Geneva, March 1955. 137 p. \$1.25. Official Records of WHO, No. 61.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development. (Prepared by the Bureau of Social Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, in co-operation with ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO). E/CN.5/301, 31 March 1955. 591 p.

Progress made by the U.N. in the field of Social Welfare during the period 1 January 1953-31 December 1954 and Proposals for the Programme of work 1955-57. (Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.5/308, 15 March 1955. 128 p. and Annexes A to G.

Report on the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the Pulp and Paper Industry, Buenos Aires, 19 October-2 November 1954. E/CN.12/361 (E/2697), FAO/ETAP No. 462, ST/TAA/SER.C/19. 139 p.

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments relating to the Legal Status of Aliens—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). Rome November 1954. LSA/20. 477 p.

CORRIGENDA

Vol. 7, No. 4, April 1955, page 123, last paragraph, line six for "Pakistan" read "Poland".

Ibid, page 126, paragraph four, line two, for "another" read "the other".

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Portugal

Trade Agreement. Signed at Lisbon, May 28, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged April 29, 1955.

Entered into force definitively April 29, 1955.



RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA

(Continued from page 148)

It was also my great privilege to be signally honoured by receiving a personal citation from His Excellency and also one from the National Assembly of South Korea.

The day I left for home they closed down the plant and everyone came to the airport, as did also members of one of the universities where I had spoken on "Canada". The flowers and presents that they gave me really showed their gratitude and were appreciated.

It was a tremendous job, but despite the difficulties it was a most satisfying and gratifying assignment, and gave me a real sense of achievement. When I returned to Canada the knowledge went with me that I had helped a country and its people who so richly deserved help, assistance and guidance.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

(Continued from page 164)

I think. The Commission is actively concerned with finding ways and means of ensuring that this provision of the cease-fire agreement is properly implemented, and it will, I am sure, consider the possibility of an extension, if necessary; but any extension of the period would require the concurrence of both parties to the cease-fire agreement, whose full co-operation would be required if an extension were to provide a real solution to the problem.

I tabled today, copies of the first interim reports of the Commission for Vietnam and the second interim report. But I should like to point out now and emphasize that the reports of the Commission were in each case prepared by the Commission as a whole, in-

cluding the Polish and Indian members as well as the Canadian representative. It may be that these reports, therefore, do not reflect entirely our dissatisfaction with the freedom of movement position.

I understand that the Vietnam Commission has recently completed a third interim report which is now being forwarded to the Geneva conference powers, as indeed the first two have been. In connection with the submission of this report, steps have been taken by the Canadian representative to ensure that the unsatisfactory situation with respect to the carrying out of the provisions in the agreement for freedom of movement for the civil population will be given special attention.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/9—*World Trade at the Crossroads*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, to the Canadian Club, Montreal, March 21, 1955. made in the House of Commons, March 24, 1955.
- No. 55/11—*The Americans—How Well Do We Really Know Them*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Women's Canadian Club, Montreal, February 7, 1955.
- No. 55/10—*The Far Eastern Situation*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, introducing the debate on external affairs,

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 55/12—*The House Building Industry*, an address by the Minister of Public Works, Mr. R. H. Winters, at a meeting of the National House Builders' Convention, Toronto, March 29, 1955.
- No. 55/13—*The Effects of Radiation on Human Health*, a reply tabled in the House of Commons by the Minister of Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, in answer to an enquiry by Mr. F. A. Enfield, M.P., April 4, 1955.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada

Ministerial Meeting of NATO Council

THE North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Paris on May 9, 10, and 11. Canada was represented at this meeting by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and Mr. L. D. Wilgress, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council. They were accompanied by Mr. J. W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs, and other officials from the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

The main occasion for this Ministerial meeting was the admission of the German Federal Republic to NATO. There were originally twelve countries signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States. Turkey and Greece joined the alliance at the beginning of 1952.


On Monday, May 9, the flag of the West German Republic was hoisted beside those of the other fourteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Chancellor Adenauer took his seat among the other Foreign Ministers at the Council. Mr. Pearson's statement of welcome on the accession of the German Federal Republic may be found in *External Affairs* May 1955, page 149.

The other purpose of the Ministerial meeting was to provide an occasion for a most useful discussion and exchange of views between the Foreign Ministers on a number of matters of political importance, both of direct and indirect concern to NATO. The discussions were held at a time when public interest in the possibility and substance of Four-Power talks was running high and the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, whose governments had already had a preliminary exchange of views on this question, were able to examine this problem informally with the representatives of the other members of the Organization. This consultation with governments which would naturally have a direct interest in the outcome of such talks, fitted conveniently into the process of diplomatic preparation for the Four-Power conference.

Broad Agenda

The agenda of the Ministerial meeting was sufficiently broad to cover all subjects of greatest concern to NATO countries and three full days were set aside to permit the Foreign Ministers to carry on the discussion in some detail. Moreover, the procedure, which was tried for the first time, of agreeing informally that certain Ministers should lead the discussion on matters they were most directly informed on, proved useful in promoting an exchange of views.

There was no attempt to reach decisions at this meeting nor to reach any conclusions except in the most general terms. These conclusions are set out in the communique issued at the end of the talks, the text of which appears on page 172.



—NATIS

NEW NATO HEADQUARTERS

A model of the new NATO Headquarters to be built at the Place de la Porte Dauphine, at the end of Avenue Foch between the Boulevard Lannes and Avenue Marechal, Paris.

While there was general agreement on the policy aims of all members in the North Atlantic Treaty area, the main purpose was not so much to reach an agreement on a common denominator of policy, as to attain a better understanding of the various points of view on problems of common concern.

As the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in an interview after the session:

I have always thought that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to survive the emergency which gave it birth, it must be much more than a simple military alliance.

I mean that as well as being an organization for co-operation on defence it must also be a centre of political, economic and social co-operation.

The last Council meeting during which we were able to exchange what seemed to me to be a wide range of opinions and views furnished us with the proof of the important progress we are making in the field of political co-operation.

The latest in the series of Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council is, therefore, mostly to be remembered for having marked a notable growth in size and stature of the Organization. The German Federal Republic has entered NATO and into full political and defence association with the Western nations. This meeting also demonstrated a growing capacity for collective responsibility in taking counsel before important decisions are made

on the use of its increasing military and diplomatic strength. As the Atlantic community is reflected in a growing feeling of community among its members, as well as in the development of various forms of co-operation, non-military as well as military, this meeting was an important milestone in the development of NATO.

COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The North Atlantic Council, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, met in ministerial session in Paris on May 9, 10 and 11, 1955.

I

To welcome the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council held an opening public session. In speeches made on that occasion, the texts of which have already been made public, Ministers stressed the significance they attach to the entry of the Federal Republic as a democratic and sovereign state into the North Atlantic community. The Federal Chancellor, replying to the welcome extended him by his colleagues, emphasized the full harmony existing between the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and the ardent desire for peace, security and freedom felt by the whole German people including the eighteen million in East Germany.

II

The Council reaffirmed the purely defensive character of the Atlantic alliance. It recorded its deep satisfaction at the entry into force of the agreements which establish Western European Union and which promote peace and provide specific safeguards, including the control of armaments. The Council also noted the valuable mutual support made possible by close collaboration between NATO and Western European Union in their respective fields of activity.

The Council welcomed the declarations made by the Ministers of member governments signatory to the Italian Peace Treaty recalling the active part taken by Italy in the progress of Atlantic and European co-operation, and reaffirming that various discriminatory aspects of that treaty were considered to be inconsistent with the position of Italy as an ally.

III

The Ministers examined major aspects of the international situation within and beyond the NATO area.

They discussed a report on the current negotiations regarding the Austrian State Treaty, and welcomed the indications that the Soviet Union may now join in concluding such a treaty, long sought by the Western Powers.

They were resolved to continue the policies heretofore followed in building and maintaining the strength and unity of the West.

The Council welcomed the initiative of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in proposing to the Soviet Union negotiations to find means

(Continued on page 183)

Disarmament Discussions in London

THE second round of private discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee began in London on February 25 and was suspended on May 18. The Sub-Committee, which consists of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R., was reconvened in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 4, 1954. At that time the Soviet representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, accepted "as a basis" for further negotiations the Anglo-French proposals which had been presented during the first round of discussions of the Sub-Committee in the spring of 1954. These proposals had then been flatly rejected by the Soviet Government. Mr. Vyshinsky's announcement, together with the fact that the General Assembly resolution on disarmament secured a unanimous vote, had been hailed as hopeful signs that some progress in the lengthy disarmament negotiations might at last be made.

The recent discussions in London may have brought about a substantial narrowing of the gap between the Western and Soviet positions. This is all the more remarkable in view of the negative attitude of the Soviet Union at the outset. The hope that some progress might be made was dashed—temporarily—at the first meeting when the Soviet delegation tabled new proposals which represented a complete reversal of the Soviet position taken at the ninth session of the General Assembly. These proposals which actually ignored the Anglo-French plan approved earlier by Mr. Vyshinsky were merely a revised version of the old "ban the bomb" propaganda theme which, this time, suggested that "all states which possess atomic and hydrogen weapons . . . should destroy completely all those weapons in their possession". Conventional armaments and armed forces under these proposals were to be left as they were and as per usual the question of international control would be discussed *after* the decision to destroy nuclear weapons. These proposals were of course completely unacceptable to the Western Powers since they would nullify the United States lead in the nuclear field while the Communist powers would retain preponderance in conventional armaments and armed forces. Not only did the Soviet Government abandon the co-operative attitude adopted last fall but at the same time it disregarded the rule of secrecy under which the Sub-Committee is operating by releasing the text of its proposals to the press in order to gain propaganda advantages.

Western Disarmament Plan

When the Western representatives decided to let the record speak for itself and prepared to abandon the talks the Soviet Union found itself in a vulnerable position and reverted for all practical purposes to the Vyshinsky proposals presented at the ninth session. This second set of proposals did not call for the immediate destruction of stockpiles and even represented some improvement on the Vyshinsky proposals, although the Western and Soviet positions remained far apart on the vital issue of international control over the disarmament programme. This happy development, however, was marred by the publication in *Pravda* (March 24) of a distorted account of the Sub-Committee proceedings followed on the same day by a more detailed distorted

story given to the Tass correspondent in London by the Soviet representative on the Sub-Committee. In the meantime the Western Powers had confirmed their position by re-introducing the Anglo-French proposals in the form of a draft resolution sponsored this time by all four Western members of the Sub-Committee. Like the Anglo-French memorandum, the Western resolution calls for the preliminary acceptance by all states of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons *except in defence against aggression*. It also calls for the preparation of a Disarmament Treaty which would provide for:

- (a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;
- (b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments;
- (c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

The disarmament programme embodying these provisions should be carried out by stages, the first stage consisting of a freeze of armed forces and military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic, at levels existing on December 31, 1954 (or such other date as may be agreed at the proposed World Disarmament Conference). During the second stage, the first half of the reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces agreed upon at the Disarmament Conference would go into effect and on completion of these reductions the manufacture of nuclear weapons would cease. At the third and final stage, the second half of agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces would take place whereupon the total prohibition of nuclear weapons would go into force and stockpiles of these weapons would be eliminated. One essential feature of the western proposals is that the measures envisaged within each stage should only take place when "the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them".

Additions to Western Proposals

The return of the Soviet Union to the Vyshinsky proposals of the autumn of 1954 set the stage for the constructive work accomplished by the Sub-Committee during its recent discussions. The Western powers took the initiative by tabling a number of proposals which supplemented or improved the general disarmament programme outlined in their basic proposals.

The most significant additions to the Western programme related to the levels at which armed forces should be reduced and to the principles of international control. On the first point the United Kingdom and the French delegations submitted proposals whereby the forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China would be reduced to between 1 and 1½ million men, while those of the United Kingdom and France would be reduced to 650,000 men. On the second point the four Western members tabled a draft resolution outlining in some detail what they mean by effective international control. This paper suggests that the control organ should have, among others, the power to supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each stage of the disarmament programme and to organize and conduct field and aerial surveys to ensure its implementation and to ascertain whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed. The Western paper also specifies that the inter-

national control officials should be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the Disarmament Treaty and that they should have the right "of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating states, and unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions".

Soviet Objections

The discussion of these and other proposals brought about useful exchanges between Western and Soviet representatives on their respective positions. The Soviet delegation insisted that the Western plan should specify precise time limits for each stage of the disarmament programme and for the programme as a whole. To meet this objection, the Western delegations accepted the principle of precise time limits being embodied in the disarmament treaty "subject to any extension of time which may be essential in any phase to permit states to complete disarmament measures".

The Soviet delegation objected that the total prohibition of nuclear weapons under the Western plan was postponed until all agreed reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces have been completed. The Vyshinsky proposals provided that the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cease as soon as the second half of the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces begins and that the completion of these conventional reductions should coincide with the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In order to meet this second objection, the French and the United Kingdom delegations proposed what is probably the most important modification in the Western position since the tabling of the Anglo-French memorandum in June 1954. They suggested that instead of becoming effective only after the completion of all agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should go into force upon the completion of the third quarter (i.e. 75 per cent) of these reductions. Simultaneously, the elimination of stockpiles and the last quarter of agreed reductions would begin and both processes would be completed within the time limit laid down in the Disarmament Treaty. This considerable concession was made contingent upon agreement being reached with the Soviet Union on two essential points, i.e.,

- (1) "Drastic reductions of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the Great Powers" and
- (2) "The institution of an effective system of control which would operate throughout the whole disarmament programme".

New Soviet Proposals

After a number of frustrating exchanges during which the Soviet Representative ignored the Western representatives' concrete answers to the objections raised against their proposals, the Soviet Union tabled a twenty-two page document dealing with disarmament and "the elimination of the threat of a new war". These proposals insist on a rigid timetable whereby the whole disarmament programme would not only be negotiated but fully implemented by the end of 1957. The Soviet Government thus refused to accept the Western compromise on one of its two major objections to Western plans. The new Soviet proposals, however, embodied the Anglo-French compromise on phasing which had been presented to meet the other Soviet objection. They also in-

cluded the United Kingdom and French proposals on the level of armed forces which was one of the conditions attached to their compromise on phasing.

The Soviet position on the second Anglo-French condition concerning an effective system of control is not clear. There is no specific indication that the Soviet Union is ready to accept the Western proposal that the officials of the control organ should be enabled to carry out inspection anywhere at any time in the territories of states. Nor is there any clear indication that the Soviet Government agrees that a control organ should be established and its officials installed in national territories *before* the implementation of the disarmament measures which they should supervise. The new Soviet paper, nevertheless, represents some advance towards the Western position of control. For instance, the U.S.S.R. now agrees with the Western view that there should be one permanent control organ which would have wide powers throughout the disarmament programme.

The new Soviet paper also agrees with the Western suggestion that states should pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons "except in defence against aggression". The Soviet acceptance, however, is qualified by the provision that the exceptional use of these weapons should only be permitted "when a decision to this effect is taken by the Security Council" where the U.S.S.R. has a right of veto.

The Problems of Germany and Military Bases

Against these concessions the new Soviet plan contains a number of features which did not appear in the Vyshinsky proposals of last September or in the new version of these proposals tabled during the recent discussions. Many of these features were actually present in various proposals put forward in the past during discussions on disarmament proper or on "the reduction of international tension". They call for the dismantling of all military bases in foreign territories (by 1957), the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany followed by the formation of "strictly limited contingents of local police forces", the condemnation of war propaganda, the removal of every form of discrimination in the field of trade, etc.

As in the case of previous Soviet proposals tabled in the Sub-Committee, it is clear that the latest proposals were submitted partly for propaganda purposes and in particular with an eye to the German problem. This is borne out by the fact that they were made public shortly after their presentation in the Sub-Committee in spite of requests by the Western members that the proposals should not be released, at least not until they had had an opportunity to study them. The question now arises whether the concessions made by the Soviet Union on the problem of disarmament, which are indeed impressive by any standards, are conditional upon the acceptance by the West of the suggestions on other issues contained in the proposals. If this were to be the case, the value of the recent Soviet concessions on disarmament proper would be reduced considerably.

Four Power Talks

It is difficult to see how the discussion of the political questions raised in the latest Soviet proposals can be regarded as coming within the terms of reference of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Yet the Soviet representative made it clear that these questions were an integral part of the Soviet disarm-

ament proposals and that the proposals should therefore be considered as a whole. If this is the case it would seem that the Soviet plan could usefully be examined during the forthcoming discussions of the Four Powers. In any event, while every effort should continue to be made to reduce the gap remaining between the Western and Soviet positions on disarmament, it might be wondered whether a final settlement of this problem is likely to occur before at least some measure of agreement is reached on the outstanding political issues between the East and the West. The Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed this view in the House of Commons External Affairs Committee on May 25 when he said:

I would hope myself that one of the subjects to be discussed at the four power meeting to be held presumably in July—and I think this will turn out

(Continued on page 192)



HEAD OF INDIAN DELEGATION TO U.N. VISITS OTTAWA

His Excellency Krishna Menon, Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, with Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, during his visit to Ottawa in June.

Visit of The Right Honourable C. D. Howe to Australia and New Zealand

CANADA is no stranger to distinguished visitors. Since the end of World War II, Canada's growing stature in world affairs and its favourable geographical location have made it possible for her to play host to leaders of countries from widely separated parts of the world. Among the distinguished visitors we have been glad to welcome have been the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia, as well as other leaders from these sister nations of the Commonwealth. But it is not always easy for busy statesmen to undertake tours in distant countries. Unfortunately, despite pressing invitations on several occasions, it has not been possible for a Canadian Prime Minister to travel to Australia or New Zealand. Although a visit to these countries had been planned by Mr. St. Laurent in 1954, circumstances compelled our Prime Minister to forego this pleasure.


In April and May of this year, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, was able to undertake a goodwill tour of these sister nations to return the compliments which Australia and New Zealand have frequently paid to Canada. Accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe left Vancouver for Sydney via Honolulu and the Fijis on April 8. Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull reached Vancouver again on May 4 after an absence from Canada of nearly four weeks.

Australia

Mr. Howe arrived in Sydney on April 11. During his stay in Australia, he visited four of the six states, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and South Australia, and the national capital, Canberra. His travels took him to Sydney, Brisbane, Bundaberg, Newcastle, Melbourne, Geelong, Mildura, Radium Hill, Canberra, and the Snowy Mountains area. Although his itinerary was confined to the south eastern seaboard and much of his time was spent in the larger centres, the tour touched on a number of geographic areas and enabled Mr. Howe to see a representative cross-section of the Australian scene.

In Queensland the Minister visited a thriving sub-tropical sugar growing community centred around Bundaberg some 200 miles north of Brisbane and inspected a sugar mill. The sugar operations were of special interest in view of Canada's annual purchase of some 100,000 tons of Queensland sugar and on a number of occasions Mr. Howe expressed the hope that Queensland would be able to increase its sugar sales to us. His stay in this important north eastern state included a visit to a large co-operative pineapple canning plant on the outskirts of Brisbane.

The party spent the better part of a day at Newcastle on the coast about 100 miles north of Sydney where Mr. Howe saw the Broken Hill Proprietary steel plant and went down one of the company's coal mines. Mr. Howe described the steel plant and its ancillaries as one of the best integrated operations of its kind to be found anywhere.



En route to Melbourne from Sydney, Mr. Howe caught a glimpse of the highly developed sheep grazing and mixed farming country of southern Victoria. His subsequent tours to the General Motors-Holden and Ford plants enabled him to see something of Australia's secondary industry. The highlight of his visit to Melbourne was a special convocation of the University where he received the honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law.

At Mildura, an irrigation settlement on the Murray River founded in the 1880's by two Canadian brothers, the Chaffey's, the Minister saw something of the growing and processing of dried fruits, an industry of which Canada is one of the largest consumers.

At Radium Hill just inside the eastern border of South Australia, the Minister, accompanied by the Premier of South Australia and his Minister of Mines, visited the underground workings of the uranium mine and inspected the mill where the ore is concentrated. Radium Hill is situated in a marginal grazing district of South Australia where the average holding runs from 250 to 300 square miles and the carrying capacity is about one sheep per fifty acres. The Minister was thus afforded a chance for a look at the Australian "outback".

In Canberra on April 21 and 22 Mr. Howe visited Parliament House, called on the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Prime Minister, and laid a wreath on the Australian War Memorial. He also attended a luncheon given by the Commonwealth Ministers of State and dined at Government House.

The Minister's visit to the A.£422 million Snowy Mountains power and irrigation development coincided with the official opening by Prime Minister

Menzies on April 23 of the scheme's first power unit delivering 60,000 kilowatts. At the invitation of Mr. Menzies the Minister attended as a special guest. The proceedings were broadcast over an interstate Australian Broadcasting Commission network and generous reference was made to Mr. Howe, both by the Prime Minister and by Mr. W. Hudson, the Commissioner of the Snowy Mountains Authority.

During his stay in Australia, Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull had conversations with members of the Australian Wheat Board, civil aviation authorities, trade officials, and other Australian leaders including members of the Commonwealth and state governments. These conversations were helpful in reaching an understanding of Australian problems and points of view but were subsidiary to the main purpose of his trip.

Goodwill missions invariably involve speech making. Mr. Howe delivered four major speeches, the first at a Civic reception given by the City of Brisbane, the second at a State luncheon given by the New South Wales Government in Sydney, the third at the University of Melbourne convocation and the fourth as a broadcast over the Australian Broadcasting Commission's Interstate Network on a fifteen-minute "Guest of Honour" programme. He also spoke informally six times.


In the main, the Minister's speeches stressed the desire of Canada for closer political and commercial relations with Australia and the similarity of the economic problems which confront the two countries. In Brisbane he expressed the hope that it would be possible for Canada to secure more Australian sugar and canned pineapple and said "that Canada was looking forward to the day when Canadian goods could enter Commonwealth countries free of quantitative restrictions. We believe that it is your desire to trade with us. We certainly want to trade with you".

State Luncheon

At the State luncheon in Sydney he spoke in some detail of the Canadian atomic energy programme and stressed the desirability of co-operation between Canada and Australia in measures to stabilize wheat markets. The Minister's address at the University of Melbourne emphasized the importance of the role which the university must play in securing a stable balance in a highly complex world society.

In his "Guest of Honour" broadcast, the Minister referred to the three aspects of Australian life which had impressed him most. The first of these was the sense of so much achieved in so little time. Another was the immense potential awaiting development and the third was a way of life which he found uncommonly attractive. He emphasized the desirability of closer association between Canada and Australia within the Commonwealth and suggested that this might be furthered by exchanges of ideas and personnel in governmental and non-governmental fields. Mr. Howe made much of his interest in such exchanges in the scientific and engineering fields particularly that of atomic energy.

Throughout the tour Mr. Howe was received with warmth and cordiality wherever he went. The spirit of friendliness and kinship was reflected in the press and radio coverage of the visit. One of the most important themes ex-



SNOWY MOUNTAIN HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT

pounded by editorial writers and commentators was the need for closer co-operation between Canada and Australia. As expressed by the Sydney Daily Telegraph, "It is a pity that Canada and Australia do not engage in more frequent flag showing in each other's territory". The Sydney Morning Herald observed that Mr. Howe's visit was "a welcome reversal of what has been, perhaps inevitably, a one-way traffic in political personalities . . . His arrival is a reminder of the highly important part that Canada now plays in world affairs".

During his stay in Canberra, the Australian government took up Mr. Howe's suggestion that a flag-pole provided by Canada be erected on some suitable site in the Commonwealth capital as a memento of the visit and a symbol of the affectionate relations between Australia and Canada. Arrangements are in train to give effect to this gesture.

New Zealand

Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull flew to New Zealand on Anzac Day, April 25, arriving at Christchurch in the South Island. The following morning Mr. Howe laid a wreath on the Cenotaph and later attended a civic reception and a civic luncheon in his honour. In the afternoon, the Minister visited the Kaiapoi Woollen Mills and later drove to Lyttelton to take the overnight ferry to Wellington.

Next morning after a formal call on Prime Minister Holland, Mr. Howe was privileged to meet for an hour with the New Zealand Cabinet. This was followed by the high point of the New Zealand tour, a magnificent state luncheon. Among those present were New Zealand Ministers, all members of Parliament, the diplomatic corps, and representative leaders of all sections of

New Zealand life. In proposing a toast to Mr. Howe, Mr. Holland spoke of Canada as the valued and affectionately regarded senior partner in Commonwealth affairs whose advice was always listened to with respect. He referred in warm terms to the part played by Canada in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan during World War II and pointed out that although New Zealand and Canada have their differences, these do not disturb the underlying unity of ideal and purpose. Mr. Holland was supported by the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Nash, who dwelt at some length on Canada's historical background and the part played by several distinguished Canadian leaders. Mr. Howe's speech in reply which touched on the position of the two countries in the Commonwealth and recent developments in Canada was warmly received.

Later that day, Mr. Howe was an interested visitor to a session of the House of Representatives and met representatives of the New Zealand press.

Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull left Wellington on April 29 for a four day tour of the North Island. During this trip, Mr. Howe inspected the geo-thermal investigation area at Wairakei, the Kaingaroa State Forests, and the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company's newsprint mill in course of construction at Kawerau. At this centre, Mr. Howe saw the new village built to house among others Canadian technicians and lumbermen and their families who have gone to New Zealand to assist in development of the forest industry. At Rotorua, Mr. Howe saw the local thermal reserves and subsequently motored across the Island to the Waitomo Caves, visiting en route hydro installations on the Waikato River.

Mr. Howe's final days in New Zealand were spent in Auckland as the guest of the Governor General at Government House. The programme included a brief press conference before a civic reception, a formal dinner at Government



WELLINGTON, N. Z.

House, and some sightseeing in the vicinity of this important seaport and business centre on New Zealand's north coast. Late in the afternoon of May 3, Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull took their farewell of New Zealand and boarded a Canadian Pacific Airlines plane for Canada.

Although Mr. Howe's visit was primarily a goodwill tour, he and Mr. Bull found time for friendly discussions with leading officials on matters of common interest such as trade, general political affairs, and atomic energy.

Mr. Howe's tour of New Zealand, as of Australia, was a splendid success. In both countries, the thoughtfulness and excellence of the arrangements made by the local authorities in conjunction with the Canadian High Commissioners and their staffs was an important factor in this. The warmth and cordiality which was tendered to him on both the official and unofficial level and the keen interest displayed by the press in his distinguished career as a Commonwealth statesman and his leadership in the field of Canadian commercial and industrial development testify to the lively sentiments of friendship which New Zealanders and Australians entertain for Canada. It can be said with confidence that Mr. Howe's tour marks a new stage in the development of closer and more cordial relations between Canada and the Commonwealth nations of the South West Pacific.



MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NATO COUNCIL

(Continued from page 172)

for resolving outstanding issues. The Council hoped that this initiative would lead progressively to agreements which would remove sources of conflict and contribute to the security and liberty of all peoples. In particular, the Council hoped that such negotiations might help to bring about the peaceful unification of Germany in freedom, and promote progress toward reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. The Council emphasized that this process of negotiation required careful preparation, and must be pursued with patience and determination.

The Council also reviewed the situation in the Middle East and Far East. The Council received reports on the conclusion of various security pacts in these areas, including the Manilla Pact and the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Council welcomed measures taken to strengthen the defence of the Middle East and the Far East areas. A report was made to the Council on the Bandung conference. The Council expressed the hope that there would be a cessation of hostilities in the Far East and no further resort to force, since this would so clearly endanger the peace of the world.

IV

Ministers expressed their satisfaction that the procedures followed in the Council had enabled them to have frank and free discussions and a thorough exchange of views. These discussions constitute a most significant proof of the solidarity of the alliance and show the great value of the Council as a forum for political consultation on matters of common concern. They also resolved to continue to follow these procedures, which enable the member governments to develop their policies on common principles.

External Affairs in Parliament

Statements of Government Policy

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their Parliamentary Assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Standing Committee on External Affairs

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, met with the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons for its sessions on May 24, 25 and 26. The Minister discussed some aspects of the work of the Department of External Affairs and replied to a number of questions asked by members of the Committee.

International Situation

At the first meeting which he attended on May 24, Mr. Pearson gave a statement on the international situation generally. He said that he thought there had been an improvement and, particularly in Europe, some relaxation of tension. Soviet tactics, if not strategy, had changed and the Soviet Government appeared to be more co-operative in regard to several international problems that had been troubling us since the war.

The reasons for the change in the Russian attitude could not be known for certain. Mr. Pearson suggested it might be due to domestic difficulties in Russia—both political and economic; it might also be due to the fact that the Russian leaders, who were realists, had realized that if war came now it would be a hydrogen war. Moreover, they might have been impressed by the growing unity and strength of the Western world and that might have impelled the change in their tactics towards us. And there was a final motive which might be still of great importance:

they may hope to put us off our guard by adopting a more reasonable and co-operative attitude in respect of certain problems. It may be that they think they can lull us into a false security and that we shall then abandon the policies which themselves have been in a large part, through NATO, responsible for the improved situation.

Evidence of the change of Russian tactics in Europe included their signing of the Austrian Treaty, their agreement to participate in four-power talks and their apparent willingness, contrary to their statements before the conclusion of the Paris Agreements and the admission of Germany to NATO, to discuss German questions at the four-power Conference.

This change of tactics does give us on the Western side an opportunity for negotiating; as I put it the other day it means that in the diplomatic field we are "out of the trenches"—out of the period of "trench warfare" and into the open. That gives us opportunities but it also may result in risks and dangers now that we are manœuvring in the open. I hope we shall be able to avoid the dangers, and I hope we shall be able to take advantage of the opportunities.

Far East

In the Far East, said the Minister, there had been some improvement of the situation over the last two or three months. In Korea we had settled down to a divided country and while we must maintain our efforts, through the United Nations, of trying to bring about unity, there was an uneasy feeling that this was going to take some time. Though the Armistice had not been converted into a Peace Treaty there was no immediate likelihood of that Armistice being broken.

In Formosa and around the Formosan Straits things seemed to have settled down somewhat. While the problem remained, the situation had not worsened in recent weeks either in regard to the off-shore islands or in regard to Formosa itself, and a kind of de facto cease-fire position seemed to be growing up in the Formosan Straits. One should not ignore the fact that the dangers inherent in that situation still remained and that there had been no particular advance to a settlement except possibly in the announced decision of the Foreign Minister of the Government of Peking to discuss these questions directly with the United States and the response given in Washington by the President of the United States to the terms of that announcement.

NATO Meeting

Mr. Pearson also spoke to the Committee about the situation in Indochina and about the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris which is discussed elsewhere in this issue.* He described the Meeting as "the most useful and effective meeting that we have held in the Council from the point of view of exchanging views and trying to understand each other's policies".

United Nations Charter

In the discussion which followed the Minister's statement, questions were asked on a great variety of subjects, all of which cannot be summarized in this article. In connection with the forthcoming celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco the Minister was asked what were the probabilities of the Charter being revised at the present time. Mr. Pearson said:

As far as Charter revision is concerned, that is a matter which I know the committee has been interested in in the past. We have been working on that in the Department and we could go into it in more detail later on if the committee would like me to do so. Our first problem is to decide whether we should support a Charter revision conference at all at this time. At San Francisco, and I recall this very well and some of the members of the Committee will recall it also—we, the Australian and other delegations were insistent that there should be provision for a revision conference after ten years. We were determined to avoid if we could the use of a veto against the calling of such a conference. And we succeeded. So a conference can be called now by the majority of the Assembly and any seven members of the Security Council. But that does not mean that in the light of the experience of the last ten years and in the light of the present international situation that it is necessarily wise to have a conference at this time. There is no veto on the holding of the conference, as I mentioned, but there could be a veto exercised against all the recommendations which such a conference might make. It would be a great mistake I think to have a conference which would be acrimonious in character and where the positions of

*See page 170.

both sides would be so far removed from each other—I am thinking of the East and West—in regard to any changes to the Charter that all that would happen would be the majority would pass recommendations which would be vetoed by the other side. I think it would be better to see if we could not first have preliminary discussions with the Soviet Union and the other side to see if there was any possibility of agreement on certain amendments to the Charter. That might be possible and in that case certainly a conference should be held.

Among possible amendments to the Charter Mr. Pearson mentioned the giving Asia greater representation in the Security Council and the removal of the veto in respect to the admission of new members to the United Nations.

Unification of Germany

Mr. Pearson was asked what was the attitude of the NATO countries towards the unification of Germany. He replied that this had been discussed in Paris at the meeting of the NATO Council and for the first time in the presence of a German representative. He said:

German reunification remains a primary object of German foreign policy and the entry of Germany into NATO has not changed that. And certainly no German government would survive which reduced that objective to a secondary place. By unification I have in mind the unification of West and East Germany, not the unification of Germany as it was before 1939, but the bringing together of the two portions of Germany, the one which we call West Germany and the other that part of Germany which is occupied by the Soviet Union and which is now governed by the communist government of East Germany. That is what we mean by unification. It is, as I have said, a major problem and it remains a major problem irrespective of the fact that Germany is now a member of NATO. It certainly will be one of the subjects which will be discussed both 'at the summit' and by the foreign ministers.

There is a good deal of talk about how this unity could be brought about and we also hear a good deal about an attempt to 'neutralize' all Germany as the price of unification. I have no doubt in my mind that there was an impelling reason for the Soviet Union changing its policy in regard to Austria and accepting an Austrian Peace Treaty involving the neutralization of Austria. It may have been in their minds that the example of a free united and neutralized Austria would have some effect on German public opinion; that it would result at this stage in the detaching of Western Germany from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Members of the committee may have read however that Dr. Adenauer has said again recently that neutralization does not appeal to his government.

Parliamentarians' Visit to Russia

At the meeting of the Committee on May 25, Mr. Pearson explained the circumstances in which an "invitation" had been received from the Soviet Government for parliamentarians from Western countries to visit Russia. It was part of a declaration issued by the Supreme Soviet on February 9, which included an appeal in Communist language for world peace on communist terms and it contained three paragraphs at the end advocating direct contacts between parliamentarians, including an exchange of visits by delegations and speeches by visiting parliamentarians in the host parliament. The document was unfriendly in its terms so far as Canada and the Western countries were concerned because the first part of it was filled with propaganda attacks on

the policy that our Governments have been pursuing. Mr. Pearson informed the Committee,

We have not received any further invitation from the Soviet Government apart from this statement of the Supreme Soviet and we have as a Government taken no action in regard to it. One would think that if this matter were to be followed up and if the Soviet Government were serious in its desire to invite Canadian parliamentarians to visit the Soviet Union we would hear from that Government to that effect.

Disarmament

During this meeting of the Committee, Mr. Pearson outlined for its members developments which had taken place in the disarmament discussions which are reported in a preceding article in this issue.* Concluding his remarks on this subject, Mr. Pearson said that he hoped disarmament would be one of the subjects discussed at the four-power meeting which will presumably be held in July. He said:

I am not suggesting now that the foreign ministers, even less the heads of governments, will be in a position finally to deal with this matter, but if they and the foreign ministers can look at the problem in its broad aspect and agree on what lines progress can be made and try to disentangle some of these political conditions from the technical considerations, and above all create an atmosphere of confidence which we have not got now by solving some political problems, then there will be a far better chance for the disarmament committee of the United Nations to be successful in its work. This has been the case in the past because as we have learned from experience it is hard to have limitation of armaments in an atmosphere of fear and political uncertainty.

Article 2 of North Atlantic Treaty

At the Meeting held on May 26 Mr. Pearson discussed problems of the International Commission in Vietnam particularly the question of the movement of refugees, and then made a statement on the implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. Pearson said that in addition to political consultation and co-ordination of foreign policies about which he had already spoken, there were other aspects of Article 2.

Economic co-operation . . . social and cultural co-operation, exchange of information between NATO countries and movement and mobility of labour. The approach to the implementation of article 2 has been pragmatic. It may be that we thought more could have been done under article 2 a few years ago than has proved to be possible, but that does not mean we should not continue to do all we can to work it out even as a long range problem. It really in essence means we should, under article 2 work toward every practicable form of co-operation in the non-military field in building up what we have called the Atlantic community. That community, of course, cannot easily be defined; but it is I think reflected in growing consultation and a feeling of community within the group. It does not necessarily have to express itself always and immediately in institutional terms. For instance, in the North Atlantic Organization we have an Annual Review Committee which primarily reviews defence collaboration, training, defence plans, and projects for the coming year. But it does consider economic problems connected with defence and it does consider other aspects of

*See page 173.

co-operation flowing out of defence and some indeed that are not primarily matter of military defence.

We have a committee under NATO that looked into the question of economic collaboration and we found—I have said this before—that it would be a mistake to use article 2 to build up economic machinery within NATO which would duplicate international machinery in the United Nations or under GATT, or OEEC which is turning out to be an effective agency for economic collaboration. While OEEC is a larger body than NATO in the sense that all European countries belong to it, it does not include the United States and Canada, it does include however all the free European countries some of whom are not members of NATO. The association of the United States and Canada with OEEC is getting closer all the time. We now have some high officials in Paris connected with NATO who spend much of their time in liaison work with OEEC.

There are also certain committees which have been set up under NATO dealing with non-military questions. There is the working group on labour mobility which has been working since 1953. That committee is studying the problem of facilitating labour mobility in and between NATO countries. It has been up to the present more immediately concerned with the movement of labour within European countries. We have been a little worried that a committee of this kind should again overlap other international agencies which are concerned with migration problems; such things as the International Labour Organization and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. This committee of NATO has, however, submitted reports to the council on trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and action taken by member governments and international organizations in this field.


There is also a standing committee which is meeting regularly on information and cultural relations, of which the Canadian member of the permanent council is chairman. That committee has made useful progress in the development of modest but practical projects designed to increase co-operation and understanding among members of the Atlantic community. We have, as a matter of fact, in Ottawa at the moment, one evidence of the useful work of that committee in the visit we are now receiving from a body of NATO journalists. This group organizes visits of that kind among other things.

Then, there is the committee dealing with emergency planning. That is primarily for European emergency planning but we have kept in contact with it also. There is the committee on civil organization in time of war which makes recommendations based on its analysis of the problems member governments might have to face in the civilian field in time of war. That committee has set up three sub-committees to deal with specific aspects of civilian emergency planning: (1) civil defence planning; (2) a committee on refugees and evacuees; and (3) a medical committee.

Then, there is a planning board for European inland surface transport which considers the co-ordination in time of crisis of the use of roads, railways and canals and ports of western Europe. They have done a great deal of work in this very important matter and have detailed plans to put into effect in time of emergency.

There is a committee on wartime commodity problems which, with sub-committees studies the difficulties which might arise in particular commodity fields in wartime and recommends what measures can be usefully taken in advance to overcome or at least to minimize them. There are subcommittees under this committee dealing with petroleum planning, coal and steel planning, food and agriculture planning, and industrial raw materials planning.

So there is a certain amount of work being done in this field although I know it is a disappointment to many that there has not been much more done.



ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

On the occasion of the opening of the Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, sent the following message to the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjoyo: "On the occasion of the convening of the Asian-African Conference, I would like to convey through you the good wishes of the people and Government of Canada for the success of the Conference. I hope that the Conference will contribute to the welfare of the people of Asia and Africa and promote the settlement by peaceful means of all disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Mr. Sastroamidjoyo replied as follows.: "As Chairman and on behalf of Asian African Conference I would like to express our high appreciation for the good wishes of the people and Government of Canada to the Conference. The heartfelt sentiments underlying those wishes were warmly received by the Conference. I am convinced that you and your Government receive in the same spirit the results of the Conference which I hope may contribute to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. With assurances of my highest consideration." In the above picture the five architects of the Conference are, left to right: Mr. U. Mu, Prime Minister of Burma; Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India; Mr. Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan; Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon; and Mr. Sastroamidjoyo.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. D. K. Doherty posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, effective May 5, 1955.
- Mr. V. G. Turner posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Hanoi, Indochina, effective May 14, 1955.
- Mr. C. E. Bourbonniere posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Saigon, Indochina, effective May 29, 1955.
- Mr. A. I. Guttman appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective May 16, 1955.
- Mr. R. M. Tait appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective May 31, 1955.
- Miss G. M. Mather retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service effective April 29, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

- Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Signed at Paris, October 23, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance
deposited April 29, 1955.
In force May 5, 1955.
- Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Paris, October 23, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession
deposited May 3, 1955.
In force May 6, 1955.
- Procès-Verbal extending the validity of the Declaration of October 24, 1953, regulating the commercial relations between certain contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Japan. Done at Geneva, February 1, 1955.
Signed by Canada April 7, 1955.
- Agreement concerning the International Institute of Refrigeration (Replacing the Convention of 21st June 1920, as modified on 31st May, 1937). Done at Paris, December 1, 1954.
Signed by Canada, May 31, 1955.
- Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession
deposited June 1, 1955.
- Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession
deposited June 1, 1955.

Bilateral

Italy

- British Commonwealth-Italy War Graves Agreement.
Signed at Rome, August 27, 1953.
In force May 20, 1955.

Union of South Africa

Exchange of Notes regarding the temporary suspension of the margin of preference on wool.
Signed at Capetown January 20 and March 21, 1955.
In force April 1, 1955.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes governing the establishment of a distant early warning system in Canadian territory.
Signed at Washington, May 5, 1955.
In force May 5, 1955.

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 20:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the installation of an oil pipeline from Haines to Fairbanks, Alaska. Signed at Ottawa, June 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 6:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America regarding the construction and operation of a Loran Station by the United States Coast Guard at Cape Christian, Baffin Island. Signed at Ottawa, May 1 and 3, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Review of International Commodity Problems 1954. (Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements). E/2672. New York, 1954. 42 pp. Sales No.: 1955.II.D.1.

Restrictive Business Practices:

Report on current legal developments in the field of restrictive business practices. E/2671. New York, 1955. 124 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 3.

Report on Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade. E/2675. New York, 1955. 20 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 3 A.

Transport and Communications Commission—Report of the Seventh Session, 7-15 February 1955. E/2696, E/CN.2/164. New York, 1955. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 4.

Nationality of Married Women. Report submitted by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/254. New York, 1954. 80 pp. Sales No.: 1955.IV.1.

Ten Years of United Nations Publications 1945 to 1955. A complete catalogue. ST/DPI/SER.F/7, December 1954. New York, 1955. 271 pp. Sales No.: 1955.1.8.

A Bibliography of the Charter of the United Nations. ST/LIB/SER.B/3, April 1955. 128 pp. (bilingual). U.N. Headquarters Library, Bibliographical Series No. 3.

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. (Reprinted from the United Nations Review, Vol. 1, No. 7, January 1955).

GATT—Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Volume I (revised): Texts of the General Agreement, as amended, and of the Agreement on the Organization for Trade Co-operation. Geneva, April 1955. 85 pp.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

ICJ—*Nottebohm Case* (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase) Judgment of April 6th, 1955. 65 pp. (bilingual). Sales No.: 131.

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa).

International Labour Conference, 38th Session, Geneva, 1955. Report I—Report of the Director-General. Geneva, 1955. 123 pp.

UNESCO

International Bibliography of Economics. (Documentation in the Social Sciences.)

Paris 1955. 429 pp. \$7.50.

Yearbook of Youth Organizations. Volume 1: Europe. First Edition, November 1954. UNESCO/Youth Institute. Gautins/Monchen, Germany.

Current Sociology, No. 4, Volume III, 1954-55. Electoral Behaviour (A trend report and bibliography). Paris. Pp. 281-344 (bilingual).

WHO—Financial Report 1 January - 31 December 1954. Supplement to the Annual Report of the Director-General for 1954 and Report of the External Auditor to the World Health Assembly. Geneva, April 1955. 53 pp. Official Records of the WHO, No. 62.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 55/14—*Debate on External Affairs*, statement made in the House of Commons on April 21, 1955, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, closing the debate on external affairs (see Statements and Speeches No. 55/10 which opened the debate).

No. 56/16—*India's Development Programme*, an address by the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott Reid, at the final plenary session of the United Nations Association's Conference on Canadian Aid to Under-Developed Countries,

Ottawa, May 28, 1955.

No. 55/17—*Canada: Energy to Spare and Share*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Texas, March 28, 1955.

No. 55/18—An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Conference of United Nations Associations in Canada, at Ottawa, May 27, 1955.

The following serial number is available abroad only:

No. 55/15—*Some Possible Features of Economic Growth and Investment in Canada, 1955-1975*, remarks by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. J. E. Coyne,

at the Annual Meeting of the Dominion Mortgage and Investment Association, held in Montreal, May 5, 1955.

DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON

(Continued from page 177)

to be the case—will be this whole question of disarmament. I am not suggesting now that the foreign ministers, even less the heads of governments, will be in a position finally to deal with this matter but if they and the foreign ministers can look at the problem in its broad aspect and agree on what lines progress can be made and try to disentangle some of these political conditions from the technical considerations, and above all create an atmosphere of confidence which we have not got now by solving some political problems, then there will be a far better chance for the disarmament committee of the United Nations to be successful in its work. This has been the case in the past because as we have learned from experience it is hard to have limitation of armaments in an atmosphere of fear and political uncertainty.

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Canada in the Soviet Encyclopaedia

IN recent years scholars in the Soviet Union have been busily engaged in producing a new edition of the "Large Soviet Encyclopaedia". Not long ago Volume 19 of the new encyclopaedia appeared and in it will be found a six-page article on Canada. The following extracts and summaries of parts of the articles on Canada will permit the reader to judge for himself the bias, not to mention the veracity, of this official picture of Canada presented to the Soviet reader in a government-sponsored publication.

Early in the article a section on population deals briefly with the majority of the population of Canada and then goes on to treat in more detail the "basic population" of Eskimoes and Indians, "who are deprived of elementary civil rights, are cruelly exploited and subjected to racial discrimination . . . In the southern regions the Indians live in special centres—reservations—where they are abandoned to the arbitrary domination of bureaucrats, speculators and usurers".

The Canadian Economy

Several long sections outline the Canadian economy. The following sentences set the tone of this analysis:

General characteristics of the economy:—Canada belongs to the industrial-agrarian developed capitalist countries and at the same time it is a country dependent economically and politically upon the United States and to a lesser degree upon England. This dependence generates the particular instability and vulnerability of its economy, as well as malformed disproportions in the development of its individual sectors.

The main theme in our economy is apparently a bitter struggle between the United States and Great Britain which the United States is now apparently winning, and in which the interests of Canada itself are always sacrificed. Our industrialists first developed their businesses to meet the needs of war and are now eager for a new war:

The monopolies of Canada, significantly enriching themselves during the war, became in the post-war period zealous champions of the preparation of a new world war. They achieved the transformation of the country to a war footing, accompanied by an increase in taxes and the cost of living and a further impoverishment of the working masses; on the other hand it brought about a big increase in the excess profits of the monopolies.

As a result of the concentration on this industry with military significance, "the production and broad distribution of consumer goods is in a state of stagnation".

We are told that agriculture in Canada "is characterized by sharply expressed class differentiations." According to the article, about two-thirds of all agricultural land is to be found in "big farms . . . of more than 40 hectares". While there is no doubt that to a Russian peasant 40 hectares of land all his own would seem incredible wealth, in Canadian terms 40 hectares or about 100

acres, considerably less than a quarter of a section, is a modest enough holding. By way of contrast with these allegedly large holdings, we are informed that one-sixth of all farmers, having tracts of land of less than 20 hectares, (about 50 acres) occupy only one-fifth of all the land. It would be interesting to know whether any group of peasants in the U.S.S.R. constituting a similar proportion of the total Russian peasantry has ever in Russian history held anything like so equitable a proportion of the total agricultural land of Russia. The article goes on that:

Agriculture is in fact dominated by the banks. They seize farms under the guise of assistance via one-sided loans and then they expropriate the land and all the property of the farmers. Even by official and *clearly lowered* data, the sum of mortgage debts of farmers in 1951 constituted 20 per cent of all the value of the land and the buildings.

The flat and unsupported statement that official Canadian statistics are deliberately falsified is worth noting.

The Monetary System

The following short paragraph quoted in full on our monetary system and finances is a good example of distortion:

The monetary unit is the Canadian dollar (100 cents). The state budget of Canada reveals the growth of state monopoly capitalism, the militarisation of the economy and the growth of the taxation burden on the working masses. Military expenditures (in million dollars) in 1950-51 were 425; in 1939-40, in spite of Canada's participation in the war, they stood at 118. To cover up the growing expenditures of the state, which results in a lowering of the living standards of the workers, the government resorts to larger issues of paper money. Monetary circulation in 1937 was 240 million dollars and in 1950 1.21 billion dollars.

It is noteworthy that this paragraph exaggerates our present military expenditures in comparison with wartime expenditures by the simple device of making the comparison with the 1939-40 fiscal year. Soviet readers are also led to believe that the increase in money in circulation in Canada between 1937 and 1950 is exclusively the result of sheer inflation by the Government with no reference to the large increase in population, in economic activity of all sorts and in national wealth in that period.

A lengthy section on Canadian history contrives to give a Marxist interpretation to most events in our past; for example, the 1837 uprising failed because its "leaders ignored the demands of the peasants and failed to call into the struggle the large popular masses".

More recent political developments in Canada have apparently turned on the desperate efforts of the older political parties and the "right-wing Socialist Party" to frustrate the vast progressive forces in Canada which would otherwise sweep into power the Canadian Communist Party. Thus we are informed that the Progressive Party, which had won a large number of seats in the Federal elections of 1921 "withered away after losing the elections in 1926, and the revolutionary elements of the working class and of the farmers rallied around the Communist Party of Canada which led the struggle of the working masses of the country". We learn that the Communist Party was outlawed in 1940,

“while encouragement was given to the activities of the Canadian fascists”, but that with the “heroic war of the Soviet people against the Germano-fascist aggressors” and the growth of the “anti-fascist sentiment of the masses . . . the King government was obliged in 1943 to permit the creation of the Labour Progressive Party which appeared as the successor of the Communist Party of Canada”. However, this new communist party has a difficult time; “the ruling circles of Canada hate and persecute (it) and nurture plans to outlaw it”.

Relatively brief sections on the other political parties of Canada point out that the Liberal Party represents “the big Canadian monopolies linked mainly with American capital” and that its leaders “carry out a policy of complete subservience of the national interests of Canada to the imperialists of the U.S.A.” The Liberal Party also “stands for the launching of a new world war”. The Conservative Party, also a party of Canadian monopoly capital, wants a strengthening of relations with England and the outlawing of the Labour Progressive Party. The C.C.F. is a “right-wing socialist party” which “leans upon the well-to-do farmers and on the petty bourgeoisie”. Both the C.C.F. and the Conservative Party are shown to be losing strength rapidly, but the author of the article curiously omits any mention of the electoral fate of the Labour Progressive Party.

Education in Canada

The encyclopaedia devotes a substantial section to education in Canada and, while there are no doubt many improvements which could be made across Canada in our educational arrangements, it is difficult to recognize in this account any similarity to normal educational conditions in Canada. For example:

The reactionary character of the educational system of Canada is particularly visible in the organization of secondary education. There are four groups of secondary schools: (1) the independent ones, reserved for the aristocracy—they are not under the control of local governmental organs but they receive subsidies from them; (2) the private secondary schools, for children of the bourgeoisie, which charge a high fee for the education they dispense; (3) the so-called separate secondary schools for the preparation of denominational clergy; (4) the state-supported secondary schools which work in really difficult conditions (there is a shortage of qualified teachers, the school buildings are poorly-equipped and the classes are over-crowded). However even these schools are far from being attended by all the children of the workers.

On the content of our education the reader is informed that:

The curricula and methods of teaching in Canadian schools are ruled by American pedagogy. Science is replaced by the propaganda of racism, chauvinism and militarism.


Other parts of the article are worth brief mention. We learn that, judging by the amount of space devoted to him, Canada's greatest literary figure is undoubtedly Mr. Dyson Carter. Radio broadcasting in Canada is “entirely in the service of the Anglo-American imperialists”. The armed forces of Canada are “formally a part of the armed forces of the British Empire but in fact they are commanded by a defense committee responsible to the cabinet of ministers and working according to the directives and under the control of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.A.” A brief section on the Canadian judiciary points out that the courts of Canada carry out a policy of repression against the working masses and that in their composition they represent the owning classes.

It might be fitting, as a footnote to this article from the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, to mention a curious incident related to the publication of the new encyclopaedia. Purchasers of the encyclopaedia recently received a notice which read:

The State Publishing House recommends subscribers to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* to remove from Volume V pages 21, 22, 23, and 24, as well as the portrait between pages 22 and 23, and to insert in their place the enclosed pages containing a new text. The pages indicated should be removed with scissors or razor blade, leaving a margin to which the new pages should be pasted.

The pages to be removed contained an impressive portrait of Beria and a very complimentary account of his career. To replace this, the authors of the encyclopaedia had produced an extended article on the Bering Straits and had dug up one or two hitherto neglected items beginning with the letter "b". It is left to one to hope that for the sake of accuracy, not to mention Soviet scholarship, the article on Canada will eventually be replaced by one which better reflects the true picture of our country.

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CORNERSTONE FOR NEW CHANCERY

The ceremony of laying the cornerstone for the new chancery of the Canadian Embassy at The Hague was performed by Princess Margriet of the Netherlands on June 14. With Princess Margriet, above, are the Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. T. A. Stone; and an official of the Netherlands Government.

The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

THE International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) held its fifth annual meeting in Ottawa from June 6 to 11. Member countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

At the closing session, after some 40 meetings held over voluminous biological, hydrographical and statistical reports, the commissioners made recommendations to restrict the mesh sizes used by trawlers fishing in additional areas off the Northwest Atlantic banks for cod and haddock.

When it was first established in 1951, the commission divided itself into five panels, each of which was to deal with one segment, or sub-area, of the fishing grounds, the divisions being made on the basis of the areas in which the nationals of member countries were interested.

These sub-areas, and the countries which are represented on the panels, are as follows:

1. The West Greenland waters—Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
2. The sea off Labrador—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
3. The Newfoundland Banks and adjacent waters—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
4. The Nova Scotian waters with the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United States.
5. The sea off the New England coast—Canada, United States.

Historic Decision

The decision made at the Ottawa meeting was historic in that it was the first time conservation measures had been recommended which will affect a group of countries. Mesh regulations for sub-area 5 have been in force for two years, but this affects only United States fishermen, who are the only ones who fish in that area outside of an occasional Canadian effort.

The fishing districts concerned in the new recommendations are sub-areas 3 and 4, which are fished intensively by Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States. British fishermen also have been operating recently in sub-area 3. If the regulations are officially sanctioned by the member governments concerned the minimum mesh size for trawlers in sub-area 3 will be four inches; that for sub-area 4, four and one-half inches. Those sizes were determined after the commission's scientific advisers had presented evidence to show that cod and haddock grow more slowly and mature later in the more northerly sub-area 3, so that a smaller mesh net there would be most effective.



FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF ICNAF

—NFB

The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, left, opens the fifth annual meeting of the International Commission of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries held in Ottawa, June 6 to 11. On Mr. St. Laurent's left is the Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Stewart Bates, and the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. James Sinclair.

The four and one-half inch mesh size for sub-area 4 conforms with the regulation referred to as already in effect on the Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine (sub-area 5).

The mesh regulations, both those proposed and those in effect, apply only to those fishing for cod and haddock. Vessels fishing for other species are permitted to use nets of smaller mesh.

The united desire to maintain the Northwest Atlantic banks at their greatest productive levels, and the spirit of co-operation that is making it possible, were commented on by all speakers at the opening plenary session of the June meeting, which was held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons. In welcoming the delegates, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent emphasized Canada's belief in international agreements for conservation, citing her participation in such arrangements as the North Pacific Halibut Convention, the International Sockeye Salmon Commission, the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention, the International Whaling Commission, and the North Pacific Fisheries Treaty.

At the meeting, in addition to commissioners from the member countries, were observers from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Pacific Halibut Commission, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission and the Special Committee of the International Geophysical Year.

Mr. St. Laurent was introduced by the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. James Sinclair, who mentioned that the international fishery off Canada's Atlantic coast went back for five hundred years, that the rich fisheries formed Canada's oldest industry, and that the Europeans who had come to fish and had then settled here had helped build a strong and prosperous nation.

For the opening plenary session, the flags of member nations of ICNAF flanked the entrance to the House of Commons, and the Prime Minister made his welcoming speech in front of an exhibit, designed by the Department of Fisheries of Canada, depicting the commission's history and functions.

Dr. Stewart Bates, former Deputy Minister of Fisheries of Canada and now President of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as chairman of ICNAF, presided over the annual meeting. At the closing session Captain Americo Tavares de Almeida, who had been vice-chairman, was elected to succeed Dr. Bates as chairman for a two-year period. The new vice-chairman is K. Sunnanaa of Norway.

Officers elected to head the standing committees are: Research and Statistics, Dr. L. A. Walford, United States; Finance and Administration, J. Howard MacKichan, Canada (re-elected). The panel chairmen are: Panel 1, B. Dinesen, Norway; Panel 2, Commander H. F. Barbier, France; Panel 3, C. L. Chicheri, Spain; Panel 4, J. Howard MacKichan, Canada; Panel 5, F. W. Sargent, United States.

Background of ICNAF

The need for joint action in the investigation of, and where necessary, the conservation of the fishery resources of the North Atlantic has been realized for many years, but no united action was taken until 1937, when a conference was called in London, at which many nations were represented. That conference resulted in an International Convention for the Regulation of Meshes of Fishing Nets and Size Limits of Fish. This convention, designed to apply to the entire North Atlantic, never entered into force, but the general problem of the fisheries of the North Atlantic was considered again at subsequent meetings in London in 1943 and 1946.

At the third conference, on the suggestion of the United States, it was agreed that the ends of conservation could be better served if the North Atlantic were separated into eastern and western sections for any work that was to be done. In January, 1949, the United States Government called a conference in Washington, at which the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries was signed. It was subsequently ratified by the ten member governments, the convention area taking in all waters from Rhode Island to the west coast of Greenland, and east as far as the 42nd Meridian.

The first annual meeting was held at Washington, D.C., in 1951, and temporary headquarters was established at St. Andrews, N.B., in offices placed at the Commission's disposal by the Atlantic Biological Station of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. The second annual meeting was held there and the third, in 1952, at New Haven, Conn. At this meeting the Commission accepted the invitation of Dalhousie University, Halifax, and the Halifax Board of Trade, to make its permanent headquarters in that city. The fourth annual meeting was held in Halifax, which will also be the scene of the sixth meeting, to be held next year.

The Australian-Canadian Association

On June 3, 1955, Mr. James S. Duncan launched the Australian-Canadian Association at a luncheon in Toronto. The members of this non-Governmental body are men and women representing the arts, universities, labour, business, journalism, publishing and finance. The broad purpose of the Association is to promote a greater exchange of information and ideas between Canada and Australia in all spheres of their economic, social and cultural life in order to foster a more intimate association between them in their common developmental problems and in their membership in the Commonwealth. The Association will undertake to increase personal contacts between Australians and Canadians by encouraging more frequent visits by educational, trade and professional associations, women's organizations and youth movements. It will attempt to widen the channels of communication between the two countries through the press, radio and television, through visits of persons prominent in the fields of art, music, literature, business and finance, and through the interchange of exhibitions and the work of creative artists.

Association Members

Mr. Duncan, who is president of Massey-Harris Ferguson Ltd., is Chairman of the new body. Associated with him on the executive as Vice Chairman is Sir Douglas Copland, High Commissioner for Australia in Canada, and Mr. K. A. Greene, former Canadian High Commissioner in Australia, is Honorary Secretary General. The association includes such prominent Canadians as Dr. C. H. Best, Director of the Banting Institute, Dr. Claude T. Bissell, Vice President of the University of Toronto, Mr. L. W. Brockington, Q.C., Dr. Edward Johnson, Chairman of the Royal Conservatory of Music, Toronto, Dr. J. R. Kidd, Director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, Dr. Norman MacKenzie, President of the University of British Columbia, Mr. H. R. MacMillan and Mr. G. W. C. McConachie of Vancouver, Mr. James Stewart, President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, and Dr. Freda Waldon, Senior Librarian of the Public Library, Hamilton.

As Mr. Duncan pointed out in addressing the inaugural luncheon, both Australia and Canada are growing in population, wealth and influence and both are members of the Commonwealth. But in neither country is knowledge of or interest in the other increasing in proportion to the prominence each is assuming in Commonwealth and world affairs. Ties of friendship, understanding, and a sense of "belonging" which are the essence of the Commonwealth association must be strengthened in order to preserve the special relationship which exists within the Commonwealth and which has served it well in the past. One way of achieving this for Canadians and Australians at the non-official level to become better acquainted. This the Australian-Canadian Association hopes to encourage through planning and co-ordination in co-operation with and working through the established local and national organizations in both Australia and Canada.

The Question of the Saar

The referendum to approve the new Statute for the Saar is to take place on October 23, 1955. If the vote is favourable, as is generally expected, an important experiment in Europeanization will begin.

The question of the Saar has long been a contentious issue. In recompense for German destruction of French coal mines in World War I the Saar was transferred to French use under League of Nations supervision for a period of fifteen years. In 1935 this predominantly German speaking area voted to return to German control; but following the Second World War, in April 1947, the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and the United States agreed to detach the Saar and place it under French economic control. They provided the Saar with a semi-autonomous constitutional government, France retaining responsibility for its foreign affairs and international obligations. Saarlanders subsequently ratified these conditions by an overwhelming majority.

Coal and Steel

Most of the million inhabitants of the Saar derive their living from the production of 18 million tons of coal and 3 million tons of steel per year. For France, this area is of great economic importance, providing over one-quarter of France's share in the European Coal and Steel Community, and contributing a substantial amount to her reserves of foreign exchange. As a people, Saarlanders enjoy a very high standard of living and consequently they are an attractive market for French and German products. This economic attractiveness has made the problem of the Saar a continual sore spot for both French and German governments. Some political leaders in both France and Germany have indicated that the arrangements set out in the proposed Statute may not be acceptable at such time as the German problem is settled, but in the meantime they seem to be fairly satisfactory to all concerned.

In October, 1954 M. Mendes-France and Chancellor Adenauer agreed on the proposed Statute by which, pending a German Peace Treaty, the Saar would continue to enjoy a semi-independent self-governing status under the aegis of the Western European Union Council of Ministers. Under its terms, a Commissioner, who cannot be either French, German or Saarlander, would be appointed by the WEU Council to represent the Saar government at the international level and to ensure that it did not violate the Statute. He would have discretion to suspend legislation pending the decision of the Council and would have the power to conclude international treaties with the approval of the Saar Landtag. He would see that all political expression, except for activity against the Statute, was free. He would represent the Saar on the Council of the European Coal and Steel Community, and act in an advisory capacity to the Ministerial Committees of the Council of Europe and the WEU. The Statute itself is to be presented to the Saar electorate; once approved by a majority it will receive the guaranteed support of the German and French governments.

The two governments further agreed that while the economic union between France and the Saar should be maintained and strengthened, a similar

economic relationship should be established between the German Federal Republic and the Saar. At the practical level such a general statement was bound to create disagreement. As a result of their economic hegemony over the area since 1947, public and private interests in France wield a large measure of control over Saar investment, banking and taxation practices, and there is little desire on their part to relinquish these advantages. The French-Saar Convention on Economic Co-operation of March 21, 1955 reaffirmed the existing economic, monetary and customs union, but provided for equal participation of the Saar in economic negotiations concerning that union.

The last major hurdle in German-French economic negotiations the proposed division of the Volklingen steel works, was settled on April 29, 1955 by M. Pinay and Chancellor Adenauer, after the French Government had declared that this question had to be solved before it would ratify the Paris Agreements. Both Governments agreed to purchase the company on a 50-50 basis, subsequently returning it to private ownership distributed equally between French and German stockholders. The managing director for the first three years will be a Frenchman.

Supervisory Commission

A WEU Supervisory Commission composed of representatives from the Benelux countries, Italy and the United Kingdom has been formed to supervise the coming Saar referendum. This Commission is responsible to the WEU Council to ensure that the vote shall be free of legislative coercion or outside interference aimed at influencing public opinion. When the Saar voters go to the polls on October 23, exactly one year after the original French-German Agreement to Europeanize the Saar, Government sources in both Bonn and Paris expect the Statute to be overwhelmingly endorsed. Eight years of semi-autonomous self-government and economic prosperity have brought to the people of the Saar a growing sense of national identity. They are not anxious to submerge this identity by closer union to either France or Germany, and hence they support Europeanization.

Ratification of the Statute for the Saar should permit a substantial decrease in the difficulties which the status of this area has imposed upon relations between France and Germany, and it is a tribute to the personal endeavours of Chancellor Adenauer, M. Mendes-France and M. Pinay that such a compromise should have been achieved. It would be wrong to expect, however, that all problems are solved. The choice of the Commissioner, subject to veto by Germany, France and the Saar, has yet to be settled. There is still the clash between French and German economic interests for the Saar market, and should a peace treaty for Germany be negotiated the whole question of a permanent status for the Saar will be re-opened. Assuming that the Saar electorate ratify the proposed Statute, their new "European" role under WEU Council of Ministers is a major step forward towards practical European co-operation and integration. Yet within the framework of Europeanization the people of the Saar are realizing a new sense of national identity and self-determination.

External Affairs in Parliament

Statements of Government Policy

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Statement on the International Situation

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made a statement on the international situation to the House of Commons on July 23 in connection with the passing of the estimates for the Department of External Affairs. The Minister commented on the significance of the Geneva meeting "at the summit", the continuing importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whose existence, he said, was not up for negotiation so long as there was no better way through the United Nations to guarantee our security collectively, and the achievements of the United Nations in its first ten years of existence.

Mr. Pearson said:

Since I last spoke, indeed since I appeared before the committee on external affairs not very many weeks ago, the improvement in the international atmosphere has, I think it is fair to say, continued. There has been now for many months an easing of tension which has reflected itself in international meetings that have taken place recently. Whether this change—and I have said this before in the House—is merely a matter of tactics on the other side or whether it represents a change in long-range policy, I do not know. Nor do I think it would be wise to attempt to come to any conclusion on this matter. It would, I think, be premature to assume that the danger of conflict which has existed now between the two worlds for many years has been removed, or indeed sensibly decreased.

While we must be careful and must remain on guard, it would also be, I think, very shortsighted and unwise if we did not take advantage of every opportunity—and there have been opportunities recently—to broaden and deepen this improvement in the international situation which has taken place. In the Far East there has been some easing of tension. There has developed in a very dangerous part of the world now, the Formosa straits, what one might call a *de facto* ceasefire. Efforts have been made by governments not committed

to either side in this world controversy, governments which have sometimes been called neutralists—I am thinking of the government of India and the government of Burma, and I am also thinking of the Secretary-General of the United Nations—efforts have been made to mediate certain outstanding differences that have for some time now persisted between the communist government of China and other governments, particularly the government of the United States. But that area of the Far East and the Formosa straits remains a danger area, and no one can rest easily as long as the two Chinese governments face each other in hard and bitter hostility, with forces at grips at and about the off-shore islands, islands that are only a few miles off the coast of China.

Geneva Meeting

In Europe the improvement in the atmosphere which I have been talking about has culminated this week in a meeting at the summit, as it is called, at Geneva, which ended this afternoon. There were very great expectations and hopes aroused by this meeting of the heads of the four governments, and there will be those who will say that those hopes and those expectations have not been realized. But I think everyone who has been following the course of international events in recent

years, and who has been guided by experience and not by emotion in these matters, must have realized from the time this meeting was called that it would be unrealistic to expect important developments out of one meeting at the summit, in the sense that problems would be solved and difficulties removed.

What has happened this week at Geneva—and I think this is something that might give us all cause for real satisfaction—is that problems have been identified, positions have been clarified and machinery has been set up for the diplomatic negotiation of those problems in the months ahead through the foreign ministers of the four great powers.

In that sense the Geneva meeting has been most valuable and encouraging. It has not solved the problems—and I myself never thought it would—but it has taken the first right step on what might become a road along which progress can be made in solving these problems. Any hon. member who has followed what has been going on at Geneva this week will, I know, be struck by the fact that while problems have been clarified to some extent, while machinery has been set up and views have been exchanged, the problems are still there. As far as I can gather there has not been very much alteration in the fundamental policies on the other side in respect of such things as the unification of Germany and the limitation of armaments.

What has happened is that the presentation of the case by the other side—I think we must all welcome this, especially those of us who have been subjected to the other type of presentation—has been more affable. That is all to the good. I think we can take some satisfaction at least from this change of atmosphere which may lead to something more important now that the process of negotiation has begun. Personally I hope for a continuation of this process through the foreign ministers and through other mechanisms inside and outside of the United Nations which may be set up or which have already been set up. I hope that in this process the negotiators will not be subjected to such publicity, exciting publicity, as that which has been reflected by the presence at Geneva this week of between 1,500 and 2,000 press,

radio and television correspondents. I agree, however, that on this particular occasion at a meeting held at the summit one can expect that kind of attention.

In other words, what has happened at Geneva is the beginning of a long process which we hope will in the end result in the solution of some of the problems that divide the world, which if they are not solved will result in danger to all. No one meeting at the summit will solve these problems. A multitude of meetings below the summit, official and non-official, will be required. That process has begun and we are hoping that it will be satisfactorily concluded. It will require on our side, patience and strength and unity.

NATO

Before the Geneva meeting began, just a week ago today, I had the privilege of attending a meeting of the NATO council in Paris at which the 15 foreign ministers of the NATO governments were present. At that meeting—I think this is the process of consultation at its best; it is one of the things we hoped NATO would be used for—the three foreign ministers who were going to Geneva told those representing the other 12 member states quite frankly and quite fully their hopes and their fears about Geneva, their plans and their policies, and gave us an opportunity to express our views.

In no sense did those three act at Geneva for the other 12, as we had our responsibilities to our own parliaments and governments. They could not, of course, be delegated by a NATO council meeting in Paris. But that meeting did give us a chance to hear of their plans and policies, to comment on them, to give them our own views. In that sense it was valuable. It was also an interesting and useful indication of the unity of the countries making up the NATO coalition. On the eve of the Geneva conference I think that may have been wise and of some value because the Geneva discussions have shown that one of the primary objectives of the Soviet Union and its friends is to weaken, or indeed to break up, that coalition. That is why I said last Saturday in Paris that NATO was not negotiable.



U.N. 10TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED IN OTTAWA

—Capital Press

The tenth anniversary of the United Nations was observed in Ottawa on June 25 by ceremonies on Parliament Hill which included a concert by the band of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

When I said that I did not mean that the deployment, the level of armaments, or the uses to which forces could be put and all that sort of thing were not negotiable. It may be part of the general price we will have to pay for a true peace settlement. That sort of thing can be discussed with anybody at NATO or outside of NATO. But NATO itself as a regional organization for collective security is not negotiable; its existence is not up for negotiation as long as there is no better way through the United Nations to guarantee our security collectively.

At London before and after the NATO meeting I had the opportunity to discuss developments with the foreign minister and other members of the United Kingdom government.

United Nations Anniversary

While I have mentioned the Geneva conference and NATO I would not want

to overlook one other useful meeting in recent weeks, the meeting at San Francisco to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the United Nations. I think that meeting turned out to be a very good and valuable development because it focused, and there was need to focus at this time, the attention of the world on the United Nations and its achievements about which we do not always hear so much, as well as its failures about which we always hear more; about its limitations as well as its possibilities.

The words used most often in the 72 speeches to which we listened at the San Francisco conference—71 in my case. Because I made one myself—were “stock-taking” and “rededication”. We took stock of the past and we looked to the future. Practically without exception, and this also applies to the delegations from the other side of the iron curtain, every statement ended with an expression of support for the United Nations as the indispensable

able and universal agency for the solution of disputes and the removal of difficulties, as the indispensable agency for international co-operation.

If it could only do the work it was meant to do ten years ago when we set it up we would not be talking today about NATO or conferences at the summit, because we would not need them. It may be that one day we will be able to use that world organization at it was meant to be used. Until that time we will be well advised, in so far as political collective security is concerned, to continue our support for regional organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to keep them strong and united, to do our very best to convince those who fear these organizations that they are defensive in character, that they have no aggressive intent against anybody. If conditions improve, if there is more trust and confidence in the world than unfortunately is now the case, then, but only then, we will be able to modify our attitude toward these regional defensive collective organizations, especially if the work which they now do can be done through the United Nations.

On the whole, then, I would say that the last two or three months have given us

cause not for exultation, not for unreasonable expectation, but for sober encouragement. The processes of negotiation between the two worlds have now begun. Some imaginative proposals have been put forward, especially the one by the President of the United States the day before yesterday in respect to disarmament. That is a key subject, as it has been for many years, and it is an evidence of our good intentions.

All this has been hopeful and has been helpful. If we can continue on our side that process which we have begun, not merely relying on our strength and our unity but also on our determination to achieve the one objective which matters most in the hydrogen age, namely peace; if we subordinate everything to that objective and maintain a realistic sense of balance, not being too excited or encouraged when things seem to go right—sometimes dramatically so—and not getting too depressed or downcast when things seem to be going wrong; and if we can maintain the essential unity with our friends which we have built up over these years, then I think we can look forward to the immediate future with more confidence than we could a year ago today.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Statements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and President of the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Tenth Anniversary meeting of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 24 and June 26, 1955.

Statement of June 24

I am the fifty-first speaker at this commemoration meeting. If my conceit reached as high as the Top of the Mark, I could not honestly hope to add anything new or profound to what has already been said about the United Nations. I may, however, be able to underline and reinforce some aspects of what should be the obvious!

The Abbé Sieyès, in his later days, was once asked what he had done during the French Revolution. "I survived" was his reply.

The United Nations has survived ten years of international tension and "cold war"—no mean achievement in itself. The world—as a Canadian journalist wrote, ironically, the other day—has also survived ten years of the U.N.! My journalist friend then went on to suggest that the observance of our Tenth Birthday in this lovely and hospitable city where the United Nations was born under such expert and co-operative care, should be a "nice mixture of thanksgiving and surprise". I agree.

Indispensable Agency

We can be thankful not only that the United Nations has survived its first years, which were more difficult than in 1945 we thought would be the case, (and which if we have any sanity will not be repeated), but also because, during this time, and notwithstanding its set-backs, our world organization has become an indispensable agency for international co-operation. If this one did not exist we would soon have to build another one.

It is, however, as idle to deny that the United Nations has lost some credit during these ten years as it is to deny that our hopes were too high in 1945. But only the thoughtless or the ill-disposed could believe that it is approaching bankruptcy. Indeed, while we the credit of the United Nations is moving upwards again—and its value is more generally recognized. Otherwise the club would not have such a long waiting list; one which we ought to remove or at least reduce.

The ghosts of past memories which this Opera House evokes, are here to warn us against over-optimism; and against the danger of trying to build—or rebuild—an international structure of peace upon grandiose but

shadowy hopes instead of on hard realities. No man is the poorer—though he may be the sadder—for being shorn of his illusions. We have lost some of ours, about U.N., but not, I hope and believe, our faith, our principles, and our ideals. Indeed if we draw the right conclusions from the experience of the past, we can gain thereby for the future. But experience in itself though a valuable channel to wisdom, is no guarantee of it. You may remember Napoleon's comment when someone recommended one of his officers to him for promotion on the ground that he had been through an exceptional number of campaigns. "My horse", Napoleon is reported to have replied, "has been through even more". Some of us have been through a good many U.N. campaigns. I hope we have learned more than our horses. If, however, we are to benefit from our experiences, the first step must be to draw the right conclusions from them.

May I recall one detail of experience. Ten years ago, in San Francisco, the smaller powers paid a price, by making certain concessions, for a foundation for the United Nations which we hoped would be solid, but which certainly proved to be illusory. This foundation was to be Great Power co-operation. The price we paid was to give these Powers a special position under the Charter.

The Veto

We could not have had the United Nations at all without paying this price. It was not too high and it should not be made an excuse for our failures. The veto, for instance, is not the cause, as I see it, so much as the result of those failures. Other international organizations in which, in effect, all members possess a veto have worked well. Our machinery is adequate; but the will to operate it successfully has often faltered or been frustrated.

Improvement in that machinery—as in any kind of machinery—can, of course, be made. But the remedy for our ills lies not so much in such improvement: as in the desire and determination to make the existing mechanism function better, and for that international agreement on disputed questions. The responsibility for such agreement rests mainly on those members of the United Nations who have the greatest power and the special privileges.

True, the Charter has given us all, great or small, a set of standards of international conduct which it is our duty to follow. The greater the power of a State, however, the heavier is its obligation to exercise this power, in the United Nations and elsewhere, with restraint, with justice and in accordance with the principles of our Charter.

Determination Renewed

This week we renew—in words—our determination to live up to those principles; above all, to rid mankind of the scourge of war. But, if we are to succeed where all previous generations have failed, words alone will be of little avail. It is not enough merely to set up an efficient international organization and lay down an ideal code of international conduct. It is not enough to hoist a United Nations flag with a map of the world, though it may remind us that we are all more directly and vitally interdependent than ever before. It is not enough to meet one another in the Assembly, in the Councils and the Committees of the United Nations, though that should increase mutual understanding. It is not enough to learn to know each other as human beings outside our official contacts, though that also helps. It is not enough to accumulate more knowledge about each other, though that makes it easier to put ourselves in one another's place—something which is essential if understanding is to grow. It is the translation of all these things into political and social action; the application of high principles to individual and collective practice that matters.

As a mechanism for helping us to do this, for bringing us all together, the United Nations, as it exists today, is not far short of what we wished it to become ten years ago. Its doors for discussion and negotiation have been kept open. They may not always have been wide open, but they have never been closed and through them progress has more than once been made in settling conflicts and solving problems. More than one agreement has been worked out in the United Nations which has prevented a war or brought a dispute to an end. There has been more than one instance where the moral force of public opinion working through the United Nations has brought about an honourable arrangement where no basis for a settlement had previously existed. There has been more than one example of the application, in and through the United Nations, of both private and public diplomacy joined together for a good objective which was successfully achieved.

Not all United Nations debates or initiatives, however, have been fruitful. It is easy to retrace, in retrospect, where we have gone wrong during these past ten years. It is not so easy to see how we should try to steer our course for the next ten. We can perhaps admit that we have been carried along by events more than we have controlled them. It may be drift, rather than design, which is now our greatest danger. Yet one of the most hopeful omens for the years ahead is the fact that we are becoming increasingly aware of where events may carry us in this nuclear age, if we do not control them; and direct them away from war and toward a peace that is more than a symbol for propaganda or an uneasy interlude between fighting. To any man, of whatever nation or race or creed or colour, who has looked squarely at the shadow of the hydrogen bomb over his own country, "there is", as President Eisenhower has truly said "no alternative to peace".

The H-bomb was not written into the Charter; it was not created for peace; it was the product of a desperate anxiety not to be left at an impossible defence disadvantage in a time of fear and crisis. But now, because of this weapon, there stands behind our Charter pledges never to resort to war as a means of settling our differences, a deeper urgency, a more impelling incentive even than that of ten years ago. It is the prospect of mutual annihilation. The balance of terror has replaced the balance of power and that is not a comfortable or strong or permanent foundation for security. Peace rests uneasily on one, even less easily on two, hydrogen bombs. It is the tragedy of our first ten years that peace has found no better resting place.

Agency for Airing Views

The United Nations has another vital role; in acting as an agency through which international public opinion can express itself. Though the United Nations can be and has been misused for propaganda and even for abuse, it has, in my opinion, a legitimate and necessary part to play as a place where opposing views are aired, for the peoples of the world to hear and draw their own conclusions. It is in this sense that the United Nations acts as a kind of "town meeting of the world". Public opinion would, of course, continue to have its effect on all Governments if there were no United Nations, for no Government in these days of mass media of communication can entirely ignore what those in other parts of the world are thinking. No curtain—of any kind or shape or pattern—can completely stop the winds of opinion. But our world organization helps in this regard.

Real Meaning of Peace

It is one of the premises of free and democratic societies that "you can't fool all the people all the time". A great deal can be said about "peace", for example. It is something we all want, but its advocacy can cover other designs. Indeed, if there were more action for peace, there might be less need to talk so much about it. But here in the United Nations, however, governments have to parade not only their words but their policies, before the scrutiny of the international public, who are becoming more skilful in detecting "false fronts". This important function of clarification, of analysis, of education, is taking place all the time; on every day that there is a United Nations meeting anywhere in the world. This is the kind of open diplomacy which can be healthy and good. Its excesses—diplomacy by "loud-speaker" or by insult—are not so good. But even they tend to correct themselves as Governments come to realize that their ends are not attained by crude and tough talk, by name calling or abuse, by legal quibblings or by procedural wrangling; by twisting and torturing the meaning of words.

This last practice particularly has had a confusing and damaging effect on our debates. Too many good words of respectable parentage—democracy, co-existence, freedom, appeasement, human rights, popular, and above all, peace-loving—have been turned upside down and inside out and made to seem what they are not. What we need as we enter our second decade is a Convention for the Defence of Peace-loving words against Verbal aggression!

When the representative of the Soviet Union says—as he did on Wednesday—that "those who pay lip service to the principle of peaceful co-existence sometimes tend to violate that principle flagrantly in practice", I could not agree with him more. But any satisfaction or comfort I secure from that agreement, however, is removed by the certainty that I could hardly disagree with him more on who are meant by "those".

That disagreement, which makes the other agreement of no importance or even indeed of much meaning, arises from the fears and mistrust that keep up apart: fears that may be strong and genuine on both sides. It is these which endanger the world and they will not be removed merely by repetition of the word "peace".

The people of my own country—like those of many other countries—still have this deep

and awful fear of aggressive attack and attack from outside; and by "outside" I do not mean our good neighbour the U.S.A. which we know, from a happy experience respects the rights and honour, the freedom of a less powerful neighbour. To remove the fear, the suspense—and I quote Mr. Molotov again—and with full approval—"what is obviously needed is something more than just verbal recognition of the principle of co-existence and peaceful co-operation between countries with different social structures".

Again unhappily, we cannot agree on how that "something more" can be achieved, or indeed even on what it should be. So the fear of each other persists, and while it does, those countries who believe in coming together for collective security—and who cannot find it at this time in the United Nations—will (let there be no doubt about this) continue to seek it in defensive regional arrangements negotiated and operated in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Our unity in this regard cannot be shaken by untrue and unwarranted allegations that such arrangements are aggressive and provocative. We know that they are not and we will not abandon them. We know that they are not a spearhead — as charged — for attack against one state. They are a shield against aggression from any state. We will not—we dare not—abandon or weaken them until our security can be assured on a broader, and better basis preferably by the United Nations—or until peace rests on something even stronger than force of any kind.

Mr. President, as we look back, let us hope that the need to avoid collective, nuclear suicide will help us to remove these fears and misunderstandings which now haunt and harry us.

It Can Be Done

It can be done; not by the recognition of "co-existence" which is a sterile word, but by active and friendly international co-operation which will convert fear and suspicion into tolerance, understanding, and one day, please God, eventually, into friendship between all peoples. For this essential process, the United Nations exists; valuable as ever, even indispensable.

It is the living symbol of our interdependence, and embodies that emerging sense of international community, going beyond nation and region, which alone can save us in this nuclear age.



UNITED NATIONS 10TH ANNIVERSARY SESSION

—United Nations

Dr. Elco N. van Kleffens of the Netherlands, Assembly President, declares open the United Nations tenth anniversary session in San Francisco on June 20. On his right is Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General, and on the right, Mr. Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. Seated at the left of Mr. Hammarskjöld is the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson seated behind the President Eisenhower.

We must broaden and deepen this development in the next ten years. For that reason I regret, though I acknowledge, the necessity of holding important conferences outside the United Nations, a practice which has been growing in recent years. This may be the best—indeed in some cases the only—way at this time to resolve some of our biggest problems. Yet it is better, whenever it is possible and as it was intended ten years ago, to tackle these problems inside our Organization. We must work towards that result.

The United Nations is a remarkably flexible and adaptable mechanism. It is led and staffed by a group of able, trained and dedicated men and women whose zeal and devotion will in time deteriorate if we do not make the fullest use of their capabilities.

Let us, then, make more use of the organization we have, not following too slavishly the original blueprint where we find it impracticable or outdated, not aiming to run before we can walk, but aware that the United Nations has unique and unexplored potentialities if we treat it as it was meant to be treated, as an instrument through which our conflicting interests may gradually, one by one, be harmonized, and our mutual understanding may grow. Here, in our world organization—better than at any other place—can we meet the challenge of the nuclear age; co-destruction or co-operation.

If we fail in this supreme challenge, there will be no occasion in 1965 to celebrate our twentieth birthday; or, possibly, to celebrate anything else.

Statement of June 26

The talking—and the traces even of tumult—are over, or almost over. All that could be

said this week about the United Nations and the world in which it must work, has been said.

Our week of commemoration now ends. But our Charter, which is today before us as signed in this place on June 25, 1945,—our Charter remains; as the international Bill of Rights, as imperishable as Magna Charta itself. It enshrines for all time man's hope—so long deferred—that he may live his life in peace and freedom; in dignity and security.

This Charter is, and will always be, the best Declaration of San Francisco, and I suppose no other can add very much to it. It remains also our best peace programme—and others with five or seven or ten points can scarcely do more than repeat it or elaborate on it.

It is the standard of international conduct by which our actions will be measured. We signed it ten years ago and we honour and commemorate that signature today. But we have not yet fulfilled it. Indeed almost before we ceased praising ourselves for what we had done by agreeing on its noble language and its lofty ideals, our actions, became shrouded in the mists of distrust and suspicion that began to envelop the world. Our faith was soon frozen by fear, and our hopes shaken by hatreds. Only now does the sun show some sign of breaking through.

When President Truman spoke at the signing of the Charter, he said this:

"You have created a great instrument for peace and security and human progress in the world. The world must now use it! If we fail to use it, we shall betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom and safety to create it. If we seek to use it selfishly — for the advantage of any one nation or any small group of nations,—we shall be equally guilty of that betrayal. The successful use

of this instrument will require the united will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job will tax the moral strength and fiber of us all".

It certainly has and it certainly will.

The fact that today is another anniversary—that of the launching of the war of aggression in Korea—is a grim reminder of how great the gap has been between our pledge and our performance, between debate and deed; of how far short we have fallen of our avowal of "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours".

It is altogether fitting this afternoon—as we celebrate, with solemnity and satisfaction, the signing of our charter of peace—to recall also, with honour and sorrow, the memory of those who have died that it could mean more than words in the search for peace. Their sacrifice is the tragic proof of our failure to understand, and act on the understanding that, in Pascal's words, "strength without justice is tyranny, and justice without strength a mockery". We can retrieve this failure and redeem this sacrifice, but only if we never forget that peace is more than a word or a declaration. It is something determined by the policies of nations. Even more, it is something in the hearts of men. There will be no peace until nations' policies are based on our Charter; above all, until we live our own lives in accordance with its principles.

This week has recalled us to these principles and, because of that, it has, I think, shortened in some small way the distance between a today—with all its alarms and unrest and tension—and a better tomorrow when strength will walk with justice, peace with progress, and the good life will be for all people.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. E. Reid posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, India to temporary duty in the Department and home leave effective May 27, 1955.
- Mr. J. Y. Grenon posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, Italy, effective May 31, 1955.
- Messrs R. R. Canon appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 1, 1955.
- Mr. M. P. F. Dupuy appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 1, 1955.
- Mr. J. G. Harris posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra, Australia, effective June 2, 1955.

- Mr. R. L. Rogers posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Home Leave, effective June 13, 1955.
- Miss H. I. Jones appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 13, 1955.
- Mr. R. Duder posted from the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia to Ottawa, effective June 14, 1955.
- Mr. P. M. Roberts appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 15, 1955.
- Mr. A. J. Hicks transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra, Australia, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, New Zealand, effective June 17, 1955.
- Mr. J. R. McKinney posted from Ottawa to Temporary Duty at the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective June 17, 1955.



TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:

Fourth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Annexes and to the texts of the Schedules to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 6, 1955.

Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, June 7, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 7, 1955.

Protocol amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Protocol amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Declaration on the continued application of the Schedules annexed to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Bilateral

Ethiopia:

Exchange of Notes constituting a commercial *modus vivendi* to regulate commercial relations.

Signed at Addis Ababa, June 3, 1955.

Entered into force June 3, 1955.

Japan:

Exchange of Notes respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visa fees.

Signed at Ottawa, June 13, 1955.

Entered into force July 1, 1955.

Spain:

Trade Agreement.

Signed at Madrid, May 26, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally June 1, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged June 30, 1955.

Entered into force definitively June 30, 1955.

United States of America:

Exchange of Notes amending the Exchanges of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, and May 1 and July 31, 1953, for the establishment of United States Global communications facilities in Newfoundland.

Signed at Ottawa, March 31 and June 8, 1955.

Entered into force June 8, 1955.

Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information for mutual defence purposes.

Signed at Washington, June 15, 1955.

Agreement for co-operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.

Signed at Washington, June 15, 1955.



PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 27:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement for the establishment of United States Global Communications Facilities in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, November 4 and 8, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 12:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America regarding the transfer to Canada of the Three Loran Stations at Port-Aux-Basques, Battle Harbour and Bonavista in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, June 26 and 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 25:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America amending the Exchange of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, for the establishment of United States Global Communications facilities in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, May 1 and July 31, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 1:—Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff. Signed at Ottawa, September 20, 1951. English and French texts. (Price 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 7:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America concerning the payment for expenditures on construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls. Signed at Ottawa, September 13, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series, 1955, No. 1:—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Peru for air services between and beyond their respective territories. Signed at Lima, February 18, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 3:—Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Signed at Paris, February 25, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

United Nations Refuge Emergency Fund.

Financial reports and accounts for the year ended 31 December 1954 and reports of Board of Auditors. A/2900. New York, 1955. 12 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 6 D.

Financial Reports and Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1954 and Reports of the Board of Auditors. A/2901. New York, 1955. 60 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 6.

Resolutions of the Nineteenth Session (1st Part) of the Economic and Social Council, 29 March–7 April 1955. E/2730. New York, 1955. 4 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 1.

The Quest for Freer Trade. E/2737, ST/ECA/31. April 1955. 59 p. Sales No.: 1955.II.C.5.

Scope and Structure of Money Economies in Tropical Africa. E/2739, ST/ECA/34. May 1955. 52 p. Sales No.: 1955.II.C.4.

Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(a) Report of the Council to the Assembly on the activities of the organization in 1954. (Supporting documentation for the ninth session of the assembly, Montreal, June 1955). E/2749, 16 May 1955. 89 p. (Doc 7564, A9-P/2, 27/4/55).

(b) Council's Budget Estimates, 1956 and Information Annex. (Supporting documentation for the ninth session of the Assembly, Montreal, May-June 1955). E/2749/Add.1, 16 May 1955. (Doc 7565, A9-AD/1, 23/3/55) 43 p.

Repertory of Practices of United Nations Organs. Volume I: Articles 1-22 of the Charter. New York, 1955. 742 p. \$3.50 Sales No.: 1955.V.2 (Vol. I).

A Study of the Iron and Steel Industry in Latin America:

Volume I—Report on the meeting of the Expert Working Group held at Bogota. E/CN.12/293/Rev.1, ST/TAA/SER.C/

16. December 1954. 123 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1954.II.G.3, Vol. I.

Volume II—Proceedings of the Expert Working Group held at Bogota. E/CN.12/293/Rev.1/Add.1, ST/TAA/SER.C/16/Add.1. November 1954. 449 p. \$4.50. Sales No.: 1954.G.3, Vol. II.

UNESCO

The Builders and the Books (Technical Assistance lends a hand to the progress of the Middle East). Paris 1955. 55 pp.

SIRS-EL-LAYYAN—Light and hope for the Arab world. Paris 1955. 26 p.

Records of the Inter-governmental Copyright Conference, Geneva, 18 August–6 September 1952. Paris 1955. 415 p. \$3.50.

International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. VII, No.1, 1955. (Quarterly). *Social Factors in Personality.* 185 p.

Urban Sociology—A trend report and bibliography. (Current Sociology, Volume IV, No. 1. Paris 1955). 52 p. (bilingual).

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Report of the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the Pulp and Paper Industry, Buenos Aires, 19 October–2 November 1954. E/CN.12/361, FAO/ETA/No 462, ST/TAA/SER.C/19. (E/2697, 17 March 1955) 139 p.

Report of the Eleventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights. E/2731, E/CN.4/719. 4 May 1955. 78 p. & Annexes I to III.

World Economic Situation—Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Latin America (Seventh annual report covering the period from 10 February 1954 to 10 May 1955). E/2756, E/CN.12/AC.26/8/Rev.1. 10 May 1955. 50 p. Appendix, 7 p.

UNICEF—Administrative and Operational Services Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956 and Information Annex. E/ICEF/L.765. New York 1955. 100 p.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

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| No. 55/19— <i>Canada Trades with the World</i> , an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, at Montreal, May 25, 1955. | Golden Jubilee Convention of Rotary International, at Chicago, June 1, 1955. |
| No. 55/21— <i>Good Neighbourhood</i> , an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, before the | No. 55/22— <i>Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations</i> , statements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and President of the seventh session, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Tenth Anniversary meeting of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 24 and 26, 1955. |

The following serial number is available abroad only:

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| No. 55/20— <i>Employment and Unemployment in the Canadian Economy</i> , an address by Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton F. Gregg, | to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, at Montreal, May 25, 1955. |
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ENGINEERING AGREEMENT SIGNED

The Department of External Affairs announced on July 6 that a detailed engineering agreement was signed recently, on behalf of the Canadian and Pakistan Governments, for the provision under the Colombo Plan of a steam power plant, boilers and generators at Hardinge Bridge, East Pakistan. The Canadian Government is also providing certain building materials, including structural steel, for the construction of the power house in his Ganges-Kobadak project. The total external cost is estimated at \$1,800,000. All local costs and labour will be financed by Pakistan. An agreement in principle was signed on March 10, 1955, and during the short time that has elapsed since then, all the machinery for the plant has already arrived from Canada and is being transported to the site ready for erection after the monsoon season.

The steam power plant will provide 10,000 k.w. of energy for use in pumping water from the Ganges River into canals and channels for the irrigation of a large area in the districts of Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore.

The steam power plant forms part of a large irrigation scheme which is an outstanding example of international co-operation. The general plan of the irrigation scheme was worked out by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations under the direction of Mr. Van Blommenstein. Pumping equipment is being provided by the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States. The Chief Engineer, Irrigation, of East Pakistan is in charge of construction of the extensive civil works. The Canadian Government is providing the steam power plant, design drawings and specifications, and building materials not available locally, as well as the technical personnel required for supervising the erection of the power house steam plant, and generators.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1955.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin

THE debate on the International Rivers Improvement Act, which was passed by the Canadian House of Commons on June 14, 1955, has served to emphasize the importance of water resources in Canada, particularly the tremendous hydro-electric potential of the Columbia River Basin in British Columbia. The Columbia River is one of the great rivers of the North American continent. It is exceeded only by the Mississippi and St. Lawrence Rivers in the amount of water it discharges annually into the ocean. It has been estimated provisionally that the water resources of this basin when fully developed will warrant an installed capacity of as much as 35 million kilowatts or approximately 30 per cent of the total water power potential of Canada and the United States combined.

Shared by Canada and the U.S.

The resources of the Columbia River Basin are shared by Canada and the United States. Of the total area of 259,000 square miles drained by the Columbia River, 39,700 square miles, roughly 15 per cent, are in Canada and more than 25 per cent of the total annual run-off originates in Canada. Because of the international character of the Columbia River and its principal tributary, the Kootenay, a number of problems have arisen and will continue to arise between Canada and the United States in the exploitation of these waters for industrial, agricultural and other uses. The Canadian Government policy concerning the development of these water resources was set forth in an address by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean Lesage, before the Pacific Northwest Association in Vancouver, B.C., on May 9, 1955. He said, in part:

The Pacific Northwest has an important common feature: its economic development largely depends upon water resources and the Columbia River System is its main source of water. However, this vast region is far from being homogeneous. It is composed of several political units separated by an international boundary whose political and economic significance cannot be ignored. The region is constituted of several distinct areas which differ both in geography and in natural resources. The distinction between upstream and downstream areas, for instance, corresponds to a basic economic reality.

Up to now, these differences have not generated any substantial diversity of interests within the region. The various areas of the Pacific Northwest have grown along parallel lines, more or less independently of each other. They were in a position to exploit their respective resources and to attract new industries through their own initiative because their energy requirements could be met by developing available heads in the Columbia River System to provide on-site power. This first phase of development did not call for joint enterprise nor create a conflict of interests, with the result that the different parts of the Pacific Northwest appeared unified through complementary relationships.

As the region approaches the end of its first stage of development, it becomes evident that the unity of interest is more apparent than real. As it moves

into the second period of its expansion a new situation will arise where inter-regional relationships are likely to show two contradictory features. First, they will have competitive aspects. All areas depend more or less directly on water resources for their future industrial growth. However, the region's potential of cheap power, although still abundant, is limited in quantity so that the additional amounts appropriated by one area will affect the character, and perhaps will limit, the further economic expansion of the others. Thus, conflicting interests are likely to develop amongst the various areas because they will be obliged to share the same scarce commodity. Second, inter-regional relations will also have complementary features. Only part of the power potential of the Columbia River System can be developed through a series of dams using the available at-site head because there is a great difference between summer and winter flows. The optimum development of the Basin will necessitate the construction of upstream storage facilities to provide downstream power and to keep costs low. Thus, joint action by upstream and downstream areas will in many cases be required to develop the power potential of the region economically.

This complex set of relationships is further complicated by the physical possibility of diverting flood waters from the Kootenay River into the Columbia through Canal Flats and from the Columbia River into the Fraser River System. Canada's right to make these diversions is guaranteed under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.

Article II


Article II of this Treaty deals with this problem in the following terms: "Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters". The article goes on to give to any parties on the other side of the boundary who may be injured as a result of a diversion the same rights to claim damages as if the injury had been sustained in the country making the diversion. The right to object to diversions resulting in material injury to navigation interests is embodied in the Treaty . . .

After discussing the historical background of Article II of the Treaty of 1909, Mr. Lesage went on to say:

Thus, our right to divert flood waters from the Kootenay and Columbia rivers is clearly established as a result of the position taken by the United States in 1909. Now that, in the main area of contention, Canada represents the upstream interests, we cannot be criticized for wanting to assert a right which was more or less imposed upon us in conditions that were then against our national interests.

However, the fact that those diversions are physically feasible and that we have the right to make them does not of itself necessarily mean that they will be initiated. Economic considerations will have to be taken into account in reaching a decision. That is why an investigation is now being made on the feasibility of the Kootenay and Columbia diversion projects. Results of these surveys are expected within a year.

We want to obtain precise data on the benefits to be derived from these diversions and on their cost, including, of course, the possible damages to downstream interests. Once we know the quantity and the cost of power which could thus be made available, it will be useful to compare those data with the cost of



thermal and atomic power. It will be particularly important to make such a comparison with the quantity and the cost of power that the downstream interests would be prepared to give in recompense for storage facilities if the flood waters were not diverted. All the direct and indirect effects of these alternatives will have to be carefully examined before a final decision is reached.

This brings us back to the competitive and complementary relationships existing between upstream and downstream areas in the Pacific Northwest region and raises the complex problem of downstream benefits. Given the strong competitive factors now opposing the two main groups of interests, it is quite understandable that the downstream areas would like to keep for themselves all the downstream power made available through regulated flow and to provide compensation only in terms of money for the damage caused by the upstream storage facilities. It is equally understandable that the upstream areas should refuse such proposals because even adequate compensation for damages does not add to their wealth. They may argue, for instance, that, once the head has been developed, the generation and transmission of power derived from on

peak storage cost very little because otherwise the facilities of the power system downstream would be idle and because unused capacity in a hydro-electric plant does not materially reduce total cost whereas the cost of providing storage may be considerable. They could claim, therefore, that most of the downstream power generated from the released storage should belong to them.

Compromise Needed

It is evident that these opposite views must be reconciled in order to reach a satisfactory arrangement. Some compromise will have to be worked out whereby the upstream areas will receive an adequate and fair share of downstream power. I am convinced that this claim of the upstream interests is perfectly justified. It should be noted that the power made available under those particular conditions is a joint product resulting from the joint enterprise of upstream and downstream interests. The downstream areas provide the head which is certainly a valuable resource, but the upstream areas contribute the storage sites which are required to regulate the flow of water and also may permit flooding above the boundary to increase the head below. It cannot be denied that a topography favourable to storage sites is a very valuable asset which can be utilized in perpetuity. It follows therefore that when downstream and upstream areas decide to use their respective physical assets jointly for the generation of power, they both have a claim on the end-product. Moreover, they both make their contribution in physical terms—even though some expenditures are involved to develop the natural resources—so that they are both entitled to a quantity of the joint product in physical terms . . .

In our country, the doctrine of sharing downstream benefits is in the process of becoming the explicit policy of the Government of Canada which is directly concerned with this problem. According to the Canadian Constitution, works built on rivers in Canada and having an effect outside the country fall under the jurisdiction of Parliament even if they are entirely located in one province. Up to now, the Government of Canada has felt that it was unnecessary to exercise this jurisdiction and to legislate in this field. Conditions are rapidly changing, however, and, as I pointed out, a second period in the development of the Columbia River System is now starting during which important international problems will arise. Special legislation will be needed to cope with these questions and to provide guiding principles of policy designed for the protection of the public interest of the Canadian people. That is why the Parliament of Canada has been asked to enact Bill No. 3, entitled "The International River Improvements Act".

Under this Bill, an "international river improvement" means a dam, obstruction, canal, reservoir or other work the purpose or effect of which is

- (i) to increase, decrease or alter the natural flow of an international river, and
- (ii) to interfere with, alter or affect the actual or potential use of the international river outside Canada.

Such works, unless specifically excepted by regulations or by the Act, would require a licence from the Government of Canada. The Bill would also enable the Governor in Council to make regulations concerning the construction, operation and maintenance of these works for the purpose of developing and utilizing the water resources of Canada in the national interest.

The Government of Canada has already made known the general principles which would serve to interpret the national interest in this respect. They require that a project must be compatible with present and future needs of the country

and with the optimum development of the site and the whole watershed. If no effective use of the water resources can be made in Canada, the improvement executed in Canada to permit downstream utilization in another country must provide for benefits commensurate with the water resources thus made available. Projects involving the storage of water in Canada to regulate the downstream flow must provide for long-term arrangements with the United States or some authority designated on its behalf and for a reasonable share of the downstream power or for a fair return in real terms. If, in order to launch a project in Canada, it is necessary to contract for the sale outside of Canada of a declining proportion of the Canadian share of downstream benefit power, then the sale of that power must be treated as an export of electricity and made subject to similar regulations as those pertaining to the Exportation of Power and Fluids and Importation of Gas Act. I use the expression "declining proportion" to indicate that there is no intention to alienate power permanently.

Not a New Trend

This attitude of the Government of Canada in respect to downstream benefits and to power development in general cannot be interpreted as a new trend in our thinking. It is merely an application to this particular field of a well-established policy. The Canadian Government has always thought that our natural resources should be exploited to the best advantage of our country. This is the position taken in the United States about United States resources, and it is the only responsible position that a government can take. We place special emphasis on energy in view of the fact that it is a strategic factor of industrial expansion in the framework of modern technology. Within the energy field we devote particular attention to water power as one of our most valuable resources. We must put it to its optimum use in Canada. We cannot be expected to make it available outside the country on terms which could hinder our own industrial progress . . .

It must be realized that British Columbia is still in its early period of expansion and that most of its resources are almost untapped. The U.S. Pacific Northwest has reached a much more advanced stage of development. This is not the first time that regions of the two countries show such a difference in timing of development. The Province of Ontario once thought that its power potential was much greater than its needs and that it could make part of it available to the State of New York. Just a few years later it needed that power but could not recover it. It took many years to solve this difficulty. To-day, southern Ontario has almost completely developed the full potential of its water resources and its power requirements are still increasing rapidly. Where there was once a surplus of really cheap power, there will, in the immediate future, be an acute shortage.

Even at the present time, the power requirements of certain areas in southern British Columbia are doubling every seven years. There is no doubt that if British Columbia experiences a normal rate of growth, all its cheap sources of power will be required in the next two or three decades.

If Canada does not want to see the economic future of its west coast area jeopardized, it cannot allow the sale in the United States of on-site or downstream power from British Columbia at a price corresponding to the average cost of power presently available on that market. This power is produced at very low cost because the main projects were built during the depression and part of their cost was assigned to irrigation, flood control and navigation. The real value of power in the United States Pacific Northwest is represented by the cost of producing additional power from the cheapest source now available in the area. Canada cannot be expected to permit the sale of its power on the

United States market at a price much lower than this cost. Is Canada reasonably to be expected to use its own resources in such a way as to encourage new industries to locate on the other side of the boundary where they will have immediate access to the United States market, where they will enjoy tariff protection and get cheap power as well? Our first duty is to use Canadian resources to foster Canadian development. We have always given consideration to the needs of our United States friends, and we always will, but we cannot be expected to do that to our own jeopardy. Since cheap energy is so vital a factor in industrial growth, Canada has for years taken the position that it cannot export power to the United States in perpetuity or even on a long term basis. If it did that, it would sacrifice one of the most significant factors in its industrial expansion. Canada might find itself without cheap power to process its own raw materials and forced to export those as well. Controlled water is simply electricity in storage. The same principle applies there.

Temporary Power Surplus

If the application of this policy results in some region having a temporary surplus of power this is no reason to think the policy is wrong. We can be sure the surplus will be only temporary. Moreover, it is not a surplus of power, but a shortage which creates great difficulties and which brings industrial expansion to an end. A temporary surplus of power is the very condition of economic progress in the age of modern technology. Power projects require several years to be completed but the demand for power may rise suddenly. That is why regions enjoying temporary surpluses possess a great economic advantage and must think twice before deciding to part with it.

As it can be readily seen, the further development of the water resources of the Pacific Northwest will no doubt create problems, difficulties and perhaps conflicts. We might as well face them frankly and realistically. We cannot ignore the fact that even in the Pacific Northwest different areas do not have necessarily the same interests. Instead of refusing to recognize unavoidable divergencies of interest we should try our best to reconcile them . . .


The United States and Canada have a long record of peaceful relations. This does not mean we do not have divergencies of interests or that, when such differences arise, either country sacrifices its interests to the other. The explanation of our friendly relations lies in the fact that we are always ready to iron out our difficulties through direct negotiations and to reach a compromise in the common interest . . .

Only disagreements and uncompromising attitudes can impair the brilliant economic future guaranteed to the Pacific Northwest by its immense natural resources.

Soviet Agriculturalists Visit to Canada

THE Soviet agricultural delegation which recently spent six weeks in the United States arrived at Montreal on August 25 to begin a two weeks' tour of Canadian farming areas. The nine-man delegation, led by Vladimir Matskevitch, Acting Minister of Agriculture for the U.S.S.R. was met at the airport by S. J. Chagnon, Assistant Deputy-Minister of Agriculture, and other government officials. The tour conducted by the Department of Agriculture began with a visit to the Eastern Townships in Quebec. After spending a day in Ottawa, the visitors enplaned for Regina and since Mr. Matskevitch had expressed a desire of spending as much time as possible studying large-scale farming their stay in that district was extended to four days. Among their hosts during the visit to Saskatchewan were the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. James Gardiner, the Premier of the Province and Mr. L. B. Thompson, head of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Organization. The last day was spent at Swift Current where research on dry land farming is done by the P.F.R.O.

On the return trip to southern Ontario a short stop was made at Winnipeg for a visit to the Board of Grain Commissioners. After arrival at Chatham the group examined corn growing methods and the purchase of a considerable quantity of seed was made. Before returning to Ottawa a day of relaxation was enjoyed in the Niagara Peninsula. A day's bus ride brought the delegates back to Ottawa where they spent four days studying more farming methods, sight-seeing and attending several receptions held in their honour. On September 10 they had their last look at Canada before boarding a plane to begin the long flight home.



—Capital Press

SOVIET AGRICULTURALISTS VISIT THE FARM NEAR OTTAWA OF DR. H. H. HANNAN

Left to right: V. V. Matskevitch, Dr. J. G. Taggart, Deputy-Minister of Agriculture, A. A. Ezhevski, A. S. Shevchenko, B. P. Sokolov.

International Trade Unionism

IN CANADA, as in most industrialized countries, trade unionism has a day-to-day impact on the lives of most people which gives rise to a general awareness of unionism as a domestic institution. There is, however, less consciousness of trade unionism in the international field. To the public at large, international unionism presents a vague and apparently insignificant picture.

Yet international unionism is important. It plays a noteworthy part in international affairs and affects or may be affected by events throughout the world. Canadians have a special interest in international unionism. Few countries have had as long a relationship with international unionism as Canada.

Eighty Per Cent Membership

Canadians have been members of and participants in international unions for over a hundred years. Belonging to and taking part in the affairs of international unions is now the rule rather than the exception for organized workers in Canada. Out of a total of more than a million and a quarter Canadian trade unionists, some eighty per cent belong to unions whose headquarters are outside Canada.

Canadian interest in international unions began in the days of the free border between Canada and the United States. Those were the days when passage to and from the two countries was a casual affair, unimpeded by rigid immigration inspection, or by the need for passports or border-crossing cards. Much of the continent was of a frontier nature: labour was extremely mobile and the "tramp" worker was common. A worker might be in Canada one day and a week later in the United States. Workers were constantly on the move and were not too conscious of the name of the country in which they worked. The whole continent was their workshop. With industry and, consequently, unionism having an earlier start in the United States than in Canada, United States or international unionism became the instrument to be used by migrant United States and Canadian workers to improve wages, working conditions and living standards generally.

"Tramp" miners, printers, construction and building workers and railroad "boomers" carried their union cards and unions with them into all parts of the continent. International unionism thus took root in Canada.

As the years passed, the industrial base was widened and expanded. This development brought about a decline in the mobility of labour, and workers settled down. Their unions evolved into permanent institutions. With the growth of permanent communities in the two countries, branches of United States unions were formed all over Canada. Belonging to the same union became the accepted thing for both Canadian and United States workers.

The flow of United States capital into Canada added an inducement for Canadian workers to become and remain members of international unions. Often working for the same employer as United States workers, Canadians concluded that their economic position would be strengthened if they also

belonged to the same unions as their American fellow-workers. Their unwritten motto was in many cases, "The same employer; the same union."

The participation of Canadians in international unions on a continental basis has assumed such large-scale proportions that policy decisions by the unions affect many people in Canada as well as in the United States. Policy is laid down at annual or biennial conventions to which the local unions of both countries send delegates representing the membership. Policies affecting workers in both countries are arrived by majority decision.

It comes about, therefore, that a local union in Canada will be following a policy similar to that of a local unit of the same international union perhaps three thousand miles away in the United States. In the earlier days of international trades unions on the continent, union policies largely ranged around improvement of the immediate conditions of life. Betterment of wages and working conditions, known to unionists as "bread and butter problems", was the chief motivation for union activity.

With the improvement of wages and conditions, however, came a greater social awakening of union membership, and international union policy broadened out into new areas of interest. The enactment of social legislation began to absorb the attention of unionists, and it may be said that much of the social legislation in the statutes of Canada and the United States had its origins in the discussions in local union halls and the conventions of international unions. The adherence of close to a million Canadians to international unions has, therefore, considerable influence on the political and economic life of Canada.

A Personal Relationship

This mass form of Canadian activity in international unions has something more than economic or political implications. It has created a personal relationship that brings together on a day-to-day basis a fellowship of tens of thousands of people of Canada and the United States, thereby enriching the life of the two countries and making for mutual understanding of each other's problems. In this fellowship lies a great contribution to the continuing peace between the two neighbours. North America is something of a continental economic unit. Because of this, it is easy to understand why Canadians of many interests join with their fellows in the United States in mutual organization.

What is not so easy to grasp is the interest and activity of Canadian unionists in world organizations and in their numerous regional or subsidiary bodies. Yet Canadian unions have had a participation of years standing in the bona fide organizations of world trade unionism. The motivation of Canadian activity in world trade unionism is basically similar to that of joint activity with United States workers. It is mutually of interest and purpose, backed by a realization that, directly or indirectly, what happens in any part of the globe has some sort of impact on the lives of Canadians generally, and Canadian workers in particular.

Canadian workers are affiliated to two world labour organizations. Canadian unions with international connections in the United States are associated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The unions in the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour are affiliated with the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

The two world federations represent the free workers of the world and both are actively anti-Communist. They take their stand against Communism on the ground that the all-powerful state is the enemy of freedom, including labour freedom. They are also agreed on the need for lifting the living standards of people everywhere, which they consider is the best means to counter Communist propaganda, tyranny and oppression.

Why Two Unions

A puzzle to some is why the two world anti-Communist federations of trades unions remain divided, if both are united on the basic principles of freedom and security. The origins of the division go back a half century into a Europe, unthreatened by Communism, when two vigorous schools of thought—the religious and the secular—debated the status of man and his mode of participation in human organization. The trade unions became involved in the debate and there resulted the establishment of two international federations of trade unions. However, within recent years there has come a recognition inside both groups that the mortal enemy of both internationals is world poverty, and the Communism that feeds upon human misery. Out of this recognition is developing a climate which should permit closer association between and, perhaps, unification of the two world organizations to conduct a concentrated world struggle against poverty and Communism.

The instrument of international Communism in the labour field is the World Federation of Trade Unions. This world body came into being in the closing days of the Second World War when there was not only a general weariness of war but an apparent desire in all countries to get together and work for the good of all mankind. The governments of the world were joining together in the aspiring United Nations and it was, therefore, believed by most free unions throughout the world that, if governments could find common ground for work on international problems, workers could also unite in one world trade union body to serve a common cause. The result was the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions to which most unions of all beliefs, Communist and non-Communist alike, adhered. Inside a year, however, it became obvious that the attempted fusion of opposites would not work. Free trade unionists realized that the Communist unions were not primarily interested in helping the workers of the world but in furthering the interests of communism and, by 1948, most of the free unions had left the new federation. Out of this departure of free trade unionists from the World Federation came the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with the slogan of "Bread, Peace and Freedom". With virtually all the free unions having left the World Federation, that body is today largely representative only of what goes by the name of trade unionism in the Communist countries.

Communist unions are not free institutions dedicated to the welfare of workers. Inside Communist countries, unions are but organs of the state, used by the government to speed up production and strengthen the economy. Unions have no voice in bargaining for wages or working conditions: they must accept the wage levels and production norms set by the state. In free countries, unions controlled by Communists have as their basic function the propagation of Communist theory. The World Federation of Trade Unions, under Communist domination, is, therefore, an instrument of Communist propaganda abroad and of subjection of the workers in the Communist countries themselves.

Of the world anti-Communist trades union bodies, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is the stronger. This body has a world membership of roughly fifty-four million members from about seventy-five countries. In the federation are men and women of all religions, faiths and political beliefs, apart from Communism.

The Confederation meets in world session every two years in different national capitals. Delegates to the biennial meetings are selected in each country by the national affiliates. Canadian international unions, with approximately one million members, send eight or nine delegates and advisers to these conferences.

At the biennial world meetings the whole condition of man is reviewed, debated and dealt with by conference decision. World economic conditions, living standards and the state of man's freedom are high on the agenda of discussion. World trading conditions, rearmament, the atomic bomb and the Communist conspiracy and infiltration are also discussed. Between the biennial meetings, the decisions of the Confederation are administered and applied by its officers and the standing executive or an emergency committee. Canada is represented on the executive body and its representatives are held in high regard for their unselfish contributions to the work of the world organization.

Regional Organizations

Below the world level, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is subdivided into regional organizations, whose work is to translate decisions of the world body to the needs of the individual countries coming within their regional jurisdiction. Canada is actively represented on the regional organization covering the Americas.

The work of the regional organizations lies in organization of unorganized workers in countries where such help is needed; the strengthening of weak trades unions; the advocacy of better laws; the establishment of educational facilities to train and educate future leadership of free unions.

In the European regional organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions not only is there an active and alert interest in workers' affairs. A continuing attention is also given to the need for European integration and to the administration of the European Coal and Steel Community on which the free unions of Europe are represented.

In addition to the decentralization of the world body into continental or regional organizations, there is a further sub-division of organization into specific trades and crafts. Out of the world organization comes the individual trade or craft organizations which meet regularly and deal with their particular problems. Individual Canadian unions are also members of and active workers in these trade units of the world body.

From this type of organization, opportunities are provided for discussion, decision and work on a world, area and individual trade basis. This process of decentralization and integration enables the world body to give attention to the needs and problems of workers in every country. The pattern of organization translates interest and activity from the world level down through the union centres in each country to the local level.

Beyond this active and continuing interest in the problems of the workers in each country, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has permanent observers at meetings of the United Nations and its many branches. At this vantage point the Confederation is able to bring attention to world problems. It was from the representation of the Free Trade Unions at the United Nations that there developed such a world knowledge and consciousness of the existence and condition of slave labour and prison camps in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions is smaller than the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The membership of the Christian International is estimated at some three million members. The main bases of its membership are in Europe, notably Belgium, France and Holland, while from Canada the Catholic Confederation of Labour contributes roughly one hundred thousand members. There is also a scattered membership of the Christian Federation in some Latin American countries and in the Far East.

The structure of the Christian Federation is basically similar to that of the Free Trade Unions, although the disparity in numbers, and limitation of membership to Christians, tends to limit the effectiveness of the body to areas having a common spiritual affinity. In countries like Belgium, France, Holland and Canada, the Christian unions have, however, an impact of some consequence. The Canadian and Catholic Confederation is widely represented in the work of the international Christian trade union body.

Useful Contribution

The long apprenticeship, which Canadian unionists have served in the international unions of North America, has enabled them to make a useful contribution to the work of the free world labour movement. Canadian labour shares the belief in the interdependence of peoples in the modern world that is the basis of the action of the Government of Canada in representing all Canadians in the United Nations, or of Canadian farmers who are active associates in the International Federation of Agriculture or Canadian businessmen who play their part in the International Chamber of Commerce. Canadian unionists readily accept the truth that in today's world "no man is an island" and they realize that they will prosper to the extent that they contribute to the well-being of the workers of all nations.

Meeting of Parliamentarians from NATO Countries—Paris, July 1955

THE idea of establishing closer relationship between NATO and national legislatures has received considerable support, both in official and unofficial circles, since the creation of the Organization. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Dr. Lange, raised the matter as far back as the Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Council in 1951 and during the last two years parties of parliamentarians from Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom have visited NATO Headquarters in order to inform themselves of the problems faced by NATO and the progress it has achieved in various fields of activities. What it is hoped to accomplish through these visits is to widen the base of public support for the Organization and, particularly, to develop useful contact, at the parliamentary level, between North American and European members of the Alliance. The value of these aims was particularly recognized by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, formed on May 14, 1954, by members of both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, irrespective of party affiliations.

The new element, however, contained in a resolution adopted this year by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association shortly after the opening of the Canadian Parliament, was to organize concurrent visits to NATO Headquarters of Parliamentarians from all NATO countries. As a result of this Canadian proposal, which was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of NATO on January 18, the Chairman of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Committee, who had been issuing invitations to a number of NATO countries to send Parliamentarians to a meeting in Paris in the spring or early summer of 1955, decided to co-ordinate arrangements on behalf of the Norwegian *Storting* with the Chairman of the Canadian group, Senator W. McL. Robertson, and it was finally agreed that only one meeting of Parliamentarians would be held in Paris commencing on July 18, the date suggested by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. Invitations were accordingly issued to all NATO Parliaments or Parliamentary Associations to send representatives on that date.

II

It is against this general background that about 175 Parliamentarians, representing the fifteen NATO countries, met at the Palais de Chaillot in mid-July. The first problem that had to be met before the Conference convened was to set up the necessary administrative machinery to enable it to function harmoniously and with the maximum efficiency. No precedent, of course, existed in this respect since Parliamentarians visiting NATO Headquarters had hitherto been mostly concerned with obtaining a greater knowledge about the Organization and its accomplishments. The proposed Conference, on the other hand, wished to initiate a discussion of NATO affairs and the role that might be played by Parliamentarians in furthering the work of the Organization. From the outset it was recognized that, the Conference having been called by the Parliamentarians themselves and not by the Organization, the actual conduct of the Conference was the sole responsibility of the Parliamentarians. On the other hand, in accordance with its policy to encourage visits from Parliamen-



NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS PALAIS DE CHAILLOT PARIS

A group of 122 Parliamentarians from the 15 NATO countries photographed in the main lobby of the NATO Headquarters—the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. Seated from left to right on the front row of this picture are the members of the Continuing Committee; M. Pierre-Olivier Lapie (France), Vice-Président et Député; M. Van Cauwalaert (Belgium), Président; Hon. Senator Wishart McL. Robertson (Canada), Chairman of the Meeting; Mr. Finn-Moe (Norway), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; The Rt. Hon. Walter Elliot C.H., M.C. (U.K.), Member of Parliament; Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands), Member of the Second Chamber.

Parliamentarians to NATO Headquarters, it was decided that the Secretariat should make available to the Conference its administrative facilities in order to assist in any technical way possible. A Conference Headquarters was therefore established to help the Conference in administrative and informational matters. This group distinct from the NATO Secretariat, consisted of an official of the Canadian Parliament, a representative of the Norwegian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council, and a representative of the French Parliament, assisted by appropriate officers from the NATO International Staff. Each national delegation to NATO was in turn asked to designate an officer to serve as a liaison point. The NATO International Staff, in addition, undertook the responsibility of furnishing a verbatim record of the discussions held in plenary sessions in either French or English and to make available translators as well as stenographic assistance in these two languages. The Conference itself elected its own "Steering Committee", which was entrusted with the task of establishing the agenda and the rules of procedure for the Conference debates. Because of the nature of the meeting, it was unanimously agreed that conclusions reached during the discussions should be communicated to the National Governments and not to the NATO Council.

III

In order to take full advantage of the relatively short time that the Parliamentarians were able to spend in Paris, it was agreed that the programme,

during the first two days of the meeting, should provide for briefings on NATO at the Palais de Chaillot and at SHAPE, while the three last days would be left open for the Members of Parliament to have discussions together.

The briefings at the Palais de Chaillot were extensive. The Secretary-General of the Organization spoke to the group on the organizational aspects of the Alliance, while the Standing Group Liaison Officer dealt with the military organization of NATO. The Conference also heard the Head of the Production and Logistics Department of NATO on problems relating to the Annual Review and Defence Production. A briefing was also given on the theme of civil defence, the role of parliaments and the role of NATO by Sir John Hodsoll, the Senior Civil Defence Adviser to NATO. In his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, the Permanent Delegate of Canada on the NATO Council, Ambassador L. Dana Wilgress addressed the group on non-military co-operation within NATO. The briefings at SHAPE Headquarters included discussions on SHAPE Organization by Gen. Brisac, on NATO air defence plans by Air Marshal Dawson, and finally an address on the wider implications of the NATO defence programme and strategy by General Gruenther.

IV

The Parliamentarians held four sessions devoted to the exchange of views on matters of common interest, the sessions taking place on the morning and afternoon of July 20, on the afternoon of July 21 and the morning of July 22. The morning session of July 20 was devoted to general statements, many of them enlarging on points which had emerged in the briefings on the previous two days. It is perhaps worth referring here to a statement made by the leader of the United States Delegation, who pointed out that the limited representation of the Congress of the United States in no way reflected a lack of interest in the meeting, but rather was an unfortunate consequence of the particularly heavy legislative schedule with which the Congress was confronted at the time of the meeting. Almost all of the general statements expressed approval of the purposes underlying the meeting, and supported the view that further meetings of NATO parliamentarians to exchange views on questions of common concern would be of great value both to the parliaments of Member countries and to the Organization itself.

This theme was developed more specifically at the afternoon session on July 20, when resolutions were introduced by the Canadian, French and United Kingdom Delegations, designed to ensure that a further meeting of the same general type should take place, perhaps in about a year's time. A Resolutions Committee was set up to seek to prepare an agreed text combining the significant points in the three national drafts mentioned. The report of this Committee was considered at the session on Thursday, July 21, at which time certain proposed amendments were put forward. The Committee met again to consider these amendments, and presented a final report at the session on July 22. This final report was unanimously adopted, and the text of the resolution was approved. At the same time a resolution calling in general terms for closer unity within the Atlantic community was presented by the French Delegation and approved by the meeting.

At various stages there were suggestions from one quarter or another for somewhat more specific resolutions on particular subjects of NATO interest,

but in the result, such suggestions seem to have been a little premature. This first meeting of NATO parliamentarians perhaps fulfilled its most useful purpose in providing an opportunity for personal contacts and the exchange of ideas among representative groups of parliamentarians from all the NATO countries. While it was obvious that most of those attending the meeting had given a good deal of thought to the major questions facing the Alliance, it was probably true that many of them had done so within the framework of their own national interests and attitudes. The meeting thus provided an opportunity for parliamentarians from the various countries to obtain for the first time a direct impression through personal contact of the points of view on NATO problems which are held in other Member countries. As a result, their consideration of such questions in the coming months can profit from the broader perspective which this meeting has helped to reveal.

For the reasons which have been mentioned, it would certainly be untrue to say that the only accomplishments of this first meeting were in matters of organization. Nevertheless, the majority of those attending were unwilling to run the risk of proceeding too hastily, and they were therefore content for the present to confine their decisions to the organizational field. The meeting in itself constituted an important new development for NATO, and it would be rash at this early stage to predict the ultimate results of this constructive experiment. Yet this first meeting was undoubtedly a success, and there can be little doubt that the contacts established and the increased understanding of different points of view held by parliamentarians from the various countries will bear fruit in future years.

RESOLUTION ON FUTURE MEETINGS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES

THIS MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES:

Recalling that the aim of the North Atlantic Treaty is both to ensure the defence of member countries and to contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of the peoples united within the framework of the Atlantic community;

Considering that achievement of the latter aim would be facilitated by closer relations between the members of the representative assemblies of the different countries and considering that this is particularly desirable in the case of the legislative branches of the member states who have by solemn treaty pledged themselves to the mutual defence and welfare of their respective peoples through the far-reaching initiative in international relations that is NATO;

Believing that these discussions between members and the NATO authorities and between members themselves have already been of great value;

"Invites the Speakers of the various Parliaments concerned, according to the procedure which they think appropriate, to send delegations to a similar meeting each year;

"Expresses the wish that the Governments of the countries here represented facilitate through the NATO Council further meetings;

"Considers further that before we separate a Continuing Committee should be selected composed of the present officers and other members of the Steering Committee, fifteen in number, to include one from each NATO nation and with the right of substitution to make arrangements for the next meeting."

This meeting further considers that such a Continuing Committee would require some secretarial assistance of its own. This should be, for the time being, on a part-time basis. The necessary finance, which should be quite small, should be provided by the participating Governments or Parliaments concerned on a basis to be mutually agreed.

THE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES:

Convinced of the vital need for developing as a matter of urgency the political, economic and cultural bonds now uniting the Atlantic community,

Considering that the solidarity of the Atlantic nations should be used to further their interests both in the Atlantic area and in all other parts of the world,

Invite their governments to explore all possible means of uniting the Atlantic peoples for the dual purpose of resisting all threats of dissension among them and of progressively achieving ever closer unity.



CANADA CONTRIBUTES TO THE EXPANDED PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Dr. R. A. MacKay, left, presents a cheque in the amount of \$1,500,000 (U.S.) to the Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. At Dr. Keenleyside's left is Mr. Bruce Turner, Comptroller of Finance of the United Nations. This sum represents Canada's contribution to this year's expanded programme of technical assistance.

Canada has now contributed \$5,322,727 to the programme since its establishment in 1950.

The San Francisco Meeting

(The Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations)

The full texts of Mr. Pearson's speeches delivered at San Francisco were carried in the July-August issue of "External Affairs". The following is a survey of the speeches made at the tenth anniversary meeting.

There was general agreement in the course of the commemorative meeting on the following points:

- (a) the United Nations is an indispensable organization;
- (b) while in the political field it has been less successful than in dealing with economic, social and humanitarian projects, its record over the first ten years is one of impressive accomplishment;
- (c) because of its flexibility, great hopes are warranted for the future and it should receive full and determined support.

In addition, the various speeches made disclosed some views on the part of many member states as to the operations, procedures, and structure of the organization: an attempt will be made to summarize them in this paper.

A Forum for Solving Disputes

While a good many speakers stressed the point that the United Nations has failed to provide security, it is interesting to note that, for many, the chief purpose of the organization is not so much to provide force to curb aggression as to become a forum where disputes can be solved. Thus Mr. Macmillan states: "the statesmen at San Francisco ten years ago saw that it would be unrealistic to try to fashion the United Nations as a kind of World Government. The world was not ready for that. Nor could it be a sort of projection of the Grand Alliance of war. They saw clearly that if a World Government was not to be set up, the United Nations would have to rely on persuasion, discussion and conciliation in order to settle disputes. For no sovereign state can be compelled by force." The same view was expressed very clearly by Mr. Eban of Israel: "a disservice may have been done to the United Nations by the unrealistic emphasis originally placed upon the coercive powers. We have become a forum for conciliation and not as originally conceived, an instrument for the enforcement of security by collective action." Representatives from Pakistan, the Netherlands, and Lebanon spoke in the same vein.

Except for Mr. Skaug of Norway, who cautioned against a tendency to by-pass United Nations machinery, many spoke in favour of allowing full scope to other forms of adjustment. As long as the principles followed were in harmony with those of the Charter, the outcome could only be favourable to the achievement of U.N. objectives. This line was followed, for instance, by Messrs. Van Kleffens, Macmillan, Munro, Spender and Entezam. There was no inclination, it seems, to suggest that the United Nations should monopolize attempts to promote compromise or substitute itself for older and still useful forms of diplomacy. It was perhaps natural that such a point should be made on the eve of the Geneva meeting.

As could be expected all were agreed that the relative lack of success in the field of security was due essentially to the failure of the larger powers to reach agreement: many speakers applied themselves to this crucial problem and suggested that means had to be found somehow to promote confidence and understanding, to develop, in the words of Mr. Spaak "an international spirit" which would make co-existence possible. Many Western representatives seemed to accept this Communist slogan and to express thus their recognition of the need for "two worlds" to get along together as opposed to the old crusading policy. There was, however, general agreement that the international atmosphere was improving and many supported the views expressed at the outset by Mr. Van Kleffens and by the Secretary-General that the anniversary meeting might make a contribution in this regard.

Regional Security

If the United Nations has not been successful in establishing collective security, it was, nevertheless, recognized that it had made important and significant contributions in this field through the cease-fire agreements, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and, particularly, through intervention in Korea. The discussion centred, however, on the question of regional security and the following features may be of interest:

- (a) many of the NATO Representatives maintained with Mr. Pinay that genuine security could only be provided through regional arrangements;
- (b) both NATO and Soviet representatives made the point that the regional security arrangements, to which they belong, were defensive and fully compatible with the Charter;
- (c) Messrs. Pinay and Dulles drew attention to the fact that regional arrangements provide security even to countries which are not parties to them.

Mr. Dulles in particular stressed that "every one of these arrangements also gives added security even to the non-participants. There is less armament, because multiplication of armament is avoided when the force that protects one equally is at the service of many. Also the military powers and facilities of a coalition tend to become distributed and not within the control of any single nation. In international affairs, as in domestic affairs, the sharing of power is the best safeguard against its abuse."

Reference was often made to disarmament as one problem which offered hopes of settlement and which, if solved, could facilitate the solution of many other issues. In this regard, it was thought that the International Scientific Conference and the proposal for the peaceful development of atomic energy presented most encouraging prospects. If progress could be made in this field, the ground would be prepared for further advances in other directions. The underdeveloped countries were also quite optimistic as to the possibilities for economic expansion inherent in such a scheme.

There was the usual and expected controversy regarding the veto. While a number of countries argued that it should be eliminated or that its use should be restricted, other countries felt that the veto represented a fair compromise

between the ideal requirements and the dictates of realism. (Netherlands). The Soviet bloc representatives claimed that the United Nations should accept the principle of "co-existence" and that this involved the recognition of Security Council unanimity. Thus, according to Mr. Molotov, "the United Nations is inconceivable without the recognition and implementation of the principle of co-existence and joint settlement of international affairs by countries with different social structures, and this finds most vivid expression in the Charter provisions relating to the Security Council." The same point was made by nearly all the satellite representatives; for instance, the Byelorussian stated that "the tendency to sidestep the Charter found expression in attacks on the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council." The repetition of this point in nearly all the Communist speeches suggests that on the issue of sovereignty, the Soviet Bloc may not yet be quite ready inside as outside the United Nations for concessions to the will of the majority.

As to the General Assembly, a few speakers urged the need for more restraint in discussion. Mr. Entezam, in particular, suggested that more energy should be devoted to conciliation, rather than to debate. This was supported by Israel. The South African representative and his colleague from Venezuela were almost alone in condemning United Nations intervention in domestic affairs.

Membership Issue

The membership issue was one of the most popular ones. All felt that the deadlock should be resolved soon and a surprisingly large number of representatives came out in favour of universality. (Pakistan, India, Greece, Indonesia, Peru, Norway, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Venezuela, Cuba). The speeches disclosed acute interest in this matter and suggested that strong pressure will develop at the next Assembly to solve the problem. The Soviet Representatives, as could be anticipated, took the opportunity to urge the admission of Red China.

No very clear indication of a definite trend was disclosed concerning Charter revision. Mr. Macmillan felt that "the United Nations, as it stands today, represents the highest common factor of agreement that is possible among the nations". Mr. Unden (Sweden), while recognizing that the Charter is not a perfect instrument considered that "the Charter as it stands at present does not prevent the United Nations from fulfilling its tasks providing that the member states really wish to act in accordance with the principles of the Charter". Others, the Pakistan Representative for instance, were prepared to consider sympathetically suggestions for revision. Chile had some interesting amendments to suggest but admitted that the time was not yet ripe for Charter revision. No strong and general desire for early revision was expressed at San Francisco.

While most representatives recognized that the best United Nations work had been done in the Social and Economic fields, those from the Asian, African and Middle East countries were unanimous and outspoken in their praise for the operations of the Specialized Agencies and the accomplishments of the organization in promoting social and economic wellbeing. The point is not particularly original, but the references to this subject were so numerous and apparently so deeply felt that from a mere reading of the speeches, it appears

that for many of its members, the United Nations symbolizes very high hopes for social and economic progress both as an end in itself and as a means of eliminating causes of aggression.

The Asian, African, and Middle East Representatives were equally articulate and united in urging progress towards independence for non-self-governing peoples; to them this seemed to be one of the main United Nations objectives and a major means of removing a strong incitement to aggression.

The Asian, African, and Middle East Representatives, as we have just indicated, insisted very much on colonial and economic development issues. Nearly all referred at some length to the Bandung Conference, to the need to enlarge the United Nations membership. In general they expressed interest in the Scientific Conference and in the security and economic implications of the peaceful development of atomic energy.

While the NATO and South American speeches did not follow a particular pattern, the Soviet Bloc generally stressed the need for the United Nations to recognize social diversity, to practice co-existence and therefore to accept the veto; the need to admit Red China into the United Nations; support for the Malik-Molotov proposals; the peaceful character of the Warsaw Treaty. Messrs. Dulles and Pinay answered in very firm terms the usual Soviet charges that tension had been caused by Western war propaganda, rearmament and military bases.

General Agreement Achieved

Many of the speeches made at San Francisco expressed general agreement on the following points, in addition to those outlined in paragraph one above:

- (a) there has been an improvement in the general atmosphere and consequently in United Nations prospects;
- (b) there may be hope for agreement on the key disarmament issue;
- (c) security functions are now being satisfactorily discharged by regional agencies and the United Nations should provide a forum for discussion and act as an agency for conciliation;
- (d) United Nations membership should be increased;
- (e) the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is one of the most encouraging prospects both in its security and economic implications;
- (f) the United Nations should develop its work in the social and economic fields and press on with the emancipation of dependent peoples;
- (g) there was no general feeling that Charter revision should be undertaken as an urgent task;
- (h) except perhaps for those delivered by the Cuban and the Chinese Representatives, most speeches were conciliatory; those made by the Soviet Representatives were still propagandistic and along orthodox party lines.

The Centenary of the Visit of La Capricieuse

A HUNDRED YEARS ago this summer, a corvette of the French Navy, *La Capricieuse*, paid an official visit to Canada. It was the first occasion on which a French naval vessel had entered a Canadian port since the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1763, under which France gave up its claim to New France. Everywhere during their visit to Lower and Upper Canada, the ship's commander, Captain Belveze, and his crew were greeted enthusiastically. Captain Belveze wrote of the voyage up the St. Lawrence River:

The arrival of *La Capricieuse* was known in advance and crowds gathered on the shores to greet it with cheers and bursts of musketry; along the magnificent Ile d'Orleans despite pouring rain, the people—all of French origin—saluted the ship from the shelter of their homes or, braving the inclement weather, ran along the waterfront in order to watch the corvette's passage as long as they could.

On July 8-9, 1955, the centenary of this historic event was marked in France at La Rochelle, Rochefort, Marennes and Brouage in the Department of Charente-Maritime by a series of Franco-Canadian celebrations. *La Capricieuse* had sailed from the port of La Rochelle, the former capital of Aunis which was the home of many of the settlers of New France. Today, Rochefort, is the seat of the maritime prefecture. It is a town of some 25,000 people while La Rochelle has more than 50,000. Marennes is a small town but is known the world over as a centre of oyster-breeding. The romantic, little, walled village of Brouage has a particularly close connection with Canada as the birthplace of Champlain, the founder of Quebec.

Original Idea

The celebrations in Charente-Maritime were the result of the initiative of a number of people in France who were particularly interested in the history of Canada and in the advancement of economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The idea was first put forward by M. Charles Braibant during the visit of the Prime Minister of Canada to the National Archives of France in February 1954. M. Braibant showed Mr. St. Laurent the original report of Captain Belveze and thought how appropriate it would be to commemorate the centenary of the voyage of *La Capricieuse* by organizing an exhibition at La Rochelle of documents and museum pieces bearing on the history of the two countries. As work on the project went forward, it gave rise to plans for other events to mark the centennial including the issue of a special postage stamp.

The opening of the exhibition at La Rochelle and the celebrations throughout Charente-Maritime were attended by the Minister of National Education of France, M. Jean Berthoin. Canada was represented by its Ambassador to France, Mr. Jean Désy, and by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton Gregg, V.C. The programme of the first day of the celebrations included a reception at Rochefort (where the official party was shown the rooms which had been



—ADP
Postage stamp issued by the Government of France commemorating the centenary of the voyage of "La Capricieuse".

occupied by Napoleon before his embarkation for St. Helena), lunch at Rennes and the presentation of the keys of the town to Mr. Désy at Brouage. The second day was spent at La Rochelle where a Franco-Canadian Exhibition was opened by M. Berthoin.

The exhibition comprised 427 items relating to Franco-Canadian history from the discovery of Canada and the settlement and growth of New France to the visit of *La Capricieuse* in 1855. A masterpiece of organization, it included the document by which Francis I granted 6,000 livres to Jacques Cartier in 1532 for his expedition to the St. Lawrence and the marriage contract of Samuel Champlain. There were numerous documents on emigration to Canada and shipping departures from La Rochelle and other ports. The exhibition also illustrated the social customs and economic pursuits of the settlers of New France as well as plans for the defence of the colony and the withdrawal of France in 1760.

The significance of the visit of *La Capricieuse* was described by Mr. Désy at La Rochelle on July 9, 1955, in these words:

When in 1855 a France naval vessel from La Rochelle came to renew official ties between your country and mine, it performed a necessary mission. This symbolic gesture, however, served only to consecrate by deed a spiritual state of affairs that had never ceased to exist. It is this fact of uninterrupted relations on the higher level of the spirit that I wish to invoke in bringing you the fraternal greetings of your Canadian colleagues.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. E. A. Côté reassigned to Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, effective July 1, 1955.
- Mr. D. V. Lapan posted from Canadian Embassy, Washington to Ottawa while on loan to the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, effective July 4, 1955.
- Mr. J. H. Taylor posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions Indochina, effective July 7, 1955.
- Mr. A. B. Roger posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo, effective July 8, 1955.
- Mr. D. B. Wilson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, effective July 9, 1955.
- Mr. P. Reading posted from San Francisco to the Canadian Legation, Helsinki, effective July 11, 1955.
- Mr. R. Duder posted from International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective July 11, 1955.
- Mr. A. C. Smith appointed Canadian Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, effective July 17, 1955.
- Mr. D. M. Cornett posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner, Canberra, effective July 25, 1955.
- Mr. J. W. O'Brien posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective July 28, 1955.
- Mr. S. A. Freifeld posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Mexico, effective July 28, 1955.

The following were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers Grade I:

- Miss E. L. Hill, R. M. Middleton, R. A. Jenness (July 4, 1955); A. O. Guerin (July 18, 1955); A. D. Small (July 18, 1955); J. R. Sharpe (July 21, 1955).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

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| <p>No. 55/23—<i>The United Nations—Review and Preview—1945, 1955, 1965</i>, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at a panel discussion sponsored by non-governmental organizations interested in the United Nations, at San Francisco, June 22, 1955.</p> <p>No. 55/25—<i>The Achievement of Hemispheric Solidarity</i>, an address by the Minister of</p> | <p>National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, to Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y., July 11, 1955.</p> <p>No. 55/27—<i>The Challenge of Inter-Dependence</i>, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the World Convention of Churches of Christ Toronto, August 18, 1955.</p> |
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The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

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| <p>No. 55/24—<i>Development of Industrial Relations in Canada</i>, a speech by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton F. Gregg, made at the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 15, 1955.</p> <p>No. 55/26—<i>Future Plans for Canada's Salk Vaccine Programme</i>, a statement made</p> | <p>by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, July 20, 1955.</p> <p>No. 55/28—An address by the Governor General, His Excellency the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, to the Rotary Club, St. John's, Newfoundland, August 22, 1955.</p> |
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CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A/2902 & Add.1. N.Y. 1955. 37 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 11.

Budget Estimates for Financial Year 1956 and Information Annex. A/2904. N.Y. 1955. 94 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 5.

Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. A/2908. N.Y. 1955. 37 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 16.

Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1954 - 15 June 1955. A/2911. N.Y. 1955. 123 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly. A/2913. N.Y. 1955. 50 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 12.

United Nations Staff Pension Fund. Annual Report of the U.N. Joint Staff Pension Board. A/2914. N.Y. 1955. 25 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 8.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. First Report to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly. A/2921. N.Y. 1955. 40 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 7.

Commission on the Status of Women. Report of the Ninth Session, 14 March - 1 April 1955. E/2727, E/CN.6/271. June 1955. 22 p. ECOSOC O.R.: 20th Session, Supplement No. 2.

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development. E/CN.5/301/Rev.1, ST/ SOA/21. N.Y. 1955. 219 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: 1955.IV.8.

International Tax Agreements. Volume V: World Guide to International Tax Agreements. N.Y. 1954. ST/ECA/SER.C/5, 29 September 1954. 480 p. \$3.00. Sales No.: 1954.XVI.3.

The Population of South America 1950-1980. Future population estimates by sex and age -Report II. ST/SOA/SER.A/21 (Population Studies Series) N.Y., May 1955. 139 p. Sales No.: 1955.XIII.4.

The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in Selected European Countries. ST/SOA/ SD/6. April 1955. 156 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.12.

GATT—Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Third Supplement: Decisions, Resolutions, Reports, etc. of the Ninth Session.

Geneva, June 1955. 296 p. Sales No.: GATT/1955-2.

ICJ—Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court:

May 4, 1955—*Antartica Case* (U.K. v. Chile), 81 p. (bilingual).

June 2, 1955—*Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952* (U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R.) 55 p. (bilingual).

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa 2, Canada.)

Safety in Coal Mines. Volume II: Legislation. Geneva, 1955. 647 p. \$3.50 (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 33).

UNESCO

Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut. The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes by Simon Van Den Bergh. (UNESCO Collection of Great Works, Arabic Series) 2 volumes. Printed at the University Press, Oxford, for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial" and published by Messrs. Luzac & Co. London, W.C. 1. 1954.

Other Men's Ways. UNESCO Programme for Study Abroad. (UNESCO and its Programme—XIII). Paris 1955. 21 p.

Nuclear Energy and its Uses in Peace by Gerald Wendt. (UNESCO and its Programme—XIV). Paris 1955. 76 p.

Bibliography of Monolingual Scientific and Technical Glossaries by Eugen Wuster. Volume I: National Standards. (Documentation and Terminology of Science). Paris 1955. 219 p. (Bilingual).

Financing of Education. (XVIIIth International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, 1955). 284 p. \$2.00. UNESCO, Paris/IBE, Geneva, Publication No. 163.

Teaching of Art in Primary and Secondary Schools. (XVIIIth International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, 1955). 312 p. \$2.00. UNESCO, Paris/IBE, Geneva, Publication No. 165.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. (Annotation by the Secretary-General) A/2929. N.Y. 1955. 389 p.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the tenth session of the Commission. E/2756, E/ CN.7/303. 8 June 1955.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
".....	Commercial Secretary.....	Melbourne (83 William St.)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Austria.....	Minister (Absent).....	Vienna 1 (Strauchgasse 1)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Forescom Bldg.)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (35, rue de la Science)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
".....	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, Rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	High Commissioner.....	Colombo (6 Gregory's Rd., Cinnamon Gardens)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Avenida General Bulnes 129)
Colombia.....	Ambassador.....	Bogota (Edificio Faux, Avenida Jimenez de Quesada No. 7-25)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida Menocal No. 16)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krakovska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Trondhjems Plads No. 4)
Dominican Republic.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Ciudad Trujillo (Edificio Copello 410)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Calle El Conde)
Egypt.....	Ambassador.....	Cairo (6 Sharia Roustom, Garden City)
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Salisbury (Dolphin House, Union and Moffat Sts.)
Finland.....	Minister (Absent).....	Helsinki (Borgmästarbrinken 3-C. 32)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris xvi (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Ambassador.....	Bonn (Zitelmann Strasse, 22)
".....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Perthshire Block, Olympic Stadium (British Sector) B.A.O.R.2)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 avenue Vassilissis Sofias)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (28, 5a Avenida Sud)
Haiti.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Port-au-Prince (Route du Canape Vert, St. Louis de Turgeau)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
".....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Indonesia.....	Ambassador.....	Djakarta (Djalan Budi Kemuliaan 6)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Israel.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Tel Aviv (Farmers' Bld., Dizengoff Rd.)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Bldg.)
Japan.....	Ambassador.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)
Lebanon.....	Minister (Absent).....	Beirut (Immeuble Alpha rue Clemenceau)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)

Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)
Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza, Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Ayala Bldg., Juan Luna St.)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (31 Ulica Katowika, Saska Kepa)
Portugal.....	Minister (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Lisbon (Avenida da Praia da Vitoria)
Singapore.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room F-3, Union Building)
Spain.....	Ambassador.....	Madrid (Edificio Espana, Avenida de José Antonio 88)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvägen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Ambassador.....	Berne (88 Kirchenfeldstrasse)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (Colonial Bldg.)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (Müdafaai Huduk Caddesi, No. 19, Cankaya)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (Suite 65, Kerry Bldg., 238 Vermeulen St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Bldg.)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok)
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
“ “	Consul General.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Los Angeles (510 W. Sixth St.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	New Orleans (215 International Trade Mart)
“ “	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
“ “	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (443 Congress Street)
“ “	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Seattle (Tower Bldg., Seventh Avenue at Olive Way)
Uruguay.....	Ambassador (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Montevideo (Calle Colonia 1013, piso °7)
Venezuela.....	Ambassador.....	Caracas (2° Piso Edificio Pan-Ameri- can, Puente Urapal, Candelaria)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Proliterskih Brigada 69)
North Atlantic Council.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (Canadian Embassy)
*OEEC.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Representative.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
“ “	Permanent Delegate..... Deputy Permanent Delegate	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Inter-Scandinavian Co-operation

A STRONG sense of kinship among the five northern European countries collectively known as Scandinavia forms the basis of an effort towards international collaboration unparalleled in any part of the free world. The feeling of solidarity which unites the people of Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden is deeply rooted in geography, history and tradition and has led them to close co-operation in nearly every sphere of activity, including economic, social, cultural, technical and political development. Until well into the middle ages Scandinavia was in many respects a homogeneous unit, not split up into five distinct national societies as it is today. This former association is also clearly reflected in present day similarities in the basic political structure, institutions, and outlook in general of the Nordic countries and has contributed much towards making inter-Scandinavian collaboration possible.

There are also of course considerable differences among the Nordic countries which explain why they frequently take individual stands on many practical questions. Mention might first be made of Finland where the language bears no relation to those of the other Scandinavian countries whose languages can be understood by each of their peoples. Although Finland was drawn into the Swedish cultural sphere at an early date the fact that for more than a century this country came under Russian domination and that it only achieved complete independence during the first world war has had some influence on its relations with its neighbours. Iceland, which achieved its partial independence in 1918 and its full sovereignty in 1944, was to some extent hampered in its early endeavours toward co-operation with the other four countries of northern Europe by its remote geographical position. That Norway has shown a greater measure of reserve towards the question of Scandinavian co-operation than Denmark and Sweden can be attributed in part to Norway's prolonged struggle for independence, first against Denmark and later against Sweden, until complete sovereignty was achieved as recently as 1905. These circumstances, however, have in no sense been allowed to detract from the work of furthering common interests between the countries involved and between their people. On the contrary, it can be said that co-operation has thrived on and has been stimulated by these differences.

Forms of Co-operation

In the course of time the Scandinavian countries have evolved a system of co-operation which has continued to grow ever stronger and which has become of increased mutual benefit to the participants. By frequent exchanges of views both at governmental and non-governmental levels each member has been able to profit from the experiences of others, the initiative of one member in undertaking some new programme frequently serving as a pattern for measures subsequently undertaken by one or several of the other members. In many cases co-operation has been organized by the establishment of inter-Nordic bodies of varying character for joint discussion, study and action. As early as 1863, at a Scandinavian national economic congress, problems connected with customs and shipping were discussed. In 1872 the first Scandinavian meeting

of jurists was held and this subsequently became a permanent institution of continuing influence for Scandinavian co-operation in legal matters. In the political field the first contacts were made by the labour movement predominant throughout Scandinavia. Even before the first world war a Scandinavian Co-operative Committee was set up consisting of trade union as well as political representatives. In 1907 a Scandinavian inter-parliamentary union was founded and, shortly after the First World War, the "Norden" Societies were established. The declared aim of these societies was "to deepen the feeling of relationship between the Nordic countries, to extend their cultural and economic connections and to promote collaboration among them". The origin of this idea was the intimate political and economic co-operation which had developed during the war and the desire of those who had been responsible for it—professional men, politicians and trade union leaders—to seek to maintain this co-operation and to direct it into new channels. In this manner the Norden associations which were set up in all of the Scandinavian countries exercised considerable and enduring influence in the wider work of Scandinavian collaboration.

In Government and administrative quarters also a measure of co-operation developed which at times became extraordinarily intimate, especially when the political situation in the world at large tightened the bonds between the Nordic countries. One of the outstanding features of Scandinavian co-operation has been the informality of its conduct and its attempt to solve practical problems as they have arisen as distinct from establishing organizations with ambitious and far reaching objectives. From time to time the Governments have appointed experts to submit their findings on joint problems, and when the need has arisen departmental heads have subsequently met to discuss common problems. This has applied not least to the Foreign Ministers of Scandinavian countries who for the past three decades have met for discussion at regular intervals not only at home but also abroad during international conferences.

For a long time permanent co-operative committees were unknown to the Scandinavian countries in their attempts towards closer liaison with each other. After the Second World War, however, the time seemed ripe to proceed more ambitiously: gradually joint Scandinavian organs were established which more formally than heretofore were charged with the investigation of various common problems. Joint committees were set up in the fields of social welfare, culture and economic co-operation, while a parliamentary committee was created to investigate the easing of travel restrictions and the establishment of a northern post, telegraph and telephone union. During the period of international tension in 1948 a political-military committee was formed to investigate the possibilities of a defensive alliance between Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Largely because of Norway's unwillingness to enter an alliance which would exclude practical co-operation with other defence groupings of the Western democracies, this plan was abandoned. Its failure, however, did not inhibit further Scandinavian co-operation; on the contrary extra effort was directed towards co-operation in other fields and on the initiative of a group of parliamentarians a Scandinavian Parliamentary Council was set up.

The Nordic Council

Although the Nordic Council was not formally established until 1951 first plans for its creation date back to October 1938 when the then Danish Foreign

Minister proposed the formation of a joint agency for consultation between the northern countries of Europe. The Council as envisaged at that time would have consisted of the Prime Ministers, the Foreign Ministers and certain members of the national legislatures. The Danish proposal met with acceptance from all members except Norway whose representatives were opposed to meetings where members of the Governments would meet regularly with members of the legislatures of the member countries.

Shortly afterwards, the Second World War prevented any further pursuit of the question but the idea of a Nordic Council continued to live in the minds of many Scandinavian legislators. After the war the initiative was again taken by Denmark and at a meeting of the Nordic Inter-Parliamentary Union in Stockholm in 1951 the Danish Prime Minister, the late Mr. Hans Hedtoft proposed the establishment of a Nordic Parliamentary Council. This time the Danish proposal was acceptable to all and immediately afterwards statutes for the new council were drafted. At a later meeting of the Nordic Inter-Parliamentary Union in December of the same year the final statutes were adopted by representatives of all the Nordic countries except Finland which declared that it was not in a position to participate in the activities of the Council. In the spring of 1952 the legislatures of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland sanctioned the participation of their respective countries.

According to its statutes, the Nordic Council is an organ for consultation between legislatures of member states and for the Government of the member states on questions concerning Nordic co-operation. The Council consists of 16 delegates from each of the legislatures of Denmark, Norway and Sweden and five representatives of the Icelandic parliament. The delegates represent various political views and are elected by the particular legislature concerned. Representatives of the Governments take part in the deliberations of the Council but have no right to vote. Provision is made for Finland's entry if and when it expresses a desire to do so.

The Nordic Council usually meets on a yearly basis and may also meet in extraordinary session if any two of the participating Governments or a minimum of twenty members so request. So far the Nordic Council has held three sessions, one in Copenhagen in 1952, a second in Oslo in 1954 and a third in Stockholm in February 1955. Members of the Council have no authority to make decisions binding upon their respective Governments. The Council's scope is limited to that of a forum where new ideas can be launched and where the possibility of putting them into practice can be investigated. It is aimed at co-ordinating the widespread work of co-operation which preceded it in various forms. The work of the Nordic Council is characterized by the attempt to solve practical problems as they arise and to avoid general declarations of aims as well as discussion about the formation of supra-national bodies. At the moment the Nordic Council is the latest step in a gradual development towards closer Scandinavian co-operation.

The question of Finland's possible inclusion in the Nordic Council continues to be a delicate one. Clearly the reason for Finland's desire to remain aloof from the Council is to be found in the hostile attitude towards the Nordic Council so frequently expressed by official Soviet newspapers. Nevertheless changes in the international political climate may produce a change in Finland's attitude. It is interesting in this respect to note that at least two of the candi-



—Norsk Telegrambyras

The Nordic Council assembled in the Norwegian Storting.

dates for the presidency of Finland in elections shortly to be held have openly expressed themselves in favour of their country's membership in the Nordic Council.

Practical Achievements

Through the medium of the Nordic Council and the various other consultative bodies set up over the years, results have been achieved which have all but abolished national boundaries between the Scandinavian countries. However, despite the reaching of agreements calling for co-ordinated legislative action, the full sovereign rights of each member country have been guarded.

The greatest measure of co-operation is probably to be found in the sphere of social services. One of the basic principles of Scandinavian co-operation has always been to grant to all the Scandinavian peoples regardless of nationality complete equality in all of the Scandinavian countries. Thus the authorities of each of the five countries have constantly placed considerable emphasis on the development of a comprehensive system of social welfare through such

machinery as health insurance, pension schemes, unemployment insurance and the like. For instance, a national of one country upon taking up residence in another Scandinavian country may in most cases transfer his insurance benefits to a corresponding insurance scheme there. This arrangement also applies in the case of casual visits by a Scandinavian to any of the other Scandinavian countries.

Social Welfare and Health

The question of co-ordinating social welfare schemes in all five countries under a joint convention has long been the subject of intensive study. Until recently the so-called principle of "reciprocity and refund" was employed and a Scandinavian staying in a Scandinavian country outside his own was entitled only to such benefits as his own country afforded the citizens of the country in which that person found himself—the institutions concerned refunding each others' outlays. On September 15 this year, however, a new Nordic convention on social security was signed in Copenhagen by the five Ministers of Social Affairs. This convention, abandoning the principle of "reciprocity and refund", will grant uniform social benefits to all Scandinavians regardless of their country of origin. Thus visitors, outside their own country, will receive the same social welfare benefits as subjects of the country in which they are visiting regardless of whether or not they would actually receive the same benefits at home. The new convention will include all the more important aspects of social welfare, viz., old-age pensions, workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance benefits, sickness insurance, financial assistance during pregnancy and confinement, and widow's pensions. The ratification of this convention by the Parliaments of the five Scandinavian countries will completely remove the boundaries between them as far as social welfare is concerned. This development is of considerable practical significance as large numbers of Scandinavians have taken up residence in Scandinavian countries other than their own. Recent statistics indicate that more than 30,000 Danes and a slightly larger number of Finns reside in the four other countries (the majority in Sweden) while the comparable figures for Norwegians and Swedes are 15,000 and 10,000 respectively.

The Scandinavian countries have also extended this policy to include medical matters. Scandinavian doctors and scientists have long maintained intimate liaison through the medium of congresses and meetings as well as through Scandinavian periodicals. In the field of public health constant attempts are being made to co-ordinate the various health schemes and, at present, plans are being worked out for the establishment of a joint Scandinavian high school for public health services and another for a joint health service for seamen. Other important work has been undertaken in certain specialized fields, particularly food control and foodstuffs legislation which has brought about satisfactory and positive results. At the present time progress is also being made toward the adoption of a system of joint medical statistics for all Scandinavia.

Co-operation in social welfare and in public health has acquired increased importance since 1954 when an agreement was concluded between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden relating to a joint Scandinavian labour market. This important step was rendered possible because the countries in question all subscribe to a high degree of State control and follow the same basic economic policy in regarding full employment as one of their most important aims. In principle a subject of any one of the four Scandinavian countries

mentioned above can now without any obstacle apply for work in any of the other countries. The question of facilitating arrangements for Scandinavians desirous of establishing business firms in any of the countries is also being closely studied.

The post-war years have witnessed the removal of yet another major obstacle to closer relations between the Nordic countries in the easing of travel restrictions. The need for visas for travel between Scandinavian countries was done away with shortly after the war. This was followed in 1951 by a reciprocal arrangement between Denmark, Norway and Sweden to facilitate the naturalization of nationals of any one country in one of the other countries and in 1952 by the removal of passport restrictions so that Scandinavians today can cross each others' borders with a minimum of formality. Currency and customs problems still present certain difficulties but even here the system has been greatly simplified and attempts are at present being made to abolish passport control even for non-Scandinavians travelling within Scandinavian borders.

In the legal field also a high degree of uniformity has been achieved. This is not only because the Scandinavian countries have a common legal tradition but also because the authorities concerned have consistently endeavoured to adopt similar laws wherever practicable. In commercial law, in personal and family law and in the laws of succession the regulations are more or less uniform. The same applies to laws governing purchase, bonds, cheques, bills of exchange, insurance, power of attorney, trademarks, air traffic and other similar questions. In addition by mutual conventions in the sphere of both criminal and civil law each Scandinavian country recognizes verdicts pronounced in the other countries and gives them binding effect.

Cultural Activities

In the cultural field a similarity in the languages of four of the Scandinavian countries has naturally operated in favour of mutual influence from the elementary stages of education to advanced studies and research. For the same reason a common influence is also to be found in the Arts and in the literature of the whole of Scandinavia. This extends even to Finland where, although the everyday language of the large majority is completely different from other Scandinavian languages, Swedish as a second language is commonly used in official dealings with its neighbours. Concerted effort is constantly directed by each individual country toward educating its people in the history, development and ways of life of each of its neighbours. Joint committees to carry out this work have been established and many misunderstandings and misconceptions of each other, often the source of ill-feeling, have been removed as a result. Through joint periodicals, congresses and the exchange of teachers and professors much has been attained towards the promotion of better and closer understanding between the people of the five countries. To complement the less formal efforts in this direction the Scandinavian Cultural Commission was established a few years ago. This body, made up of members of parliament, senior government officials and prominent personalities in the cultural and scientific fields, constitutes an effective force in the co-ordination of cultural activity and in the planning of scientific and industrial research.

While co-operative organizations are active in all of the fields already mentioned and while far reaching practical results have been achieved, the

same degree of progress has not yet been reached in the very important pursuit of economic integration. Although the business life and economic policy of the Scandinavian countries—especially those of Denmark, Norway and Sweden—have many common features, so far great caution and restraint have been exercised with regard to the creation of an economic unity in Scandinavia. The technical development which has taken place during the last two or three decades has made this question all the more topical. In some respects the Scandinavian countries separately constitute units which are too small to compete effectively in the international market. After the Second World War, therefore, a joint Danish, Norwegian, Swedish air line company—the Scandinavian Air Lines System (SAS)—was set up as the three countries concerned realistically considered that they would be unable as separate units to operate effectively on an international basis. SAS operates not only on an inter-Scandinavian service but also conducts scheduled flights to five continents using the most modern equipment maintained with typical Scandinavian thoroughness. Recently SAS has gained the distinction of pioneering a trans-Polar route and establishing a regular service over the North Polar regions terminating on the west coast of North America. The enviable reputation which this enterprise has attained in all its operations during its relatively brief history offers a unique example of Scandinavian business co-operation.

Customs Union

After the establishment of the Nordic Council the idea of a joint market or customs union between the same three Scandinavian countries loomed larger as a measure of practical politics. A joint committee of the three countries was set up under the direction of a cabinet minister from each country for the purpose of investigating the possibilities of a closer economic unity and of submitting proposals to that end. While Denmark and Sweden are keen to see the idea of a joint market realized as quickly as possible, Norway's attitude is one of considerable reserve and possible apprehension. The Norwegians are more inclined towards a restricted form of economic co-operation to apply for instance to individual Scandinavian joint projects than to favour an unlimited type of joint market. This point of view stems not only from purely political reservations but also from the fact that Norwegian economic life in many respects, and not least as a result of the Second World War and its attendant occupation of the country, has not been so highly developed and is consequently not so competitive as that of Denmark and Sweden. This applies especially in the realm of secondary industries.

Co-operation on the purely political and international plane must be determined to a large extent by the different situations facing each of the five Scandinavian countries. Finland has its special relations with the Soviet Union to consider, Denmark, Iceland and Norway their membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Sweden its neutrality. Finland is not a member of international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and OEEC. In these organizations, however, intimate co-operation exists between the countries of Scandinavia and almost invariably a common policy is pursued regarding the more important problems which arise. The

(Continued on page 272)

After Geneva: a Greater Task for NATO*

By the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson

THE "summit" at Geneva seems to have been a more comfortable and relaxing place for a meeting than "summits" often are. The results achieved there have been rightly hailed throughout the world as marking the beginning of an effort by the leading nations of the two power blocs to adjust by discussion and negotiation their conflicts of national interest and ideological difference which have divided and distressed the world during the last decade.

This conference, however, was not an end but a beginning—though a good beginning—and it would be foolish, perhaps dangerous, to draw premature and exuberantly optimistic conclusions from it. Peace will not be achieved by one or even by two or three meetings at the "summit", but by many meetings and much hard, constructive work at lower levels. This work, which is one of negotiation, and is now well launched by top statesmanship, remains to be carried on through day-to-day diplomacy. It will be conducted, one may hope, without all of the fanfare and publicity which unavoidably and, no doubt, rightly attended the conference at Geneva. While it is important to relate the results and implications of the Geneva meeting to the current international situation, it is even more important to decide the right course to follow in the new and warmer international climate which the conference has generated.

The Geneva talks have a special and immediate significance for NATO. The Atlantic organization, indeed, is involved in terms of both cause and effect. The collective strength—political and military—which we have developed in NATO was perhaps the most important of the international forces which made the recent discussions possible; just as the growing realization by Soviet as well as by Western leaders of the dread risks and consequences of nuclear warfare made them essential.

A Major Deterrent

It is indisputable that NATO's collective strength has been a major deterrent against aggression in Europe. Without NATO, and the united defensive purpose which it represents, the successors to Stalin might not have gone smilingly to Geneva to join in the effort to diminish the risk of war and to lighten the crushing burden of armaments which Stalin's threatening policies placed on many peoples, including his own. NATO, which was brought into being primarily in response to the fears aroused by overwhelming Soviet military force used as the spearhead for Communist expansion, will obviously be affected profoundly if the threat from that force has, or appears to have, diminished.

The adjustment of conflicting national interests between the big Powers which we hope has now begun is, of course, entirely in accord with the principal, persistent and permanent objective of NATO: to prevent war without sacrificing the freedom and security of its members. Our long-term aim remains

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to eliminate altogether the use of force for national purposes by establishing the general collective security system intended by the United Nations Charter and by operating through the world organization. But only when that is accomplished can NATO, as a security agency, safely "wither away" like the state in a pure Communist society. (The analogy is a somewhat discouraging one). So long as fears and ambitions and aggressive ideologies result in the division of the world into power blocs, and thereby make a universal system of collective security unattainable the prevention of war through a regional security system based on the unity and defensive strength of its members is the best way open to us; and it is entirely consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

Danger Must be Reduced

No person, no nation, no group of nations can view with comfort, however, the prospects for a world where peace rests primarily on the deterrent effect of collective military strength and regional political unity. That discomfort becomes deep anxiety in the face of the fantastic development of nuclear weapons and their inclusion in the armament of a few big Powers now, and of many other Powers soon. This makes it more than ever necessary, while maintaining military strength, to put forth every possible effort to reduce the danger of war and gradually make such strength unnecessary. In all the long story of mankind, arms alone, however powerful, have never been sufficient to guarantee security for any length of time. Your strength for defence becomes the weakness of those against whom you feel you must be ready to defend yourself. Your security becomes their insecurity. So they in their turn seek safety in increased arms. A vicious circle commences which in the past has caused untold misery and destruction and might now, if we cannot cut through it, cause mankind's extinction. Even adequate collective force for defence, then, is no final solution. It is merely a means to an end—peace based on something more enduring than force.

Furthermore—and this must increase our anxieties in the nuclear age—it is more difficult under conditions of fear and mounting international tensions for governments to distinguish between real and apparent threats to their vital interests. The frightened man is usually the most trigger-happy. This consideration makes it all the more necessary to reduce tension in order to avoid a war caused by accident or miscalculation.

Paradoxically, the growing realization of what nuclear warfare means in terms of global destruction has already created what many consider to be the greatest deterrent to war. It has also been one of the major impulses which brought about Geneva; and it may lead us still further on the road to peace. The knowledge that any aggression might bring about total war, that all-out aggression would certainly do so, and that the aggressor could not hope even through massive surprise attack to escape nuclear devastation himself, has inevitably had a sobering effect upon the conduct of international relations.

When the use of nuclear weapons could bring global catastrophe, a special responsibility rests upon the Powers possessing them to exercise restraint in the conduct of their foreign policies and self-denial in using threats of force. They are called on to make a supreme effort to adjust conflicts of national interest so that these do not lead to war. Negotiations such as those at Geneva

should serve to increase the awareness by the nuclear Powers of this special responsibility to resolve their conflicts not only in their own interests but in those of the international community as a whole. That is another reason why the members of NATO join with all other peaceful nations in welcoming such negotiations.

That welcome, however, should not lead us into wishful but unrealistic thinking and happy but premature conclusions. Diplomatically, it is true, we seem now to be out of the trenches and manoeuvring in the open. This discloses hopeful possibilities of victories for peace. But it also has its dangers, inherent in any fluid situation. Now more than ever we shall need imagination and caution in the right balance. Above all, in this warmer climate of today we shall need to be resolute against the temptation to relax our vigilance or abandon our defence efforts. Until the underlying conflicts between the two power blocs are peacefully resolved—and that has not happened yet—nothing could be more dangerous than to yield to such a temptation. NATO has assumed special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security. The discharge of them has never required that we should brandish our arms. They do require, however, that we should not now discard them and thus give grounds to any potential aggressor for believing that it might be safe to take risks with peace.

Re-examine NATO Strategy

Refusal to weaken our NATO strength does not mean, of course, that we should not re-examine in NATO the strategy which determines the use and purpose of that strength. This has, I think, become increasingly necessary as conditions have altered since the NATO pact was signed. Various experts have recently pointed out that there is now virtually an atomic stalemate and that this, along with the over-all balance of power which it represents, is now the main protection for Western Europe. If so, then NATO strategy which has tended to emphasize the importance of large conventional forces on the European continent, should be looked at again.

No one would deny the value of such forces and the desirability on both political and military grounds of including North American contingents among them. But equally important in European defence and as a deterrent against aggression is the protection of the centers on the American continent from which atomic retaliation—if it ever has to be used—must come. For this reason, North America in a very vital sense may be a NATO center of as great importance to the defence of Europe as any defence line or barrier on that continent itself.

Until the present improvement gets beyond the atmospheric, at all events, until we are sure that it is not merely designed to remove apprehensions of conflict without removing the sources of the conflict itself, any weakening of our strength and unity would be no service to peace. Let us try to distinguish, though it will not be easy, between the real product of hard bargaining and diplomatic negotiation, and a gambit in psychological warfare.

The current Four-Power negotiations themselves provide the best means we have had in many years for testing how real the apparent change in Soviet international policies may be. They also give the Soviet leaders the same oppor-

tunity to test the words and attitudes of Western leaders. This alone would make these negotiations desirable and worthwhile. Up to the present, however, conflicts of interest and policy have not been settled and the basic security of the West has not improved. The problems facing the Big Four—and all of us—have been identified and clarified but they have not been solved. If I may switch to a meteorological metaphor, the dampness has disappeared but the cold remains—even though we don't feel it so much! It would be premature in these circumstances to discard our "woollens" but permissible to look forward to the day when, perhaps, it might be safe to do so.

There is another important question related to the above. If the current relaxation of international tension, based mainly on a realization of the completely new dimensions of nuclear warfare and its consequences, is interpreted to mean that war is now unlikely, or at least far less likely, what effect will this have on NATO and the relations between its member countries?

Stronger Bond of Unity

For one thing, it will strengthen the temptation, which I have mentioned, to relax our collective and individual defence efforts—and save a lot of money! As the direct military threat may seem to recede, the fear of aggression which brought NATO into being in the first place will lessen. With that, it must be admitted, NATO will lose much of the cohesive force which still holds it together. There are those who are counting on this. These dangers to NATO must be faced. Defence strength and unity must be maintained yet we may not have for this purpose the same incentive which we have had before. We must, therefore, develop a stronger bond of unity than a common fear. If the challenge of the Communist nations to our free institutions should take new forms, avoiding tactics and policies which risk nuclear devastation NATO should in its turn, while maintaining whatever collective military defensive strength is necessary, develop new impulses for unity and community.

NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being. A renewed emphasis on the non-military side of NATO's development would also be the best answer to the Soviet charge that it is an aggressive, exclusively military agency, aimed against Moscow. One way in which NATO might pursue this objective would be to initiate consultations from time to time on the economic policies of its members, just as we now hold frequent consultations—to great mutual advantage—on foreign and defence policies. It might also be found useful to consult together informally but frankly on matters normally dealt with in their international bodies, not with a view to the adoption of a common NATO policy—which would be undesirable as well as impracticable—but in order to develop a better understanding of each other's policies and to avoid conflict between those policies and the interests of the broader international community.

NATO, then, while resisting the temptation to weaken its collective defence effort merely because of the warmer post-Geneva climate, must also broaden and deepen the basis of association of its members in non-military fields. It must prove to those who profess to fear that it is aggressive that it has no other purposes than defence and no greater interest than the resolution of serious international issues in such a way as to bring about genuine security.

One such issue is the conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over the right of a reunified Germany to associate herself with the West through membership in NATO—if her people freely decide so to do. Now Soviet policy in Europe since the war has clearly been designed and stubbornly enforced to prevent any German settlement which would permit the alignment of a rearmed Germany with the Western Powers. This policy was presumably based on the premise that the addition of German military, political and economic power to the side of NATO would prove a serious threat to Soviet security, as well as adding substantially to the means at the disposal of the Western alliance to resist direct and indirect pressure.

Compromise Through Negotiation

Surely under the overriding necessity of avoiding a war in which both sides have enough atom bombs to knock each other out, a way will be found to settle even such an important conflict of interest as exists in Germany by seeking a compromise through negotiation—a compromise in which the claims of German unification can be reconciled with those of Soviet and European security. Such a compromise cannot be found, however, in the determination of the Soviet Union and its friends to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO and drive its overseas members out of Europe. About that there should be “no possible, probable shadow of doubt, no possible doubt whatever.” NATO can safely disappear as a security agency only when these functions are absorbed by a United Nations which is able to guarantee the security of each by the collective action of all.

Is what the Soviet Government fears most about Germany her potential threat in the future rather than the actual political and military measures authorized under the limiting and restrictive clauses of the London and Paris agreements? If so, assurances and guarantees could be worked out which should serve to remove any such fears. These safeguards might cover such matters as Germany's eastern borders and the level, deployment and equipment of NATO and anti-NATO forces in Central Europe. There is room for negotiation, for bargaining, if you will, over reciprocal concessions of this kind—provided it is clearly understood that both Germany and the other members of NATO are free to choose the kind of international association they require for the collective protection of their security.

In order to make the necessary safeguards reasonably acceptable in Moscow, the Soviet Government will have to be persuaded that the participation of a united Germany in NATO and in the Western European union is not, and will not be, a spur to German aggression, but, on the other hand, represents an effective means of limiting German power and controlling German action. The fact is that NATO, in its expanding network of relationships, in its developing consultative machinery, does exercise such a limiting and controlling influence on the activities, not merely of any one but of all of its members. In this case there is indeed more safety in our numbers even for the other side!

Is it beyond the capacity of our diplomacy to convince the new leaders of Russia of this—that a united Germany in NATO would be a defensive and defensible solution to the German problem, preferable in every way to an independent, armed Germany free-wheeling in the center of Europe, or to a Germany divided in a manner which cannot be permanent but which while it lasts frustrated European security or stability?

Moreover, if the Soviet Union were successful in destroying NATO through its German policy or in some other way, would that really add to Soviet security? On the contrary, it would increase tensions between the two great super-Powers by driving the United States, unweakened in its nuclear strength, but now more resolute and determined than ever to maintain that strength, behind its continental ramparts. From that position its capacity to retaliate with overwhelming power would still be great, indeed decisive. But there would also be a more intense and fearful feeling that such capacity might have to be used.

Would the Soviet Union feel more secure with that situation than with one where the United States and Germany were grouped with other states in a defensive NATO arrangement of checks and balances? If Moscow, however, clings to its own solution of the German problem, if it insists on remaining implacably hostile to NATO, determined to do everything it can to break it up, then it will indeed be difficult to convert the "spirit of Geneva" into constructive and lasting diplomatic achievements at the forthcoming meetings "below the summit".

Sense of Proportion and Sober Realism

These views may seem pretty dark in the light of the new hopes and relaxed tensions of recent weeks. They are not meant to be so. Nothing will be gained, however, and ultimately much may be lost by nourishing illusions that Geneva has solved our problems, that the dangers to peace dissolved when four men smiled into 40 cameras. A sense of proportion and sober realism in the months ahead will be more useful than premature hosannahs in ensuring that the progress recently made is continued until we find a peace that is something better than mere coexistence.

We have had concrete evidence, and we can rejoice in it, of a greater willingness on the part of the Soviet leaders to negotiate over conflicting issues. This is a situation which we have always hoped to bring about because there is no tolerable alternative method of settling disputes in the nuclear age. But this does not necessarily mean that the basic long-term aims and policies of the Soviet leaders have changed. Nor have those of the West.

It will be well also to remember that the huge Soviet military capability remains intact, and well-tried Communist techniques of political infiltration and subversion are still readily available for use. Nor is there much evidence as yet that the extension of Communist control over other countries by non-military means as opportunities offer has been renounced. It is to be hoped that convincing evidence of this kind will soon be forthcoming. Otherwise there is bound to be an ultimate limitation on the final degree of *détente* which we can expect in the relations of the West with the U.S.S.R.

In all these circumstances, I repeat, it would be folly for NATO not to remain on guard, strong and united. It used to be said that "eternal vigilance is the price of freedom." In the nuclear age it is the price of survival. NATO should at the same time avoid any provocation in action or attitude that might seem to substantiate any possible feeling that it is an aggressive threat to those whose policies and actions actually brought it into being in the first place. One way to remove this feeling would be to convince the Soviets that we realize that armed strength is relative; that a reduction of armaments which is general and equitable does not decrease anybody's strength, but *does* increase every-

body's security—provided, of course (and this is a vital proviso), that there is confidence in the effectiveness of the arrangements to ensure that the undertakings given are being carried out.

Limitation of armaments is a cause which all men of good will can support, but we must be wary of proposals which would be unfair and unbalanced in their effect. We must remember also that there can be no effective and general disarmament until some measure of security and trust has been established. And let us not forget that even if arms are reduced, if security is increased, if the cold war thaws away in the sunshine of Geneva, there will remain certain basic conflicts between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The task of statesmanship will remain: the resolution of these conflicts without war.

Competitive Co-existence

Let us also remember that if we are approaching peaceful co-existence, it will be also competitive co-existence. In this competition, which is not new but may now gain new emphasis, NATO and its individual members will have to show that their system of free society is not only militarily defensible but does more for the individual than Communism can ever do. Ultimately it is on this test that NATO—and the non-Communist world—will succeed or fail. To ensure success, expanding economies, full employment, social justice and welfare and the freest possible international trade will count as much as atom bombs and jet aircraft.

In this marshalling and collective employment by NATO of its non-military as well as its military resources, NATO's influence will extend beyond its immediate membership. It covers, of course, only a limited geographical area. But it includes the most powerful nations of the West which have world-wide interests and responsibilities. Thus, inevitably, NATO impinges on the rest of the world. Its members have the right to hope that their motives and policies will not be misunderstood or misinterpreted, even (or possibly especially) by those who may feel, sincerely and for reasons which seem to them convincing, that regional security systems of any kind do not make for peace.

May I conclude by summarizing what is, in my opinion, the best course for NATO to follow after Geneva? The Atlantic organization must become more flexible. It must adapt itself to meet the new challenges which will come if happily we enter a period of peaceful but competitive co-existence, and its member governments will have to use it more for that purpose. This is no time for NATO to weaken or limit itself. On the contrary, it should redouble its effort to fulfil the full promise of the Atlantic Pact. It has already proved to be an effective agency for organizing defence co-operation to meet a military threat. It must now develop greater cohesion and co-operation among its members in the pursuit of common political, social and economic objectives.

Increased consultation within NATO is essential in order to ensure that NATO unity will not melt away under the warming rays of Big Four cordiality. It is not surprising that in foreign and defence policy more has been done in this regard than in other fields. If countries are pledged to stand by each other if any one is attacked it is to be expected that they would consult together about policies which might result in such attack. But the maintenance of expanding economies and healthy social structures must surely be regarded as being as much a common interest of all members as the maintenance of com-

mon defence measures. Harmony between the governments in the economic and social field is, therefore, almost as essential as is co-ordination of foreign and defence policies.

We need not only to persuade our own membership of the continuing value of the organization for maintaining the collective force which our security requires; we must also be convinced of its value as a vehicle for developing those closer political, economic, cultural and social relations which can give greater vitality both to the Atlantic community and to the broader community of the United Nations. To the world as a whole we have to prove that our hopes and plans for an enduring peace envisage more than a reliance upon the fear of nuclear devastation. We have to demonstrate in action the worth of NATO as an effective international organization based upon democratic principles and as the guardian of our "freedom, common heritage and civilization" when matched against the Communist bloc in the competitive co-existence which lies ahead. This will be a time of severe tests for NATO. If it fails to meet them, far more than NATO will suffer.



—United Nations

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE 10th GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Canadian Representatives to the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly are, left to right: the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Paul Martin; Minister of National Revenue, Mr. J. C. McCann and Vice-Chairman; Mr. Michael Starr, Parliamentary Observer; Lt. Col. O. Gilbert, Alternative Representative; and Mr. M. Breton, M.P., Parliamentary Observer. (Second row) Mr. Marshall A. Crowe, Department of External Affairs, adviser; Mr. J. W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. P. Conroy, Alternate Representative; Senator G. J. Turgeon, Representative; and Senator W. M. Wall, Alternate Representative.

Canada and the United Nations

Tenth Session of the General Assembly

THE Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of the General Assembly, which opened in New York on September 20, is as follows:

Representatives

- Hon. Paul Martin, M.P., Minister of National Health and Welfare (Chairman of the Delegation)
- Hon. J. J. McCann, M.P., Minister of National Revenue, succeeded by the Hon. Roch Pinard, M.P., Secretary of State.
- R. A. MacKay, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York
- Senator J. G. Turgeon, Vancouver, B.C.
- Mrs. Jack Houck, Brampton, Ontario.

Alternate Representatives

- W. G. Weir, Member of Parliament for Portage-Neepawa, and Senator W. M. Wall, Winnipeg, Manitoba (in succession).
- Maurice Breton, Member of Parliament for l'Assomption-Montcalm.
- Lt. Col. Oscar Gilbert, president of the newspaper "Le Soleil", Quebec, Que.
- J. W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- Patrick Conroy, Labour Attaché, Canadian Embassy, Washington.

Advisers for the Delegation are drawn from the Department of External Affairs, from the Department of Finance and from the Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations in New York.

Elections

Jose Maza of Chile was elected President of the General Assembly, receiving all 60 votes cast. He succeeds Dr. Van Kleffens of the Netherlands.

The following committee chairmen were elected by acclamation for the tenth session of the General Assembly:

<i>First Committee</i>	Sir Leslie Munro.....	New Zealand
<i>Ad Hoc Committee</i>	Prince Wan Waithayakon.....	Thailand
<i>Committee 2</i>	Ernest G. Chauvet.....	Haiti
<i>Committee 3</i>	Omar Loufti.....	Egypt
<i>Committee 4</i>	Luciano Joubanc-Rivas.....	Mexico
<i>Committee 5</i>	Hans Engen.....	Norway
<i>Committee 6</i>	Manfred Lachs.....	Poland

The seven Vice-Presidents elected, all on the first ballot, were the following: Ethiopia, France and United States, with 53 votes each; the United Kingdom, with 52 votes; the Soviet Union, with 50 votes; Luxembourg, with 49 votes and China with 41 votes.

Chinese Representation

Shortly after the opening of the meeting, the representative of the U.S.S.R. raised the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. He submitted a draft resolution whereby the General Assembly would decide "that the representatives of China in the General Assembly and in the other organs of the United Nations are the representatives appointed by the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic". The representative of the United States immediately proposed that the question of Chinese representation be deferred for the duration of the tenth session during the current year. The United States proposal was adopted by a roll-call vote of 42 in favour (including Canada), 12 against (Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Indonesia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia) and 6 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen).

Statement by Mr. Martin

The general debate in the Assembly opened on September 22. The Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Paul Martin, delivered his address at the 8th Plenary Meeting on Monday afternoon, September 26. Following is the full text of Mr. Martin's speech:

As one who is participating in this debate at a comparatively early stage, may I offer the warmest congratulations of my delegation on your election to the high office of President of this tenth General Assembly. May I also assure you of our complete co-operation in carrying out your difficult and important task. Three years ago, at the seventh Assembly, Canada's distinguished Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. L. B. Pearson, was privileged to occupy the Presidency and, for this reason, we have special reason to know how onerous, yet satisfying, these duties can be.

Through you, Mr. President, I should also like to acknowledge our great debt of gratitude to your able predecessor, Dr. Van Kleffens, who presided with such distinction over our deliberations last year.

I am sure that every member of this Assembly was grieved to learn over the past weekend of President Eisenhower's sudden illness. We welcome today's news that he is progressing satisfactorily and we join the American people in wishing him a complete and speedy recovery. As

the great leader of a peace-loving nation, President Eisenhower symbolizes all that is best in the ideals of this Organization. Despite the enormous burden of responsibility which he must carry, his far-seeing wisdom and sober council have been a constant source of encouragement to all peace-loving peoples. I know that I speak for every delegate to this Assembly when I express the fervent hope that President Eisenhower will soon be restored to sound health.

All of us gathered here are, I know, acutely aware of the extraordinary importance of this tenth session of the General Assembly. Ten years ago the golden gates of San Francisco, where we signed our Charter of Peace, seemed to open on the bright vista of a future free from conflict. And then the gates to that future suddenly narrowed and a war-weary world has had to live through a decade of division and difficulty.

But once again, ten years later, we are given a fresh opportunity to establish here, on this Island of Manhattan, a new beach head of hope.

So much has been said here and elsewhere about the new atmosphere and the new spirit abroad in the world that I hesitate to speak of it again. Indeed, there is perhaps a danger that the vitality will be squeezed out of this so-called Geneva spirit if it becomes no more than a stale phrase, a muddy conception trotted out to bemuse us, to befog the hard issues we still face, or to cover a multitude of sins—whether of omission or commission.

This would be a pity, because I believe there is something which can come alive if it is only nourished. If it is too early to say that confidence has been re-established—or perhaps one should say “established”, for international confidence would be something quite new in the history of the world—one can at least say that there is evident a search for confidence, a struggle for mutual understanding which did not exist before.

Gap Closing

It seems to my delegation that, in the dark years through which we have passed, it was not so much the matters at issue which created a sense of frustration and despair but the absence of any real anxiety to solve them. What encourages us most now is not that the issues have been solved—although the gaps are closing—but that the leaders of the great powers in particular now seem to be seeking to define the issues and to understand and, if possible, to meet each other's objections.

This may seem to be little enough in the way of progress, but it is a beginning in the right direction. Our very processes of thought have become corrupted by the deadening spirals of propaganda and counter-propaganda in this forum and in lesser councils. So deeply have we been mired, that this evidence of simple honesty and sincerity in our dealings with one another seems in the nature of a fundamental regeneration.

Confronted by the appalling spectre of disaster, the world has sobered up in the nick of time.

At least, we trust that it has. We cannot yet be sure. The test is whether those who bear the chief responsibility for debauching international relations by the manip-

ulation of truth for their own purposes and the denial of civilized ethical traditions have finally renounced their old habits and methods. Unhappily, during the brief history of this organization, appeals to the mind and conscience of the peoples of the world, which is the rightful work of the United Nations, have too often become a sordid effort to trick and seduce mass opinion.

No Time for Recrimination

This is no time for recrimination. However it is still a time for caution. I do not suggest that one state or one group of states bears the full responsibility for lowering the standards and frustrating the achievements of the United Nations. Propaganda has inevitably been matched by counter-propaganda which has mistakenly aped the technique of the opponent.

It seems to us that the most hopeful augury for this session then is the fact that both here and in such important organs of the Assembly as the Sub-Committee on Disarmament there is evident the desire to state as straight-forwardly as possible positions sincerely held rather than to establish propaganda positions or to score debating points. If we carry on in this way, there is no limit to what we can achieve in the United Nations.

What I have said is, I assure you all, said in humility. There is no cause for smugness on the part of any member or group of members. Nor is it just for us to blame all our errors on the great powers and simply demand that they change their ways. It is the great powers themselves, and particularly those at their summit who met last July in Geneva, who have set us an example and who have given us cause to talk about a new spirit and to hope that it may extend. We must all acknowledge as we do, I'm sure our great debt to those leaders who, have looked squarely at the appalling, brute facts of life and decided that man must not be allowed to extinguish himself when he could be saved by the use of human intelligence.

This, it seems to my delegation, is the challenge of the present Assembly.

The great powers have pointed the way to the relaxation of tension. It behooves

the General Assembly to respond to that situation. We must match their moderation and restraint with moderation and restraint. We must seek to match their realism with constant recognition of the complexity of the problems we face, of the fact that truth is unfortunately not revealed to one of us alone, and of the infinite amount of patience which progress requires.

Disarmament

There is no doubt that the question of the reduction of armaments and the control of their use is the subject on which the achievement of peace and the dissipation of tension most depend. Here we are more hopeful than at any time in the past ten years, although by no means unaware of the enormity of the problem yet to be solved.

As a nation associated with the Big Four in the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, I feel that my country in a sense speaks not for itself alone, but for many other nations within and outside this organization. From the outset, we have been particularly conscious of the terrifying responsibility which rests on the great powers on whom the peace of the world primarily depends. One wrong decision for them could mean disaster not only for them but for us all. I say this in recognition of the awesome potentialities of present nuclear weapons and without any reference to the even more frightful possibilities the future may hold. We must remember too, of course, that the longer we delay in reaching agreement on disarmament, the greater will be the encouragement to nations not now in possession of nuclear weapons to begin their manufacture.

It is well for all of us to realize then the solemnity of this obligation when we complain or castigate. This is not to say that other powers should refrain from criticism or suggestion. We certainly have not in the past refrained from doing so, on many occasions and we intend to continue criticizing when we think it is justified and making suggestions when we think they might be useful. We trust that during this session all members will have a free opportunity to express their views on a subject which is of as much concern to them as

to the major powers. However, we hope, that these contributions will be as constructive as possible and will bear directly on the dilemmas which I believe the great powers are striving with determination and imagination to solve.

I realize that all of us in this Assembly are fully aware of the difficulties to be surmounted in reaching a general agreement on major reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The reductions and prohibitions must be so co-ordinated and scheduled that no nation, at any stage in the process, will have genuine cause to fear that its security is endangered. In the course of our Sub-Committee meetings progress has been made towards an agreed position on this most important question of the time-table or schedule of reductions.

However, the whole question of an effective arrangement to guarantee the fulfilment of any undertaking to prohibit atomic weapons must now be considered in the light of the fact, admitted by all concerned, that secret evasion of any agreement for total prohibition of atomic weapons would in the light of present knowledge be possible, however stringent the control and inspection might be. It was partly in order to meet the difficulties on this key problem of control and inspection that a number of new proposals were advanced at the Geneva meeting.

New Proposals

Premier Faure of France suggested a plan involving budgetary checks on reduction in defence expenditure and the use of savings resulting from disarmament for assistance to under-developed countries. Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom, with his great experience in international matters, suggested a preliminary pilot project which would give us useful practical experience in the mechanism of inspection and control. Premier Bulganin of the U.S.S.R. put forward a plan in almost the same terms as a proposal made by the Soviet delegation in the Sub-Committee. This Soviet plan incorporates some important advances on the question of control, although in the view of my Government the provisions for inspection and control are still inadequate.

Exchange of Blueprints

Finally, at Geneva, President Eisenhower suggested a step, which might be taken immediately, a step taken to eliminate the possibility of a major surprise attack and to prepare the way for a general disarmament program. Such an agreement would certainly be more easily attainable if we could first remove the overhanging threat of surprise attack. My Government has expressed its great interest in this plan; a plan put forward by the President of the United States for the exchange of military blueprints and for mutual aerial inspection. To us that plan is a gesture of faith and imagination typical of a great man and of his country. We in Canada know the Americans well and, although we often disagree with them, it never occurs to any of us to doubt the fundamental goodness and sincerity of their intentions. And so we were particularly happy to hear Mr. Molotov's tribute to President Eisenhower and we assure Mr. Molotov, as people who know, that his confidence in the sincerity of this American proposal is not mistaken.

I noticed with regret, however, that Mr. Molotov, in his statement in the General Debate on September 23, seems to have misunderstood a comment made by Mr. Dulles the day before on the inevitable connection between a sense of insecurity and fear, on the one hand, and a possibility of disarmament on the other. I would recall to the Soviet delegation that a thought very similar to that expressed by Mr. Dulles occurs in the proposals made by the U.S.S.R. on May 10 of this year in the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee.

In the Soviet proposals of May 10, which have now been circulated to all members as a General Assembly document, we read the following paragraph:

"On the other hand, the cessation of the 'cold war' between States would help to bring about a relaxation of international tension, the creation of the necessary confidence in international relations, the removal of the threat of a new war and the establishment of conditions permitting a peaceful and tranquil life of the peoples. This, in turn, would create the requisite conditions for the execution

of a broad disarmament programme, with the establishment of the necessary international control over its implementation."

And so I say to the Soviet Delegation, is it not clear from this paragraph that the U.S.S.R. also sees the inevitable connection between insecurity and threat of war and the prospects of disarmament?

Not Inconsistent

We think that the President's plan as well as the other proposals made at Geneva are not necessarily inconsistent with the proposals which have already been advanced in the Sub-Committee and on which, after long and difficult negotiations, some degree of general agreement may be in sight. None of these proposals, in our view, need be mutually exclusive. There is no reason why they might not, all of them,—modified perhaps, become steps along the road to disarmament.

And as we see it, it is essential that we start quickly on this road, admitting that there must inevitably be experimental phases while the search for the trust and confidence without which disarmament would be impossible. This search will not be successful unless prior agreement on a system of control has been worked out. This will require an enormous amount of careful study and discussion by our technical and constitutional experts before it can be formulated. It would be unwise, therefore, to expect too early decisions.

I have been the representative of my Government in the Sub-Committee talks since their resumption in New York on August 29 and I would not want to conclude my comments on this subject without a reference to the friendly and co-operative spirit exhibited by all delegations on the Sub-Committee in their relations with one another and in their work on the Committee. It would seem that the members of the Sub-Committee have all seriously determined to reach a practicable and mutually acceptable agreement on disarmament.

Atomic energy seems to come more and more to the front in our discussions. This is not surprising. A revolutionary source of energy has been tapped and the conse-

quences are yet incalculable. The new power at the disposal of man holds the promise of a changed and perhaps easier relationship with his surroundings and the implications of this extend into almost every field.

Atomic Energy

This Assembly will have to deal with a number of items relating directly to atomic energy. In the first place, there is the report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva from August 8 to August 20. This conference has been widely and quite properly acclaimed as a great success, and I think it is a matter of satisfaction to us all that such a conference was organized by the United Nations. I should like to pay a word of tribute to the Secretary-General personally for his part in making the conference a success. In this, as in so many other things, he and the Secretariat have demonstrated their efficiency and imagination. The conference was, indeed, a fitting implementation of the unanimous resolution on international co-operation in developing the peaceful use of atomic energy adopted in the ninth General Assembly. I am confident that this conference will not be a unique and isolated event but that it will be followed by other meetings and developments which will build on the foundation now established for international co-operation in the peaceful development of atomic energy.

Perhaps I may be permitted to recall at this point that Canada has played a not inconsiderable role in the dramatic search that has led to the harnessing of the restless energy of the atom. I will take occasion later when the appropriate items are being discussed in committee to report on our activities in developing industrial and agricultural uses of radioactive isotopes and such medical applications as the use of Cobalt 60 Beam Therapy in the treatment of cancer as well as what we are doing in the field of radiation detection and its health aspects.

The extensive work which Canada has done on the peaceful uses of atomic energy has made it possible for us now to extend assistance abroad. We have recently

arranged to provide the Government of India with an atomic reactor. It has been a source of satisfaction to my country to be able to share our resources in this way with a country to which we are so closely tied in bonds of friendship and partnership. We are happy also that this reactor will benefit our other friends in Asia by reason of the intention of the Indian Government to allow scientists from neighbouring countries to use their facilities.

Desire to Co-operate

It is our desire in Canada to co-operate insofar as possible with the great evolutionary movements in South and South-east Asia. Our admiration for the peoples of these countries has been constantly strengthened by our personal association in the United Nations and the Colombo Plan and more recently with the International Supervisory Commissions in Indochina. I should like to say here a special word for the peoples of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam for whom so many Canadians have come to have a deep respect and affection in the past year and who, we sincerely hope, will soon be able to take their rightful places in our councils. It seems to us quite wrong that so many of these Asian countries have been arbitrarily prevented from joining us here in the United Nations.

If anyone were to doubt the role which the countries of Asia can play in this Assembly he should study the proceedings of that great conference which took place at Bandung last spring. It was an impressive assembly of distinguished representatives of two continents which brought great credit to those who had initiated that conference. It may not be that we would agree with all of the conclusions of the conference, but we pay tribute to the wisdom and the moderation of men who have preserved their perspective and their proportion through times of revolutionary change and passionate conflict. It was a great source of encouragement to those of us who believe deeply that the East and the West can work together for our mutual good.

Admission of New Members

There are, I believe, twenty-one outstanding applications for membership in

our organization and it is the view of my delegation that the continued exclusion from the United Nations of so many nations of the world is a great handicap. I know that in the minds of many delegates there are great difficulties of a legal and constitutional character which hinder the reaching of any practical solution of this problem. We too are concerned and troubled by these difficulties, but we recognize that the political realities must be faced if we are to break the long deadlock on this question.

I am aware that the Great Powers, because of their world responsibility, may show some concern over the application of this or that particular candidate or group of candidates. I am convinced, however, that this should not necessarily lead them to oppose the desire of what I believe is a substantial majority of members of this Assembly for as quick and as broad an advance towards universality of membership as may be possible.

The basic political reality which we cannot ignore is that if this organization is not truly representative of the great majority of the countries of the world it will be unable to make its full contribution to settling problems of the world.

In the view of my delegation, we should all be prepared to examine carefully the possibility of the admission at the same time of a very large proportion of the outstanding applicants. There are, of course, particular difficulties with reference to the admission of countries temporarily divided, but we believe that serious consideration might be given to the early admission of the other applicants.

(At this point I should like to question Mr. Molotov's mathematics. In his address on Friday he referred to 16 applicants. According to the figures compiled by my delegation, if we exclude the divided applicants, there remain 17 candidates. So I say with respect but with much confidence, we hope that Mr. Molotov will look into this question again and find it possible to make this essential correction.)

Charter Review

A particular question which under the terms of the Charter comes now to our

attention is whether a conference should be convened for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.

Unless there appears to be a general desire to hold a Charter review conference at this time we are inclined to think that there would be no particular advantage in pressing for it. On the contrary, there would probably be considerable advantage in convening that conference after the political differences which divide us have to some extent become reconciled. We might well ask ourselves, at this stage, whether the relaxation in tension would be stimulated as a result of a Charter conference. We do not think that the Charter is a perfect instrument, but we do think that, in a better political climate, we can construct on its solid foundation a more effective instrument than we now have.

Whether we decide to review the Charter or not, the Assembly as we see it should consider the useful and timely proposals put forward by the Secretary-General in his Annual Report on the Work of the Organization concerning the greater use which might be made of United Nations machinery in the effort to bring about the relaxation of international tension. These suggestions are clearly consistent with the improved atmosphere in which we meet.

Colonial Questions

At this session we have on our Agenda many of what have come to be called the colonial issues. Some of these were referred to last year by my colleague, Mr. Pearson, as "hardy perennials". And as he so aptly observed, "to insist on discussing the same question seven times in seven years does not necessarily bring us seven times nearer the solution." Of course, some of these items, have more recently made their appearance on the Assembly Agenda.

My country doesn't claim any particular competence in discussing colonial matters, but from past experience we have come to the conclusion that the debates in this Assembly on colonial issues do not always produce useful results and in some instances, I fear, have had harmful effects.

The last thing I want to suggest is that discussion should be stifled to avoid an

objective airing of legitimate grievances. Canada has frequently in the past asserted its belief that the Assembly *should* be allowed to discuss any matter of international concern. We do recognize, however, that there are times and circumstances in which discussion may be neither wise nor helpful.

Many of us I think in this room are politicians and proud. I hope, of our craft and our profession. However varied our experiences, we have all learned that politics is the art of the possible. Much of our art is that of timing. We know that there are some political measures which are not right or wrong in the absolute sense. They are so often right only if they come at the right time. I wish to make this point clear so that we will not be accused of a reactionary attitude towards change and progress or of lacking sympathy for those who challenge the existing order of things. For the fact is that in a great many cases we do not quarrel with proposals for change which come before the Assembly, we question only the time chosen. And our opposition is not absolute or timeless either. We do not want to see the United Nations become like the so-called Holy Alliance which set its face against all reforms by arguing that they were never timely.

Assistance to Materially-Under-Developed Nations:

Among those subjects which can be most usefully discussed at this Assembly are those which are part of the economic and social work of the organization. We have in mind, in particular, questions concerning materially under-developed areas of the world. This is surely a field in which the work of the organization is progressively becoming more efficient and more effective. And we, speaking for Canada do not wish to see this creative work curtailed for there can be no lasting peace so long as ignorance, sickness and poverty are allowed to go unheeded anywhere. We are more than ever convinced that no nation can remain healthy and prosperous in a diseased and bankrupt world. But our dilemma is that some assurance of peace and security is required if all member countries are to make a full contribution

to combatting economic and social ills. Nations which want to assist in the development of less fortunate countries often find that for their own security they must limit that assistance in accordance with the burden of national defence which they must also bear.

This is one more reason why we hope that progress in disarmament will continue to a point where more substantial resources can be released for the great international co-operative project of bringing a better life to all citizens of the nations of the world.

Dependent Peoples and Self-Government:

Perhaps the most complex problems which face us each year concern the progress of the dependent peoples towards self-government and independence. Our responsibilities in this field as an organization are an essential part of our Charter. The Charter envisages an orderly advance in the direction of the desired goals. This is in keeping with the Canadian concept, a concept which is based on our own historical development.

We have learned from our own experience that the art of self-government can best be acquired by the peoples of any race in partnership and collaboration with other established states. It is not in Canada's interest, in the interest of the countries of the United Nations, nor, as we see it, of the administering powers themselves to delay unnecessarily any peoples from enjoying the fundamental rights to which the charter refers, and we agree that the interests of the dependent peoples should not be sacrificed to those of the governing power. We believe on the other hand that it is not in the best interests of the peoples concerned that the achievement of these worthy aims should be brought about precipitately.

We must also recognize the complications which international tension imposes on the orderly development of dependent peoples. There is no doubt in our mind that as international tension decreases, the progress of the dependent peoples towards self-government and independence will increase likewise. It is all the more im-

portant, therefore, that our intervention in this field should contribute to the easing of tension rather than its prolongation.

Conclusion:

These are some of our thoughts on how we might in specific cases meet the challenge of the tenth session of the Assembly. We trust that no one will consider our suggestions unduly restrictive or detrimental to the aims and aspirations of nations which do not consider themselves immediately concerned with the problems to be solved by the great powers.

If we are to agree that the future of the United Nations is inextricably bound up with the achievement of a lasting world peace, we must surely also agree that no effort should be spared and no opportunity lost by the United Nations, both as an organization and as individual member states, to advance the cause of peace. If the great powers can find ways of bringing about an end to the tensions of the past nine years, if they can agree on programmes for disarmament, for greater international co-operation, then all of us should be prepared to move forward in the same direction.

If those aims are achieved—and today our hopes are high—and if both sides involved in other international disputes have concurrently followed the example of the great powers, the prospects for this world organization will be unlimited. There could then be, it seems to us, the real hope of attaining the objectives which have been assigned to the United Nations and which are so much a part of man's universal aspirations. We need more good deeds of the kind already displayed at this Assembly by our Brazilian colleagues when they offered to accept the Korean prisoners who have so long been in the care of the Indian Government.

We have assumed, and I suppose at one time or another most of us have argued, that the United Nations could only be made to work effectively if great power agreement, one of the basic assumptions

of the Charter, could be realized. Today we see signs of hope in that direction. It is, however, as my Government sees it, not sufficient for the United Nations to sit back and wait for the great powers to produce the desired results. The new and encouraging situation in which we find ourselves requires, on the part of every member country a sense of responsibility, a willingness to accept international discipline, and an approach to international issues in a moderate, peaceful and co-operative spirit. Perhaps never before in the short history of this Organization have these requirements been so urgent.

Let me therefore, in full consciousness of the responsibility which is placed upon all of us, urge every delegate to this Assembly to join in seeking the broad objectives I have mentioned and in making the United Nations response to the improved situation which faces us a whole-hearted and substantial contribution to further improvement.

I will conclude by recalling that, two weeks ago this very afternoon, I had the pleasure of visiting the Canadian community of Cobourg in the Province of Ontario and of dedicating a Cairn of Peace erected in commemoration of the first World Ploughing Match held there two years before. I mention this little incident because atop the cairn was a golden plough bearing the finely-wrought inscription: "that man may use the plough to cultivate peace and plenty". A miniature of this trophy, emblematic of the world's ploughing championship, travels annually from one country to another as a messenger of peace and a harbinger of hope and abundance for all mankind. What better symbol could be found for our common hope and for our united determination to help bring about the fulfilment of the ancient Biblical prophecy:

"They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. And nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore."

Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs

THE Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which met in Washington in March 1954, held its second meeting in Ottawa on September 26. The United States was represented by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; Mr. George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Ezra Taft Benson, Secretary of Agriculture; and Mr. Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce.

Canada was represented by Mr. C. D. Howe, M.P., Minister of Trade and Commerce and Defence Production; Mr. J. G. Gardiner, M.P., Minister of Agriculture; Mr. L. B. Pearson, M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs; and Mr. W. E. Harris, M.P., Minister of Finance.

In addition to the members of the Joint Committee, Mr. Douglas Stuart, United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, participated in the discussions.

Symbol of Close Relations

This Committee was established by the United States and Canadian Governments to provide an opportunity for Cabinet members of both countries concerned with economic and trade matters to meet together periodically and review developments of common interest. Its existence symbolizes the close and friendly relations existing between the two countries and is evidence of the interest which each country has in a great number and variety of economic questions affecting the other. Its meetings supplement and reinforce the daily exchanges which take place between official representatives and between private citizens of the two countries.

At this meeting the exchanges of views dealt mainly with general commercial policies and prospects, with progress being achieved in dealing with broad international trade and payment problems, and with policies relating to trade in agricultural products.

The Committee emphasized the importance of encouraging a large and growing volume of mutually beneficial trade between the United States and Canada. They discussed the difficulties which were experienced from time to time in this connection. They shared the view that this trade would develop most satisfactorily as part of a widespread system of freer trade and payments. Such a multilateral pattern of trade would also best serve to sustain relations between the United States and Canada, and between each of them and the many countries with which they are associated throughout the world, on a wholesome and durable basis. The Committee recognized that policies and practices which promoted these purposes were important to the national well-being and security of the two countries.

The Committee noted that, with the high rates of employment and economic activity which had prevailed in most parts of the world, the level of international trade had generally been well maintained during the past year. While some progress had been made in removing restrictions and reducing



—Dominion-Wide

UNITED STATES-CANADIAN TRADE AND ECONOMIC MEETING

Members of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs gather at the home of the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, at the conclusion of the talks. Left to right: Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. George M. Humphrey (U.S.); Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson (Canada); Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles (U.S.); the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent; Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Ezra Taft Benson (U.S.); Minister of Agriculture, Mr. J. G. Gardiner (Canada); Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe (Canada); Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Sinclair Weeks (U.S.); and Minister of Finance, Mr. W. E. Harris (Canada).

discrimination in many countries, there remained however a need for further advances in this field.

It was realized that difficult, although it is hoped temporary, problems existed as a result of the accumulation of large quantities of some agricultural products in several countries. These problems, if not handled carefully, could adversely affect the trade in such products and might also have damaging consequences for international trade generally. The members of the Committee were able to acquaint one another with their views on these matters. It was agreed that in dealing with these problems, there should be closer consultation in an effort to avoid interference with normal commercial marketings.

It was recalled that the initiative for the creation of this Committee had come from conversations between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister St. Laurent in 1953, reflecting the keen desire which both have always shown to improve understanding and strengthen relations between the two countries. At the meeting the Canadian members expressed their deep sympathy with President Eisenhower in his illness and their hopes that he would soon be restored to full health.

INTER-SCANDINAVIAN CO-OPERATION

(Continued from page 252)

result has been to lend added weight to the influence of Scandinavia as a whole in world councils.

Through their fruitful co-operative efforts in so many fields of activity the Scandinavian peoples and their respective Governments have set an example to the rest of the world. What the five nations have attained through deliberate commonsense should provide an inspiration to other nations striving toward the less ambitious yet most desirable goal of peaceful co-existence.



COLOMBO PLAN AID

A brief ceremony was held in Montreal on August 1 to mark the commencement of loading operations of a \$2,500,000 consignment of heavy construction equipment and stores destined for the Warsak hydro-electric power and irrigation project which is to be built by Canada under the Colombo Plan.

With the High Commissioner for Pakistan in Canada, His Excellency Mirza Osman Ali Baig, centre, the Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, left, and Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell looking on, a token shipment of crated goods, labelled with a large streamer "Colombo Plan, Canada - Pakistan" was swung aboard the SS City of Doncaster at Pier 15 shortly after noon.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Major General L. R. LaFleche, Ambassador to Argentina, retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service effective July 11, 1955.
- Mr. D. M. Johnson appointed Canadian Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, effective August 5, 1955.
- Mr. H. O. Moran, Ambassador to Turkey, posted to temporary duty in Ottawa and home leave effective August 10, 1955.
- Mr. J. J. Hurley, High Commissioner to Ceylon, posted to home leave, effective August 25, 1955.
- Mr. O. W. Dier posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Copenhagen, effective August 1, 1955.
- Mr. A. F. Hart posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective August 2, 1955.
- Miss C. S. Weir posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, effective August 2, 1955.
- Mr. R. E. Branscombe posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, effective August 3, 1955.
- Mr. J. G. H. Halstead posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective August 3, 1955.
- Mr. J. A. Cadwell posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, effective August 5, 1955.
- Mr. F. M. Tovell posted from Copenhagen to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective August 8, 1955.
- Mr. G. H. Blouin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective August 8, 1955.
- Mr. W. E. Bauer transferred from the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, to the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, Hanoi, effective August 11, 1955.
- Mr. E. D. Wilgress posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective August 11, 1955.
- Mr. E. G. Smith posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective August 12, 1955.
- Mr. G. W. Charpentier, posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra, to home leave, effective August 13, 1955.
- Mr. E. H. Gilmour posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective August 15, 1955.
- Mr. W. A. MacKay posted from Ottawa to duty outside the Department with the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, effective August 15, 1955.
- Mr. D. V. Smiley posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, Phnom Penh, effective August 20, 1955.
- Mr. L. V. J. Roy posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, for temporary duty, effective August 21, 1955.
- Mr. F. C. Finnie posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective August 23, 1955.
- Mr. J. O. Parry posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Helsinki, effective August 23, 1955.
- Mr. L. Houzer, posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective August 27, 1955.
- Mr. E. P. Black posted from home leave to Ottawa, effective August 29, 1955.

Mr. I. W. Robertson posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective August 30, 1955.

Mr. G. S. Murray posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective August 31, 1955.

The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs:

Miss A. M. Matheson, A. O. Chistoff, D. W. Fulford, (August 2, 1955); Miss M. E. Kesslering (August 8, 1955); J. W. Rogers (August 22, 1955).

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information, done at Paris June 22, 1955.

Signed by Canada June 22, 1955.

Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan, on the one part, and the Government of Japan, on the other part, regarding Commonwealth War Graves in the territory of Japan.

Signed at Tokyo September 21, 1955.

Bilateral

Ceylon:

Exchange of Notes supplementary to the Exchange of Notes of July 11, 1952 for the co-operative economic development of Ceylon.

Signed at Colombo July 5, 1955.

Entered into force July 5, 1955.

Denmark:

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

Signed at Ottawa September 30, 1955.

Israel:

Exchange of Notes respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visa fees.

Signed at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on February 7, August 2 and 15, 1955.

Entered into force September 1, 1955.

Japan:

Exchange of Notes bringing into force as of July 20, 1955 the Agreement for Air Services, signed at Ottawa January 12, 1955.

Signed at Tokyo July 20, 1955.

United States of America:

Agreement regarding Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Supplies and Port Services to Visiting Naval Vessels of either country.

Signed at Ottawa, July 21, 1955.

Exchange of Notes bringing into force as of July 21, 1955 the Agreement for co-operation concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the two countries, signed at Washington June 15, 1955.

Signed at Washington July 21 and 22, 1955.

Exchange of Notes bringing into force as of July 22, 1955 the Agreement for Co-operation regarding atomic information for mutual defence purposes signed at Washington June 15, 1955.

Signed at Washington July 22, and 25, 1955.

Exchange of Notes respecting the construction and operation of a petroleum products pipeline between the USA Air Force dock at St. John's and Pepperrell Air Force Base in Newfoundland.

Signed at Ottawa September 22, 1955.

Entered into force September 22, 1955.

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 9: Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Adopted at Venice, October 19, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 2: British Commonwealth-Egypt War Graves Agreement. Signed at Alexandria, June 8, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 4: Trade Agreement between Canada and Portugal. Signed at Lisbon, May 28, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 6: Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Paris, October 23, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 7: Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Paris, October 23, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 8: Exchange of Notes (May 5, 1955) between Canada and the United States of America governing the Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System in Canadian Territory. Signed at Washington, May 5, 1955. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Information Annex II to Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. A/2904/Add.1. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 5 A. New York 1955. 38 p.

United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board on the third actuarial valuation of the Fund as of 30 September 1954. A/2916. New York, 1955. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 8 A. 8 p.

Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955. A/2935. New York, 1955. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 2. 33 p.

Report of the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (1 September 1954 - 30 June 1955). A/2936. New York, 1955. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 18. 27 p.

Economic Survey of Latin America for 1954. E/CN.12/362/Rev.1. New York, 1955. 204 p. \$2.00 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs).

Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East, Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954. ST/TAA/SER.C/21, 10 August 1955. 50 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.15.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

World Theatre, Volume IV:

No. 1—The Actor. 78 p.

No. 3—Theatre Architecture. 86 p.

(International Theatre Institute, published under the Auspices of UNESCO)
Publisher: Elsevier, Bruxelles.

Plant Ecology. Proceedings of the Montpellier Symposium. (Arid Zone Research). Paris 1955. 124 p. \$3.00 (bilingual).

Music in Education. International Conference on the Role and Place of Music in the Education of Youth and Adults, Brussels, June 29 to July 9, 1953. Paris 1955. 335 p. \$2.50.

The Teaching of Modern Languages (Problems in education—X).

A volume of studies deriving from the International Seminar organized by the Secretariat of UNESCO at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, in August 1953. Paris 1955. 294 p. \$1.75.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 55/29—*Canadian Foreign Policy*, an address by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, at the closing dinner of the Canada-United States Conference, University of Rochester, N.Y., September 1, 1955.

No. 55/30—Excerpts from an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Women's Canadian Club, Vancouver, B.C., August 25, 1955.

No. 55/31—*The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway*, an address by the President of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, Mr. Lionel Chevrier, to the Edmonton Canadian Club, September 6, 1955.

No. 55/32—Statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, made in Plenary Session of the General Assembly, September 26, 1955.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Mr. Pearson's Visit to the U.S.S.R.

THE Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, was a guest of the Government of the U.S.S.R. from October 5 to 12. Given below are the texts of statements made by Mr. Pearson relating to the visit, and of the joint communiqué issued on its conclusion.

Statement Made by Mr. Pearson at Moscow on October 5

I should like to express my pleasure at being here and my sincere thanks for the very cordial reception which has been given us on arrival.

Mrs. Pearson and I are grateful for this opportunity of visiting Moscow and some other parts of this vast land. We also hope to be able to see something of the life and work of the peoples of the Soviet Union who were our courageous allies in two world conflicts, and who know as few peoples have ever known, the cruelty, devastation and tragedy of war. I am also, of course looking forward to an exchange of views on world problems with Soviet leaders. This will, I hope, enable us better to understand each other's points of view.

In its international relations, my Government, strongly supported by the people of Canada, has worked steadfastly for the establishment throughout the world of peace and justice, freedom and welfare, for all people. We have no other purpose in our hearts or minds. But the pursuit and achievement of these aims require not only effective co-operation between governments but better understanding between peoples. This can be assisted by greater knowledge of each other; by the exchange of visits and of views.

There are special reasons why such co-operation and understanding is desirable between the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Canada. We are neighbours across the North Pole. Though you are much greater in numbers than we are, we have common problems in our vast distances; in the variety and, indeed, the severity of our climate; in the extent and nature of our material resources and the crying need for their peaceful development in the interests of the people. It seems to me, therefore, important that we should come to know one another better and more clearly understand our respective problems and points of view so that we can work together to avoid a war which would engulf and destroy

It is my strong hope that my present visit will contribute in some small way to this great purpose of peace with justice between peoples.

Joint Communiqué

A joint communiqué was issued as follows in Moscow on Wednesday, October 12, on the conclusion of Mr. Pearson's visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

From October 5 to 12 as a guest of the Soviet Government, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson visited the U.S.S.R.



ARRIVAL AT MOSCOW

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. I. B. Pearson, left, is met by Mr. V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., centre, and Mr. Yakushin, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R.

During his stay in Moscow, Mr. Pearson met leading statesmen of the Soviet State and had discussions with the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. M. Molotov; the Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. I. G. Kabanov; and with the acting Minister for Culture of the U.S.S.R., Mr. S. V. Kaftanov.

In discussions during these meetings there took part on the Canadian side the following persons accompanying Mr. Pearson: the Associate Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce, Mr. M. W. Sharp; the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. J. W. Holmes; as well as Mr. J. B. C. Watkins, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Canada to the U.S.S.R.

On the Soviet side there took part in discussions the Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. A. Zorin; the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. to Canada, Mr. D. S. Chuvakhin; and the Chief of the Second European Department of the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. Y. Yerofeyev.

These meetings and discussions took place in a cordial atmosphere and ranged over a wide variety of subjects, including matters of specific concern to their two countries as well as others of major international significance. The exchange has resulted in a clearer understanding of each other's point of view which should assist in promotion of good relations between the two countries.

It was recognized that there were no problems between nations or group of nations which were incapable of solution by peaceful means if goodwill and a sincere desire for strengthening peace and friendly relations between nations were present. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pearson expressed their satisfaction at the fact that the points of view in the United Nations sub-Committee on disarmament of which the U.S.S.R. and Canada are members had come closer together and it was established that both sides had common views with regard to the necessity to facilitate early solution of the disarmament problem. It was agreed that for such an achievement the development of confidence and trust between nations and growth of a sense of security was vitally important. This end should be served by measures directed at further relaxation in international tensions. It was noted with satisfaction that the decisions of the conference of Heads of Governments of the Four Powers in Geneva in July last had facilitated relaxation of tension in international relations although many problems still remained to be solved.

In connection with Mr. Molotov's co-Chairmanship of the Geneva Conference and Canada's membership in the International Supervisory Commission for Indochina an occasion for discussion of problems of Indochina was presented. It was agreed that in spite of difficulties, the object of implementation of the Geneva Agreements while maintaining the truce and avoiding further hostilities should be pursued.

Possibilities of Trade Agreement

Advantage was also taken of Mr. Pearson's visit to explore the possibility of concluding a trade agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R. on a mutually beneficial basis with the most favoured nation principle being observed. The desirability of measures directed towards removal of barriers to international trade generally was recognized by both Ministers. There was a sufficient measure of agreement to warrant resumption of negotiations shortly in Ottawa which were started in Moscow and which will, it is hoped, produce positive results of benefit to both countries.

In the course of the discussions held, it was agreed that mistrust and misunderstanding could be to some measure dispelled by greater exchange of visits, both official and unofficial. It was agreed that every effort should be made to remove obstacles to the freer flow of information and views and to develop as much as possible cultural, scientific and technical contacts. It was agreed in the first place to consider means of scientific and technical co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and Canada in industry, transport, and agriculture and an exchange of information on scientific research in Arctic regions.

It was also agreed that visits by Parliamentary Delegations could contribute to better mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Canada and strengthen the ties between them.

The Foreign Ministers recognized that their governments' differences of approach to political and economic problems should not be a hindrance to co-operation on many practical subjects on the basis of mutual interest and desire to promote peace and good neighbourly relations. Such co-operation would be based on the principle of noninterference by each country in the domestic affairs of the other and would be inspired by a desire by both to



VISIT TO AGRICULTURAL EXHIBITION

Mr. and Mrs. Pearson visit the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow on October 7 and receive a gift from the Chairman of the Exhibition. Left to right, front: Mr. V. N. Tsitsin, Chairman of the Exhibition, and Mr. G. Ignatieff, of the Department of External Affairs.

work together for the establishment of international peace and ensuring of security.

Before leaving the U.S.S.R. Mr. Pearson visited the Crimea where he was received by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. N. A. Bulganin, and by the member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R., Mr. N. S. Khrushchev.

Statement Made by Mr. Pearson at Stalingrad

My colleagues and I are very glad to have this opportunity of visiting Stalingrad. The name of this city will always stand for the outstanding courage and prowess in arms of the Russian people and of her armed forces. We have also heard of the heroic feats of reconstruction carried out here, which makes Stalingrad a symbol of achievement in peace, as well as victory in war.

Stalingrad marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Allies in the last war. It was as crucial in this respect in the Eastern front as the landings on the Normandy beachheads were on the Western. From Stalingrad onward, the great Soviet armies passed from the defensive to the counter-offensive which swept them on to final victory. Likewise on the Normandy beachheads, where Canadian troops from three thousand miles across the sea, had partici-

pated in hard fighting, the Western allies moved forward until eventually they clasped hands with their Soviet allies over the ruins of Nazi tyranny.

It is therefore with sincere feelings of admiration that I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the war heroism and sacrifice of the Russian people symbolized in this city. It also gives me pleasure to recall the victorious co-operation in war between the Soviet Union and Canada which is evoked by the memory of the great battle which was fought here. It is my hope that this co-operation can also take place in the effort to establish and maintain a secure and just peace and to promote the welfare of peoples. May that struggle also end in victory.

Press Interview at Basra on October 13

Bearing in mind that we were official guests of the Soviet Government, enjoying generous hospitality; that we therefore saw only one side of the picture and that our impressions are accordingly bound to be somewhat superficial, the chief impression from the visit was one of massive collective energy, strength and wealth, along with individual deprivations.

A group of strong and able men are in charge in the Soviet Union, who profess no other desire than to be left in peace to build the country and solve their problems, of which they admit they have a good many.

It is difficult to doubt the sincerity of the ordinary people of the Soviet Union in their protest against war; the fear of war must be very real in places like Stalingrad.

As regards Canada-Soviet relations, the fact that we are neighbours was constantly emphasized by the Soviet leaders together with their desire to increase mutual contacts, especially in trade.

There was a good deal of talk about the "Spirit of Geneva", but the Soviet leaders do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead in translating that spirit into action.

The Soviet leaders stated their views on the international situation with frankness, and I replied with equal frankness in giving the Western point of view.

The visit, as a whole, was not only very interesting but also very worthwhile, as I feel that I am in a better position to understand the sources of Soviet power and the nature of Soviet policy. I hope that in turn the Soviet leaders might have learned a little bit more about Western views; particularly that, in or out of NATO, the West is not, and will not become aggressive or war-mongering; that the West is as vitally concerned, as Soviet leaders told me they were, with peace and security.

Khrushchev said to me in the Crimea, "We are not going to attack anybody and you say that neither the U.S. nor anybody else in the West will attack anybody". Then he added, "So we will work things out somehow". After this visit, short and specialized though it was, I hope more than ever that "We will, and in the right way".

The Colombo Plan

*The meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held in Singapore
October 17-21, 1955.*

THE annual meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee was held this year in Singapore from October 17 to 21. The chairman of this year's meeting was Mr. David Marshall, leader of the Singapore delegation. Mr. Marshall is also the first elected Chief Minister of Singapore. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson was the leader of the Canadian delegation.

In addition to reviewing progress under the Colombo Plan and defining the task which lies ahead, the Committee this year decided to continue the Plan to June 30, 1961. The period covered by the original Plan would have ended on June 30, 1957.

Progress in the Area During the Past Year

As at previous meetings of the Consultative Committee, an opportunity was taken to review the progress in co-operative economic development throughout South and Southeast Asia during the past year. The basis of these discussions was furnished by each country's survey of its own development. These surveys together with the Committee's assessment of the problems of the area as a whole, were incorporated in a draft report prepared by officials at their preliminary meeting for the consideration of the ministers. After full discussion, agreement was reached on the text of the Fourth Annual Report which became available for publication in the capitals of member countries late in November.

The period which was reviewed at this year's meeting represented the fourth year of operation of the Colombo Plan. Most of the countries of the area have been able to maintain and a few surpassed their previous rate of economic progress. In general the Asian countries were able to show noticeable increase in national income and output particularly in industrial and mineral production and power generation. Favourable world economic conditions created an increased demand during the year for the products of the area and made it easier for developing countries to obtain the capital equipment they need. However, it was recognized that the prices of some commodities such as rice have fallen, and countries dependent on the export of these commodities have had special difficulties.

Because of the special conditions which exist in this area, it is not easy to gather precise statistical data. However, it is perhaps worth noting some of the improvements which have been shown by the economic indicators as taking place in various sectors of the economy of the area. In the industrial sector remarkable progress has been achieved. Expansion of electric power capacity, frequently an integral part of multi-purpose schemes, has been a major development goal. All of the countries show an increase over the past year in their electric power capacity, with very significant increases in both India and Pakistan. The increase in electrical capacity for the area last year

was estimated at 13 per cent over the previous year. Other aspects also showed marked improvement. For example, cement production increased by 17 per cent and the output of steel by 12 per cent and the manufacture of jute, a staple for some of the countries of the area, by 6 per cent.

During 1954-55, the countries of the area were able to devote over \$2,100,000,000 to development expenditures in the public sector as compared with expenditures of \$1,417,000,000 in 1953-54. More than two-fifths of the expenditure was directed to agriculture, one-quarter to transport and one-quarter to social welfare. Most of the countries are hopeful that they will be able to achieve an even higher expenditure in 1955-56.

The Committee recognized that the substantial amounts of capital made available over the past five years by the contributing governments, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by other institutions has assisted the countries of South and Southeast Asia in furthering their development programmes.


The Task Ahead

While it was recognized that the Colombo Plan has made a significant and lasting contribution to the economic welfare of South and Southeast Asia, the Committee emphasized the problems which remain. The Colombo Plan, of course, is not in itself a blueprint and has no centralized control over development programmes. However, each year by discussing their mutual problems and by reviewing personal contacts, the ministers and officials from member countries are in a position to appraise the needs of the area and determine the adequacy of available resources. It is to help meet these needs that external aid is made available by the more developed member governments to their Asian partners.

The general views which emerged from the review of the situation at the recent meeting may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Recent experience, in a period when not all countries of the area benefited from world economic conditions which were generally favourable to the economic expansion of the area as a whole, has brought out once again the wide differences that exist in the economic situations of the different countries.
- (b) Considerable progress has been made and some of the earlier plans are now bearing fruit, but much more still has to be done and some of the tasks ahead will be even harder.
- (c) While the need for capital from outside the area remains, the close-linked problem of mobilizing domestic resources is of paramount importance. This is true both for public and private capital, and for development in the public as well as the private sector.
- (d) The many common economic problems calling for the co-operation of all countries in the region, possibly in new ways, have been thrown into sharper focus.

One of the most complex problems still facing the countries of the area is the difficulty of maintaining adequate levels of food production in the face of



—Standard

COLOMBO PLAN CONFERENCE AT SINGAPORE

The Secretary of State for External Affairs and leader of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson, addressing a meeting of the Colombo Plan Conference.

a rapidly increasing population. In the Annual Report, the Committee summarized this problem in the following way:

When the progress achieved so far, not only in food production but in economic development generally, is compared with the fundamental problem of raising the living standards of a rapidly increasing population, it is clear that much remains to be done. Current levels of per capita food consumption are substantially higher than in postwar years but are lower than before the war and below accepted standards of nutrition.

At the same time the population of the area as a whole is estimated to be increasing by about 10 million persons a year. This rapid growth, deriving from an increasing birth rate and from the less often recognized phenomenon of a falling death rate, is a fact of singular importance for the future development of the area and the improvement of its living standards. . . In practically every country of the region under-employment, especially in rural areas, is common and in some countries unemployment has become a serious issue . . . Development plans have, therefore, both a current and long term problem to meet, if opportunities for employment in activities beneficial to the economy generally, are to be created at a rate sufficient not only to keep up with the annual increase in the labour force, but to overtake it.

The review also brought out the difficulties experienced in a number of countries in expanding their domestic budgetary resources. Since there is usually a time-lag between the investment outlay on large scale projects and

the return in the establishment of increased output and incomes, tax receipts in many cases have been slow to rise at a time when considerable increased investment is becoming necessary. In these circumstances a number of governments have found it useful to improve the structure and revise the general level of their taxation and in some cases resort to judicious credit creation. Many of the countries of the area rely on external trade not only for foreign exchange but also in a large measure from import and export duties for external budgetary revenues. A fall in export earnings which some of the countries experienced, coupled with necessary restrictions on imports, contributed to a fall in budgetary receipts. This set up what the Report describes as "a vicious circle with development checked for lack of financial resources while resources remain low for lack of development."

To offset this problem the Report emphasizes the need for greater development in the private sector. It was recognized that only limited financial resources were available in the countries of the area, for private firms to draw on. However, this situation is to some extent being remedied by setting up financial institutions with government support for the undertaking, in the private sector, of approved investments which fit in with the planned programme development.

Need for External Capital

Throughout the meeting it was stressed by representatives of individual countries that the need for external capital remains as a crucial supplement to the direct efforts being made by the Asian countries. In view of the normal ratio of foreign exchange requirements to the local costs of development in Asia a given amount of external capital could be expected to facilitate investment some three to five times its value in monetary terms. In order to secure this beneficial result, strenuous efforts will be required on the part of the countries of the area to mobilize their internal financial resources.

The Committee recognized that external capital may come from friendly governments, international institutions and private investors. Capital from governments and international institutions such as the International Bank has been made available at an increasing rate and many governments in the area are devoting greater attention to the needs of utilizing their external aid as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. The Committee also recognized the importance of maintaining an increased flow of private capital to the area. With this in mind a number of governments are adopting policies designed to help increase foreign capital. It is expected that the International Finance Corporation to which Canada has pledged over \$3 million as its contribution, will be useful in helping to finance private undertakings in this as well as in other parts of the world.

Prominent also is the need for greater technical skills which, at least as much as finance, are the key to economic progress and social welfare. Under the various technical assistance schemes nearly 7,200 places have been found for trainees outside their own countries, of which some 2,200 places were found in the past year. Similarly some 1,200 experts were provided during the year to the countries of South and Southeast Asia, bringing the total to 3,700. The Consultative Committee recognized that this type of contribution is of great

significance. They also considered means of extending the scope, increasing the volume and improving the operation of the technical assistance programmes.

The Report concludes its analysis of the task ahead with this summing up:

This outline is necessarily brief and such conclusions as it seeks to draw are inevitably provisional. If it seems to lay undue stress on problems and difficulties, this is because it is the business of the Consultative Committee to consider such matters, and by the sharing of experience to help towards finding solutions. This should not obscure the solid achievements recorded and the great efforts that have gone into securing them. The idea of co-operative effort, both within each country and between countries, is spreading ever more widely and deeply. The concept of international economic co-operation embodied in the Colombo Plan is of special significance in world history, and as the Plan enters its fifth year its members may take courage from all that has been accomplished and prepare themselves to meet the challenge of the task ahead.

Role of Atomic Energy*

At this year's meeting considerable attention was devoted to the important role which the development of atomic research and nuclear energy might play in the economic development of South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Pearson informed the Conference of the announcement made in September that the Indian and Canadian Governments were embarking on a project in which Canada would provide a high-powered and versatile research reactor to India under the Colombo Plan. This research reactor will be similar to the NRX reactor now in operation in Canada at Chalk River. Mr. Pearson indicated that the external costs of the proposed reactor would be financed by Canada in such a manner as not to reduce the amount of aid which otherwise would have been made available to other Colombo Plan countries, including India, for more conventional projects. For its part, the Indian authorities have agreed that they will make this reactor available for use by scientists from other countries including those in the Colombo Plan area.

During the Conference the United States Delegation suggested the establishment under the auspices of the Colombo Plan of a centre in South and Southeast Asia for nuclear research and training. The United States Government would be prepared to contribute substantially towards such a centre, which would supplement existing facilities for basic training in the various fields relating to the peaceful application of atomic energy. The United States delegation emphasized that their offer and the Canadian offer to India mutually complemented each other and multiplied the potential benefits to be derived from atomic energy research.

Future Contributions

All of the delegations represented at the Conference were unanimous in their desire to continue the Plan beyond June 30, 1957. Mr. Pearson and the Canadian delegation actively supported the extension of the Colombo Plan until 1961 with the understanding that the future of the Plan would be further examined in 1959.

* See also page 300.

During the Conference several delegations indicated that they proposed to maintain or increase their contributions next year to the Colombo Plan. Mr. Pearson outlined Canada's intentions for next year in the following words:

So far as next year's activities under the Colombo Plan are concerned the Canadian Government proposes to ask the next session of Parliament to make a significant increase in Canada's contribution above the amount of \$26.4 million which we are making available this year. The bulk of the increase would be for the purpose of meeting that part of the costs of the proposed atomic Reactor arising next year and for covering the increase in costs occurring in that year for certain other large projects already under way such as the Warsak project in Pakistan. In addition I am hopeful that with this increase we shall be able to begin some modest but very worthwhile projects particularly those involving technical assistance and equipment in those countries which have not been receiving much assistance from Canada in the past but with whose needs we are becoming more familiar.

During the Conference Mr. Pearson indicated some of the steps which were already being taken to provide aid to those countries in the area which had not yet received much assistance from Canada. He told the Conference that a Cobalt beam therapy unit would be made available to Burma and that necessary training for Burmese technicians would be provided under the technical co-operation scheme. He also informed the Conference that a Mission from Canada would shortly visit Indonesia with a view to determining how Canada might assist that country in developing its engineering training facilities; and this same Mission would also examine the desirability of Canada providing some assistance for a resources survey. Many other possible projects in these and other countries of the area including Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were discussed by the individual Asian countries with the Canadian delegation at Singapore.

International Control of Narcotic Drugs

By Kenneth C. Hossick, Director, Division of Narcotic Control, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa, and Canadian Representative, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The control of narcotic drugs, a matter of vital concern to Governments, to many professions, and to individuals, has been the subject of international consultation and co-operation since early in this century. From 1909, when the first International Meeting on Opium was convened in Shanghai, until 1953, when an Opium Conference was held in New York, there have been concluded a number of international treaties, agreements and protocol relating to narcotic control, to which Canada has become a party. In this article I examine the workings of the highly complex international machinery of narcotic control and its relation to Canadian narcotic law. I will also try to demonstrate that the problem of narcotic drugs is in no sense a problem



Mr. Kenneth C. Hossick

confined to Canada alone, or even to our so-called Western civilization. It is in every sense an international and a world-wide problem.


In itself, the legitimate use of narcotic drugs, if properly handled, is neither dangerous nor harmful. Indispensable to modern medicine, narcotics are used the world over to alleviate pain and restore health. Thus used, they bring great benefit to suffering humanity: abused, they can cause havoc and misery. The social dangers of drug addiction are well known and need no further elucidation.

Dual Nature

This dual nature of narcotic drugs—stress-relieving and addiction-causing properties—has made it necessary that they be subject to the most stringent international control. Consequently, in the general interest of the world community some seventy governments, parties to international treaties on narcotics, have agreed to renounce certain prerogatives of national sovereignty, and have accepted a system of international narcotics control. Formerly confined to opium, coca alkaloids and *cannabis sativa*, this control is now extended to cover recently discovered synthetic drugs such as Demerol, (*Pethidine*) and Dromoran (*Levorphan*). The international agreements which have been concluded are designed to ensure that the manufacture, trade and consumption of narcotic drugs are devoted to legitimate needs only.

The Organs of International Narcotic Control

The chart which follows shows the organs of international control of narcotic drugs, as at present constituted.



As shown in this chart, the 15-member Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) is the governing body entrusted with the overall supervision of the implementation by governments of the International Treaties on Narcotic Drugs. This body must consider and, where it sees fit, approve recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a technical commission which meets once every year and reviews data on narcotic drugs collected and presented to it by the Narcotic Division of the United Nations Secretariat. It is a Commission function to recommend, by means of resolutions submitted to the Economic and Social Council, that governments take certain action with regard to international control of narcotics and implementation of treaties. One of the most important continuing tasks of the Commission and the United Nations Secretariat has been to draft a single treaty encompassing the essentials of the nine existing narcotics treaties (including the United Nations opium protocol, which has not yet entered into force). The Commission and the Secretariat have been working on this project for several years.

The Economic and Social Council may accept or reject a proposal of the Commission by a majority vote; alternatively it may refer it back to the Commission for further study before making any representations to governments.

When approved, resolutions of the Council dealing with narcotics control are transmitted to member governments of the United Nations to be referred by them to the narcotics control agencies in their countries.

Col. C. H. L. Sharman, CMG., CBE., ISO., who retired in 1954, was Canadian Representative to the Narcotic Drugs Commission for more than 20 years.

The Permanent Central Opium Board is composed of eight persons appointed in an individual capacity and for a term of five years by the Economic and Social Council. Established by the Convention of February 19, 1925, the Board is charged with the continuous surveillance of the licit movements of narcotic drugs with a view to preventing licitly produced drugs being diverted into illicit channels. It receives from parties to the Conventions of February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931, statistics on imports and exports of narcotics, including stocks, seizures, manufacture and trade; from this data, the Board prepares an annual report to the contracting parties and to the Economic and Social Council. The Board is empowered to take semi-judicial measures against countries which fail to carry out their obligations under the international narcotics treaties or are in danger of becoming centres of the illicit traffic.

The functions of the Drug Supervisory Body are described below.

The World Health Organization, a Specialized Agency of the United Nations, with headquarters in Geneva, has been entrusted with the specific responsibility of extending international control to new drugs and, in particular, of estimating the properties of these new drugs and determining whether they should be classed as narcotics or not. This work is carried out with the co-operation of the United States Government at the Bethesda, Maryland, clinical centre for pharmacology and chemistry and at the Lexington Drug Addiction research centre. The Drug Addiction Committee of the National Research Council of the United States also gives great assistance to the World Health Organization.

Approach to Narcotics Control in Various Countries

It is interesting to note the differences in many countries in the type of governmental agency which control narcotic drugs. In Canada, which is a non-manufacturing and non-producing country, the Narcotic Act is essentially criminal law, the administration of which is the responsibility of the Division of Narcotic Control of the Department of National Health and Welfare, with the criminal side of the Act being enforced by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. However, in the United States of America, which is primarily a narcotic-manufacturing country, narcotic legislation is in the "nature of a taxing measure designed to have the effect of regulating the domestic trade and distribution of narcotic drugs". It is, therefore, not purely criminal law as in Canada. The United Kingdom, like the United States, is also a manufacturing country and control of "Dangerous Drugs" in that country is treated in a somewhat special way, i.e., as a national problem arising out of international obligations. The United Kingdom Minister responsible for the administration of the United Kingdom Dangerous Drugs Act, 1951, is the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Secretary).

In France, the control of narcotic drugs is based on legislation and regulations which are essentially of a preventive nature, and are based on a most

simple principle: "no narcotic drugs—no toxicomaniacs (addicts)"; the control and enforcement of the regulations are centralized at the Central Pharmacy Services, Ministry of Public Health. India, one of the largest producers of opium in the world, has one of the most complete methods of control. In India, narcotic control is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance (Revenue Division) since opium is classed as a revenue-producing agricultural product.

Regardless of whether a country is a narcotic manufacturer, a producer of primary natural products, or, like Canada, a consumer, all narcotic legislation has one essential principle in common—to control very closely any narcotic substance from its origin until it is legally consumed, and thus to prevent it from being misused at any stage in this process.

Control Procedures in Canada and Internationally

The control of narcotics in Canada is governed by the Narcotic and Opium Drug Act and Regulations, the last important amendments to which were adopted by Parliament in 1954. Since it is a matter of prime importance to control drugs from their origin to their consumption, the Regulations include detailed provisions for the maintenance of accounts of narcotic transactions. Under these Regulations, wholesale druggists in Canada (who number approximately 160) are required to submit monthly reports on sales of all narcotic drugs. The Division of Narcotics Control maintains on individual cards a record of drugs received by all hospitals, physicians, dentists, veterinary surgeons and retail druggists. As many as 14,000 entries are made monthly, indicating the number of transactions which go on between the various professions in one month.

Wholesalers also submit reports on the quantities of drugs on hand at the end of each year. These statements, together with import and export data, are used to prepare estimates of Canada's narcotic requirements for medical and scientific purposes. The yearly estimated requirements are then sent to the Secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body, which, as indicated in the chart above, function independently of the Narcotic Commission (although they are represented on the Commission).

Every year the Supervisory Body assesses the requirements in narcotic drugs of each country and territory throughout the world. Since the quantity of raw material for the manufacture of these drugs is known, and its importation can be adjusted to the requirements for authorized manufacture, it is therefore possible to adjust effectively the legitimate manufacture of narcotics to legitimate world demands. All channels of distribution, national and international, are subject to control and all commercial transactions, national and international, are recorded, with statistics being transmitted periodically to the Supervisory Body. The functioning of this system is constantly being supervised and co-ordinated by the international organs concerned.

There remain, of course, many loopholes yet to be closed up. A solution of the problem of over-production of raw material, with its consequent entry into the illicit market, was one of the main objectives of the 1953 Opium Protocol, which is designed to limit the production of opium strictly to medical and scientific needs. Although ratified by a number of countries, including Canada, the Protocol is not yet in effect.

To sum up, the narcotics industry now operates to a great extent according to an internationally conceived and enforced plan. One fact is perhaps worth emphasizing—social and humanitarian reasons, and not economic or financial ones, led to the establishment of international regulations. In the general interest of the community of states, governments fully consented to limit their own freedom of action and to transfer certain powers to international organs, also conferring upon them the power to apply sanctions against an offending state.

Scientific Research on Opium in Canada

The magnitude of the problem of controlling narcotics is indicated by the fact that in 1954 over 35 tons of illicit opium was seized throughout the world. Had it not been seized, this opium would otherwise have been converted into 140,000 ozs. of heroin with a value in illicit world markets of about one billion dollars, i.e., about one quarter of Canada's national budget in the last fiscal year. Canada has, therefore, a vital and self-evident interest in the effective control of production and distribution of opium. In collaboration with at least fifteen other countries, work in this field has been carried on in Canada since 1949 under the direction of Dr. Charles G. Farmilo, head of the federal narcotic laboratory in the Food and Drug Directorate at Ottawa. The work of Dr. Farmilo and his colleagues has been of great importance in establishing that the origin of seized samples of opium can be determined by scientific methods. Canada can well be proud of the achievements of its narcotic research scientists who have gained international recognition for their work in this field.

Conclusion

I have tried to show how the work of creating and setting in motion the machinery of international control, the methods employed, and the results obtained, are in the nature of a laboratory experiment with the world as its test tube. Social research has, with patience and imagination, led to results which may eventually have an unforeseen and far-reaching influence on society, far transcending the sphere of narcotic drugs. If I may in conclusion quote from the speech of Senator de Brouchere, President of the 1931 Conference for Limiting Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs:

This is an immense piece of work—nothing of the kind has ever been attempted before . . . If a similar system could be established for far more dangerous drugs and far more murderous weapons, humanity would have made a considerable advance.

In 1955, these words are of even greater significance. If the principles on which are based international treaties of narcotic control could be applied to atomic weapons, peace would be within our reach.

Canada and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The International Agency for Atomic Energy

On October 27, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted without dissent an eighteen-power Resolution recommending the early establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency, whose primary function will be to encourage and assist world wide research on, and development of, the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The resolution also recommended that a second international conference for the exchange of technical information regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be held under the auspices of the United Nations in two or three years time.

Canada, besides co-sponsoring the joint resolution, was one of the eight countries which drew up the draft statute for the Agency which was distributed to Governments on August 17 last for their consideration and comments. Under this draft statute the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Canada will become members of the Agency's first Board of Governors in virtue of their status as "the most important contributors of technical assistance and fissionable materials."

Canadian Statement

On October 10 during the general debate in the First Committee on the item "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the following words:

At the ninth General Assembly Canada had the honour to be one of the co-sponsors of the resolution, adopted unanimously, which dealt with the proposed establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. What progress has been made in carrying out the terms of the resolution? If I may borrow a saying from my medical friends, "Slower than hoped for but much better than expected."

The drafting of a constitution which will ensure the establishment of the Agency on a sound foundation, so that it will be able to fulfil its role with maximum effectiveness and with the greatest measure of support from potential member nations, has admittedly been complex and difficult. However, by the time of the conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Geneva last August, the work had advanced to the point where the United States representative was able to announce that the eight nations (including Canada) which had been discussing the possible establishment of the agency had reached agreement on a draft statute and that this draft statute would be distributed to member countries of the United Nations.

It is our hope that the draft statute will find general favour and that it will be implemented at an early date, so that the Agency will be in a position as soon as possible to get on with its important work of aiding in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the world, and in doing so,

will provide a basis for peaceful co-operation in our time as perhaps nothing else can or will.

All State members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies have received copies of the draft statute and, undoubtedly, will have constructive comments to offer. Last year, in this Committee, it was generally accepted in the debate—and tacitly acknowledge in the resolution—that the detailed negotiation on the Statute must be left to a small group of states. The resolution suggests that when the agency is established it shall negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations. Mr. Pearson, in his statement to the last General Assembly, said that “this is one field in which the United Nations should not, and I am confident will not, be by-passed.” My Government continues to be strongly of the view that the Agency, once established, should negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations.

For the present it would seem to be most advantageous to follow the procedure envisaged in the resolution and the one which I am sure will lead most quickly to the establishment of an agency; the resolution provided in fact “that the views of members which have manifested their interest be fully considered.” Each nation can therefore assist by submitting comments on the draft statute as soon as possible. The Canadian Government as one of the negotiating states, for its part, will welcome all these comments and consider them most earnestly in reviewing the Statute which will ultimately be submitted for individual approval.

It will have been noted that the draft statute as it now stands makes careful provision for the representation in the structure of the agency of the various interests involved and in particular of the major areas of the world. Special account has been taken of the under-developed countries and of their requirements. We hope that countries from other areas than those which are now or potentially the major contributors will examine the draft statute and offer suggestions to ensure that the agency is so devised that it can serve adequately their present and future needs. We for our part are anxious that the agency should be the instrument of the common goal and that like other United Nations Agencies it should play an important and ever increasing role in fostering the establishment of conditions of greater equality in opportunities between all countries. We note with approval the decision of the Soviet Government to support the proposals to set up the international agency. My Government may wish to comment on the various detailed suggestions put forward in this connection by the Soviet Government when there has been an opportunity to examine them.

Revised Resolution

When Mr. Martin made the above statement, the Canadian Delegation had not yet associated itself as a co-sponsor with any of the draft resolutions which had thus far been introduced during the debate in the First Committee on “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”. However, the Delegation eventually asked to be listed as a co-sponsor of a substantially revised version of the draft resolution on the Atomic Energy Agency which had originally been tabled on October 6 by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States. Commenting on this revised resolution, Mr. Martin made the following statement in the First Committee on October 26.

This cumulative effect of debate, submission of alternative resolutions and of amendments, and of informal discussions among delegations is clearly ap-

parent to anyone who compares the text of the present draft resolution, of which Canada is a co-sponsor with the text of the original draft.

Major Alterations

Among the major alterations, all relating to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, are the following:

1. The resolution now refers to a conference of all members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to consider the final text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Substantial progress has been made already towards the establishment of this Agency and the draft statute has been circulated to governments for their consideration and comment. We sincerely hope that much further progress will be made along these lines and that governments will not delay in forwarding their comments as requested. However, we also welcome the intention now embodied in the draft resolution to launch the agency at an international conference which will be even wider in its membership than the present General Assembly and which will have the final say on the text of the Statute of the new international Agency. Whatever may be the interpretation on this point, I cannot too strongly say that the conference is not intended to be a ritual merely to approve something previously conceived. There is a danger that advantage will not be taken of opportunities to make suggestions and to provide improvements to this statute so that the final document will be the best conceivable instrument to launch into being this most significant act of the United Nations.

2. The resolution now requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee, to study the question of the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations and to transmit the results of this study to governments before the conference which I have mentioned above is convened. We all know and welcome the intense interest of the Secretary-General in the development of international co-operation with respect to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Our draft resolution records the Assembly's appreciation of the Secretary-General's work in preparing and organizing the Conference on Atomic Energy held in Geneva. The question of the proper relationship of the new agency to the United Nations has naturally attracted a good deal of attention in this debate and has been thoughtfully analyzed by several delegations. If I may do so without implying any lack of appreciation of the merits of other statements on this subject, I will single out the important statement made on this subject by Mr. Sandler, the distinguished representative of Sweden, at our meeting on October 18. I think, therefore, that we all have cause for satisfaction that the Secretary-General and his Advisory Committee are expressly requested in the present draft of the resolution with which my Delegation is associated, to study this question. I am sure that, if this resolution is approved by the Assembly, we shall have no cause to regret having placed this heavy responsibility upon our Secretary-General.

3. The resolution now refers to the invitations which have been extended to the Governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the U.S.S.R., to participate, as governments concerned, with the present sponsoring governments in negotiations on the draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I very much hope that these governments will find it possible to join with the group of countries, of which Canada has been one, in further negotiations which, we trust, will quickly lead to the establishment of this Agency.

4. Another important addition to the draft is the recommendation that the governments concerned should take into account the views expressed on the agency during the present session of the General Assembly and that they should

take all possible measures to establish the agency without delay and bearing in mind the provisions of this resolution. The views expressed in this session of the General Assembly have already had a marked and proper influence on the drafting of the resolution of which I have been speaking. I can assure all members of this Committee that so far as my Government is concerned, the views expressed here on the draft Statute will be given careful and sympathetic consideration.

In its final form the operative part of the eighteen-power resolution relating to the Atomic Energy Agency:

- (a) *Welcomed* the announced intention of governments sponsoring the Agency to invite all members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to participate in a Conference on the final text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (b) *Further welcomed* the extension of invitations to the Governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the U.S.S.R. to participate as governments concerned with the present sponsoring governments in negotiations on the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (c) *Recommended* that the governments concerned take into account the views expressed on the Agency during the present session of the General Assembly, as well as the comments transmitted directly by governments, and that they take all possible measures to establish the Agency without delay bearing in mind the provision of this Resolution;
- (d) *Requested* the Secretary-General to study the question of the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations.

International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

In the same resolution which proposed the early establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 27 also placed on record an expression of satisfaction with the results of the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which was held in Geneva from August 8 to August 20, 1955. This Conference, which was universally acclaimed as being of historic importance, brought together scientific delegates from 73 nations, including the Soviet Union, and representatives of eight Specialized Agencies, in detailed and technical discussions of power reactors, the physics and chemistry of nuclear energy, and the uses of atomic energy in industry, agriculture, and medicine.

The Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy stemmed directly from a resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 4, 1954. As stated in this resolution, the purpose of the Conference was to study the peaceful uses of the atom in such fields as biology, medicine, radiation protection and fundamental science. It was organized by the United Nations Secretariat in such a manner as to promote free discussion and exchange of scientific knowledge while ensuring that political considerations would not enter into the discussions.

Canada, one of the countries which sponsored the General Assembly resolution of December 4, 1954, took a very active part both in the preparations for the Conference and also in the Conference itself. Dr. W. B. Lewis, Vice-President of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, was appointed, along with



—Atomic Energy of Canada

CANADIAN EXHIBIT AT ATOMIC ENERGY CONFERENCE

A view of the Canadian exhibit at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva.

leading scientists from Brazil, France, India, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to an advisory committee which assisted the United Nations Secretary-General in organizing the meetings. Dr. Lewis was also appointed one of the six Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

Under the Presidency of Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, the Conference was organized on the basis of an initial series of plenary sessions, a concluding plenary session and three parallel series of section meetings dealing with technical and specialized

matters. These were supplemented by a series of public evening lectures by a number of eminent scientists. The Canadian delegation, led by Mr. W. J. Bennett, President of Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, consisted of scientists from Atomic Energy of Canada, economists, university professors and representatives from several Canadian firms interested in the industrial applications of atomic energy. Twelve scientific papers were presented at the Conference by members of the Canadian delegation from which several of the chairmen for panel discussions were also chosen.

Canada, along with Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, the U.S.S.R. and the United States also sent a scientific exhibit to Geneva in conjunction with the Conference. The Canadian exhibit, which contained models and photographs of Canada's two atomic reactors, NRX and NRU, featured two beam therapy units used in the treatment of cancer schematic diagrams of the Nuclear Power Development reactor (sometimes called NPD), which will be the first reactor built specifically for producing electricity; and a display depicting the uses of radioactive isotopes in forestry, industry and medicine. The exhibit also contained a large number of photographs, including a series describing the production of Cobalt 60 and another series illustrating the work of decontamination and reconstruction of the NRX reactor after it developed a "leak" in December 1952.

Benefits of Conference

In his statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 10, 1955, Mr. Paul Martin said that the Conference was "one of the largest and most successful scientific meetings ever held." Mr. Martin added that the principal benefits of the Conference were:

- I. The release to the public domain of a great mass of scientific information which had hitherto been secret;
- II. The opportunity for scientists and engineers from all over the world to learn at first hand of the work of their confreres in other lands, and to discuss common problems.
- III. The focussing of public attention not only on the role which atomic power is expected to play in the future, but also on the formidable problems which must be overcome before it can be exploited to economic advantage throughout the world.

The United Nations Secretariat plans to publish a set of volumes containing a complete record of the Conference and all the scientific papers presented. These volumes will include much material of use to scientists and should also be helpful in planning future conferences on this subject.

The Conference has opened new vistas for people in all countries by turning the world's attention from the destructive potentialities of atomic energy to its constructive possibilities, and by revealing the tremendous strides many countries have already made in harnessing atomic energy for the welfare of mankind. A most important aspect of the Conference was that at its sessions the veil of secrecy which has shrouded atomic energy for many years was in large measure torn away. To this fact, and to the more hopeful atmosphere in international relations associated with the meeting of heads of government at

Geneva earlier in the summer, can be attributed much of the credit for the success of the Conference. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his report to the General Assembly,

The formal sessions of the Conference were supplemented and elaborated by numerous informal discussions among groups sharing common interests which took place outside the scheduled meetings. These significant spontaneous activities, which could find nourishment only in a friendly and trustful atmosphere, merit special mention.

Canadian Atomic Reactor for India

The Governments of India and Canada on September 16 announced jointly that Canada had offered an NRX Atomic Reactor to India under the Colombo Plan, and that this offer had been accepted by India.


In the original message in which this offer was made to India, Prime Minister St. Laurent, expressed the hope that such a reactor would serve India as well as it had served Canada in research and in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. In accepting the offer Prime Minister Nehru indicated that his government would be prepared to allow accredited foreign scientists including those from other Colombo Plan countries in South and Southeast Asia to use the facilities that will be available at the atomic energy centre in India where the reactor will be located.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, gave further details of this project at a Session of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Meeting in Singapore on October 20, 1955. The relevant part of Mr. Pearson's statement was as follows:

The centre of our own atomic activity has been our so-called NRX Reactor at Chalk River, Ontario, which some of you or your officials visited when you were in Ottawa last year. This high-powered and versatile Reactor is serving us well in our research and experimental work. The manufacture, installation and operation of this type of unit present numerous problems and involve rather heavy costs and require a considerable number of very scarce experts. Nevertheless we have concluded that we should try to arrange to set one up in the Colombo Plan area.

Therefore as was announced jointly by the two Governments last month, the Indian and Canadian Governments have reached agreement in principle on such a project and the details are now being worked out. We plan to meet the external costs of this Reactor in such a manner as not to reduce the amount of aid which would otherwise have been made available to other Colombo Plan countries including India for more conventional development projects. We have also indicated to the Indian authorities that we would be agreeable to their using counterpart funds arising from earlier Canadian aid to finance local costs relating to the Reactor.

It has been agreed that this Reactor should be made available for the use of scientists from other countries including those from countries in the Colombo Plan area. Such joint participation by the Indian and Canadian Governments in a project which aims to improve mastery of this new-found source of energy for constructive purposes for the benefit of and with the participation of scientists from other countries as well as reflects, I think, the common purpose which we all share in the Colombo Plan. It is, I believe, right that we should look well ahead and plan to bring the latest as well as the most ancient methods



—Atomic Energy of Canada

NRX REACTOR

Examining a model of the NRX reactor, of the type offered by Canada to India under the Colombo Plan are, left to right: Mr. A. G. Ward, Head, Reactor Physics Branch; Dr. R. F. S. Robertson, Development Chemistry Branch; and Dr. W. B. Lewis, Vice-President, Research and Development, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., one of six scientists appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld to act as vice-presidents of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

into service in raising living standards and strengthening our economies. It is well to remember, however, although this reminder is scarcely needed in this company, that progress in economic development will continue to require old-fashioned toil and a careful use of resources. Atomic energy is by no means the magic answer to all our problems. Our main efforts will have to continue to be directed to the age-old tasks of irrigating and enriching the land, cutting the timber, bringing up the ore from below the ground, improving the means of transport, generating energy from all available sources, building up sound and productive industries and combatting disease.

In addition, Mr. Pearson stated, as noted on page 288, that Parliament would be asked to make a significant increase in Canada's contribution above the amount of \$26.4 million which is being made by Canada this year, and that the bulk of the increase would meet part of the cost of the atomic reactor.

Canada and the United Nations

Tenth Session of the General Assembly

Adoption of the Agenda: Withdrawal of France

The General Assembly on October 3 completed work on its agenda and decided to consider sixty-six questions at its current session. With few exceptions, items recommended for consideration by the General (Steering) Committee were adopted without discussion. In both committee and plenary meetings, however, strong opposition arose against inscription of three items: the Algerian question, the question of self-determination of the people of Cyprus, and the status of Western New Guinea (West Irian).

The request of thirteen Arab and Asian Nations that the question of Algeria be discussed in the General Assembly was opposed by France in the General Committee on the ground that it was a matter which, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, fell exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of France and outside the competence of the United Nations. The General Committee by a vote of 8 to 5 with 2 abstentions finally recommended against inscription of the item. However, the General Assembly did not approve this recommendation and on September 30 decided by a narrow vote of 28 in favour, 27 against, including Canada, and 5 abstentions, that the item should be included on the agenda. This decision was taken after a debate in which most of the Afro-Asian sponsors of the item delivered statements in support of their contention that a denial of the right of self-determination to Algeria is a potential source of international friction. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Belgium were among those who spoke in favour of the French position and voted, as did the representative of Canada, against inscription. After the vote, Foreign Minister Pinay, leader of the French Delegation, declared that the United Nations, and not France, would have to face the consequences of this clear violation of Article 2 (7), that France would refuse to accept the decision of the majority, and that it would consider any recommendation made by the Assembly as null and void. The following day the Delegation of France was withdrawn from the General Assembly; France did not, however, completely sever its relations with the United Nations and announced it would remain on the Security Council and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament.

Strong Opposition

As indicated above, there was also strong opposition in both the General Committee and the General Assembly to the inscription of the items on Cyprus and West New Guinea. The Cyprus item, submitted by Greece for the second successive year, was not adopted for consideration. The Assembly however endorsed the General Committee's recommendation that the question of West New Guinea be inscribed.



—United Nations

CANADA PLEDGES \$1,800,000 FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Sixty-one nations promised the equivalent of \$28,031,536 to finance operations in 1956 of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. Lt. Col. Gilbert, of Canada, signs the Final Act of the Conference, pledging \$1,800,000. Looking on are Mr. Mehdi Vakil, Secretary of the Conference, and Mme Georgette Cislet, of Belgium, President. Standing at the right is Mr. David Owen, Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board.

Increased Canadian Contribution to the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance

As announced by Mr. Pearson at the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Meeting at Singapore on October 20, the Canadian Government proposes to seek Parliamentary approval for a contribution of \$1,800,000 to next year's United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Representing an increase of \$300,000 over the Canadian contributions of the past two years, this amount was formally pledged at the Sixth United Nations Pledging Conference at New York on October 26 by Lt. Col. O. Gilbert, the Canadian representative to the Conference. Col. Gilbert said that the Canadian Government's decision to increase its contribution represented an expression of Canada's continuing support for a programme which contributes appreciably to a better understanding among peoples and governments, and provides continuing evidence of concerted international co-operation in the economic field. He added that in order to help establish the Expanded Programme on a firm administrative foundation, and to ensure that projects may be planned on a long term basis, the Canadian Government has decided, subject to annual Parliamentary approval, to make contributions in 1957 and 1958 of the same general order of magnitude as that for 1956.

The United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance co-ordinates technical assistance activities of the United Nations itself and of the Specialized Agencies in such varied fields as public administration, agriculture, health, education, fisheries, vocational training and social welfare. Last

year seventy-one countries pledged a total of \$27.9 million to this programme. Canada's total contribution since the inception of the programme in 1950 has totalled \$5,400,000.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries

In a statement on October 14 during the general debate in the Second Committee, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Paul Martin, emphasized the growing importance in world affairs of the part played by the United Nations in assisting in the economic progress of the less-developed countries. He noted that the agenda of the Committee focussed attention on the financing of economic development and on the Technical Assistant Programmes. Referring to his earlier statement in the General Assembly, Mr. Martin emphasized how important it was that the United Nations function harmoniously and that its discussions reflect a genuine sense of concord. Unless political questions are dealt with moderately and constructively the prestige of the Organization will suffer, and its work in the field of economic development is bound to be adversely affected. Speaking of the benefit of collective effort as a developing force, he noted that there are many projects which can better be dealt with on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis, and cautioned against attempts to force the pace.

Discussing the report of the Economic and Social Council, Mr. Martin commended ECOSOC for focussing its discussions on the world economic situation and the possibility of expanding world trade. He expressed whole-hearted agreement with the observation of other representatives in the Second Committee that the best way to achieve and maintain international economic equilibrium is to work towards the re-establishment of a multilateral trade and payments system, and also concurred in the view of those representatives who had warned against tendencies of governments to turn their efforts towards making themselves self-sufficient and arranging closely-knit preferential trading areas.

Mr. Martin went on to speak of Canada's support of President Eisenhower's initiative in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy and noted that Canada was one of the sponsors of the resolution last year on the establishment of an internal agency. He hoped that the less-developed countries would examine and make any necessary amendments and improvements of the Statute drafted by Canada and the other sponsoring countries.

Outlining the steps taken by Canada to increase the flow of private capital to under-developed countries, Mr. Martin underlined Canada's support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Finance Corporation. He also announced that Canada would make another substantial contribution to technical assistance, and at the same time direct attention to the assistance being rendered by Canada outside the United Nations, both on a bilateral basis and through collective plans such as Colombo Plan. Speaking of the connection established by the Charter itself between the preservation of peace and the improvement of social and economic conditions in the world, Mr. Martin concluded: "... we do not fail in our solemn obligations when we try to contribute to the maintenance of peace, not only in attempting to solve political problems, but in supporting

to the limit of our ability and capacity the hopes and aspirations of all peoples for a life of security, dignity and justice."

Canada Elected to ECOSOC

Elections to fill six seats on the Economic and Social Council were held on October 19 and 20. Canada was elected on the first ballot, together with the United States of America and Indonesia. On subsequent ballots, Yugoslavia, Brazil and Greece were elected to the remaining vacant seats.

Disarmament

The United Nations Disarmament Sub-committee which had reconvened in New York on August 29 last, concluded its discussions on October 7. The Sub-Committee, which meets, in private, is composed of representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The New York talks represented the second part of the round of discussions which began in London February 25.

In New York the delegations of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. reiterated the proposals which the Heads of their governments had put forward during their Geneva conference last July. The United States tabled detailed proposals of the Eisenhower plan for the exchange of military blueprints between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and for the aerial surveys of the territories of the countries; the United Kingdom restated its proposal for a system of joint inspection of the forces confronting one another in Europe in a specified area to be agreed upon; and the French delegation submitted an extended version of M. Faure's plan for the control of military budgets and the earmarking of savings resulting from disarmament for economic development programmes. The Soviet Union simply tabled the text of Premier Bulganin's Geneva programme, which is essentially a repetition of the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 insofar as they relate to disarmament.

In addition to the above, the United Kingdom and France each put forward proposals on the structure and powers of the international control organ which they considered should supervise any disarmament programme.

There were useful exchanges of views on the various papers tabled in the Sub-Committee and, in particular, on the Eisenhower proposals, which were welcomed by Canada and other Western delegations as a first step towards a more comprehensive disarmament programme of which they would form a part. No decision was, however, taken on any of the plans put forward. On October 7 the Sub-Committee submitted a non-committal report to the Disarmament Commission (which is composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada) reviewing the work of the Sub-Committee and indicating that it may hold further meetings and submit a supplementary report. It was indicated that one of the reasons for the adjournment of the Sub-Committee at that time was that disarmament was to be discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference which opened in Geneva on October 27.

Although the Western delegations had been under the impression that the Soviet delegate had agreed to the Western time-table whereby the Disarmament Commission would be meeting only after the "Big Four" talks in

(Continued on page 308)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT SIGNED



Seated left to right: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States; Mr. Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank; Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States; and Mr. J. H. Warren, Canadian alternate executive director at the International Bank.

Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, signed the Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation in Washington at 12:30 P.M., Tuesday, October 25, 1955. The Ambassador also deposited Canada's Instrument of Acceptance with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, thus completing the requirements for membership in the Corporation.

Parliament has made provision in the current year's estimates for an expenditure which will enable the Canadian Government to purchase 3,600 shares in the International Finance Corporation at a value of \$1,000 (U.S.) per share.

The International Finance Corporation will have an authorized capital of \$100 million available for subscription by members in amounts proportionate to their subscriptions to the capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Corporation will come into being when at least \$75 million has been subscribed by at least 30 governments to the capital of the Corporation.

The basic objective of the International Finance Corporation will be to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in its member countries,

(Continued on page 308)

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. E. M. Reid, High Commissioner, returned to New Delhi from home leave, effective September 12, 1955.
- Mr. P. A. Bridle appointed Canadian Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Laos, effective September 19, 1955.
- Mr. G. H. Heasman, Ambassador, returned to Djakarta from home leave, effective September 26, 1955.
- Mr. L. Mayrand, Canadian Commissioner, posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commission for Laos, to home leave, effective September 28, 1955.
- Mr. A. Rive appointed Ambassador of Canada to Ireland. Proceeded to Dublin on September 29, 1955.
- Mr. L. P. Picard Q.C., appointed Ambassador to Argentina. Departed from Ottawa October 20, 1955.
- Mr. E. Turcotte, Ambassador to Colombia, posted to home leave, effective October 28, 1955.
- Mr. W. G. Stark appointed Consul General of Canada, New Orleans. Proceeded to New Orleans on September 1, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Boyd posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective September 2, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Kilgour posted from home leave to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. T. B. Wainman-Wood posted from home leave to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. C. H. West posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, to Ottawa, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Crepault posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective September 7, 1955.
- Mr. A. C. Anderson posted from home leave to Ottawa, effective September 12, 1955.
- Miss M. E. Kesslering posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective September 14, 1955.
- Mr. T. M. M. Pope posted from Ottawa to the London School of Oriental and African Studies, effective September 22, 1955.
- Mr. W. G. W. Olivier posted from home leave (Washington) to Ottawa, effective October 3, 1955.
- Miss B. E. McGregor posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective October 5, 1955.
- Mr. J. C. J. Cousineau posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective October 7, 1955.
- Mr. J. G. Maranda posted from home leave (Indochina) to Ottawa, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. J. M. Harrington posted from home leave (Belgrade) to Ottawa, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. S. G. LeFeuvre posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. J. M. J. Hughes posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, The Hague, effective October 29, 1955.
- The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers Grade 1:
- W. F. S. Beattie, J. M. Hunter (September 6, 1955); Miss M. T. A. L. Saint Pierre (September 30, 1955).

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, approved by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on April 11, 1955.

Signed by Canada, October 25, 1955.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited October 25, 1955.

Bilateral

Mexico:

Exchange of Notes respecting air services.

Signed at Mexico, October 28, 1955.

Entered into force October 28, 1955.

United States of America:

Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries,

Signed at Washington, September 19, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged at Ottawa, October 11, 1955.

Entered into force October 11, 1955.

Exchange of Notes respecting financial arrangements for furnishing supplies and port services to visiting naval vessels of either country.

Signed at Ottawa, July 21, 1955.

Entered into force October 19, 1955.



CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued on page 305)

Geneva, the Soviet Union asked that the Commission be reconvened on October 17. At this meeting which was finally convened on October 21, the representatives of New Zealand, Belgium and Peru all objected that the voluminous documentation of the Sub-Committee had become available only that day and that the countries not represented on the Sub-Committee had had no opportunity to study it; they considered, therefore, that a disarmament debate at this stage would serve no useful purpose. This stand was supported by all the Western members of the Sub-Committee, including Canada, and, over Soviet objections, the Commission decided to adjourn on October 31 and to hold its next meeting at a time to be fixed by the next Chairman, bearing in mind the desirability that the Commission take full account of the deliberations of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva.



INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION

(Continued from page 306)

particularly in the less developed areas of the world. The Corporation will invest in undertakings in co-operation with private capital. In general the corporation will seek to help create conditions which will stimulate the flow of both domestic and international private investment for enterprises in its member countries.

The representative from Canada who serves as a Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will also become a member of the Board of Governors of the International Finance Corporation.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1955.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

The Growing North in the Growing World

By R. A. J. Phillips*

THOSE readers who persist through the estimated fifteen minutes required to read this article will find themselves in a world grown larger by some 857 people than it is now. Should the reader of *External Affairs* put aside this article for another year, the rate of population growth is likely to be even greater.

These thirty million people by which the earth's population grows each year, these thirty million more people who are born than who die each year, are perhaps the single biggest reason why the north of Canada is bound to become an area of the greatest consequence not only to Canadians, but to men and women in virtually every part of the world.

These thirty million people require not merely the food, clothing and ordinary necessities of life, but the accoutrements of a fuller life. The world's need for resources is growing not merely in proportion to its growing population, but in relation to the steadily rising individual demand for a better standard of living. The demand can in part be met by higher productivity, but ultimately it can be satisfied only by the discovery or exploitation in vast measure of resources which until now have been unknown or unused.

Undeveloped Resources

One of the greatest potentials of undeveloped resources in the world is the Canadian north. The surprising, and perhaps heartening fact, is that Canada's economic strength and prosperity, her reputation for vast mineral and other natural resources, has so far been built almost entirely on the natural wealth of the southern fringe of the country. Beyond it, to the north, lies a million and a half square miles containing some of the most promising mineral-bearing rocks in the country. It is scarcely touched. It lies waiting for the miner's drill in something of the way the rich prairie wheat fields awaited the plough three quarters of a century ago.

The minerals of the north are unlikely to lie fallow very long, for real as the difficulties of their extraction often are, the demand for their use must in time transcend the barriers that climate and—much more serious—distance impose. The overwhelming demand, though not necessarily the most articulate demand, will probably come from the people outside North America in their desire to share the benefits of modern technology. The measure of the potential demand can be seen in a comparison of consumption in the United States and outside. For instance, in 1954 the per capita consumption of zinc in the United States was 11 pounds and in the rest of the world it was 1.4 pounds. The per capita consumption of lead was 9.4 pounds in the United States and 1.2 pounds elsewhere. A similar disparity exists in most other raw materials. If the rest

* Executive Officer, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and formerly of the Department of External Affairs.



—Northern Affairs and National Resources

SPRINGTIME ON THE YUKON RIVER

of the world moved only a minute distance towards the consumption levels of the United States, the need for resources would rise tremendously.

Something of the world's growing need for minerals was forecast by the Paley Commission in the United States 3½ years ago. In 25 years, the Commission estimated, the U.S. demand for lead would increase 39 per cent, the demand of the rest of the world by 61 per cent; the demand for copper by 43 per cent and 54 per cent; the demand for nickel 100 per cent throughout the world. The United States by 1970 or 1980 would need 1,845 per cent *more* magnesium than in 1950. The list could become tedious. Let it merely be noted that deposits of most minerals are known in the Canadian north, and deposits of almost all are considered likely by geologists, with the exception of those produced by surface action in tropical conditions, e.g. bauxite.

The Wealth of the North

What is the wealth of the Canadian north? Some minerals have been known since earliest exploration. Some have been developed commercially for more than half a century. Others have more recently been brought into production, or are soon to be. Extensive geological surveys have been made over almost the entire north. In the longer settled regions, the surveys have been relatively intensive; in the lesser known barren lands they have been designed merely to point the way to areas which appear promising to the prospector. All this is by way of saying that we cannot generalize: a few examples may help.

The original wealth of the north was in fur, in search of which traders became explorers and explorers became traders. It was fur which saved the north from limbo after the search for the Northwest Passage became, commercially at least, a hopeless quest. But by the Second World War white fox was falling behind minerals and the main export of the two northern Territories. In 1898 the whole world heard of gold in the Klondike and raced to find elusive fortune. When most of the adventurers returned from the Yukon they left in their wake a sense of anti-climax but they had formed the foundations of the future development of the Territory.

Great Mineral Potential


Today gold still comes from creeks which half a century ago were lined by men with hopeful pans, but now the operation is carried out by dredges on a scale typical of the new approach to northern mining. Gold is no longer as important to the Yukon as lead, zinc and silver. Production in the leading mine, which only nine years ago was less than half a million dollars, now approaches 14 million dollars. The potential, however, is undoubtedly greater than the realization. Other highly promising deposits of lead-zinc, of silver-lead, of nickel-copper, and of asbestos have been found. An area of 12,500 square miles in the northern Yukon is under active exploration by a private company seeking oil and natural gas.

The importance of these mineral deposits is heightened by a staggering potential of water power, part of whose benefits will be available to the Yukon. Present plans for the upper Yukon River and its tributaries envisage the production of 4,500,000 horsepower, that is, one quarter of the present developed capacity in all of Canada.

The Yukon has some good merchantable timber, not enough for significant export, but useful for local needs. In agriculture, too, production may be expected to satisfy part of the requirements of the population. Now between 500 and 1,000 acres are under cultivation, less than one-fifth of one per cent of the estimated arable land.

Less in detail is known of the Northwest Territories whose tremendous expanse, though completely mapped, has known detailed geological exploration only in very small part. The present mining industry is centered around Yellowknife on Great Slave Lake where gold production (based on ore of extraordinary high grade) increased five fold from 1939 to \$10 million in 1954. Gold was not the first important mineral development. Uranium was produced on Great Bear Lake in 1933, and since the War this area has been one of the world's most important sources of uranium. Oil was first extracted on a commercial scale from Norman Wells on the Mackenzie River in 1920; after a greatly increased production during the War, this field is now used to serve the needs of the Mackenzie Valley.

The record of mineral production in the Northwest Territories is less spectacular than its future. The first big name is Pine Point on the south shore of Great Slave Lake where there is an indicated zinc-lead ore potential of something over 60 million tons. Much of it would be available by open-cut methods, all of it is easy to treat. A list of other promising areas reads like a minor gazetteer of the Northwest Territories. Proved mineral deposits within the



—Northern Affairs and National Resources

GIANT YELLOWKNIFE GOLD MINE

Largest Gold Mine in the North, Yellowknife, N.W.T.

relatively tiny fraction of the north so far carefully investigated include (besides gold, uranium, lead and zinc) copper tungsten, iron, coal, tantalum, beryllium and lithium.

Possibly the pace of things to come is best indicated by one figure: in just seven years between 1946 and 1953, mineral production in the Canadian north increased 1,000 per cent.

Climate and Distance

Here, then, is much of the wealth the world needs. What are the problems of getting it? They are considerable. The first one which comes to any mind is climate.

Climate is not, however, as serious a factor as most people think. In the first place, in the area of Great Slave Lake where mining activity is now, and for some years is likely to be, centered, the harshness of the climate is often exaggerated. The winter temperatures are a good deal colder than in the cities of the south—Yellowknife winter temperatures average 17 degrees F. below those of Winnipeg. In the summer months, however, Yellowknife is pleasant and has an average temperature of 57 degrees, only about seven degrees cooler than Winnipeg and only three degrees cooler than Edmonton. And, though the summer growing season is short, the long hours of sunlight permit the rapid growth of plants.

In neither winter nor summer does climate present any insuperable obstacles to living or to industry. Houses require good insulation, consumption of fuel oil is high. But the only real problem of cold is paying for it.

Distance is a more serious problem than climate. Transportation increases production costs more than any other single factor. The Yukon has good roads linking development areas and connecting them with the highway network of the south, and it has a railway to tidewater. The Northwest Territories, however, has only one main highway from the south and it ends at Great Slave Lake. For the rest transportation is by water, dog sled, tractor, train or air. The Mackenzie River transportation system is extremely important, but it has the disadvantage of being ice-free only three or four months a year.

Transportation, serious a problem as it now seems, can be met by man. A railroad has been proposed to link the rich Great Slave Lake area with Canada's trans-continental railway network. The effect of such a railway, its proponents point out, would be not only to open up the most extensive zinc-lead deposits in North America near its terminus: it would also hasten the development of many other mineral resources now awaiting the approaching day when costs (largely transportation costs) can be reduced to the point where the operations are not only commercially profitable, but even more profitable than other mineral developments far to the south. It would, in fact, open up the 530,000 square miles of the Mackenzie District.

Other Factors

It would be both unrealistic and unfair to think of the place of Canada's growing north in the growing world merely in terms of the material wealth which it is about to yield. The north has importance to Canadians in other ways. It is a defensive zone used to warn of the approach of hostile aircraft, a zone used to protect the settled areas of the south from their onset. Colourful and dramatic as the building of radar lines across the Arctic and sub-Arctic are, their importance to the future of the north is largely confined to the transportation routes which they encourage as well as for the knowledge of northern conditions to which their construction and operation will undoubtedly contribute. The north of Canada is not being developed for defence, nor does the development of the north depend upon defence. It is, however, an activity which might, if worst ever came to worst, make the free world even more grateful for the existence of the Canadian Arctic.

The north is also important because of its people, the 10,000 Eskimos who inhabit some of the farthest and bitterest climates of the earth. They are people watched carefully by their fellow Canadians for they are now facing difficult problems of adjustment as the south moves at an accelerated pace into their homeland. With their closely-linked problems of health, education and new economic outlets to replace traditional ways, the people of Canada are closely concerned. This is neither charity nor condescension. They are important citizens of Canada, citizens who, particularly in the light of their numbers, have had a unique impact on the art world through the quality of their remarkable stone carving. They are also the people who know the High Arctic best, and upon whom Canada and the rest of the world will have to rely for its progressive development.

Across the Pole

Canadians are not alone in their appreciation of the potentialities of northern development. Canada's next door neighbour across the Pole has been actively exploiting the wealth of the north for at least a generation. The best of many of the Soviet Union's mineral reserves lie in the sub-Arctic and these have for some time been contributing to the national wealth. Like Canada, the U.S.S.R. faces problems of climate and transportation. Soviet successes in developing the Northern Sea Route are well known. Railways have long reached into the European Arctic and supplementary networks have been developed both in western and eastern Russia. Regular air routes cross much of the Soviet north.

It is not surprising that the north in the Soviet Union has reached a later stage of development than in Canada. Canadians, with their limited population and relative national youth, have been deeply pre-occupied in their short history with the opening of regions closer to the old and settled parts of the country. They have had no population pressures, no shortages of raw materials to lead them north, and only recently have they had the economic strength, the freedom from pre-occupations with other frontier building, the peace and prosperity to enable them to turn to the north.

The longer experience of the Soviet Union in northern affairs, the professed desire of its leaders to promote closer relations through the exchange of information and of visits, has led naturally to proposals for the sharing of northern knowledge. The idea was discussed with Mr. Molotov on Mr. Pearson's visit to Moscow last autumn. The success of such exchanges with the Soviet Union could be much more than a test of the good relations of the two coun-

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—NFB

SHAMAN WITH DRUM, TYPICAL OF ESKIMO
STONE CARVINGS

Admittance of Palestinian Refugees to Canada

THE Department of External Affairs announced on December 2 that the Canadian Government has tentatively decided to admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees as immigrants to Canada. This decision has been taken in view of the requests received from Palestinian refugees for immigration to Canada and in the context of Canada's continuing desire as the fourth largest contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to do what it can to promote the welfare of refugees.

The immigrants would be chosen from amongst English or French speaking refugee applicants in Lebanon or Jordan who have certain specified trades or skills which would enable them to find employment in Canada. Prospective immigrants and their families must also meet certain health and other requirements.

Because of the lack of Canadian immigration facilities in Lebanon and Jordan, the Canadian Government has requested UNRWA to assist with pre-selection of refugees applicants who have the necessary qualifications and UNRWA has been kind enough to agree to provide this assistance. The final choice of immigrants, however, will be made by Canadian immigration officials who will visit Lebanon and Jordan in the near future for this purpose. Because of the limited number of applicants to be accepted, the Canadian officials will make a selection from amongst applications submitted by UNRWA.



THE GROWING NORTH IN THE GROWING WORLD

(Continued from page 315)

tries: it might well be positive contribution to the early development of the Canadian north.

The North and the Rest of the World

Canadians no longer look upon their north as merely frozen wastes. Neither do they look upon the north as the repository of fantastic wealth ready for the taking. They look upon it as an opportunity and as a problem. For them it is both. For the rest of the growing world it is an opportunity, one of the most hopeful of the second half of this century.

Franco-Tunisian Relations

ON July 3, 1955, a series of Conventions were signed by the Prime Ministers of France and Tunisia setting forth a new relationship between the two countries. The Conventions were later ratified by the French and Tunisian Governments and the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Paris on September 1, 1955. The conventions envisage an enduring and close communion between the two countries. Within this framework a large measure of local autonomy is transferred immediately to Tunisia and authority in other spheres is to be assumed by the Tunisians in specified stages extending over a period of 20 years. However, throughout this period France will remain responsible for the defence of Tunisia and for the external relations of the territory. This important event opened a new era in Franco-Tunisian relations. It was the climax of a process of constitutional evolution which commenced when Tunisia became a protectorate of France.

The French protectorate of Tunisia was established by the Treaties of Kassar Said (or LeBardo) and La Marsa of 1881 and 1883 respectively. The subsequent development of the country was governed by the clause in the Treaty of La Marsa under which the nominal head of state, the Bey of Tunis, undertook "to make such administrative, judicial and financial reforms as the French Government considers advisable". In the years that followed, a French administration was grafted to the traditional Tunisian institutions; modern communications were introduced; agricultural and mineral resources were developed; and modern health practices were introduced. Many thousands of European colonists settled in the protectorate.


The rise of nationalism in Tunisia may be said to date from 1920 when the Destour or Constitution Party was formed. The programme of the Destour called for a number of political reforms including the establishment of a deliberative assembly elected by universal suffrage and of government responsible to this assembly, elective municipal institutions and the appointment of Tunisians to posts in the civil service. A number of administrative reforms were adopted by the administration but these did not satisfy the nationalists. Following a series of incidents in the early thirties the Destour was dissolved by the authorities. Its place was soon taken, however, by the Néo-Destour (New Constitution), a movement with modernistic tendencies and organizational methods, which sought not only political objectives but also the raising of the standard of living of the Tunisian people. Labour troubles and political unrest led to the proclamation of martial law in April 1938, the dissolution of the Néo-Destour and the arrest of many of its leaders.

Postwar Developments

By the end of the Second World War the Néo-Destour had become a popular symbol of the growing Tunisian desire for self-government. Progress was made towards this goal in successive reforms which were granted by France with a view to the development of representative institutions. In 1949 a Tunisian cabinet was set up under Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik. In April 1950, the French Government responded favourably to a seven-point

TUNISIA

SCALE IN MILES



programme for the Tunisian autonomy which was put forward by the leader of the Néo-Destour, Habib Bourguiba. The Chenik cabinet was broadened to include members of the Néo-Destour and other nationalists and the negotiation of reforms commenced. Some progress was made and initial reforms were proclaimed in February 1951. However, further negotiations ended in deadlock because the Tunisians were unwilling to accept the principle of co-sovereignty, under which the French and Tunisian residents of the protectorate would have had equal political, administrative and economic status. The failure of the negotiations caused a breakdown of Franco-Tunisian collaboration. Serious rioting early in 1952, marked the beginning of a period of unrest which continued for more than two years.

Discussion in the United Nations

After the dismissal of the cabinet of Mohammed Chenik in March 1952, and the arrest of many Tunisian nationalists, a number of Asian and African states asked the Security Council of the United Nations to intervene. The Security Council voted against putting the question on its agenda and the African and Asian states then requested a special session of the General Assembly in June 1952. This move was not successful but the African and Asian states did succeed in having the Tunisian question inscribed on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly in 1952. Canada supported the resolution which was adopted and which expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government in Tunisia, and appealed to them to refrain from any act likely to aggravate the situation. The General Assembly began its eighth session in 1953 towards the end of another year in which physical force rather than political negotiation had dominated the Tunisian scene. The Assembly agreed without debate to include the question of its agenda but did not adopt a resolution.

Franco-Tunisian Negotiations 1954-55

Earnest efforts were made by the French Government in the winter of 1953-54 to bring about a greater degree of Tunisian participation in the affairs of the country. In March, 1954, the Bey of Tunis signed six decrees establishing the basic institutions of the new regime and appointed Salah M'Zali as Prime Minister. Neither the Néo-Destour nor any of the French settlers in the protectorate were satisfied with the reforms and their opposition, together with acts of terrorism by Tunisian fellaghas brought about the resignation of the M'Zali government in June 1954.

Such was the situation when M. Mendes-France became Prime Minister of France. In July 1954, he paid an unexpected visit to the Bey of Tunis and announced that France was prepared to recognize the internal autonomy of Tunisia, reserving only the control of defence and foreign affairs. M. Mendes-France suggested the formation of a Tunisian Government which could enter into negotiations with France. A new Tunisian cabinet was formed of independents and members of the Néo-Destour with Tahar ben Ammar as Prime Minister, and French Assembly approved in broad outline the proposals which the Government intended to make. In order to create an appropriate climate for negotiation the legal status of the Neo-Destour was restored and the state of siege in large areas of the protectorate was lifted. M. Bourguiba, the leader of the Néo-Destour, described these French policies as courageous and bold.

The negotiations, began on September 11, 1954, in a spirit of mutual confidence and with a clear objective in mind. Considerable progress had been made by the time the United Nations General Assembly reached this item of its agenda and the Assembly decided to "postpone for the time being the further consideration of this item."

The Government of M. Mendes-France was defeated in February 1955, when the French National Assembly expressed lack of confidence in his North African policies. Terrorist acts again disturbed the peace in Tunisia but before the situation deteriorated seriously, the new Prime Minister of France, M. Faure, declared that his Government would pursue the objective of an autonomous Tunisia. Negotiations with the Tunisian leaders were resumed and although agreement was reached on most major points, a temporary impasse developed on the question of the future association of the territory with France. Prime Minister Faure broke the deadlock on this point by calling in M. Bourguiba, then in exile, who persuaded his colleagues to accept a compromise.

Consequently, a *protocole d'accord* was initialled on April 22, 1955, and was expanded into the series of Conventions which will henceforth be the basis of Franco-Tunisian relations.

The Provisions of the Agreement

The Conventions, six in number, with the Annexed Protocols establish the relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual consent deriving from free and equal associations. France recognized the internal autonomy of Tunisia and renounced the right which it obtained under the Treaty of La Marsa of 1883 to introduce administrative, judicial and financial reforms. Tunisia is free to choose its own political and administrative institutions and the decrees of the Bey (i.e. Tunisian laws) will no longer require the approval of the French representative. On the local government level, the *caids* or local Tunisian authorities are no longer to be under the tutelage of French civil controllers. Within the Tunisian Government, the French directors who have headed the department of finance, public works, public education and communications (P.T.T.) have been replaced by Tunisian ministers. (This completes the gradual transfer of cabinet portfolios from France to Tunisia which began in 1945 when only two departments—Justice, and Local Affairs and Religious Foundations—were headed by Tunisians). The Resident-General of France in Tunisia has been replaced by a High Commissioner who will act as intermediary between the French and Tunisian Governments in all questions of mutual interest and will exercise those powers still belonging to France in Tunisia.

The transfer of powers relating to law and order will be made by specified stages over a period of 20 years. Jurisdiction in cases involving Tunisians becomes the responsibility of Tunisian courts upon the entry into force of the Conventions. The competence of French courts in questions involving a Tunisian and a non-Tunisian will gradually be reduced in favour of Tunisian jurisdiction; courts of mixed composition are to be established within five years and are to have a life of 15 years.

The Tunisian Government was given complete responsibility in internal financial and budgetary affairs but the economic and commercial interests of

the country continue to be closely associated with those of France. Tunisia remains in the franc area and will form a customs union with France. French financial and technical assistance is provided to assure the continued economic and social progress of Tunisia. An annual programme of capital investments will be prepared by agreement of the two Governments.

Although France retains control of Tunisian defence and foreign affairs, the Conventions provide for a significant degree of Franco-Tunisian co-operation in these fields. A high committee for defence will be set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Tunisia. The committee will include the officer commanding French troops who will serve as the Bey's Minister of Defence. Frontier security is the responsibility of France. The French Army remains in the military installations in the Bizerte-Ferryville area and will occupy the frontier zone in the southern part of Tunisia bordering on Libya and Algeria. With respect to foreign affairs, France has agreed to consult and inform the Tunisian Government on questions affecting Tunisian interests. France will sponsor Tunisia's candidacy for membership in international organizations including, specifically, UNESCO and the International Labour Organization. Tunisian trade officials will be assigned by the Tunisian Government to serve with French commercial representatives abroad.

Rights and Interests

A number of provisions in the Conventions deal with the rights and interests of the 200,000 French nationals who live in Tunisia and of Tunisians residing in France. French nationals retain their own personal status and their interests will be protected by the High Commissioner of France. The French are free to continue to practice their religious, cultural and commercial activities but their participation in public life is restricted to municipal affairs and the mixed Chambers of Commerce. A French Cultural Mission is responsible for the direction of educational institutions and cultural organizations of the French Government in Tunisia. French and Tunisian nationals may travel in both countries, establish residence and earn their living with full freedom in accordance with labour and security regulations.

The Franco-Tunisian Conventions were approved with large majorities in the French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic and were greeted with enthusiasm in Tunisia. Prime Minister Tamar ben Ammar described the agreement as marking the full restoration of Franco-Tunisian friendship and expressed the conviction that a new age of happiness, prosperity, and liberty had begun for Tunisia. The successful conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations is of great significance not only to the future relations between the two countries but also to the tranquility and security of the Mediterranean area. The calm in Tunisia which has contrasted so sharply with the outbreaks of violence during recent months in the neighbouring North African territories of France, is a tribute to the constructive policies and moderation of the French and Tunisians. It is an example of the progress that can be achieved through an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process of development in dependent territories.

The Tunisian Government has announced its intention of establishing a constitutional monarchy under the Bey of Tunis and of calling elections for a

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Canada and the United Nations

Admission of New Members

A portion of the statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, is found on page 328.

When the tenth session opened, no new members had been admitted to the U.N. since Indonesia became the 60th member in 1950 and there were 21 pending applications for membership. In the past, the 7 applicants favoured by the U.S.S.R. (Albania, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, North Korea and North Vietnam) had not been able to obtain the necessary affirmative votes of 7 members of the Security Council. The 14 favoured by the non-communist members (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea and South Vietnam) had all been vetoed by the Soviet Union. A 22nd candidate, Spain, presented its application only after the opening of the session and the Security Council had not yet considered it.

Canadian Resolution

In an effort to break this deadlock, Canada took the initiative at this session in obtaining support in the General Assembly for a resolution looking to



NEW MEMBER OF UNITED NATIONS

—United Nations

The Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, left, congratulates Mr. John Conway, representative of Ireland, on the admission of his country to membership in the United Nations.

the admission into the U.N. of all outstanding applicants other than the temporarily divided countries of Korea and Vietnam. According to the draft resolution, which was co-sponsored by 28 states,

The General Assembly, . . . *believing* that a broader representation in the membership of the U.N. will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation . . . *Requests* the Security Council to consider in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of all those 18 countries about which no problem of unification arises; *Requests further* that the Security Council make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.

Acting on a report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the General Assembly approved the 28 power resolution on December 8 by a vote of 52 in favour, 2 against with 5 abstentions, China and Cuba voted against the resolution stating that they considered its "package deal" form to be in contravention of the relevant Charter requirements and that they opposed the admission of the 5 communist candidates (China voiced particular opposition to the application of Outer Mongolia).

The Security Council considered the admission of new members at meetings on December 10 and 13. On the latter date the Council voted on a resolution enumerating the 18 applicants and Nationalist China used its veto against Outer Mongolia. Thereupon the U.S.S.R. vetoed the 13 non-communist applicants and the resolution as a whole was defeated.

The following day, the Security Council reassembled to consider a Soviet draft resolution calling for the recommendation of all those applicants on the previous list except Japan and Mongolia. The U.S. Delegation then proposed an amendment adding Japan and this received 10 favourable votes and one negative vote cast by the U.S.S.R. and constituting a veto. The U.S.S.R. resolution was then voted on and, after each of the 16 applicants had been approved individually, the resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour, none against, and 3 abstentions (Belgium, China and U.S.).

At an emergency plenary session that evening, the Assembly approved by large majorities the recommendations of the Security Council and a draft Assembly resolution to the same effect (submitted by 30 powers including Canada). As a result the following states became members of the U.N.: Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain".

Korea

The debate on the Korea item occupied the Political Committee from November 10 until November 22. It was evident from the beginning that the Communist bloc powers were as firmly opposed as ever to the United Nations objective of a unified democratic Korea. In the face of their insistence on unacceptable provisions for the holding of all-Korean elections, the debate reflected the opinion of the majority that the time had not yet arrived for substantial progress to be made on the basic question of unification. It therefore followed familiar and expected lines.

As was the case a year earlier, the Committee dealt first with the question of which non-member states should be invited to participate in the debate. Two

resolutions were tabled on this subject, one by the United States for the seating of a representative of South Korea, and one by Syria for the seating of representatives from both the North and the South. The United States resolution was adopted by a vote of 44 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, (the Soviet bloc), and 9 abstentions. The Syrian resolution was defeated by 14 in favour, 34 against, and 10 abstentions, (including Canada).

Question of Unification

The subsequent debate on the question of unification was based on a draft resolution sponsored by the United States Delegation. This resolution which started the broad objectives of the United Nations, provided as follows: it noted the report of UNCURK; recalled that in approving the report of the 15 nations participating for the United Nations in the Geneva Conference of 1954, the General Assembly had expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible to make progress toward a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government; noted that the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 would remain in force until it had been expressly superseded by mutually acceptable amendments or by an agreement reached at a general political conference; reaffirmed the Assembly's intention to continue to seek an early solution to the Korean question in accordance with United Nations objectives; and urged that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives. Finally, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the provisional agenda of the Eleventh General Assembly.

Speaking in favour of the United States draft resolution, the Canadian representative, Mr. Paul Martin, said that while Canada was disappointed that more progress on the unification question had not been achieved, it was necessary to recognize that quick solutions could not be expected. He pointed out that the fundamental difficulty regarding the conduct of free and democratic elections as part of the unification process could be traced to the system of government in North Korea. It had to be recognized that so long as totalitarian Communist principles obtained these in undiluted form, it would be extremely difficult to arrange free elections—the essential act in the formation of truly representative government. He did not wish to imply, Mr. Martin said, that it was impossible to unify by free elections countries in which one part was under Communist domination, but only to point out that it would be inadvisable to ignore the difficulties that arose from the nature of the situation in divided countries, and to establish positions which did not take the existing realities into consideration. Canada stood by the position which it took at the Geneva Conference in 1954 but was prepared to examine the problem with an open mind, and stood ready to consider any new proposals which might be advanced by either side in the dispute. Mr. Martin thought some distinction could and should be drawn between conceptions of the United Nations as the organizer of the armed defence of Korea and that of the United Nations as a peace-maker. It would not amount to the condoning of aggression for the United Nations to take into account the position of both sides in its endeavour to bring about unification.

Another draft resolution, which was submitted by India, was concerned with the problem of the resettlement of ex-prisoners of the Korean war. This

resolution noted that a number of the ex-prisoners remained temporarily in India, and that the Governments of Argentina and Brazil had offered to resettle as many of them as wished to go to those two countries. It requested that other member governments accept for resettlement those not covered by the Brazilian and Argentinian offers, and that the Government of India report again to the eleventh General Assembly on this problem.

In the voting which took place on November 22 the United States draft resolution was adopted by 45 in favour (including Canada), none against, and 11 absentions. The Indian draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 50 in favour, none against, and 6 abstentions.

Charter Review

The Charter Review question was considered by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 109 of the U.N. Charter which provides that (a) if a General Conference for the purpose of reviewing the present charter has not been held before the tenth session of the General Assembly, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session and (b) the conference shall be held, if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

Canadian views on this subject have been based on two premises: (1) Failure to arrange a conference (which under proper circumstances could make useful studies and recommendations) might cause widespread disappointment but, on the other hand, an acrimonious and unproductive conference could have even more serious consequences; (2) A conference would not be likely to achieve success until international tensions are relaxed. Hence, while not opposed to the holding of a review conference, Canada preferred to see it postponed to a sufficiently distant date to permit adequate preparations for it and, perhaps, a substantial easing of East-West differences.

Accordingly, Canada agreed to co-sponsor a 7-power draft resolution reflecting these views which had been worked out mainly by the United States and United Kingdom. This resolution provided for a decision in principle by the General Assembly that a Charter Review Conference "shall be held"; it also provided for the appointment of a committee to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for the conference and its organization and procedures. By giving the committee two years to study the question before reporting to the twelfth session, the resolution provided for a lapse of time during which Canada and others hope there will develop an atmosphere more congenial to the holding of a successful Conference.

The original proposal called for the establishment of an 18-member committee but, after some discussion, it was decided that a committee consisting of all members of the U.N. would best meet the situation and the resolution was amended accordingly. The resolution was approved by a large majority even though the Soviet Union and other communist members opposed it and announced that their delegations could not take part in the work of the Committee or in any action aimed at revising the Charter.

Withdrawal of South African Delegation from Assembly Delegation

On November 9 the South African Government recalled its Permanent Representative and its delegation from the tenth session, following the approval by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of a resolution expressing concern over the continuation of policies of *apartheid* and calling upon the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa to keep the matter under review and report back to the eleventh session. Thirty-seven countries voted in favour of the resolution, seven against (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom) and 13 abstained.

The South African delegation maintained that the activities of the Commission constitute intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union, in direct violation of Article II (7) of the Charter. This view was supported by the majority of the countries which opposed the resolution. The Canadian position was, however, based primarily upon the principle that it was undesirable to continue a commission which was unable to discharge the responsibilities assigned to it, and that there was risk of damage to the prestige of the United Nations if courses of action were decided upon which were not capable of producing workable results.

Return of the French Delegation to the General Assembly

Following the withdrawal of the French Delegation from the General Assembly on October 3, 1955, in protest against the inscription of the Algerian item on the agenda,* there was considerable informal consultation among delegations regarding a compromise which would allow the French to return. The members of the United Nations remained divided on the question whether the Assembly was competent to discuss Algeria (which, the French claimed, lay essentially within their domestic jurisdiction). However all United Nations members eventually accepted the view that, without prejudice to existing differences of position with respect to competence, it was not expedient to discuss Algeria at this time, especially in view of the recent improvement in the North African political situation.

Taking advantage of this favourable atmosphere, the Indian Delegation introduced a motion to the effect that the General Assembly would not consider further the item entitled "The Question of Algeria" and that it was therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the tenth session. On November 25 the Assembly adopted this resolution without objection and many of the 22 delegates who gave explanations of their vote appealed to the French Delegation to return speedily and also expressed confidence that France would promote a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. All those speaking made it clear that there had been no change in the views they had expressed in the earlier debate on the subject regarding the General Assembly's competence to discuss the Algerian item.

The French Government immediately announced that France would return to the Assembly and its Delegation resumed its seat on November 29.

* See *External Affairs*, November 1955, p. 302.

Atomic Radiation*

In the summer of 1955 the United States Government suggested that at its tenth session the General Assembly should take steps to establish procedures for the collection and the distribution of information on the effects of atomic radiation. In making this proposal the United States recognized the widespread interest throughout the world in the possible effects of the use of atomic energy on human health and safety. Many studies were being made by governments and national scientific bodies on this complex problem and the need for assembling and making available on an international basis the results of these studies was being increasingly felt.

The General Assembly readily concurred in the United States suggestion and on December 3, 1955, adopted unanimously a United States resolution, also sponsored by Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, establishing a Scientific Committee to study the effects of atomic radiation. This Committee will be composed of scientists representing the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Under its terms of reference the Committee will receive and assemble radiological information furnished by states members of the United Nations of its Specialized Agencies on (1) levels of radiation and (2) scientific observations and experiments concerning the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environment. Yearly progress reports will be made by the Committee which is also called upon to develop by July 1, 1958 or earlier, if this is warranted, a summary of the various reports received. From time to time, the Committee will transmit as it deems appropriate documents and evaluations on information received to the Secretary-General for publication and dissemination to states members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies. The Committee will recommend uniform standards with respect to sample collection and radiation counting procedures; at the same time it will furnish indications of research projects which might require further study.

Human Rights and Self-Determination

The Committee on Human Rights, one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, decided at its second session in December 1947, that the task of drawing up an international bill of rights should be carried out in three stages: A "Declaration", a "Covenant", and "Measures of Implementation". The first stage was completed on December 10, 1948 a day since known throughout the world as Human Rights Day when the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which had been prepared by the Commission, by a vote of 48 in favour, none against with eight absentions (the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa). Between 1949 and 1954 the Commission on Human Rights devoted six sessions to the preparation of two draft covenants, one on economic, social, and cultural rights, the other on civil and political rights. All participating governments were consulted, and the final drafts were submitted to ECOSOC, which at its 18th Session in 1954 transmitted them to the Assembly without taking any decision on their substance.

* See statement by Mr. Martin, p. 336.

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ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

Statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, and Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Ad Hoc Committee, December 1, 1955.

... We are not asking the agreement of the other members of this organization to a proposal which is without difficulties. There are reasons why we should have preferred not to take this course but in this imperfect world it is often unwise to refuse to take any action unless that action is open to no possible objection or criticism from any standpoint. It seems to us that the course we recommend is best, on balance. To delay longer would be to perpetuate injustices. We doubt the wisdom of such an alternative.

After long consideration it has seemed to us that the worst course would be to allow a considerable number of countries to languish in frustration outside the United Nations. Most of the applicants are countries with much to contribute to or gain from our organization. They are in many cases countries with ancient traditions and great cultures. Some are countries with governments newly instituted which are anxious to establish their international relations within the ordered framework of the United Nations as the organ of the community of nations.

In particular—and I mention this as an ex-

ample—I have in mind the case of Italy, a country which culturally has been one of the main creative forces within our Western civilization and one which, for instance, in the field of law, for thousands of years literally has made a constant and inspiring contribution. It is hardly conceivable that our organization should continue any longer to operate without being able to list among its members a country like Italy which is one of the recognized founders of the very family of nations of which this organization seeks to be the expression.

Some applicants are controlled by regimes or are following policies which we do not like. Some dwell in such isolation and obscurity that we know little about them. This is far from a satisfactory situation but the question remains whether admission of these members will on the whole make it better or worse. We think that the edge is more likely to be taken off intolerance and misapprehension within the United Nations than in barren isolation.

We do not agree with the tendency to look upon admission to membership in the United



—United Nations

SIXTEEN NEW NATIONS ADMITTED TO UNITED NATIONS

At a meeting of the Security Council on December 15, sixteen new countries were admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Nations, or for that matter, upon recognition of states as the conferring of a favour and to forget that it is also in some respects the performance of an international duty and the imposing of a discipline. Admission to membership means the bringing of countries under the obligations of our organization and these are obligations which go far beyond those which are normally incumbent on members of the international community under the law of nations. We may disapprove of the regime or of the policy of some of the applicants but are they not likely to become more acceptable members of the world community as part of this organization, when they are committed to its purposes and subjected to its rules. There is an obligation upon members of this organization to behave in accordance with definite principles and to observe insofar as possible the decisions of its various bodies. While no member could pretend that his record has been impeccable—and I am certainly not suggesting that ours is, and certainly the record of some have left much to be desired—the noble principles of the Charter remain for all of us, to a greater or less extent, standards by which to measure ourselves. They are not yet fully attained but they inspire our conduct and we can say that being accountable to this great organization has had a beneficial effect on our behaviour. The same is bound to happen to these countries which are now outside, when they subscribe to principles and join an organization which we strongly support.

No Violence to Principles

We are all, of course, deeply concerned to preserve and to respect the principles of the Charter. We are convinced that the action we propose here does no violence to these principles. The Charter is not a law with a precise interpretation for every article. It is a document which has to be interpreted with understanding and with moderation. Being the product of many different civilizations and schools of thought, it would be presumptuous for any of us to insist upon interpretations which would be inevitable only in terms of our own education and concepts. This is no plea for taking a light or expedient view of the Charter but a request that we should recognize that there may be legitimate differences in its interpretation.

Let us face frankly the principal concern of those who fear, for instance, that the admission of some of these states would be contrary to the terms of Article 4 (1). Can we say that these states are "peace-loving", an essential requirement for membership? How can we interpret exactly the meaning of this term "peace-loving"? It does certainly not mean

"pacifist", because virtually all member states, including my own, maintain armed forces and believe that we must be prepared to fight if necessary to defend our principles and our way of life. Perhaps it is easier to understand this term if we contrast it with its antonym, which would presumably be "war-loving". We have known war-loving states in the past. The United Nations was itself founded in the association of countries fighting together against states controlled at that time by men who loved and glorified war for its own sake. There remain perhaps some individuals in the world who share this degenerate attitude to war, but I doubt if there is any state in the world today which now does so as a national policy. This is the age of the hydrogen bomb. To me it is inconceivable that states, whatever they may consider their national interests to be, should not now live in horror of war. It remains true that there are states—and I do not exclude some of the present applicants for membership—whose policies, if not altered but pursued in the extreme, could provoke war, but I am prepared to believe that they are not seeking war as an objective or instrument of national policy and that they would in fact go to considerable lengths to avoid it. This it seems to me rather than compliance with certain subjective structural or policy tests, should be the criterion to be applied in relation to Article 4 (1).

Some objections have been made to the admission of certain applicants on the grounds that they might not fully qualify as states and that they might not be able to carry out their obligations as members of this Organization. We are entering here a field where there is bound to be controversy. Unless there is willingness to compromise to take a moderate view, again the prospects of progress are likely to be jeopardized indefinitely. For our part, we consider that new candidates should not be required to meet stricter standards than those which have been applied in the past in dealing with this problem.

I submit that we must interpret the Charter in a spirit which is compatible with the Organization as it exists and as it has developed since its foundation. The United Nations is not and it never has been the preserve of countries all of whom are inclined to give similar interpretations to Article 4 (1) or any other. We could of course have formed a United Nations of this kind with membership exclusive to those who see alike on most things. When we rejected such a conception of the United Nations we accepted by implication a broad interpretation of the terms of the Charter.

In the view of my Delegation there has never been any doubt as to the infinitely greater value of a United Nations which embraces all the major traditions and contemporary philosophies of government than of one confined to those who are unlikely to quarrel with each other over anything serious. Having accepted this view as one more likely to bring about peace and harmony in the world, we are obliged, I think, to accept its implications. One of those implications is that we ought not to use the Charter to bar from membership countries whose policies and points of view resemble closely those of other states which are Charter members.

It is by the principle of ensuring the broad representative character of the United Nations that we have justified the position taken in our draft resolution. It may be thought that this is a principle which is contrary to the strict letter of the Charter. If one accepts, however, the argument that I have put forward above, I do not think that there is a contradiction involved. My argument is that the principles of the Charter must be interpreted in the light of the intended world-wide nature of our membership. If the United Nations were confined entirely to peoples of one tradition, then we might be justified in a more limited interpretation of Article 4. Given the fact, however, that it includes members of many different traditions, that it is in a sense, therefore, virtually universal, we must understand its provisions in those terms.

Members of the committee will have noted that the draft resolution refers to the pending application for membership of all those countries about which no problem of unification arises. It will be understood that the

resolution refers to unification for purposes of membership in the U.N. only, and that it is not intended to exclude from membership, now or later, applicants which have problems of this nature in other contexts . . .

It will be obvious also, as we indicated in our statement in the general debate, before Spain submitted her application, that in submitting our resolution we had in mind that the Security Council should consider the other 17, and now as a result of the Spanish application, the 18 other outstanding applicants. In our view, the admission of 18 new members remains the target. For our part, we are prepared to receive favourably all the recommendations which will be made by the Security Council.

Our support of the draft resolution is based on a philosophy of the United Nations as we see it, a United Nations which is as near universal as possible. We are aware of the fact that the expansion of the United Nations will introduce more voices, perhaps in some cases discordant voices, into a community where there is already much discord. We realize that by bringing in these members we may be swelling the opposition occasionally to measures which we shall undoubtedly be supporting. Unquestionably it would be easier to sit back and prolong the present situation indefinitely out of fear of unknown consequences but in our view to do so would be a sterile attempt to preserve a restricted arrangement which is bound to be swept away sooner or later. We cannot ignore the nature of the world as it exists. If the United Nations is to survive and if it is to play the great role intended for it, then it must reflect the real world, not a partial world of our contriving.



FRANCO-TUNISIAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 321)

national assembly which will prepare a democratic constitution for the new nation. The influential leader of the Néo-Destour, M. Bourguiba, who returned from exile in France following the conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions, described the future of his country in these terms:

le français restera toujours le lien qui reliera la Tunisie à la civilisation occidentale . . . une Tunisie . . . solidaire du monde arabo-musulman par son âme et sa culture et résolument tournée vers l'occident dont elle fait partie . . .

SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

Statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Third Committee, October 27, 1955.

The Canadian Delegation would like to take the opportunity afforded by the Third Committee's discussion of Article 1 of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights to express some views on the question of self-determination of peoples and nations. I should perhaps explain that we wish to make these views known now rather than at a later stage, because they are of a fundamental nature and have a direct bearing both on Article 1 of the draft covenants and on the various proposals to be considered under the next item on the Committee's agenda.

I should like to refer first to the comments of the Canadian Government on the Draft Covenants on Human Rights, which are to be found in Document E/CN.4/694/ Addendum 6, dated March 10, 1954. Paragraph 8 of that document refers specifically to the self-determination articles in the two draft covenants. The Canadian position, as stated there, is that self-determination is a collective matter rather than an individual human right. We believe that this distinction is fully justified and we attach such importance to it that we find it necessary to adhere to our view that reference to self-determination of peoples is inappropriate in an international instrument dealing with individual human rights.

Views Shared

We share the view of those Governments which look upon self-determination more as a goal than as a right. In this connection, I should like to emphasize that we continue to believe that the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"—recognized in the United Nations Charter—is a matter of the greatest importance and deserving of the fullest respect and support.

While this is still the guiding factor in our thinking, we have become conscious of the need for a fuller analysis of self-determination in the light of views expressed by other governments in various organs of the United Nations in recent years. We have been greatly concerned to find that our understanding of this provision in the United Nations Charter is somewhat different from that of some other governments. In fact, it has become increasingly clear to us that the nation—if I may call it that—of self-determination is susceptible of a number of varying interpretations. The dis-

cussions concerning self-determination in the Commission on Human Rights and in this Committee have merely served to emphasize these differences in interpretation and have not resulted in the universal approach which we believe to be essential before any further progress can be made in this field.

It is important, Mr. Chairman, before proceeding any further, to clarify one or two points so that there can be no possible misinterpretation of the position of the Canadian Delegation—and perhaps that of some other delegations who, it seems to me, share our views in this matter.

Division of Opinion

Given the nature of our organization and the obvious division of opinion on the subject of self-determination, I am led to ask very earnestly whether any group of nations represented in this Committee considers that further progress in finding an acceptable solution will be facilitated by an attempt to formulate or define so-called rights or principles which another group of nations is—for reasons which I will mention later—not prepared to accept. Is it not more in keeping with the spirit of our organization and, I would add, more practical and sensible to recognize that there are differences in approach to the subject? Would it not be better to attempt to seek solutions or arrangements which will narrow these differences and—without impairing the all important goodwill and understanding which should inspire our deliberations—make it possible for all of us to advance, agreed step by agreed step, towards mutually satisfactory arrangement?

Now I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that those who regard self-determination as a right take their stand as a result of deep conviction—often in the light of bitter historical experience and under considerable and understandable pressure of public opinion. Is it unreasonable to appeal to fellow members of this organization, to approach differences with moderation and with a willingness to seek reasonable compromise; to consider that other countries which do not share their view on this particular subject are also motivated by the same high purposes, guided by long-established national traditions and a most earnest desire to do only what is right and fair?

This leads me, Mr. Chairman, to the crucial point. The members of this organization, when

they signed the Charter or adhered to it, have repudiated, one and all, the idea that any human being—and, even more, any group of human beings—should be held in political subjection or be the object of any kind of exploration. The very principles of our Charter proclaim in the most solemn fashion that alike in the relations between individuals and between nations or peoples, the golden rule is one of service, of dedicated and generous assistance. It is not helpful to suggest, therefore, in anything we say here that some members of our organization are not prepared to abide by these principles and are influenced by any purpose other than those which have enshrined in the Charter. It is not better to assume that in all this the main difference between us is not one of principle but perhaps one of method, not one of goals but rather one of approach. All of us here should seek what will be most beneficial to those peoples or areas which are not self-dependent or self-governing. We are all of us committed under the Charter to enlarge as far and as fast as possible the area of freedom in the world, in a manner which is consonant with the provisions of the Charter as a whole.

If we approach the issue facing this Committee with these thoughts in mind, our task will remain formidable but I am confident that it will be much more easily manageable. It is our hope that, through calm and friendly discussion among Member Governments, many of the question-marks resulting from the various understandings of this provision in the Charter will be permanently removed by working out generally agreed answers to the questions.

No General Agreement

What are these questions? They have been asked before, but I take the liberty of repeating them. First, "what do we really mean by the term 'self-determination'?" Second, "what do we really mean by the term 'peoples and nations'?" Mr. Chairman, I am sure that no member of this Committee would pretend that there are generally agreed answers to these questions. There is, for example, no general agreement whether political self-determination is achieved when self-government, or autonomy or full internal and external sovereignty have been concerned. Similarly, there is no general agreement on who is to enjoy self-determination—whether racial, religious, geographical, cultural and economic units are to be invited to determine their fate *and, if so, what tests are to be applied to ascertain whether such a unit is seeking expression of an articulate desire in this respect.* Besides, how many countries have no minorities? There is also the question of timing and

of selecting the arbiter. Who will say when a certain unit has reached the necessary degree of maturity? This raises problems which may not be essentially different in nature from those involved in the question of recognition of states. It seems to us what the very notion of who is entitled to self-determination and what it means—or when and how it should be asserted—is still too loose, too vague, to be defined with the desirable accuracy. In these circumstances, we find it impossible to declare our unreserved acceptance of self-determination, either as a right or as a principle. It is already clear that there are many other governments represented here which find themselves in very much the same position.

More Specific Questions

Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned a few questions of a general nature which have been troubling us. Since the generality of these questions may make them seem not too difficult to answer, I should like to mention briefly a number of more specific questions which I think will bring out the very real difficulties inherent in any attempt to implement self-determination.

First, self-determination must be examined in relation to Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. If it were to be suggested, for instance, that the General Assembly ought to determine when self-determination should be applied, intervention in domestic matters might be involved and nothing less than an amendment of the Charter might be required.

Second, the preamble to the Charter states that one of its purposes is to promote respect for the obligations arising from treaties. To accept self-determination as a right might have far reaching effects on existing territorial arrangements. Acquire rights under valid international treaties might also be affected.

Third, the provisions in Chapter XII of the Charter recognize that self-determination is not an absolute right and that, in their own interest, certain peoples need the protection and support of other countries and that in such matters "the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples" must be taken into account.

Fourth, the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter imply that self-determination is not to be interpreted in such a way that it would be inconsistent with the obligations and rights of the administering countries. Admittedly, this is a contentious subject but even so, my government is of the opinion that any action which might have the effect of urging interpretations which are unacceptable to a number of members of the United Nations is

a matter for concern and should not be disposed of precipitately.

I have mentioned only four specific points which we believe must be examined carefully before a decision can be reached on the precise implications of self-determination. There are doubtless many other questions of equal or perhaps even greater importance which the General Assembly should study. I should like to say with all sincerity that the Canadian Government is (and has always been) ready and willing to play its part in finding the answers to these questions.

Dual Traditions

Finally, I would like to recall that our historical experience in Canada has been one of evolution tending to free and equal association. Our Nation, among others, encompasses peoples of many racial origins with varying religious beliefs and cultural heritages. We live freely together, and each citizen is free to think according to his own conscience and to act as he sees fit within the limitations imposed by the law. It would be a serious matter indeed if, through a decision of the United Nations, member countries were placed in a position of being morally and even perhaps legally bound to grant to these minority groups the right to determine their own institutions without consideration for the wishes of the community as a whole. For historical reasons our nation bears the dual stamp of Anglo-Saxon and French traditions. We have inherited from the old French tradition a true appreciation of the importance of formulating and codifying the rights and obligations of individuals throughout the world. Who can deny that Frenchmen have been in the vanguard of those who have sought to express in unequivocal terms the rights of the individual persons? From the Anglo-Saxon tradition we have inherited a cautious approach to the formulation of broad and theoretical principles. Because of this, we feel that there is a danger that premature formulation of principle may introduce an element of contention and rigidity in the field of self-determination when the emphasis should, in our view, be on specific cases and on flexibility. This is especially true in an age when all nations are becoming more conscious of their interdependence rather than of their separateness.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have given sufficient indication of the way in which my Delegation views, at this stage, the question of self-determination. In closing, therefore, I should merely like to emphasize that we have a keen interest in the whole subject, that we are prepared to study it carefully and to sup-

port any practical, concrete suggestions which will not involve contradictions with other Charter obligations and which appear to us to be politically advisable in their flexibility and timeliness. Whether in the context of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights or in any other context, our attitude to self-determination will be fully in accordance with our political traditions and what we may consider to be the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the United Nations. We have no other considerations in mind. We sympathize with those governments which are genuinely anxious to find a generally agreed definition of self-determination and also appropriate measures to implement it, once defined. Our aim is that all that is feasible in this field should be done with as little delay as possible. Because we are determined to live up to our obligations we are *not* prepared, however, to subscribe to broad and imprecise statements relating to hypothetical situations. We are willing to accept solutions which will be effective and which will positively contribute to the cause of freedom in the specific situations which have to be dealt with in the very concrete world in which we live and in which this organization has to operate.

Sovereign Equality

While we believe that the United Nations can and should help to solve this problem, we do not delude ourselves that our organization will have the final word. We do not forget that the organization is based on the principle of "the *sovereign* equality of all its members" and that in matters of such fundamental importance as "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and nations" there can be no really effective action without the consent of all the parties concerned. We do not look upon "self-determination" as a new idea because, as we see it, many countries, including our own, owe their existence to the practical application over a period of time of this very idea. That is why we can have no objection to its application in the future—under generally approved safeguards.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that I have made it clear that our purpose is not to delay or to oppose constructive action, but rather to help build firmer foundations for developing friendly relations among nations, as envisaged in Article 1 (2) of the Charter.

I have thought it desirable to speak in rather general terms at this time. I would like, however, to reserve the right of my Delegation to intervene again when the Committee reaches the stage of considering the various proposals that have been made for further study of this problem in the United Nations.

THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

Text of the talk by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the "Special Speakers Series" of the CBC on November 27, 1955.

Since returning from my visit to the Soviet Union, I have often been asked: Why did you go there? And what were the results, if any?

I went to Russia primarily to exchange views about current international issues, particularly those of direct concern to our two countries, in the hope that such an exchange might assist in some small way in the resolution of differences; or at least give me a clearer understanding of what these differences were. Certainly no one can be happy about them when you realize that the price of failure to establish a durable peace might easily be the unimaginable devastation of a nuclear war.

In my talks with the Soviet leaders I did what I could, and whenever I had the chance, to correct misunderstandings or misapprehensions about the policies by which we in Canada, in concert with our Allies, seek to protect our security and ensure peace.

I tried to make them realize—and I did not have the impression that this was labouring the obvious—that we of the West are as vitally concerned as the Soviet leaders told me they were, with peace and security and the removal of the causes of war. But I likewise made it clear to them that we were not prepared to scrap our collective security arrangements or weaken our defences merely because of what has been called the "Geneva Spirit";—especially when as the recent Geneva conference has shown, that "Spirit" as a subject for toasts is one thing; but as a basis for negotiations is something else. It is not enough to talk in general and friendly terms about "Reducing International Tension", while leaving unresolved the basic difference which causes these tensions.

No Secret

During my visit to Moscow and to the Crimea we talked of many things—of Ski's and shoes and sealing wax, and cabbages"—and NATO. Mr. Khrushchev, a very blunt and outspoken person, who does not waste time on the niceties of language or protocol, and the more subtle and sophisticated Mr. Bulganin (these two seem very close together at the "summit", of Soviet affairs) made no secret to me of their determination to weaken and destroy our North Atlantic Organization as an aggressive, anti-Soviet Bloc.

I told them that NATO was no such thing; that it was formed only after the United Na-

tions had proved ineffective to guarantee our security against the dangers that threatened us; that strong support for it would remain a principle of Canadian foreign and defence policy until the international situation or the United Nations made regional security pacts unnecessary.

I also did my best to convince them that the United States had no intention of attacking the U.S.S.R. or trying to use NATO for that purpose. I pointed out that if the United States were the aggressive military, imperialist state they claimed it to be, there would be no Canada today, except as an American satellite, and that, as they should know, we were not.

The Soviet leaders also talked a lot about Germany. They stated bluntly that they would not permit that country to be unified unless she withdrew from NATO.

We should not force Germany to remain in NATO, said Khrushchev. I replied that all we asked was the right of a Germany united by free elections to decide what her future course would be.

Frank Discussion

But there would be no such elections—or no such unification—Khrushchev warned me—until a European security system of the kind proposed by his government had replaced NATO.

Well, that was the kind of frank discussion we had, and I think it was useful—and revealing.

Such a forthright talk, however, did not affect in any way the friendly welcome we received. Our hosts could not have done more for our comfort and entertainment. The warm and generous hospitality for which the Russian people have been noted—and long before the Communist revolution—seemed, and I think was, genuine. It was difficult to doubt the sincerity of the rank and file when they protested their passion for peace. But the people of *all* nations want peace. Their desire in this regard is only politically important when they can bring it to bear effectively on the policy of their Governments.

For Canada, specifically, those with whom I talked expressed high regard; respected our achievements in war and peace. They are not unaware, I may say, of our strategic location as their neighbours across the Pole. Mr.

Khrushchev, for instance, averred that if there were ever another world war, Canada would have no geographical immunity from attack. He thought that this should make us all the more anxious to be on good terms with *both* our neighbours.

I replied that we were well aware of our strategic position, and also of the fact that we could never feel really secure if either of our two neighbours were hostile to us—or to each other.

I made it clear, however, that in coming to Russia to explore the possibilities of understanding in issues on which we differ; or the prospects of trade and increasing contacts, we had no thought in any way of loosing our historic and friendly ties with nations with whom we have been so closely associated as proven friends over the years.

What did I gain by my visit?

For one thing, a better understanding of the great gap of ignorance and misunderstanding which, divides the Communist world from ourselves.

Lack of Understanding

This ignorance and misunderstanding is not, of course, all on one side. But on their side it is colossal; almost pathetic, and certainly dangerous.

Western—and especially American—policy and purpose is judged on the basis of cabled newspaper stories which give only one side and the most lurid side of life in free countries.

It seems quite impossible to convince Soviet leaders—who seem to base their alleged fear of us on such information—that these stories are distorted and unrepresentative.

I told Mr. Khrushchev that we found the truth out of the clash of varying opinions—all of which could and must be expressed. It didn't make sense to him.

Similarly when I argued (he had been talking about the threat from American bases) that a Communist party in any country was a source of fear as a Russian base, his immediate and natural reactions was that this was purely domestic matter; that if we didn't deal effectively with what we considered to be a menace—as they would certainly do in Russia—then that was our affair. That a group should have the right to express views detested by the vast majority was quite beyond his comprehension — as it would be to any Communist leader.

In the face of all this, what should we do? We should stand firm against tactics of divide, weaken and destroy — through threat *or* through blandishment.

But equally, we should do nothing—by provocative word or policy—to increase that fear of the West as a threat to peace—which they claim, genuinely or not, to feel.

We should also remember that to the Soviet rulers, peaceful co-existence means competitive co-existence—and that in this competition, which they expect to win, they are bound only by their own rules.

That is why I was ready to believe Mr. Khrushchev and the others when they told me, as they often did, that they wanted peace, or, if you like, a peaceful interlude.

In addition to the compelling reason that the alternative of war may be universal destruction—and these men are not suicidal Hitlers—there is their conviction—as Mr. Khrushchev has candidly admitted—that in a more peaceful international climate the free peoples will lose the competition, because they will not accept the sacrifices that prolonged defence preparations involve. Their coalitions — particularly NATO — will therefore fall apart. Communists, I was assured, could stand up better to sacrifices than we could—are tougher, more disciplined, and more patient in the long pull than we are. Communist society would therefore be superior to our capitalist society, in peaceful but competitive co-existence.

Certainly I am satisfied, from what I saw and heard, that there is great power in the Soviet Union—based on total control and iron discipline. We would be making a big mistake if we interpreted recent tactical and amicable advances as dictated by weakness. Mr. Khrushchev was emphatic about this and I suspect that he is right.

Strength Based on Free Man

But our strength can be far greater—for peace as well as for defence—if we wish to make it so—because it is based on the free man.

The Communists think that this freedom of ours, by encouraging laziness and licence, will be our undoing. We know that—rightly used—it is our greatest source of strength.

It is up to us to make it so, and thereby we win the struggle, and it is going to be a long, and hard, and costly struggle, for a free and peaceful world.

EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION

Excerpts from a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the First Committee, November 1, 1955.

The Canadian Delegation agrees with the proposal of the United States for the establishment of a special Technical Committee to co-ordinate information relating to the effects of ionizing radiation because it is conscious of the primacy that must be accorded to human values in the development and application of nuclear energy.

There is no need to re-state in this body all that has been said about the cataclysmic effect for our civilization of the release of nuclear energy. Like all such forces, it has incalculable possibilities of good and evil. It would be cowardly in the extreme to renounce the prospects of good because of the fear of evil. Nor could we now, even if we wanted to do so, exercise the new force we have liberated. We have no alternative but to behave like civilized human beings in the face of this magnificent and terrible challenge. To save ourselves we shall need discipline and intelligence of a high order. We must also be fearless in our pursuit of truth. This is too dangerous a matter to allow us the luxury of personal or national pride and prejudice. It is necessary that we work together on this subject.

The health problems associated with radiation have increasingly engaged the attention of officers of my own Department of National Health and Welfare and of a number of other government agencies since the development of our atomic energy programme. In addition to the protective measures taken by the authorities at our Atomic Energy project to ensure the health and safety of their own workers, extensive precautions are required to safeguard the health of persons working with radioactive isotopes in research laboratories and industry. Medical uses of radioactive isotopes are subject to review by physicians specially experienced in this field.

A broader problem is presented by the undoubted fact that in recent years there has been a slight, though appreciable, increase in radiation all over the world. The health implications, for our own and succeeding generations, of this increase the most sober and thorough consideration. Already significant studies are being pursued in a number of countries, with the result that a body of scientific literature in this field is rapidly developing. It must be acknowledged that some conflicting views have been expressed, but the consensus of the best scientific evidence available seems to be that no significant im-

mediate or long-range harmful effects of serious proportions will result from the increased radioactivity that has occurred.

Nevertheless, it would appear to me as a layman that there remain a number of unanswered questions, particularly in relation to possible genetic effects, which underline the need for the compilation and co-ordination of existing information by a body such as the proposed technical committee and which call for continuing research by competent scientists.

A Study of Genetic Effects of Radiation

Experiments on certain rapidly-breeding lower forms of life, such as bacteria, plants, insects and small mammals, have established the fact that genetic changes can be produced by exposure to radiation. By analogy it is assumed that the same phenomenon will occur in humans, but it will take many generations to assess the magnitude of the problem.

I am told by my medical and technical advisers that, in determining genetic effects on man, there are two principal difficulties. First, most mutations will remain hidden until one individual receives the same mutated gene for both parents. Secondly, naturally occurring genes for recessive defects and abnormalities are already numerous in the population. Neither these naturally occurring mutant genes nor those that might be induced by radiation are likely to produce a significant effect in the children of the individuals carrying them unless the parents have received the same defect from a common ancestor.

The genetic problem is exceedingly complex; the important factors are not known and our scientists are attempting to carry on useful investigations in this field. A great deal of study has gone into this question, and a long range programme is now being developed for the collection and study of human data that will aid in the assessment of this problem.

I should like to call the Committee's attention to the terms of reference of the special body to be established. It is suggested, quite appropriately in our view, that the special committee will undertake what will in effect be a survey. This is the logical first step to enable governments to assess the situation in the light of the facts as they will have been established. The Governments will then have

information on the levels of a radiation through the whole world instead of just in their respective territories as at present and will thus be in a position to determine the hazards involved on the best and most authoritative available information. The Committee should do more than circulate reports. It should organize systematically the materials received, putting the various contributions in proper perspective. Perhaps its most important work will be to tackle the difficult problem of recommending a research programme to answer the questions which now beset us. In this understanding it will of course be essential to proceed on the basis of information received from national committees.

The Canadian Delegation agrees that it is important to have some sort of deadline in order that, on the one hand, the report will not be unduly delayed, and, on the other, that

we should not be pressed into bringing in a report prematurely on the basis of insufficient data. I should like to make it clear, however, that in our view, a report delivered by 1958 should not be regarded as final and conclusive, particularly in relation to genetic effects, the study of which may well extend over many years and, indeed, several generations.

Through the ages, each new scientific and industrial advance has brought with it new problems. We have only to think of the airplane. While the airplane has done a great deal to bring people and communities closer together, it has created a whole new set of problems relating to such matters as the regulation of international air routes, safety and health standards. Nuclear energy is, in a sense, unique among scientific discoveries in that preventive action against the hazards it may create is now being taken well in advance of its actual widespread development.



CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued from page 327)

At the current session detailed examination of the covenants was opened in the Third Committee. The preamble was approved, subject to final review, but Article I, which deals with the right to self-determination, proved highly controversial. This article reads as follows:

1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

3. All the states parties to the Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

The Third Committee concluded its debate on November 29, and approved the inclusion of the article on self-determination as Article I of both covenants, over the objection and negative votes of 12 countries, Canada among them.

In the course of the debate the Canadian representative pointed out that self-determination was a collective matter rather than an individual human right and therefore had no place in an international instrument dealing with such rights; that it was to be regarded more as a goal than as a right; and that a comprehensive study of the whole question was needed before constructive action to assert a right of self-determination could be undertaken. The full text of the statement made by the Canadian Representative, Mr. Paul Martin, will be found on page 331.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. H. O. Moran, MBE, Ambassador, returned to Ankara from home leave, effective November 21, 1955.
- Mr. J. J. Hurley, OBE, High Commissioner, returned to Colombo from home leave, effective November 11, 1955.
- Mr. C. J. Small, transferred from the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 3, effective October 1, 1955.
- Mr. G. S. Levey resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective October 17, 1955.
- Mr. D. W. Munro transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. G. W. Charpentier posted from home leave (Canberra) to Ottawa, effective November 1, 1955.
- Mr. R. W. Murray posted from home leave (Indochina) to Ottawa, effective November 7, 1955.
- Mr. J. C. Langley transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 12, 1955.
- Mr. D. H. W. Kirkwood, posted from home leave (Paris NAC) to Ottawa, effective November 14, 1955.
- Mr. M. C. M. Gauvin, DSO, posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 17, 1955.
- Mr. M. D. G. Baudouin posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 23, 1955.
- Mr. J. A. Donald, posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective November 25, 1955.
- Mr. T. H. W. Read posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy Havana, effective November 28, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Bilateral

France

Exchange of Notes respecting modification of the 1950 Air Agreement.

Signed at Ottawa July 30, 1954 and October 29, 1955.

Entered into force October 29, 1955.

Japan

British Commonwealth—Japan War Graves Agreement.

Signed at Tokyo September 21, 1955.

Union of South Africa

Exchange of Notes respecting the tariffs on wool, molasses and unmanufactured hardwood.

Signed at Ottawa, September 13 and October 26, 1955.

In force from April 1, 1955.

United States of America

Exchange of notes respecting the relocation of Roosevelt Bridge crossing the Cornwall South Channel.

Signed at Ottawa November 16, 17, 1955.

Venezuela

Exchange of Notes renewing the terms of the Commercial *modus vivendi* of October 11, 1950 for a period of one year.

Signed at Caracas, September 19 and October 11, 1955.

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 5: Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan and the Government of Italy relative to the Graves in Italian Territory of Members of the Armed Forces of the British Commonwealth, English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its seventh session, 2 May–8 July 1955. A/2934. N.Y. 1955. 49 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 9.

Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 7 August 1954 to 5 August 1955. A/2943. N.Y. 1955. 118 p. \$1.25. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 3.

Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. A/2947. N.Y. 1955. 20 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 13.

Report of the Committee on Contributions. A/2951. N.Y. 1955. 7 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 10.

United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954. Report on Ruanda-Urundi together with related documents. T/1168, March 1954. N.Y. 1955. 64 p. T.C.O.R.: Fifteenth Session (1955), Supplement No. 2.

Resolutions of the Sixteenth Session of the Trusteeship Council (8 June–22 July 1955). T/1193, 3 August 1955. 54 p. T.C.O.R.: Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 1.

International Tax Agreements, Volume IV. ST/ECA/SER.C/4. New York, 24 Sep-

tember 1954. 286 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: 1954.XVI.1.

Commodity Trade Statistics, January-December 1954. ST/STAT/SER.D/22 (Vol. IV.No.4) August 1955. 598 p.

Taxes and Fiscal Policy in Under-developed Countries. A report based on technical assistance experience, with special reference to field missions and to the Technical Assistance Conference on Comparative Fiscal Administration (Geneva, 16-25 July 1951). ST/TAA/M/8, 4 October 1954. 124 p. \$1.00. Sales No.: 1955.II.H.1.

ICJ—"ICJ Pleadings, South—West Africa (Voting Procedure)" 115 p. (bilingual). Sales No.: 133.

ICJ—*Yearbook 1954-1955.* 272 p. Sales No.: 136.

GATT—*Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Schedules of Tariff Concessions.* Geneva, June 7, 1955. 113 p.

WHO—*Executive Board, Sixteenth Session, Mexico, D.F., 30 May 1955: Resolutions. Annexes.* Geneva, August 1955. Official Records of WHO, No. 65. 21 p.

(b) Mimeographed Document:

The Stabilization of the Olive Oil Market. (E/CONF.19/1). FAO 55/8/5405, Rome, Italy, August 1955. 91 p.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

NATO Ministerial Meeting—Paris, December 1955

AT the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on December 15 and 16, the representatives of the fifteen member governments exchanged views on three basic questions:

- (a) the military problems of the alliance;
- (b) the international situation in the light of the Geneva Conferences;
- (c) the future development of the Atlantic community.

Canada was represented at the meeting by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Harris and the Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, Mr. L. D. Wilgress. They were assisted by Mr. W. M. Benidickson, Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance, and by officials of the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, Finance and Defence Production.

Military Problems

The Council reaffirmed the basic strategic objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and agreed on the measures necessary to adapt its forces to be prepared for a possible future war and on the general order of magnitude of these forces. In addition, principles to govern the development of defence planning, both collectively and nationally, were adopted; and consideration was given to the establishment of priorities for the defence programmes of individual member countries so as to achieve the most effective pattern of forces, given the resources in men, money and material likely to be available to the Alliance.

One specific problem to which the Council devoted some attention was the urgent need for an effective air defence and warning system in Western Europe. It was decided that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe would be responsible for co-ordinating the air defence of NATO European countries, and the main outlines of the system to be developed by SACEUR were also approved.

Review of the International Situation

The members of the Council exchanged views on current political issues and, in particular, discussed recent Soviet non-military activities including their recent moves in the Middle East and Asia. As the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers had ended only a few weeks earlier, and as this was the first annual NATO meeting at which German representatives were present, it was natural that the German problem should be given special attention. Although there were, of course, differences of emphasis it was apparent that all members of the Council were in substantial agreement both in their assessments of Soviet policy and on the broad outlines of recent Western policy towards the Soviet Union.



—NATIS

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

A Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Paris in December 1955. The Canadian delegation included the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, centre, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. R. O. Campney, right, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Harris. Speaking to Mr. Pearson is Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of NATO.

There was a general awareness that the Soviet leaders were exploiting in their current diplomatic offensive all situations that could give rise to difficulties for the members of NATO in an attempt to break up the unity of the Alliance. There was unanimous agreement that greater unity is the only possible answer to these tactics. The exchange of views on the international situation gave further evidence that NATO is becoming increasingly important as a forum in which members hear each others views and, where possible, try to achieve an agreed approach to outstanding international issues.

Implementation of Article 2

That the Council is developing into something more than a purely military alliance was also stressed by the discussion at the Ministerial meeting of the need for extending consultation within NATO to the economic, information and social fields. As noted in the final communiqué, the Ministers decided that the Council in permanent session should "examine and implement" all measures conducive to closer co-operation between members as envisaged in Article 2; the discussion did not, however, reveal any desire to establish new machinery for this purpose.

The consensus was that the meeting was a successful one. The political discussions, in particular, were very useful and were conducted in a frank and informal manner. The communiqué was intended to make clear to public

opinion the unanimity of the member states on the essentials of their German policy, in the face of the negative results of the second Geneva Conference. It also showed an awareness that, while the Council has taken cognizance of the new threat which exists for the free world in Asia and the Middle East, the problems of Europe are by no means solved and will continue to demand the close attention of the Council.

Final Communiqué

The North Atlantic Council held its regular December Ministerial Session in Paris on the 15th and 16th of December. Member governments were represented by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers. Dr. Kristinn Gudmundsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland, acted as chairman.

I

The Council examined and assessed the present international situation.

It unanimously welcomed the vigour with which the three Western Ministers had presented to the second Geneva Conference the proposals already outlined at previous meetings of the North Atlantic Council. These proposals aimed at the reunification of Germany through free elections; left the unified German Government free to choose its own foreign policy and offered a security pact to the U.S.S.R.

The Council noted with regret:

1. that the U.S.S.R. had repudiated the proposal to negotiate on the reunification of Germany through free elections, in spite of the directive agreed at the first Geneva conference;
2. that the U.S.S.R. was opposed to any effective system for the control of armaments including the air inspection plan proposed by President Eisenhower;
3. that the U.S.S.R. had given proof of its fear and hostility with regard to the free exchange of information between the people of the Soviet Union and the free world.

The Council declared that the negative outcome of the Geneva Conference had in no way halted the efforts of the North Atlantic powers to secure the reunification of Germany in freedom, such reunification continuing to be held by them as an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

The Council reaffirmed that they consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs; it is stressed once again that the security and welfare of Berlin should be considered as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation; it urged the importance of consulting further within NATO on the question of German reunification and on the situation in Berlin.

The Council also reviewed recent provocative moves and declarations by the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East and Asia. They recognized that these tactics, coupled with a continued increase in Soviet military capability created new problems and a new challenge to the Free World.

II

Following a report by the Secretary-General on the work and activities of the Organization in the last eight months, the Council discussed future defence planning of NATO. It considered the Annual Review Report for 1955 and approved force goals for 1956, 1957, and 1958. The Council welcomed the German Federal Republic's participation for the first time in the NATO Annual Review. The Council adopted procedures *designed to give new impulse and direction* to the future defence planning of the Alliance and to ensure even closer co-operation in this field. The Council expressed the firm determination of all member governments to see the Atlantic forces equipped with the most modern weapons. The Council noted with satisfaction that substantial progress could be achieved in this respect as a result of the valuable assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Council devoted major attention to *improving the arrangements for air defence and warning in Europe*. It accepted recommendations for the re-organization and closer co-ordination of the air defence in NATO European countries, so as to integrate further NATO activities in this vital field. The Council also received a report on a *new type* of communications system for air defence and warning. The United States offered to finance a pilot project for this new system.

III

The Council recognized that recent developments in the international situation made it more necessary than ever to have closer co-operation between the members of the Alliance as envisaged in *Article 2 of the Treaty*. They decided to instruct the Permanent Council to examine and implement all measures conducive to this end.

IV

In concluding its work, the Council declared that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the essential foundation of the security of the *fifteen* associated nations. Such association is in direct contrast to the obsolete system under which isolated nations are in danger of being subjugated, one by one, by despotic groups such as the Soviet bloc.

Palais de Chaillot,

Paris, XVI^e.

16th December, 1955.

STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, MR. L. B. PEARSON, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1955.

The recent NATO meeting gave a straight answer to the Soviet Union's recent efforts to weaken our alliance. Besides approving more effective defence plans, the Paris meeting demonstrated four things in particular: (1) the need for strength and vigilance in defence and for flexibility and unity in policy; (2) the need for continuous and frank political discussion in NATO to ensure this unity; (3) the importance of the problem of German reunification and (4) the welcome growth in NATO consultation on economic and other non-military questions.

The meeting emphasized that we cannot relax either in defence or in diplomacy, in the face of new Soviet tactics. This was agreed by all of us. If the Soviet Union can be made to realize the determination of the fifteen NATO members to work closely together to resist aggression and infiltration, the world will be spared a lot of unnecessary trouble.

The Council meeting also showed that the NATO countries sincerely seek to relax tensions but that they will not be deceived by mere technical manoeuvres. In this period of Soviet zigzag tactics NATO must be both strong and flexible; it must be strong militarily, though it is more than a military alliance, and it must be imaginative and ready to meet new diplomatic situations. The Paris meeting reflected the firmness with which these views are held by NATO governments.

The communiqué mentions German questions a good many times. At the recent Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference the Soviet Union unmistakably revealed their real policy towards Germany. They are not merely opposed to German rearmament or membership in NATO. They would not even be satisfied with a "neutralized" Germany, whatever that may mean. Their present price for German reunification was a fully communist satellite state. Therefore, it was obvious they would not permit free elections. We agreed in Paris that it was of primary importance to make this clear to public opinion and to pin the responsibility for a divided Germany where it belongs.

At Paris the German situation was re-appraised with care and candour, and it was concluded that the NATO countries should continue their efforts "to secure the re-unification of Germany in freedom, such reunification continuing to be held by them as an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace". We agreed, in short, after this searching re-appraisal that we should follow our present line in German policy, as that which was in accordance with the wishes of the majority of German people and as that which was being steadily and firmly pursued by the German government. We came to these conclusions only after receiving the considered views of the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany.



CORRIGENDA

Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1955, page 331, column one, three lines from bottom, for "nation" read "notion".

Ibid, page 332, column one, line 16, for "It is" read "Is it".

line 20, for "approach." read "approach?"

ten lines from bottom, for "concerned." read "conceded."

column two, twenty lines from bottom, for "Acquire" read "Acquired".

Ibid, page 333, column one, twenty lines from bottom, for "persons" read "person".

Canadian Recognition of Sudan

Following a decision for sovereign status taken by the Sudanese House of Representatives on December 19, 1955, the independence of the Sudan was formally recognized on January 1, 1956, by the governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt. These two countries had exercised a *condominium* over the Sudan since 1899. Canadian recognition of the new state of the Sudan was extended on January 6 in a telegram of congratulations from the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Mr. Ismail el Azhari, as follows:

“On behalf of the Government and people of Canada I extend my warmest felicitations on the achievement of independence by the Sudan. The progress of the people of the Sudan towards full government has been followed with sympathetic interest in Canada. It is a source of much satisfaction to me to be able to join in welcoming the Sudan into the comity of sovereign nations and to offer sincere best wishes for the happy and prosperous future of your country.”

Mr. Ismail el Azhari replied to Mr. St. Laurent, as follows:

“On behalf of the people and Government of the Sudan I heartily thank you for your warm message of felicitations on the occasion of Sudan’s independence and send you and the people of Canada our most sincere wishes for your well being, happiness and prosperity.”



KHARTOUM, THE CAPITAL OF THE SUDAN

Mayurakshi Project

THE Mayurakshi River rises in the Chota Nagpur hills of Bihar State, flows east and then south through West Bengal, and after 150 miles joins one of the rivers by which the sacred waters of the Ganges pass through its delta to the sea. The Mayurakshi used to be like many Indian rivers. During the monsoon it would be so swollen by the rains that its banks could hardly contain it. During the dry season it would become a trickle through the barren waste of its bed. Meanwhile the villagers in its basin, particularly those who farmed in the West Bengal district of Birbhum through which the upper part of the river flows would see their crops once in every four years wither and die for want of water. As recently as 1927 the crop failure was so bad that the district of Birbhum experienced severe famine.

Today the Mayurakshi—or peacock's eye if we may translate the name from Bengali—is like the old grey mare—it isn't what it used to be. There is this difference, however, the change has been for the better. While it still may roar in the monsoon and hibernate in the dry season, the river has now been tamed. It has become the subject of the Mayurakshi project—West Bengal's largest river valley project.

The key structure of this vast undertaking is a dam 2,000 feet long and 155 feet high over its deepest foundation. On the white granite face of the dam above the three main sluice-gates is set a black marble plaque on which these words have been cut in golden letters:

CANADA DAM

This Dam in connection with the Mayurakshi Project was constructed with funds made available by the Canadian Government and opened by the Hon. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, on 1st November, 1955.

Therein lies our tale.

As a result of the Birbhum famine, investigations were begun in 1928 with a view to providing this district with irrigation facilities. After years of study by its engineers the Government of West Bengal approved a composite scheme by which the water value of the Mayurakshi system would be eventually realized instead of dissipated. The plan was put into effect by stages beginning in 1948. First, some irrigation canals were built and barrages to supply them. However, a barrage across a river can hold back only a relatively small amount of water and therefore, if the demands of established canals always were to be met, and indeed the needs of new ones, a master water bank was necessary from which supplies could be drawn when required. This meant that a dam worthy of the ambitious project which had been put in train had to be built. Fortunately just across the border from West Bengal in Bihar the Mayurakshi empties from a narrow valley at Messanjore, an ideal site for a dam.

Before work could begin two important problems had to be solved. One of these concerned location. Being in Bihar the dam would flood a part of that

State mainly for the benefit of West Bengal. Moreover, in a heavily populated country land cannot be flooded without people being displaced. In the area of 27 square miles destined to be submerged, some 14,000 people lived in more than 100 villages. Many of these were an aboriginal folk called Santhals, whose forebears had occupied the valley at a time immemorial even in the historic land of India. As might be expected, they faced the prospect of being uprooted from their ancestral lands to meet an unknown future without enthusiasm.

The question of the dam site was settled by the good sense and goodwill of the Governments of West Bengal and Bihar. After a series of conferences they arrived at an agreement in the spring of 1949. Under this agreement, people displaced from the catchment area were given the choice of taking compensation for their land in cash or moving to well-planned and reclaimed areas with irrigation facilities. Although this choice was given at a cost of more than double the amount which would have been involved if the land in the reservoir area had simply been requisitioned, it had the happy and worthwhile result of enabling the valley to be vacated with the co-operation of all concerned. Another element of the agreement ensured that in Bihar the dam would be regarded as something other than an unwanted engine affixed to its soil. Provision was made for water to be drawn direct from the dam into a canal dug to serve the irrigation needs of Bihar farmers.

Financing the Undertaking

The second problem was the familiar one of financing the undertaking. River valley projects are not bargain-basement propositions. However, the Indian Government was about to embark on its first Five-Year Plan to develop the economy of the nation and in that Plan it gave pride of place to schemes calculated primarily to enhance agricultural production. Satisfied with the merits of the Mayurakshi project, it agreed to lend to West Bengal the money it needed to complete the enterprise. In June 1951 Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of India, laid the foundation stone of the dam. Eight months later the first bucket of foundation concrete was poured. Work on the project has continued ever since.

The temporary transfer to the federal authority of responsibility for financing only solved the problem as far as West Bengal was concerned. It added another to those with which the Indian Government had to cope. While the Government was determined to make the maximum use of the country's resources to improve the standard of living, these resources fell short of enabling the Government to accomplish everything it planned. Thus, if the Government provided the Mayurakshi project with all the funds it needed it would have to pare its aid to other deserving projects. It so happened that during a food emergency Canada had provided India, under the Colombo Plan, with wheat worth \$15 million. According to the agreement between the two countries India sold this wheat for rupees and credited the sum realized to a special account called a counterpart fund. This fund could then be used to finance the local costs of some economic development project mutually acceptable to both Governments. Mayurakshi clearly was such a deserving project and hence it was agreed that the money should be allocated to pay part of the costs of the local labour and materials needed in the construction of the dam. Subsequently the fund was further swollen by the addition of the counterpart rupees generated by the Canadian gift to India of about \$2 million worth of locomotive boilers.



—Gov. of West Bengal

ARRIVAL AT THE CANADA DAM

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mrs. L. B. Pearson arrive at the site of the Canada Dam for the opening ceremonies. Included in the party, at Mrs. Pearson's right, is the Chief Minister, West Bengal, Dr. B. C. Roy, and the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott M. Reid.

Our assistance did not stop here. The plan for the dam included provision for a small hydro-electric plant. Canada agreed to donate, at a cost of about \$3 million, the electrical equipment needed to put this plant into operation. The powerhouse will have an installed capacity of 4,000 kws. of hydro-electric power, half of which will be certain throughout the year. Its full capacity will be realized during the monsoon season when the power will be most needed for cottage industries which are being developed in the area to help the villagers supplement their means of livelihood. During the rains they cannot work their plots. When they can, those whose lands lie in areas where lift irrigation is necessary, will continue to derive benefits from cheap power in their farming activities. Electricity will operate the irrigation pumps.

West Bengal and the Indian Union have reason to be proud of what Indian skills and labours have accomplished in the Mayurakshi project. We have mentioned the length and height of the dam and the size of the reservoir. However, there are other facts about the project equally impressive. For example, the method followed in constructing the dam combined the employment of manual labour for rubble masonry work with the use of light hoists for lifting operations. Through this method six million cubic feet of masonry work were completed in a single year even though the only shift was of eight hours and the work had to be done in circumstances which were not always favourable. The structure was finished before schedule at a cost within the estimate. Since the time of the President's visit to Messanjore more than 15,000 manual labourers have toiled on the dam and in the canals. Strikes have been unknown.

The dam has been designed to withstand floods, wave pressure and even seismic disturbances. Its northern wing is a gravity bulkhead section while its southern wing has a 740 ft. spillway controlled by twenty-one gates each 30 ft. long by 15 ft. high. The bulkhead section includes three low-level and three high-level under-water sluice gates for the control and passing of irrigation water. The penstocks each 6 feet in diameter will provide the powerhouse with its water needs.

In West Bengal the canals of the Mayurakshi project are over 840 miles in length and more are being built. They fan out from the harnessed river system in an arterial network which will irrigate 600,000 acres of land. During the *kharif* or main crop season (June to October) all of these acres will be provided with water. During the remaining seven dry months, known as the *rabi* season, 120,000 acres will benefit. Although the project can ration its store of water, it can only get new supplies when the monsoon so wills. In Bihar the canal which leads from the dam will carry water to 30,000 acres in the Santhal Parganas region in the wet season and to 6,000 the rest of the year.

Over the more than 1,000 square miles through which the project extends, the staple crop is rice and the yield per acre has been low. Through sample surveys and harvesting experiments Indian experts have calculated that henceforth irrigation will increase the rice output grown in the *kharif* season by 325,000 tons a year. Most of what will be grown in the *rabi* season will be pure gain because before there was very little double cropping. Sugarcane and cotton will probably become the main crops of this season. Long ago, by Canadian but not Indian standards, Birbhum cotton was famous in South Asia and merchantmen of the East India Company beat their way home under sails made from it.

Official Estimates

According to official estimates, the total capital outlay for Mayurakshi—some \$31 million—will be recovered in about three years' time in the form of increased agricultural produce. Such an estimate does not take into account the possible secondary results of irrigation. For example, villagers will be encouraged to invest their new-found savings in improved implements and fertilizers and hence to increase their production still more. Small wonder that Mr. Pearson when he opened the dam should speak of the magic of this project where an initial investment of Canadian wheat (not to mention boilers) would be transformed into great harvests year after year after year. Instead of being a wasting asset this project is a compounding one.

In northern India the weather smiles from November to February and it got off to a good start on November 1 when Mr. Pearson came to Mayurakshi. The dam, curried, brushed and tidied for the occasion, bounced back the bright light like a glacier. The lake of its creation still burdened with the red silt from the fields below spread out like an arm of the upper Bay of Fundy. The jungle-clad hills threw a scalloped hem around the horizon. Below the dam near the three sluice-gates a gayly coloured canvas canopy had been erected to shield from the sun the official party and distinguished guests. About this canopy and along the sluiceway crowded thousands of inhabitants of the area,



OPENING CEREMONY

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, officially opens the "Canada Dam", the main reservoir in the Mayurakshi Project.

who before dawn had left such romantic sounding places as Mahammad Bazar, Ahmedpur and Dumka to see what was going on at the dam.

Mr. Pearson, who was introduced to the gathering by the West Bengal Minister for Irrigation, said Canada had been honoured through the naming of the dam. "Our peoples have shared the cost. And because, among friends, when the welfare of some is furthered by help from others, we also share the benefit. It is as simple and as fundamental as that; as simple as neighbourly help and as fundamental as friendship." The Chief Minister of West Bengal, Dr. B. C. Roy, then paid tribute to our country for the active help it was giving India in its drive for economic regeneration.

The time had come for the dam to be opened. Mr. Pearson pushed a button and simultaneously the curtain which had shrouded the name plate on the dam swept back and from the sluice-gates the tawny water spouted in three roaring jets. The ceremony was over and the official party had hardly left the dam site before the sluice-gates were shut again. Because it had taken twenty-seven years of planning and striving to capture the water treasure of the Mayurakshi only so much and no more could be spent of it for ceremonial purposes. This seemed peculiarly fitting.

On the day Mayurakshi formally became a part of India's destiny, Prime Minister Nehru sent a message of good wishes which concluded with these words: "The dam will be a visible and enduring link of friendship between Canada and India. Let this friendship endure."

AN ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, MR. LESTER B. PEARSON, AT THE MAYURAKSHI CEREMONY, NOVEMBER 1, 1955.

It is good to be back in India after nearly six years. My absence almost coincides with the period of your First Five-Year Plan which has put so many and such large developments in train. I welcome the opportunity to learn something about these at first hand, reflecting, as they do, India's steady progress. Of course, my second-hand knowledge of them is already pretty comprehensive. Our High Commissioner takes great pains to ensure that this is the case by providing a continuing flow of information on these matters. But nothing, not even a High Commissioner's reports, quite takes the place of a personal visit and a personal experience.

Canadians rejoice whenever we hear that free India is succeeding in its drive for a fuller and better life for her people. We rejoice because our nations and our peoples are friends who are fraternally associated in the Commonwealth; and who are co-operating for the common good within the framework of the Colombo Plan and the United Nations. We are striving for the same things; for peace and security on earth; for the advancement of the dignity and worth of the individual, irrespective of his class, his creed or his colour; for free government, carried on by the consent of the governed.

An Enduring Monument

It is most fitting that the Mayurakshi project should be the first I am seeing in India. For one thing, you have done us the honour of naming it the "Canada Dam", and this will give us a special and continuing interest in the project. Here indeed is an enduring monument to Indo-Canadian co-operation and friendship. Our peoples have shared the cost. And because, among friends, when the welfare of some is furthered by help from others, we also share the benefit. It is as simple and as fundamental as that; as simple as neighbourly help and as fundamental as friendship.

The Mayurakshi development is an integral part of your First Five-Year Plan. You are now about to embark on a Second Plan—on the successful completion of the First. The Mayurakshi development is also an integral part of the Colombo Plan, which is one of the most farsighted and imaginative attempts at international co-operative assistance ever devised. Last week at Singapore, the Indian, Canadian and all the other governments concerned, agreed to continue in operation this Plan for at least another five years—evidence enough that the Colombo Plan has been a success. Mayurakshi bears true witness to that success, and to the friendship between peoples without which it would not have been possible.

It is not for me to tell you about this project—you who have made the plans and executed them with results which stretch well beyond the horizons which hem us in today. Although I could not recognize a kilowatt if I saw one, I have some idea of what 2,000 kilowatts of hydro-electric power can do when turned over to people with the initiative and resourcefulness to use them well. Although my practical experience with irrigation consists of dampening a small lawn with a hose, I know what water can mean to 600,000 acres spread in the path of the Indian sun, and to the people who must work them. Developments such as these have inspired some observers to say that the face of India is being transformed. Such comments smack of face-lifting, and I do not like the ungallant implications. Rather would I say that through developments such as these, India is staking her claim to a good future in the material and economic sense, without losing her wise heritage from the treasury of the past, or her sense of deeper spiritual values.

The magic of the Mayurakshi, then, is something for great satisfaction. And magic it is when you consider that here an initial investment of Canadian wheat will be transformed into a great harvest of Indian rice year after year after year. It is a

magic not of sleight-of-hand, but of hands, the hands which harvested the wheat, drew the plans, carried the cement, dug the ditches—Indian hands and Canadian hands—all moved by a will to do good. And now the great part of the work is done, and soon the water, tamed by this dam, will be adding the benefit of electric power to those other benefits it is already providing.

Mayurakshi now becomes a part of India's great destiny. I offer my sincere congratulations to all those who have brought it into being and my good wishes to all those who will sustain it henceforth.



—*Republic News*

CANADIAN GIFT FOR INDIAN FLOOD VICTIMS

The High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott M. Reid, right, presents to the Secretary-General of the Indian Red Cross Society, a gift of 2,500 woollen blankets and other articles for distribution to flood victims in India. This gift, which was specially flown to India by the Royal Canadian Air Force, was part of the relief supplies bought by the Canadian Red Cross from a donation of \$50,000 made by the Canadian Government for Red Cross relief work in India.

Candel, Kampot, Cambodia

By MAJOR A. L. MACLEAN, CD, RCME

(Some impressions of the life and work of a member of the Canadian Delegation on the Fixed Inspection Team at Kampot, Cambodia, during the first year of its activities.)

A team was established in Kampot, on the south coast of Cambodia, on September 15, 1954, with a strength of seven: two Indian officers, two Canadian officers, two Polish officers and a Polish-English interpreter. During the first year the composition of the team varied from nine (an addition of an Indian (English-French) interpreter and a Polish-French interpreter) to only four (one officer from each country and a Polish-French interpreter). This group lived together in a large villa, ate their meals together there and had their headquarters there. The writer was a member of this team from the beginning until August 20, 1955.

During the early months the life was novel, the work new and interesting and the relationship between members grew from being formally polite to relaxed and informal associations. However, when such a small number of persons with vastly different backgrounds are together for work, for meals and for relaxation, relationships tend to become strained. This situation was aggravated by the climate: it rained nearly all day every day for the first month and then intermittently until early November. It wasn't a cool refreshing rain but a warm tropical one. It was difficult to dry laundry and the dampness permeated everything; clothes, bedding, etc. When the dry season arrived we had hot dry weather for seven months: the dryness was appreciated but not the heat. Then the rains started again.

Language Difficulties

Another factor which tended to separate the members of the team was language. It is very difficult to carry on detailed and interesting conversations through interpreters. Also, because we were together all the time, it was mutually agreed not to discuss politics or religion or any other topic that might bring to the surface deep-rooted prejudices. Thus, conversations were kept on a light plane and topics were soon exhausted. Because of the language and background, eventually the Poles tended to keep pretty much to themselves and the Indians and Canadians spent considerable time together. But, "familiarity breeds contempt", and therefore we soon found it better not to be too much in each others' company. When team members went to Phnom Penh for a few days each month they invariably went alone, so that they would spend their time in a different atmosphere and with different people.

A logical escape from this "desert island" was to seek companionship with the local inhabitants: French, Cambodian and Chinese. Here again the language problem arose. In Kampot only five persons, apart from the team members, had any knowledge of English. The answer to this, and the eventual inactivity of the team, was to learn French. Most officers on the teams in Cambodia managed to pick up a good working knowledge of that language.

During the first three months life was new, exciting and interesting. Everything we saw was different from what we were accustomed to and there was much to learn about the country: socially, politically, geographically and administratively. In the beginning we worked with the local Mixed Group, the representatives in our area of the Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of officers from both the Cambodian Army and the Communist forces. The job of the Mixed Group was to arrange the disbandment of the Khmer Resistance Forces (local communists), and the evacuation of the Viet Minh forces from Cambodia. Our task was to supervise these activities, and in many ways this was the most interesting part of our work in Kampot, working as we were with both Viet Minh and Cambodian officers.

Escort Duty

On one occasion the team, accompanied by a Cambodian and a Viet Minh officer, had to go by boat 90 miles, almost to the border of Thailand, to escort a few Viet Minh troops to the regrouping area at Chhuk, 25 miles north-east of Kampot. We took a small motor junk from Kampot and went down the river and out into the Gulf of Siam where we boarded a French Navy Patrol Craft (600 tons). This ship took us to Lem Dam where we picked up 26 Viet Minh (25 soldiers and one nurse). Each man carried a personal weapon, a bandolier of ammunition and a bandolier of rice. This latter was a tube of cloth about four inches in diameter and about four feet long. It was carried slung over the shoulder and contained about 6½ lbs. of rice, sufficient to feed one man for about 4 days. Besides this there were certain common stores: cooking utensils, dried fish, a mortar and ammunition, first aid kit, and similar items. The 26 were completely self contained and could move very quickly across the country. We escorted this group back to Chhuk without incident, and the Viet Minh seemed quite happy and in good spirits.

Several days later all the Viet Minh who had assembled at Chhuk (about 500; some with wives and children) were escorted to the Mekong River at Neak Luong where they embarked in French Navy craft bound for Viet Nam. The Cambodian Army provided the trucks and drivers and were responsible for the security of the convoy. We, in our white jeeps, escorted them; the Indians at the head of the column, the Canadians in the middle and the Poles in the rear. Due to excellent co-operation on both sides and the good security arrangements, the evacuation was carried out on schedule without any trouble. Troops of both sides carried loaded weapons.

Once all the Viet Minh were out of the country, our next job was to check on the re-integration of the disbanded Khmer Resistance Force personnel into the community, and to see that they were not subjected to reprisals. We received several complaints against the government but on investigation all were found to be groundless. During this period we visited nearly every district in the populated parts of the two provinces for which we were responsible, Kampot and Takeo. We visited the towns and numerous small villages, many accessible only on foot. One trip was made down the Takeo River in a small motor boat, another was made to Kompong Som Leou by boat, bicycle, foot and finally, elephant.

Many humorous incidents took place. In one village we were investigating a charge that the inhabitants were not allowed freedom of movement. We



CAMBODIAN FIXED INSPECTION TEAM

The Kampot Fixed Team, consisting of Indian, Polish and Canadian Officers, is shown above with interpreters during an investigation in a remote village. Seated in the front row are: Commander Malia, Indian Navy (in the white uniform), Captain Malianowski, Polish Army, on his right, and the author, Major Maclean, Canadian Army, on his left. French coconuts, brought by the villagers, are shown in the foreground.

asked one old man if he ever left the village. He replied, "no". When asked why, he stated that he was old and he didn't want to leave, all he wanted to do was to sit by his house. We decided then to ask a younger man and chose a good looking Cambodian about 18 years old. He was asked if he could leave the village and go into the nearest town (sic) if he wished. He said; "no". We all perked up at this and were ready for a story of local authorities' suppression of freedom of movement. When asked who would not allow him to leave he replied: "my father". That broke up the meeting and we moved on to another nearby village. The outcome of this investigation was that we found no government restriction on the freedom of movement of the villagers.

When in the rural areas on a case we always draw a large crowd and at the end of the investigation we asked if any one had any complaints. On one occasion an old man came forward and stated his case: he complained that

the previous year he had paid only 100 piastres (three dollars) tax but this year the government was demanding 150 piastres (four dollars and fifty cents). Of course this question did not come within our terms of reference and we told him so. Many of the peasants complained about having to pay taxes. On another occasion, a man asked us for which party he should vote in the coming election. We steered clear of that one too, although we had a good laugh over it.

Translation Problems

Language was not only a problem among the team members, but also during investigations. On most cases one officer from each country did the investigation; that is, an official team consisted of three people. However, our three jeeps carried a total party of twelve: the three officers, an Indian (English-French) interpreter, a Polish-English and a Polish-French interpreter, two Cambodian-French interpreters (employed by the Commission and representing both sides), a servant to look after our meals, and the three Cambodian Army drivers. It was quite an entourage and caused great excitement when we arrived in the small villages. When we had settled down in a shady spot and selected our witness, questions were decided upon, and then asked by the Indian team head in English, translated on the side into Polish, then into French and from French into Cambodian. The answer came back through the same channel: Cambodian—French—English—Polish. From this it can be readily understood that we soon learned to ask simple direct questions which required short definite answers. Another problem was that Cambodian is a simple language and one word has many meanings in English. For example, *Tchop* means: arrest, stop, detain for questioning, etc.; another, *Samlain* means; parents, relatives, friends, neighbours, etc., and another, *L'hoa* means; good, nice, well, fine, pretty, etc. Therefore, in many instances, in order to assure that the exact meaning was clear, it might take from 15 to 20 minutes to get an understandable answer to one simple question.

In one investigation an important witness was a Viet Nameese who spoke only that language. Our Cambodian interpreters did not speak Viet Nameese so we had to search the village for someone who spoke Viet Nameese and Cambodian or French. We found a Chinese merchant who spoke Chinese, Cambodian and Viet Nameese, and who agreed to act as interpreter. So the questions and answers went; English (then Polish)—French—Cambodian—Viet Nameese—and back. Obviously only the most elementary questions could be answered with any degree of accuracy, particularly since Cambodian was an intermediate language.

Rural Cambodians don't have much use for calendars or watches. They tell the time by the sun and the date by the phases of the moon related to the seasons (there are two seasons: dry and rainy). Thus, a time and date may be given as: when the sun was descending on the eighth day of the waning of the third moon since the last rains. When this is translated into English and then corrected to the best of every one's ability it is realized that the witness meant in the afternoon of some day late in January. But that was as near as it was possible to come. Hence the establishment of the exact time of any specific occurrence was very difficult to determine.

After the Viet Minh had withdrawn and the ex-members of the Khmer Resistance Forces had been taken back into the community and given equal

rights with the rest of the population, the teams had little to do except to be in the country in case something happened. Thus we had no specific jobs for weeks on end. The first few months of this inactivity were not too bad because we spent our time learning as much as we could, considering the language problem, and seeing as much of our area as possible. However, except for the main highways, roads are very bad and travel is not easy. Trips on jungle tracks and cross country mud routes are not comfortable in old jeeps. The Kampot jeeps travelled a little over 14,000 miles during the first ten months of the team's activity and we were reluctant to use them more than was necessary.

Boredom, the Great Problem

The inevitable boredom eventually set in and was our biggest problem after March 1955. We were fortunate in Kampot to be near the sea and a good bathing beach, at Kep, and we took full advantage of this during the dry season. There was a local tennis club where we played from time to time. A great deal of reading and a little writing were also done; but still, life was rather dull. There was only one Canadian officer at Kampot from mid March unto early August and lack of a country-man to talk to was the worst feature of life during that period. This was overcome to a degree by frequent (every three or four weeks) trips to Phnom Penh; however, the feeling of isolation and loneliness was always present and sometimes spirits sank pretty low. There were compensations though.

On one occasion the Governor of the Province of Kampot had a large party, and according to custom, several girls were hired as dancing partners for the guests (wives do not take part in such activities in Cambodia). All team members attended, resplendent in our uniforms, prepared to watch the dancing, which is Cambodian style, not Canadian. Imagine our astonishment when the girls came over and asked all of us to dance with them for the first number. After much self-conscious kidding we got up and tried to go through the motions; much to the delight of the several hundred locals present.

On Christmas eve a group of local friends decided to entertain the one Canadian and one Indian remaining in Kampot over the holiday. We finally went to the hotel at Kep, the beach resort mentioned earlier, and had a few drinks on the verandah under "a star-filled tropical sky on the palm lined shores of the Gulf of Siam." As is the French custom, we sat down to dinner (which was quite good and included roast turkey, unfortunately a little under-done) at 2 A.M. But the remarkable thing about this Christmas dinner was that it was attended by 15 people: seven Cambodians, six Chinese, one Indian and only one Christian, the Canadian. Nevertheless, it was enjoyed by all, and the Canadian certainly appreciated the party.

Other memorable events were: walking across rice paddies in the heat of the day to reach an isolated village and being given fresh coconuts from which to drink the milk, which was most refreshing; attending a Chinese School Children's concert and sitting through four hours of singing and dancing and not understanding a word; swimming in the Gulf of Siam in December, January and February; leave in Hong Kong and a week-end in Bangkok; eating a Chinese meal at a small native sidewalk cafe and watching the teeming population walk by in various styles of dress, very short shorts, sarongs, sampots, pyjamas or western clothes; struggling at learning French; the early long ses-

sions to reach agreement on our reports; having dinner with the ex-king, Norodom Sihanouk, who speaks excellent English; visiting Angkor Wat; eating fried crickets at a Cambodian home; finally meeting the replacement officers and commencing the journey home.

Life with the Fixed Team, Kampot, during the first year varied from most interesting to very boring. We had our high points and our low ones. However, despite the circumstances, there was never an occasion when tempers got out of hand, and the team members got along remarkably well together. Personally I enjoyed the tour of duty. I saw many places and things about which I had only read in the past and I met and made friends of many peoples of different nationalities and ways of life. However, one year on a "desert island" is sufficient.

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—Capital Press

FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL VISITS OTTAWA

The Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Moshe Sharett, visited Canada November 30 and December 1, 1955. He discussed the situation in the Middle East with the Governor General, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Sharett is shown talking with the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent.

Canada and the United Nations

Security Council Elections

The tenth session of the General Assembly ended on December 20. At its last meeting, the stalemate in the elections for the Eastern European seat on the Security Council, which had engaged the General Assembly eight times since October 14, was finally broken by the election of Yugoslavia on the 36th ballot by a vote of 43 to 11 for the Philippines (Finland and Sweden receiving 1 vote each). The required majority was 38 votes. The Council's elected membership from January 1, 1956, is as follows: Cuba (replacing Brazil), Australia (replacing New Zealand), Yugoslavia (replacing Turkey), and Belgium, Iran and Peru (whose terms expire on December 31, 1956).

A somewhat confused situation resulted from the behind-the-scenes proposal of the President of the General Assembly that the two contestants draw lots, the winner to resign after filling the first half of the two-year term, and the loser to be elected next year for the remainder of the terms. Before the 35th ballot, the President announced that both countries had agreed to this procedure and Yugoslavia had won the draw. Nevertheless, the vote given Yugoslavia on this ballot (34 to the Philippines' 19) fell short of the required majority of 40. The failure to achieve an overwhelming vote in favour of Yugoslavia indicates how little general support there was for the scheme to end the deadlock. The Canadian Delegation made no commitment, public or private, regarding any arrangement by which Yugoslavia would resign after one year on the understanding that the seat would then go to the Philippines.

Disarmament

On December 16, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 56 in favour, 7 against (Soviet bloc) with no abstentions, the disarmament resolution approved by the Political Committee on the initiative of the Western members of the Disarmament Sub-committee (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States). The Communist countries had been the only opponents of the Four Power resolution in the vote of the Political Committee.

The resolution urges the States concerned, and particularly countries members of the Sub-committee, (1) to continue their efforts towards reaching agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme and (2) "as initial steps, to give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (A) such confidence-building measures as President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and Marshall Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centres; and (B) all such measures of adequate safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible" in spite of the technical difficulties which have arisen in regard to the detection and control of nuclear weapon material. The resolution at the same time suggests that account be taken of the French proposals for the exchange of information on military budgets and the allocation of savings resulting from disarmament for economic development, of the Eden proposal for a "pilot scheme" of inspection and

control and also of the Indian proposals regarding the suspension of nuclear tests and an "armaments truce".

The final text adopted embodied a number of Soviet and Indian amendments. In spite of this, both countries insisted on a number of additional amendments all of which were defeated by a substantial majority. The closest vote was on the Syrian (and Indian) suggestion that the disarmament Commission and the Sub-committee be enlarged. At the suggestion of the United States the Assembly decided by 35 votes in favour, (including Canada) 18 against and 7 abstentions that the Syrian amendment should not be put to the vote.

A United Kingdom motion that no vote be taken on a Soviet resolution under the Soviet item "Measures for the Further Relaxation of International Tension and Development of International Co-operation" was adopted by the Political Committee by a vote of 40 in favour (including Canada), 11 against (including Soviet Bloc, India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia) and 6 abstentions (including Burma, Argentina, Lebanon). In plenary, the Soviet Union did not ask for a vote on its resolution.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

On December 3, 1955, the General Assembly approved by a unanimous vote the resolution on the peaceful uses of atomic energy which had been approved by the First (Political) Committee on October 27. There had been no dissenting votes in the Committee but all six Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) had abstained. In plenary, the Arab delegations explained their affirmative vote by pointing out that the resolution was no longer a draft sponsored by 18 countries (including Canada*) but a proposal from the First Committee as a whole.

By its resolution, the Assembly recommended that a second international conference for the exchange of technical information regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy (similar to that which took place in Geneva in August 1955) be held in two or three years' time. For this purpose, the Assembly decided to continue the Advisory Committee of Scientists (of which Canada is a member) which assisted the Secretary-General in organizing last summer's conference. This Committee will also advise the Secretary-General in the study of the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations, which he is called upon to make under the resolution. The Assembly endorsed the decision of the governments sponsoring the Agency to invite all members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to participate in a conference on the final text of the statute of the Agency. The Assembly at the same time welcomed the extension of invitations to the governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the U.S.S.R. to participate as governments concerned with the present sponsoring governments (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) in negotiations on the draft statute of the Agency.

* Other sponsoring countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

External Affairs in Parliament

Speech from the Throne

Delivering the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Third Session of the Twenty-Second Parliament on January 10, 1956, the Governor General said in part:

Since you last met there have been significant international developments. Some of them have been welcome as releasing tensions in certain parts of the world while others unfortunately have had the contrary effect. My Ministers remain convinced of the need to maintain the defences of the free nations as a deterrent to war. A strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization and adequate



—NFB

CANADIAN PARLIAMENT OPENS

The Third Session of the 22nd Canadian Parliament was opened in Ottawa on January 10, by His Excellency the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, Governor General of Canada. Above, the Governor General reads the Speech from the Throne in the Senate Chamber, with the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Louis S. St-Laurent, seated at his right, and on his left, the Leader of the Government in the Senate, the Honourable William Ross Macdonald. Seated in front of the Governor General, are the members of the Supreme Court.

protection for this continent are in their view fundamental to the preservation of peace and the security of Canada.

Security, however, cannot rest on arms alone. The Government, therefore, is continuing its constant efforts, through diplomacy and negotiation and through the United Nations and other international agencies, to bring about better understanding between nations.

A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers will be held in London in June to consider matters of mutual interest. My Prime Minister has accepted the invitation to attend.

Meanwhile my Ministers are looking forward to the visit to Ottawa in February of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.

The annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan agreed that this constructive work should be continued for a further period and you will be asked to authorize Canada's continued participation in the Plan, as well as in the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme . . .

The Middle East

The following statement was made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, on January 24, 1956.

Export of Military Equipment to the Middle East

I propose this morning to discuss first the question of the export of military equipment to the Middle East and secondly—and this I hope will put the first question in perspective—the political situation in that part of the world, with particular reference to the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

As to the first question, I wish to outline the principles which governed the policy of the Government in this matter and then give particulars regarding the application of those principles and that policy, both as to the procedures that are followed and the results in terms of shipments over the last two years.

* * *

Now, what are the principles, the rules governing the shipment of military equipment from this country? These principles are the result of careful consideration and are, I think, sound and reasonable. The decisions based on them are made only after studying the relevant factors in every case submitted to us. The system of controls and checks through which policies and decisions are carried out is as effective as that of any other free country.

The basis of our control system is the Export and Import Permits Act of 1954, which superseded the Export and Import Permits Act of 1947. Incidentally, both these acts were discussed in the House and the earlier one was referred to a committee, and in all the discussion of these two acts no reference was made at that time by the hon. members opposite to the question of arms shipment. Under the act of 1954 it is illegal to export or attempt to export to any destination affected any item included in an export control list except under an export permit issued by or under the authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce.

The exporter must present this permit at the time he clears his shipment through Canadian customs at the port. The Minister of Trade and Commerce has the power to amend, suspend or to cancel permits if changing circumstances should render this necessary after issuance of a permit and before a shipment is made. The act provides severe penalties for those convicted of offences. The powers for enforcing the controls, imposing severe penalties, and revoking permits if circumstances so require are provided in that act. Shipments are, of course, checked by the customs authorities at the ports and action can be taken then as well as at the permit stage if required. Procedures are also laid down to prevent diversion and there is co-operation with many governments in the free world to ensure that so far as possible such procedures are effective.

There was published in the *Canada Gazette* on May 27, 1954, the export control list established in accordance with the provisions of the act. Group 8 within the list is headed, "Arms, Ammunition, Implements or Munitions of War; Military, Naval or Air Stores". The list of arms, aircraft, etc., specifically includes parts of these various items. So much for the legislative basis of our policy.

Government Policy

The following principles govern the policy of the Government in carrying out this act.

(1) In the case of certain allied and associated states, for example, NATO and most Commonwealth countries there are no restrictions on the export of military equipment, except—and the exceptions are important—those of supply, of domestic requirement and of security.

(2) No shipment of any kind to the Sino-Soviet bloc is permitted.

(3) Shipments of any significance are made to other areas only after consideration and approval at cabinet level, according to a procedure which I will later describe. Special attention is given—and special care shown—in respect of areas of tension or strife or what we call sensitive areas. A list of such areas, they are now 34 in number, is kept and, naturally, is modified from time to time as conditions change.

(4) Arms shipments are made only to the defence department or regular military establishment of the country concerned; and the recipient government may be required to give appropriate assurance regarding re-export.

(5) Shipments are not permitted if, in our opinion, they exceed the legitimate defence requirements of the state in question or which would themselves constitute a threat to neighbouring countries.

(6) Shipments are not permitted to sensitive areas of arms of such a character that they might increase any temptation to commit an aggression or begin a preventive war.

It is not, however, our policy to put a complete embargo on arms shipments except to the Sino-Soviet bloc, or to other countries, if any, who are a threat to our own security or where the United Nations has declared an embargo.

An embargo on all shipments in other cases, if it became general international policy and practice in the free world, might frustrate the right of nations under the United Nations Charter to defend themselves; or it might

drive them wholly into the arms of Russia and its satellites as the only source of supply. It might perpetuate inequalities between states in respect of their defensive capacities, thereby creating fear and insecurity; and encouraging aggression. One state might, for instance, have its own defence industries, and another—its neighbour—might be wholly dependent on imported defence equipment. An embargo could not possibly operate fairly in such cases, and might indeed encourage armed conflict over disputed territory. I can assure you that this is no hypothetical argument.

Let us see, for instance, how such an embargo—if it could have been agreed on and enforced internationally—would have operated in the Middle East in respect of Israel and its Arab neighbours. I gather from observations made in this House and outside that this is the policy that is advocated by at least certain members of opposition parties.

This area has been one of tension and unrest and indeed danger from the very day that the State of Israel was created. That creation—it should not be forgotten—was the result of a United Nations decision which Canada supported. If the embargo principle had been adopted, Israel would have been completely powerless to defend her very existence; unless she had agreed in desperation to throw herself into the arms of communist suppliers. If it had suited their purposes, and for a price—and it would have been a high price—the Moscow government which controlled these suppliers would have been quite happy to arrange such a deal.

An alternative, which could be in hon. members' minds, would have been to permit certain quantities and types of military equipment to go to Israel during this period of tension and to allow nothing whatsoever to go to any Arab state in any circumstances. That would, of course, have been considered as an unfriendly policy by those states with which Canada has normal diplomatic relations. Neither this policy nor that of the complete embargo for both sides has, so far as I know, been adopted by any country. Indeed a policy of control which has been adopted by the United Kingdom, the United States and France, the policy which has been accepted by the free world, is that which we ourselves are now following.

Exchange of Information

Another important principle which we have followed is that of consultation and exchange of information about orders and requests—except those of no significance in quantity or nature—with certain governments who have special responsibilities in this field. We do that so that one country may know what the others are doing and thereby ensure that so far as possible the principles that I have mentioned above are adhered to.

If, for instance, we are asked to supply some ammunition for 25-pounders for a particular country—and we have been asked for that, and it is still before Cabinet—we try to find out, before taking any action, not only whether such an order would be excessive having regard to the number of guns involved, and existing stocks, but whether orders for this ammunition have also been received by other governments. The responsibility for the decision, however, is of course ours.

Now, what is the procedure by which this policy is carried out?

Under the law, as I have said, the export permit must be given by the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Before doing so, if the destination is one

of those 34 sensitive areas where consultation is required, he consults with both the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs and acts only after agreement with those two departments. If the application is a particularly significant one, either in quantity or because of the political circumstances surrounding it, and even though the three ministers may have agreed to the permit, the matter is referred to the whole Cabinet.

In the case of shipments to NATO or most Commonwealth countries, the Minister of Trade and Commerce may act after consultation only with the Department of National Defence, in order to make sure that security and supply factors are considered as well as our own defence requirements.

In all cases where government surplus supplies are involved, the matter must also go to the Treasury Board for approval. Even after there has been ministerial agreement on an export permit, that board, a committee of the Cabinet, may also ask the full Cabinet to reconsider a decision taken.

Export of Harvard Aircraft to Egypt

Now, having indicated the procedures laid down, I should like to show how they were applied to the case of the 15 Harvard trainers approved for export last July.

In the spring of 1955 a supplier of these aircraft received enquiries from qualified representatives of the Egyptian Government concerning 15 Harvard trainers. There were also received at the same time somewhat less formal enquiries about F-86 jet fighters. There was no problem regarding the jets. The reception by the Government to the idea was negative and the matter was dropped even though that order, and others for jets about which we have been approached from other quarters, would have been very attractive commercially and would have assisted in maintaining work and employment in our aircraft industry.

As for the Harvards, the matter was brought to the attention of the Department of Trade and Commerce by the company and referred by that department to the Department of National Defence and the Department of External Affairs for an opinion. The Department of National Defence studied the matter from the point of view of possible domestic requirements and of the military implications of supplying these aircraft to the particular government in question.

Information was also exchanged with certain friendly governments about the request. No objections were raised to the transaction from these or any other quarters. After all these steps had been taken, and as the matter in my judgment raised no new policy issue or important international consideration, and as the planes could not be made into effective combat aircraft, and as the request fell within the criteria I have mentioned already, I gave my approval. The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) was so informed and an export permit was issued in due course, the first week in September.

Before proceeding further I should like to answer the question addressed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) to the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) in these terms:

Whether any field artillery weapons are being or have been dismantled and the parts sold separately by the War Assets Corporation under circumstances which would make it possible for those parts to be sold outside of Canada.

That was the question. I am informed by the corporation, on the basis of a check going back to January 1, 1952, that where any gun barrels or breech blocks have been disposed of they have been sold as scrap and in respect of each sale there is evidence available that they were mutilated prior to delivery as scrap. Such scrap also requires an export permit. Surplus field artillery or surplus artillery parts, as opposed to scrap, that is to mutilated parts, can be sold abroad but always subject to the export control procedures I have mentioned.

What are the results of this policy in respect to arms shipments to the Middle East? An impression may have been created that Canadian arms were flowing into that area in great quantities. That is not the case. The amounts involved are small and do not contravene the principles which I have outlined as governing our policy. The impression may have also been given that we were releasing modern and dangerous weapons whose capabilities could disrupt the military balance among the countries in that region and encourage all-out aggression or an arms race. That also is not the case.

Shipments to Israel and Egypt

There are certain figures I should like to give and I give these figures although similar figures are not given in respect to arms shipments by other countries. In 1954 export permits for military equipment to the value of \$735,574.60 were granted for Israel; for Egypt the figure was only \$296; for all other Arab states, none.

In 1955 the figure for Israel was \$1,332,110.59; for Egypt, \$770,825; for all other Arab states, \$70. The figures for the two years were \$2,067,685.19 for Israel, and \$771,121 for Egypt.

The Harvard trainers and spare parts for them were responsible for practically the whole of the Egyptian figure. The main items covered by the other figures are:

- Harvard aircraft parts

- 75 mm. shells

- Anti-tank equipment

- Tracks and spare parts for world war II type tanks (Shermans)

- 25-pounder guns and accessories

- .303 calibre Browning machine guns

- 3.7" anti-aircraft guns, accessories, spare parts and ammunition (This was a large proportion of the total)

The anti-aircraft guns are of course defensive weapons, and the 25-pounder guns are trailer guns in this case. In respect to the tank tracks and spare parts, which constituted a rather large proportion of the total, we were at our request given written and official assurances that they would not be re-exported and that they were all required for normal maintenance and servicing purposes for the existing stock of tanks. I have available the exact descriptions by item, quantity, value and destination of all the items covered by the totals I have mentioned. I am reluctant to make these figures public as the recipient government—there is only one in this case because in the case of Egypt the totals have already been made public—feels that, in spite of the relatively small amounts involved, the information might be prejudicial to her security. I would, however, be happy to let any hon. members who may desire, see all these details in confidence.

These figures show what has been approved. If there could be shown a similar table for the dollar value of the requests for military equipment that have not been approved the amount would be many times as great. Some requests had to be refused in toto, such as those for F-86 jet aircraft. Others covered a legitimate requirement of a type which did not contravene the principles we had established but in our opinion the amount was excessive for such requirements.

I mention these cases of rejection to make it clear that the procedures I described earlier are not merely a complicated method of in fact releasing everything we are asked for. The procedures do constitute an effective control system. This control has been applied because in the view of the government it is important that Canada should not contribute to the development of an arms race in the Middle East or any place else; that is, should not permit exports which would give either of the conflicting sides—if there is a conflict, a political conflict—a military advantage which the other would be bound to try to correct by increasing its military purchases in turn.

* * *

The Political Situation in the Middle East

I should like to turn now to the political situation in the area in order to give the background to the question we have been discussing. It is a situation which has been disturbing and unsettled, as I have already said, since the very foundation of the State of Israel. It is becoming increasingly clear that some solution must be found for the problem of the relationship between Israel and her Arab neighbours if that situation is to improve. If it does not improve it will get worse and the danger of conflict will increase. This is especially the case because there are governments which are cynically hoping to obtain political advantage from keeping the Arab-Israeli dispute burning without any concern for the damage that this would cause the Israeli and Arab people, or the danger to peace that might result. I think there would be no contribution on our part to improving the chances of peace in that area by cutting off all shipments of defence equipment to the State of Israel, if that is the policy of my hon. friends opposite.

It is the realization of this danger, the danger of conflict, which prompted Western statesmen recently to offer the assistance of their governments and themselves in helping Israel and the Arab States find a solution for their disputes and problems. We in this government are very much in accord with the spirit of such pronouncements which point to the necessity of a settlement based on conciliation, understanding and compromise, which alone can afford a real basis of security and prosperity for both the Arab and Israeli peoples. The difficulties are great and the dangers are very real, as they always are when passions are high and feelings are deep.

We can sympathize with and understand the fear felt in Israel when they hear across their borders threats of destruction; and, of course, the United Nations did not establish the State of Israel in order to see its obliteration. Similarly, we can understand the feelings of Arab peoples at the alienation of land which was occupied by Arabs for centuries; we can sympathize with the sufferings of the many thousands of Arab refugees who have been made home-

less. But surely to both sides the advantages of a confirmed and secure peace, instead of the present condition of precarious armistice, are so great both economically and politically that a negotiated settlement should not be impossible.

I cannot mention the armistice without paying tribute here, and I know the House will join me in this, to the work of Major General Burns, the chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine. He is not, of course, serving as a Canadian but as a United Nations official. Nevertheless, since he is a Canadian, I am sure that all hon. members are as proud as I am of his devoted and skilful work in safeguarding the armistice in most difficult and, indeed, at times dangerous circumstances, and of the high regard in which he is held by both sides for his sincerity and impartiality.

Discussions with Israeli and Egyptian Leaders

As hon. members know, I have had the privilege recently of exchanging views with Israeli and Egyptian leaders. In July the Egyptian foreign minister visited Ottawa and I had the honour of being received by the Premier of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, at Cairo on my way back from Southeast Asia in November. I might at this point answer a particular question put to me by the hon. member for Prince Albert [Mr. Diefenbaker] when he inquired whether I would "equalize" Canada's position in the Middle East by going to Israel, in view of my visit to Egypt. I hope that it may soon be possible for me to visit Israel to see for myself the exciting and constructive things that are being done there. The reasons why I could not do so during my recent journey have been fully explained already, and I will not waste the time of the House in repeating them here, especially as they were made known to and understood in Israel at that time. I was all the more pleased, therefore, because I had not been able to visit Israel on this trip, to welcome to Ottawa at the beginning of December Mr. Sharett, the Foreign Minister of Israel, who came here at the invitation of the Prime Minister [Mr. St. Laurent]. I agree whole-heartedly with the hon. member for Prince Albert that our attitude should be "equal" but I doubt whether anyone would seriously contend that the criterion of such an attitude is an exact and prompt balancing of my journeys to foreign capitals. This "equality" which, as I say, I endorse, must rest on a sturdier basis than that.

In any event, during 1955 two cabinet ministers, two senators and six members of parliament visited Israel from Canada and each spent some time there. The members included the leaders of two parties, and, above all, they included the hon. member for Prince Albert himself. I am flattered, indeed, I am flabbergasted, by the suggestion that all of these visits by such distinguished Canadians were more than equalled by a day and a half stopover by me in Cairo on the way home from a Colombo Plan meeting.

My own discussions with Egyptian and Israeli leaders about the problems of the Middle East and my study of these problems, which I share with others in the House, have left me with the impression that, while the issues are complex and difficult, and even dangerous, there is a basic desire for peace on both sides because it is realized, it must be realized, that this is indispensable to social and economic progress. There seems, then, to be at least this foundation upon which a settlement could be reached.

I believe that the Western powers are ready and anxious—I know that Canada is—to assist in the achievement of a settlement. I hope sincerely that the Soviet Government and its friends are equally anxious. If they are, they

will not stimulate and encourage an arms race in the Middle East which can have no good result, except for the political machinations of the stimulators. I agree, of course, with the hon. member for Winnipeg North that the way to blunt the machinations of those who seek to gain advantage from inflaming the troubles of the Middle East is to bring about peace there. I am sure any Canadian Government, any government, would wish to do what it could, along with other similarly disposed governments, to assist in bringing about such a peace.

With all respect, however, I do not think that the speech of the hon. member for Winnipeg North made much of a contribution to that end. Among other things he complained of the "passionate admiration" of officials in the London foreign office for the Arabs. His own attitude seemed to me to be one of passionate hostility to the Arab governments. Passion on either side of this issue is not likely to help; indeed, it already has hindered and bedevilled the chances of a settlement. The hon. member implored this Government to pay a "more significant part" in bringing about such a settlement. The attitude he took in the House, however, would make it more difficult, not less difficult, for any Canadian representative, if he were charged with any responsibility in this matter, to be considered as an impartial and objective conciliator and to pay effectively what he referred to as an "honourable part".

It is easy enough to criticize indiscriminately those powers and those persons who have had to cope directly with this complex issue. It is easy enough to put forward proposals which fortunately no one is expected to put into practice. If our response to recent Soviet moves in the Middle East were to abandon friendly relations with the Arab States and support Israel, completely and exclusively, with our diplomacy and our arms, then we should indeed be playing the communist game. The moral position of the Western powers in that area is based on the fact that they have, though not without mistakes and contradictions, tried to preserve peace on a basis of mutual accommodation rather than on the triumph of one side over the other. I suggest we must not abandon that position because the Russians have done so for their own purposes.

Compromise is Needed

The important question is, however, how can an honourable and satisfactory solution be brought about? The main issues are now commonly known. It seems clear that both sides, if they recognize the desirability of a settlement, must give something to achieve it, must make some compromise. There can never be a negotiated settlement where one side or the other remains adamant. Each must enter into negotiations prepared for some sort of give and take although, of course, no one would expect one of the sides to make prior or unilateral concessions.

It seems to me that an essential, indeed, a first requirement, is that the Arab states should recognize the legitimate and permanent existence of the State of Israel. That, as I see it, necessitates abandonment by them of the impractical stipulation that we must return to the United Nations resolutions of 1947 which provided for a divided Palestine. The Arab states took up arms to prevent these resolutions becoming effective and I do not see how they can claim the right to have them accepted now as the price of peace in that area. The people of Israel have the right to know that their national existence is not at stake. That seems to me to be fundamental. Efforts to bring peace and all

its benefits to the Middle East will be of no avail unless Israel and the people of Israel are released from the overhanging fear which naturally envelopes the country as a result of the threats of destruction and of the political and economic warfare directed against it by its neighbours. Deep fear leads to desperate acts which, though they cannot be condoned, may at least be understood. Surely it is essential, therefore, that this basic cause of fear must be removed if there is to be a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Just as we should like to see Israel freed from the fears and economic pressures which are being imposed on her, we must also hope that the Arab populations will be enabled to move forward toward their goals of economic betterment and social progress. There have, indeed, been concrete proofs that this is the hope of the West.

It may perhaps be said that there is fear also on the part of the Arab states lest they should be attacked. But so far as I am aware, the 1950 tripartite declaration of the three leading Western powers is still valid, that they would oppose the changing of borders by force. Moreover, the United Nations is dedicated to the prevention of aggression and the House will be aware of the fact that only recently the Security Council of the United Nations, in considering a most regrettable development of the Arab-Israeli dispute, gave unanimous evidence of its determined opposition to the resort to aggressive force. These, I maintain, are no inconsiderable safeguards. They would be even stronger if there were permanent frontiers settled by negotiation.


The Arab states on their part are, however, entitled to certain assurances. There must be a fair and honourable solution to the problem of Arab refugees. That is a subject which my hon. friend touched on the other day. The unhappy plight of these refugees is of serious concern not only to the Arab countries and to Israel because it poisons their relations but also, for humanitarian and political reasons, to the whole free world. These unfortunate people have largely been maintained by the United Nations, and Canada has contributed its share toward their support. But that cannot go on much longer. Shelter and a dole are pitiful substitutes for a permanent home and opportunities for gainful work. As I see it, some compensation should be paid these refugees by Israel for loss of land and home. But it is clear that so large a number cannot return to their former land, which is now in the State of Israel whose total population is less than two million; nor in all probability would many desire to live in what would now be to them an alien country. A limited amount of repatriation might be possible such as that which would be involved, for example, in the reuniting of families. For the rest, resettlement as an international operation, to which Israel among others would make a contribution, seems to be the only answer.

Question of Boundaries

But even more important is the question of boundaries. There are at present armistice demarcation lines. They are therefore lines which have not been finally determined by a peace settlement. I believe that they could be susceptible to readjustments. This, of course, is by no means to suggest one-sided concessions of territory or any such thing as the "truncation" of Israel which would be crippling to the new state. But perhaps certain boundary rearrangements could be made so as to produce mutually acceptable permanent borders. There is no doubt, in my mind at least, that if the permanent borders

could be agreed upon in this way the United Nations would be deeply interested in the maintenance of their security.

In return for the international guarantee which might result from this interest, with security and stability in the area which would result, I should think both the State of Israel and the Arab States would be willing at least to discuss such readjustments at a peace conference table. It seems to me also that any state which would refuse to discuss peace at such a conference table—and on some such basis of principles as that outlined above, although sketchily—would be taking on a very heavy responsibility indeed. I share, however, the optimism of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is now visiting this area on a mission of conciliation and peace, that such an uncompromising attitude will not be adopted by anyone and that a settlement based on justice and security will be found. Please God it may be so and that this tense and torn area, the Holy Land of so many millions, may become again a land of prosperity and of peace.



—Capital Press

FOREIGN MINISTER OF PORTUGAL VISITS OTTAWA

The Foreign Minister of Portugal, Dr. Paulo A. V. Cunha, and Mrs. Cunha are shown being welcomed to Ottawa on December 11, 1955, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. During his two day visit in Canada, which immediately preceded the December meetings of the North Atlantic Council, Dr. Cunha discussed questions of common concern with the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

Issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, over the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service.

For those concerned with international relations, and for those devoted to the long quest for peace and security and international justice, this has been in many respects a turbulent and disappointing year, and we shall enter 1956 with many anxieties. During the coming year, it seems evident that we shall need all the patience, good sense and resolution which we can command.

When I spoke on this programme a year ago, the principal international problems were as follows: relations between the Soviet and the free world; disarmament and the menace of atomic warfare; the unification of Germany; friction and violence in the Near East and serious unrest in many parts of the world, notably North Africa, Indochina and Formosa.

These problems are still with us; and it would not be difficult for a pessimist or a cynic to compile a list of our failures and of our disappointments during the last 12 months.

Must Accept Setbacks

It must, however, be remembered that these international problems, and the circumstances in those areas where peace is uncertain, have been the consequence of many centuries of world history; and it is unrealistic to expect the progress from year to year in their solution will be easy, inevitable and cumulative. We must, it seems to me, be prepared to accept setbacks and disappointments without giving way to despair; and to take comfort and courage from what has in fact been accomplished without becoming complacent.

If this has been a difficult year for all of us, we are ourselves in some measure to blame. We expected, for example, far too much from the Summit Conference in July; and then, later, we tended to go to the other extreme of dejection when the results of the later Ministerial Conference in Geneva proved so disappointing.

In this problem of the relations between the Soviet and the free world we have gained this year at last one very solid advantage; we now have far more knowledge of policies and objectives of those we fear. If we have the wisdom to benefit by what we have learned, we shall not a second time allow ourselves to become too elated by successes or too dejected by failures as we face and deal with

the tortuous and contradictory tactics and policies in which the dictators of Russia indulge.

While sharing the disappointment felt about many of the events of 1955, I believe that in many matters important progress has been made. At the Tenth Anniversary Assembly of the United Nations, for instance, the deadlock on the acceptance of new members has been very largely broken. We are happy that Canada was able to make an important contribution to this objective. We still think it most unfortunate that the United Nations will not have the benefit of a delegation from Japan; but the acceptance of 16 new members, thus making the United Nations more nearly a universal body, is clearly an important forward step. Nor have we given up, nor will we give up, the search for an agreement by which armaments can be reduced and atomic weapons outlawed.

Another achievement of the United Nations this year has been the decision to set up an international agency for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This has brought great satisfaction and hope to those areas of the world, and there are many of them, in which the absence of a cheap and continuous source of power has been a principal reason for lack of progress in economic development.

There are other U.N. achievements. The unspectacular but vital work of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations has continued, and a good fight is going on against ignorance, disease, poverty and misfortune.

NATO Stronger

Also during the year NATO has grown in strength and unity and remains our most effective deterrent against aggression. Our progress here is an answer to those who hope that in an atmosphere of relaxation of tension NATO will weaken and fall apart. This is, of course, a danger, but it can be met by strengthening the non-military aspects of our association—and by rejecting all temptations to weaken our defences merely because of communist blandishments.

During the year, NATO and free Europe has been strengthened and made more secure by the decision of Germany to join the company of Western European nations prepared to unite their efforts to defend their freedom. It is reassuring to know that our new associates resolutely refuse to accept Soviet terms

for the reunification of their country which could result only in their becoming one more Communist satellite. We of the NATO alliance welcome free Germany to our association and we look forward to the time when she will be reunited in dignity, freedom and in safety.

In Asia and the Middle East, while there has been no armed conflict during the year—except sporadically but dangerously on the border of Israel—difficult and complicated problems remain to be solved. Korea and Vietnam remain divided while the two Chinese regimes continue to face each other with implacable hostility; at one point with only a few miles of water between them. No one can be other than anxious about the prospects for peace in the Far East while this situation continues, especially when each of these Chinese regimes has power and support behind it from outside.

The Soviet Union, in pursuance of its policy of “all conflict short of war” is fishing—and

scattering bait—in these troubled Asian and Middle Eastern waters. This is not reassuring in assessing the prospects for peace.

Turning closer to home, we in Canada rejoice in our continued friendly relations with all countries of the world whose motives we can trust, whose policies do not threaten peace, and who use language in a sense which seems to us intelligible and sincere. Particularly with the nations of the Commonwealth and the United States are those relations very close and very important. We will do our best to keep them so, and also to improve relations with those who have given us heretofore more cause for fear than friendship.

1956 will certainly have its problems, but these need not cause any despair. We must be resolute but not provocative; patient, but not indifferent. If we can, and if the free governments can work together for good purposes, it may be possible a year hence to report real progress toward peace and security in the world.



APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. H. G. Norman, CMG, appointed Consul General of Canada, New York. Proceeded to New York December 2, 1955.
- Mr. J. A. Chapdelaine appointed Minister to Sweden and Finland. Departed Ottawa November 30, 1955.
- Mr. P. R. Jennings posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, effective October 17, 1955.
- Mr. F. G. Ballachey posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective November 22, 1955.
- Mr. J. D. Foote posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, to Ottawa, effective December 5, 1955.
- Mr. P. Dumas posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective December 12, 1955.
- Mr. R. H. Jay posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective December 14, 1955.
- Mr. C. S. Gadd posted from the Canadian Embassy, Havana, to the Canadian Embassy, Bogota, effective December 21, 1955.
- Mr. J. R. Barker posted from home leave (Moscow) to Ottawa, effective December 27, 1955.
- Mr. J. J. Dupuis posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, effective December 28, 1955.
- Mr. G. E. Logan appointed to the Department of External Affairs as an Administrative Officer, Grade 3, effective December 1, 1955.
- Mr. J. Timmerman appointed to the Department of External Affairs as an Administrative Officer, Grade 7, effective December 16, 1955.

OFFICIAL VISITORS TO CANADA DURING 1955

January

His Excellency Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan.

February

His Excellency Paul Eugène Magloire, President of Haiti, and Mrs. Magloire.

His Excellency Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium.

March

Dr. Manuel ReSumil Arangunde, Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce of the Dominican Republic.

Senor Salvator Ortiz, President of the Sugar Commission.

Honourable Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia.

Mr. J. Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State.

His Excellency R. S. S. Gunewardene, Ambassador of Ceylon to the United States of America.

His Excellency Mario Scelba, Prime Minister of Italy, and Mrs. Scelba.

His Excellency Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and Mrs. Martino.

April

H. R. H. Prince Tongi, Premier of Tonga.

Dr. M. Y. Candau, Director-General of WHO.

Rt.-Hon. Clement Attlee, Leader of the Opposition (United Kingdom).

May

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (United Kingdom).

Members of the 1955 Tour of Journalists from other NATO Countries.

Members of the NATO Council.

Senor Don Rafael Cavestany y de Anduaga, Minister of Agriculture for Spain.

Field Marshall P. Pibulsonggram, Prime Minister of Thailand.

June

Dr. Hermann Punder, Member of the German Bundestag.

32 Journalists from France.

His Excellency Khrisna Menon, India.

His Excellency Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Egypt.

Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Federal German Minister for Economic Affairs.

Fifth Annual Meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

ACARD Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development.

July

Honourable Eric H. Louw, Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Finance of the Union of South Africa.

Honourable Howard Beale, Minister of Supply of Australia.

August

Professor Victor Pires, Under-Secretary of Agriculture of Portugal.

Annual Congress of the Guild of Carillonners in North America.

Delegation of Agricultural Experts from the U.S.S.R.

Japanese Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

September

The Honourable Garfield Todd, Premier of Southern Rhodesia.

The Honourable Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Japan.

October

H. R. H. the Princess Royal.

Colonel A. D. Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (United Kingdom).

Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Fourth World Convention of French-Speaking Journalists.

November

Mr. C. Staf, Netherlands Minister of War.

December

His Excellency Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel.

Rt.-Hon. Reginald Maudling, United Kingdom Minister of Supply.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

Doutor Paulo A. V. Cunha, Foreign Minister of Portugal.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

The British Caribbean Federation

ON February 23, 1956, sixteen West Indian leaders put their signatures to an agreement to federate the British colonies of Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Barbados, the Windward Islands and Trinidad. Before the federation becomes a reality, however, a constitution must be drafted and approved and the formal consent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom obtained. It is expected that the British Parliament will give its approval before its present session comes to an end and a draft of the constitution is expected to be ready before the end of this year. This draft will then have to be approved before the first federal general elections are held, probably early in 1958.

Federation is regarded by the United Kingdom and by the Caribbean leaders as a major step towards full independence within the Commonwealth of Nations. However, full independence and Commonwealth membership will probably not be attained until the Federation ceases to be dependent upon United Kingdom grants-in-aid.

Some Notes on the British Caribbean Islands

The British Caribbean islands stretch from Grand Cayman, a Jamaican dependency in the western part of the Caribbean Sea, through Jamaica to the Leeward Islands and south from the Leewards past Barbados and through the Windward Islands to Trinidad and Tobago, a distance of about 1800 miles. In area the islands are only two-fifths the size of Nova Scotia but their population almost equals the combined population of Canada's three westernmost provinces. The figures for area and population are as follows:

	<i>Area (sq. m.)</i>	<i>Population</i>
Jamaica	4,411	1,490,000
Leeward Islands	423	122,000
Windward Islands	826	290,000
Barbados	166	221,000
Trinidad	1,980	678,000
Totals	7,806	2,801,000

Bermuda and the Bahamas are not included among the Caribbean territories.

The majority of the people are descendants of Africans originally brought to the West Indies as slaves for the plantations, but a substantial (East) Indian minority is to be found in Trinidad. It is descended from indentured labour recruited in India after the abolition of slavery. There are comparatively small white populations and a large number of persons of mixed descent. Despite their varied racial origins the people of these territories have set notable examples of how to live together in a multiracial society. Coloured persons play an ever-increasing part (in some cases the preponderant part) not only in politics but also in the civil service and in the business and professional life of their territories.

Literacy is widespread. British law is long established and representative institutions are of very long standing. Adult suffrage, however, has been introduced only within recent years. Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad now have

Executive Councils or Cabinets where elected ministers are in the majority; this means in practice that these three territories are close to self-government in internal affairs. For practical purposes their powers are limited only in respect of foreign affairs, defence and internal security. The Windward and Leeward Islands have not yet attained the same degree of self-government, partly because most of them are financially dependent on the United Kingdom, but even here a ministerial form of government has been introduced.

Economic development of the islands has been and will continue to be limited by their scattered geography and their small size. The economies of all the territories are mainly agricultural and depend on export crops of which sugar is the chief. Oil in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica are the only minerals of commercial significance. A growing industry is tourism, which so far has been developed mainly in Jamaica and Barbados. But it is on agriculture that the territories must mainly rely for increasing their capacity to support their people.


The economic difficulties of the islands are aggravated by the major problem of the West Indies—its expanding population. The islands are heavily overpopulated and the situation is not improving. The best solution would appear to lie in extensive industrial development but such opportunities are not to be found in the West Indies. Home markets are small, raw materials are few, labour costs are not so low nor special skills so high as generally to counterbalance these disadvantages. Closer co-operation is needed if their economic problems are to be solved.

Some Historical Notes on the Federation Idea

The idea of federating the British West Indies is not a new one. In 1922 it was discussed but rejected because of local opposition. During the economic strains of the 1930's the idea again appeared. A royal commission examined the question in 1938 and reported "that while local opinion has made a considerable advance in the direction of political unity . . . it is doubtful whether the time is yet ripe for the introduction of any large scheme of federation." Nevertheless, the commission recommended that a combination of the West Indian colonies into one political entity was the ideal towards which policy should be directed. In the meantime, attempts should be made to encourage regional thinking.

Undoubtedly the greatest single influence in developing a regional viewpoint among West Indians was the Second World War. Regional organizations such as the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, the Barbados Sugar Cane Breeding Station and the West Indies Development and Welfare Organization brought West Indians together on a regional basis to tackle their common problems and helped to lay the foundation for regional political action; but it was the demands of wartime cooperation in the Caribbean which did most to break down the isolationism bred by an island life. Communications were vastly improved, impressive military establishments were built at top speed, military and naval bases were leased to the United States, and in all these activities the West Indians participated. When the war ended and the pace of economic expansion slackened the time was ripe for another attempt to bring the territories closer together.

In 1945, the Secretary of State for the Colonies launched the idea of federation once again, stressing the United Kingdom Government's view that



movement towards political unity must come from within and not from outside the area and asking the colonies to keep federation in mind as self-governing institutions developed. The ultimate aim of a West Indian federation would be, he said, internal self-government within the British Commonwealth.

Principle Accepted

The Legislatures of the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and the Windward Islands debated the idea of federation and with the exception of the Bahamas agreed to participate in a conference to discuss proposals for federation. In 1947 at Montego Bay in Jamaica, West Indian representatives met with the Colonial Secretary, agreed that closer association was desirable, and accepted "the principle of federation in which each constituent unit retains complete control over all matters except those specifically assigned to the federal government." It was further agreed that a Standing Closer Association Committee should be constituted to recommend, *inter alia*, "the form of a federal constitution and federal judiciary most likely to give effect to the aspirations of the people".

By May 1948 the legislatures of the colonies represented at Montego Bay had agreed to participate in the work of the Standing Closer Association Committee and Sir Hubert Rance, who became governor of Trinidad in 1950, was appointed chairman. Seventeen months later the Committee's report was published. The Committee worked on the assumption that the main purpose of its task was "to seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples of the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth". The Committee recognized that this independence could not be given substance unless an economically viable political unit could be created. Special attention was therefore given to the soundness of federation from an economic point of view.

While the Committee found that the finances of the area were sound, it also found that the causes were, unfortunately, only temporary. World prices for the exports of the region were high but the productivity of the islands, on which permanent prosperity depends, had not shown any real increase. It was further recognized that the Caribbean territories were not richly endowed with natural resources and that if a reasonable standard of living was to be achieved for the people of the islands "the not-too-abundant resources will have to be freely fertilised with brains, skill and hard work." In the opinion of the Committee, this could be done if the political and administrative arrangements of the region are such as to enable modern knowledge to be applied efficiently when and where needed; "... Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of achieving economic stability and through it ... political independence".

With the basis of their thinking thus clearly stated, the Committee went on to outline in detail the type of federal structure it wished to see organized. Their report was debated in the various legislatures and, with the exception of British Guiana and British Honduras, accepted in principle. There were, however, objections to some features of the Committee's federal plan and the Secretary of State for the Colonies accordingly proposed that there should be a conference of delegates from the territories which had accepted federation in principle. This conference was convened in April 1953 in London.

Delegates from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, and observers from British Guiana and

British Honduras examined in detail the report of the Standing Closer Association Committee. The delegates agreed on numerous modifications and were informed of the extent and the nature of the financial support which the United Kingdom Government was prepared to give to the Federation. The Colonial Secretary assured the delegates that the region would continue to share the financial assistance the United Kingdom extends to her colonies under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, that the Government was prepared to invite Parliament to grant up to £500,000 towards the capital cost of establishing a federal headquarters and that the United Kingdom would assist the Federation in meeting the annual deficits of those units which might be unable to pay their way from their own revenues or reserves. If, however, the Federation was to gain full independence these latter grants must be temporary; the United Kingdom was consequently thinking in terms of grants-in-aid for a five-year period with a possible further five-year extension.

The Federal Plan Approved by the London Conference of 1953

The London Conference in 1953 agreed that a federation should be established comprising the following member units: Barbados, Jamaica (excluding the dependencies of Jamaica), Antigua, St. Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica.

The federal legislature should consist of a Governor General, a Senate and a House of Representatives, and have the exclusive right to make laws in fields such as defence, exchange controls, external affairs, immigration into and emigration and deportation from the Federation, and the seat of government of the Federation. Both federal and unit legislatures should have the right to make laws on matters such as banking, the incorporation of banks and the issue of paper money, the census, currency, coinage and legal tender, imposition and collection of import duties, and collection of export and excise duties, postal services, taxes on income* and trade and commerce; but in the case of inconsistency between any federal law and any unit law on any such subject, the provisions of the federal law should, to the extent of the inconsistency, prevail. All residual legislative powers should be vested in the unit legislatures.

It will be seen from this brief description of the proposed division of legislative powers that the Australian pattern of federation has been followed in preference to the Canadian system. Residual powers rest with the units, not with the central government, as is the case in Canada. It will also be noted that the concurrent legislative list includes many subjects—such as banking and currency—which most federations bestow exclusively on the central government. Many of these subjects will probably be assumed gradually by the Federal Government as the economies of united action became apparent.

The London Conference in 1953 agreed that the federal Senate should consist of nineteen senators appointed by the Governor General for a term of five years and that each unit, with the exception of Montserrat, should have two senators. Montserrat, because of its small size and population (32 square miles and less than 14,000 persons), should be represented by one senator.

The House of Representatives should consist of forty-five elected members with representation based roughly on population. However, each unit should

* Provided that the federal legislature should not have power to impose taxes on income for the first five years.

not have fewer members in the elected house than it has in the appointed chamber. It was agreed that Barbados should have five members, Jamaica seventeen and Trinidad ten, while the other units should each have the minimum representation allowed.

The proposed federal plan left no doubt as to which of the two chambers should be the paramount legislative authority. Money bills may be introduced only in the House of Representatives and provision is made for overcoming a negative Senate vote. On other legislation the Senate would be empowered to delay for twelve months. The London Conference also agreed to empower the Governor General to reserve certain bills dealing with defence, external relations, and proposals which might lead to the need for financial assistance from the United Kingdom Government. A very limited power of disallowance would be granted to the Government of the United Kingdom.

Composition of the Council

The federal plan provided that the executive power of the Federation should be exercised by the Governor General on the advice of a Council of State, a body of 14 members consisting of the Prime Minister and seven persons of either of the chambers of the federal legislature chosen by him, three officials appointed by the Governor General, and three members of the federal Senate appointed by the Governor General in Council.

The delegates to the London Conference further agreed that the judicial power of the Federation should be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, and in such other courts as the federal legislature may create or invest with federal jurisdiction. The Federal Supreme Court should exercise appellate and original jurisdiction and have the power to interpret the provisions of the constitution.

Thus the federal plan as approved by the 1953 Conference called for the establishment of a federation with certain limitations on its independence of action primarily due to its expected dependence on the United Kingdom Government for grants-in-aid and assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. The plan also visualized the creation of a comparatively weak central government in the first years of federation.

Developments Since the London Conference of 1953

By January 1955 the proposals of the 1953 Conference had been adopted by the legislatures of the territories which sent delegations to London. The Colonial Secretary then announced the establishment of three commissions to examine the fiscal, civil service and judicial aspects of federation.

While these commissions were being organized, a conference was convened in Trinidad in March 1955 to reach agreement on one of the most difficult problems confronting the Federation—the movement of persons and goods. Some of the more prosperous islands feared that unrestricted movement would result in serious dislocation of their economy; however, the conference agreed that the preamble to the constitution should emphasize the desirability of the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and goods within the Federation and that control of movement between units should be exercised jointly by the Federal Government and by the units for the first five years after Federation. Beyond the five year limit the Conference recommended that any local legislation affecting movement of persons then in existence or enacted thereafter would require federal validation.

The three commissions studying the fiscal, civil service and the judicial problems of federation presented their reports late in 1955. The Secretary of State for the Colonies then invited the colonies concerned to send representatives to a conference to be convened in London on February 7, 1956.

The London Conference of 1956

The principal task of the London Conference of February 1956 was to study the reports of the three commissions on the fiscal, civil service and judicial problems of federation and to incorporate the recommendations arising out of their reports and out of the Trinidad Conference in the federal plan of 1953. The report of the fiscal commission gave rise to the greatest amount of discussion.

In 1953 it had been agreed that the Federal Government should receive the postal revenues, when the Federation assumed responsibility for the postal services, and fifteen per cent of the custom duties on imports; the fiscal commission thought, however, that the Federal Government should be assured of a more reliable and productive source of revenue if it were to be able to discharge its responsibilities satisfactorily. The 1956 Conference agreed, and it was decided that for the first five years the Federal Government would obtain its revenue from profits on the issue of currency and from a mandatory levy on the unit governments. It will also have the right to raise revenue by excise and custom duties concurrently with the unit governments.

It was also agreed that there should be an integrated trade policy for the Federation and that a customs union should be introduced at the earliest opportunity.

Certain constitutional changes were agreed upon. As noted above, it had been agreed in 1953 that the Council of State should consist of the Prime Minister and seven members of either houses of the Federal legislature chosen by him, plus three officials appointed by the Governor General and three members of the federal Senate appointed by the Governor General in Council. The 1956 Conference decided, however, (a) that the three officials appointed by the Governor General would only have the right to attend meetings of the Council of State and to participate in its discussions; (b) that the three federal Senators would be appointed to the Council on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and not of the Governor General in Council.

One matter which was not settled at London was the site of the national capital. The Conference agreed to appoint an independent fact-finding commission of experts which would recommend three suitable sites for a capital and indicate its preference. One of the sites on the commission's list would then be chosen as capital by the delegates to the London Conference who agreed to continue to act as a standing Federation Committee to carry out constitutional and administrative pre-federation functions. The United Kingdom Government has undertaken to contribute to the cost of the necessary federal buildings up to one million pounds, an amount double that pledged in 1953.

The Conference ended on February 23, 1956, with the historic announcement that the sixteen delegates had agreed to federate their respective islands. The first Federation Day in 1956 will be proclaimed when Royal assent is given to the United Kingdom Act approving federation; in subsequent years, however, February 23 will be the official Federation Day.

Visit of Prime Minister Eden to Ottawa

THE Right Honourable Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Right Honourable Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom arrived in Ottawa on February 3, following a visit to Washington. During their four days in Ottawa, Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Lloyd were guests of the Governor General at Government House and attended luncheons and dinners given in their honour by Mr. Massey, Prime Minister St. Laurent, Mr. Pearson, and Sir Archibald Nye, the United Kingdom High Commissioner. Mr. Lloyd also addressed a luncheon meeting of the Women's Canadian Club at the Chateau Laurier.

While in Ottawa, Sir Anthony and Mr. Lloyd attended a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet and met members of both Houses of Parliament informally. In addition, they had informal talks with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs about questions of common concern to Canada and the United Kingdom, with particular reference to recent developments in the Middle East, the Far East and Southeast Asia, the forthcoming conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and Anglo-Canadian trade.

On February 6, Sir Anthony addressed a joint session of the House of Commons and the Senate, and on the following day Mr. Eden and Mr. Lloyd held a press conference in the East Block of the Parliament Buildings. The text of Sir Anthony's speech to Parliament, and extracts from the record of the press conference, are reproduced below.

Statement in the House of Commons by Sir Anthony Eden on February 6.

Mr. Prime Minister, I am indeed grateful . . . for your generous words, and to the Canadian Parliament for this invitation. I am deeply moved by the compliment which you have paid to me for the second time in my life. That must be a rare event. I believe that it is in fact unique in history. On neither occasion have I been able to catch your eye. I do trust the backbench members will not in consequence be so much aggrieved that they will move the closure on me. I was a little reassured to learn that this is an unusual custom for your Parliament.

You know that I speak sincerely when I say I am happy to be amongst you again. It is now 30 years since I first came to Canada and travelled across your country. On many occasions since then I have had opportunities to visit your vast and hospitable land. I am proud to think that I have more friends here than in any country outside my own.

Canadiens de langue française, je vous remercie chaleureusement de votre accueil. Je tiens à vous dire combien j'admire et je respecte la culture et les traditions que vous gardez si fièrement. Vous savez que cela me fait un plaisir sincère d'être de nouveau parmi vous. Trente années se sont écoulées depuis ma première visite au Canada. Je suis revenu maintes fois dans votre pays si hospitalier et à chaque occasion je retrouve beaucoup de vieux amis et j'en fais, je l'espère, de nouveaux.

Je suis profondément reconnaissant du grand honneur que vous m'avez fait en m'invitant, pour la seconde fois dans ma vie, à parler devant le Parlement canadien.

Inevitably, my mind goes back this afternoon to that earlier occasion, to which you, Mr. Prime Minister, have referred, when I spoke to you during the war. Then, though the tide had turned, victory had yet to be won and the future beyond it lay all uncertain. He would be a rash man or an ill-informed man who would attempt a confident prophecy for mankind today.

Balance of Good and Evil

Yet there is a certain balance sheet of good and evil which we can draw up, and I propose to do so, and to begin with the good, because it is more comforting than the evil. There is next the unshakable strength of the Anglo-American alliance in which we all join. Third, the growing unity of Western Europe within the framework of NATO. Fourth, and grimmer but still real, the deterrent power of the new weapons, including the hydrogen bomb, which restrain where they cannot reform. Fifth, the growing understanding by the West of the threat of communist penetration which it has to meet and of the new methods which we will have to employ.

And now on the debit side I would cite, first, the increasing hazards which some are prepared to take; second, the dangers of aggression by countries which believe they can ignore the deterrent; third, the continued existence of local disputes, whose consequences could engulf the world; fourth, the daily communist call to abhor the West sounds sharply. In contrast, the steady effort of the West to raise the standard of life for all free people must take time. It is easier to spread hatred than to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before.

It is with this balance of good and evil in mind that we have to prepare ourselves. Economic weapons may take the place of military ones. But always our purpose must be the same; to maintain the right that men's minds may be free and the care that their bellies be filled. Well now, to achieve this, free nations like ourselves, like free men, must draw and hold together and it is in the spirit of those reflections that I would like to make some comments on the recent conversations which I have held in Washington with President Eisenhower.

I can best sum up my impressions of those talks by saying that there has never been so full a measure of agreement between our governments. In the whole field of European diplomacy, which a year or two back was troublesome enough, there was no difference between us. You may have noticed the attempts of the Kremlin to obscure the issues and confuse our councils. In fact they only provided most obligingly an opportunity to underline the unity between the United States and ourselves.

Now much of our meeting was devoted to the difficult and critical problems of the Middle East. Here too we were in agreement that the first danger was the continuing Arab-Israel dispute. We were also in agreement as to what we should do to try to resolve it. We decided that the necessary treatment should be of three kinds. We should continue to work without publicity—I really think diplomacy is more effective without publicity—and by every means



—Capital Press

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM VISITS OTTAWA

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Eden, and Foreign Secretary, the Right Honourable Selwyn Lloyd, visited Ottawa on February 3-9, following talks held in Washington with President Eisenhower. During his Ottawa stay, Sir Anthony had consultations with Government officials and gave a press conference. Left to right: Mr. Selwyn Lloyd; the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent; Sir Anthony Eden; Mr. Rene Beaudoin, Speaker of the House of Commons; and Mr. Wishart Robertson, Speaker of the Senate.

to bring about a settlement in that area. This can only be realized if both sides are prepared to reconcile the positions they have taken up to now. That means a compromise. Some people tell me compromise is a horrible English habit; however, some might learn from it to their own advantage in the world. But we can both help, and are ready to do so, for example by financial aid to help settle the tragic refugee problem and by a guarantee of the frontiers once agreed.

Meanwhile, as you know we, the United States and France have our responsibilities under the tripartite declaration of 1950. We arranged for discussions on the action to be taken to meet an emergency should it arise. The French Government has agreed to join us in this. Personally I am convinced that to make ready in this way is to reduce the risk of conflict. It may also be that a strengthening of the United Nations truce supervisory organization would assist to prevent incidents. Both the United Kingdom and the United States governments are very ready to agree to this. But of course we should wish to be guided by General Burns, a brave Canadian soldier who is resolutely carrying out this thankless task.

As regards the dispute which we have with Saudi Arabia our position is this. We are not prepared to return to arbitration. There can be no question of

that in view of our recent experiences with their bribery and corruption. On the other hand, as we made clear in Washington, we are ready to enter into direct discussions.

The United States Government has declared its solid support to the Bagdad pact to which we belong. This again we welcome and here again our views are alike. The fact has economic purposes and aims which fully match its military provisions and importance. We have considered the kind of help which each member country needs and we are determined to make a success of the pact.

All this does not exclude some help to other countries in the area. An example is Jordan, to whom we shall continue to make substantial payments under our treaty.

Other Problems Discussed

So much then for what is perhaps the most critical region at the present time. Of course, we talked of many other problems, in many parts of the world, just as I had the privilege to do with the Prime Minister and your Cabinet this morning. We discussed the Declaration of Washington which the President and I issued together. In this we set forth the true principles which guide the free world. Some say that these have been stated before. Maybe, but it does no harm to state them again in a manner which make it clear that we are aware of the modern communist challenge. The Declaration of Washington is, in fact, a charter to which the whole of the free world can subscribe. I am sure that here in Canada you will agree with its purpose. It is in the tradition of the work you have done so well to unite the countries on either side of the Atlantic in defence of the free world.

I now come back to our own friendship and the work of our two peoples together. Many speakers and writers have tried to define the Commonwealth. None has really succeeded, for the reason no doubt that the spirit which gives it life is indefinable.

In a few months' time I look forward to welcoming the prime ministers of the Commonwealth to our London meeting. Foremost amongst them is your own Prime Minister, wisest of counsellors and most loyal of friends. May I here suggest that though we enjoy being the hosts to all these meetings of prime ministers, it would be good if from time to time the meeting place were to revolve.

I am here this afternoon surrounded by the familiar setting of our own House of Commons. This morning, Mr. Prime Minister, you were good enough to invite me and my colleague the foreign secretary to attend the Canadian Cabinet. Our systems, our modes of thought, our traditions and our ways of life are all so much alike, that perhaps we ought not to take too much credit to ourselves, but Anglo-Canadian relations are a model to the world.

But there is more to it than all this. The pervading influence which the Commonwealth carries into the four corners of the earth is one of understanding among friends, of tolerance and of peace.

In all this work Canada now plays a leading part. It is impossible to travel, as I had to do as foreign secretary until a year ago, into so many lands without

constantly hearing warm praise of the judgment and kindly help you have so often extended to less happier lands. The service that you are rendering in Indochina is but one example of the world's debt to you. By this action alone you made possible an armistice which may yet become a peace.

If I may conclude on a slightly more familiar note, I have from my childhood, like many of you, seen this great nation grow up into a position where its authority is among the foremost in the world. I have no doubt of what the future holds. You will be called upon to carry ever more burdensome responsibilities, but they go with authority. That is inescapable. Yet ever so at home and over the world at large there is great comfort in that thought, for I have no doubt that the guidance and wisdom of Canada will always be thrown in the scales on the side of toleration and peace.

It is not given to many of us to look far into the future, but of this no one who observes your country from outside can doubt a future, an almost unimaginably great future, is in your hands. I have no doubt that you will fashion it in a manner worthy of a great people.

And so I salute this Canada which commands the future as probably no other land in the world today. I salute you also as the standard bearer of loyalty and a herald of goodwill. And I wish you well.

Press Conference Excerpts

(A Press Conference was held by the Right Honourable Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom assisted by the Right Honourable Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, at Ottawa, February 7, 1956.)

Question: In your speech yesterday to the House you said you were ready to participate, I believe, in an international police force in Israel, if such a force were set up and if General Burns found favour with the idea of strengthening the truce commission there. How do we get the ball rolling on that? Where does the first move come from?

Mr. Eden: It was not quite that. What I think I said, and it is on the record, was that there are already observers on the spot and it might be desirable to increase the number of observers. If so, we were in favour of that, but it must be for General Burns to advise. Let me say I have the utmost confidence in him. He is doing an absolutely first class job. It is also a matter for the United Nations Secretary-General. It would not be proper or possible for our countries to just say we think the United Nations should have more. But we have expressed the view that if they wanted to have more we would be willing to join in that effort. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary who has been dealing with this idea a long time would like to say a word about that.

Mr. Lloyd: It would be a matter for the United Nations and also for the governments in the area concerned. There is going to be no attempt to impose on an unwilling people something which they do not want. The question of recruitment and increased facilities and all the rest of it must be a matter for the detailed recommendation of General Burns, and also the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, who has been there and has been discussing the matter. We shall have to await his return to discuss the matter further.

* * * *

Question: I wanted to put a question on Indochina. Have you officially

rejected the idea advanced by Chou-en-Lai for a conference on the Indo-chinese elections?

Mr. Lloyd: One of the jobs which I inherited has been co-chairman with Mr. Molotov of the Geneva conference. The position is that we have received a communication; that is known, and we are obtaining the views of the other governments concerned. I think it would be premature for me to announce any United Kingdom decision on the matter until we obtain the views of the other people. Let me make it clear that it is our policy to sustain the 1954 agreement.

* * * *

Question: Is your government going ahead with plans for the visit to the United Kingdom by Premier Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev following their interesting tour of the Far East and the remarks that they made?

Mr. Eden: The invitation stands.

* * * *

Question: Yesterday you mentioned that the Commonwealth conference may take place some place else. Would that mean it may take place in Ottawa or some other Commonwealth country?

Mr. Eden: Yes, I am glad you have taken that up. I was hoping somebody would. I hope I did not say anything to embarrass anybody. The word I used was "revolve". I used it deliberately because I would have thought there would be a good deal to be said for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting taking place occasionally in other capitals than London. Ottawa obviously has a very high claim but there are others, too, to which in due course we may go. I do not mean they are never coming to London because that would be bad indeed, but just occasionally to move around I think brings a new atmosphere, a new sense of the worldwide nature of this organization to which we all belong, the different atmospheres in which it works; that is what I really had in mind.

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Question: Do you feel it has been helpful to the West, the United Kingdom recognition of communist China, under present conditions? Is it a good thing to have a British representative in Peking?

Mr. Eden: That is a thing about which many people could have different points of view. For quite a while our representatives in Peking had practically no contacts with communist China. In fact, the position was we recognized Peking and they did not recognize us—at least, not so you would notice. That was the position for a while. Then, after the Geneva conference there have been more contacts which have certainly been useful, and I think not only useful to us. But my only word on that is that I do think it is a matter of opinion and judgment by everybody, and the best of friends can disagree about it or have different views. Generally speaking, as I say, our recognition is never based, as some people seem to think, on approval or disapproval—our recognition of foreign countries. It is based on what we think is a recognition of fact.

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Question: With regard to Palestine, there was this suggestion while you were in Washington that Canada might contribute observers to act as sort of police officers. If Canada does do that, how might that prejudice the position of General Burns who is a Canadian serving for the United Nations, and how do you balance, so to speak, General Burns against a possible contribution of Canadians to the truce team there?

Mr. Eden: I feel there may have been some misunderstanding on this. What we contemplated was that the number of observers under the United Nations might be increased with advantage. That, of course, is a matter for the United Nations. General Burns is there under the authority of the United Nations. If the numbers were increased they would be no doubt increased by recruiting from a number of countries, of which yours and ours might be one. I have never heard of any specific proposal—certainly we did not have one in mind—to allot some special task to Canada.

Mr. Lloyd: We have the United Nations as the principal supervisory organization, and the people to be recruited would serve in that organization. There was no idea of sending an actual national contingent.

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Question: In view of the fact the expression “H-bomb” was used twice yesterday, are we ready to go on with it knowing that possibly the enemy has a good stock of such weapons?

Mr. Eden: You mean, what is the additional danger from the fact that three countries have or will have the hydrogen bomb? I tried to explain in Washington that, in my view, that creates a certain mutual deterrent. It is good because nobody who knows about these things is going to start major trouble; that is what I call the negative advantage, the deterrent advantage. It does not solve any of our problems, but it prevents in certain instances their becoming explosive, even though the bomb itself goes off.

* * * *

Question: I should like to refer to the question of the Middle East. You mentioned yesterday, sir, the possibility that the great powers might guarantee negotiated frontiers. In the event of negotiations failing or it being impossible even to start them, do you mean to suggest that the great powers should, in effect, guarantee the present frontiers by forcibly restraining any act of aggression in that direction?

Mr. Eden: The present position, so far as we and the United States and France are concerned, is covered by the tri-partite undertaking. What I said yesterday, if we could get agreement—that represents the position of the United States government and ourselves—if we could get agreement between the two sides we would then guarantee the frontiers resulting from that agreement.

* * * *

Question: Would you have any observations to make, as a result of your visit, on the means of furthering our Anglo-Canadian trade?

Mr. Eden: I am glad you have raised that topic. It is a point of some interest to both of us. We very much want to increase mutual trade. Few things are more important in our relations. I have certainly already had the advantage of some informal discussions since I have been here. For instance, I have seen James Duncan, who is a very old personal friend of mine and who has done wonderful work in this direction.

As you probably know, I think it worked out last year that your exports to us, which have increased a great deal or considerably were about twice our exports to you. Now, we want the trade to go on growing but it is most important that the unbalance should be rectified to some extent if the trade is to go on growing. Now, that is one of the problems. I am sure it can be met and there are a number of ways in which you are already helping.

May I say I should like to mention one. You have been sending representatives of your industries over to Britain. I think that is a good thing indeed. I hope you go on doing that on an increasing scale because they can then see at home, on the spot, what it is they want and decide whether they want to order it or do not want to order it. It is a better method in certain respects than any other that could be contrived. I want to assure you that we in Britain are most anxious to meet your requirements in this Canadian market. We understand that it is highly competitive but all the same we want to be in the competition and, from time to time, we want to do very well in it.

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Question: On British trade, I believe the sales of British cars here have dropped off quite badly. I have found it is due largely to the fact Canadians have lost confidence in being able to get maintenance, spares and proper servicing quickly. Do you know if the British manufacturers are going to do anything about that situation or whether they are aware of it?

Mr. Eden: I am aware of the facts about the sales. I have heard different explanations, not all the same. Sir William Rootes was over here the other day with this important commission and also representatives of the Board of Trade, and I look forward when I get back to hearing their report about the position.

* * * *

Question: Have you any solid hope or can the West have any or anything else but the continuation of the current cold war with Russia in our time?

Mr. Eden: That is a good question. You know, just about two years ago I was in Berlin and we sat through that conference for weeks and weeks and we did not agree on anything at all. The advantage that was gained, and it certainly was one, was to show that we, the United States Government and the French were completely in agreement, but there was a deep division between us and the Russians on everything, including, in particular, Austria. If you had asked me after that meeting what the chances were of ever getting an Austrian settlement that year, I should have rated them very low indeed. Most people would have said they were non-existent. Well, two months and a year later, the Austrian business was settled. Now, foreign troops have gone from Austria.

One of the most difficult problems Europe has to face is that one, so you just cannot tell. You have to keep on making the effort, the more you and we and the United States are together in making that effort, the more chance we have of making a success of it. That is the whole basis of the foreign policy that the Secretary and I were pursuing.

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
Question: Can you tell us something about the forthcoming three-power talks in Washington on the Middle East, what the purpose is and what we hope to do?

Mr. Eden: That is a good point; that is the other side. You see, the observers have become very prominent in our discussion. As I said yesterday, there are the observers, there is the attempt to try to keep the peace by quiet negotiations or discussions and there is finally the responsibility which we three share under the tri-partite declaration. In respect of that, as our communique says talks are to begin between us. I understand the French government has accepted to join, in which case I should think they would be going on within the next day or two.

Indians in Canada*

By Sadar H. S. Malik

ONE of the most moving experiences of my life was my first meeting with the Indians who have settled down in Canada. It was in 1948 when I was posted to Ottawa as India's first High Commissioner to Canada. My wife, my daughter and I arrived at Vancouver by train and were met by what looked like every member, man, women and child, of the Indian community settled in Canada. There were among them the original settlers who had gone there almost 50 years ago and they presented an impressive appearance with their white beards and soldierly bearing. Many of their womenfolk although domiciled in Canada for many years still looked as if they had just come from their villages in the central Punjab but the younger folk looked very much like any young Canadian. My family and I were received with an enthusiasm and kindness that was most moving. They had gathered in their hundreds to welcome us and they brought with them, each and every one of them, a garland of flowers for us. They insisted that we go in a procession to our hotel and Vancouver can surely never have witnessed such a sight as our procession presented on that day with over a hundred cars, full of our people now settled in Canada, bedecked with flowers, and to the astonishment of the citizens of Canada, aeroplanes overhead showering flowers on us as we drove slowly through the streets of Vancouver.



Sadar H. S. Malik

India's First Representative

I asked myself: "Why this great and moving welcome?" The answer was that these folk who had taken an active part over the years in the struggle for India's independence, some of whom had lost their kith and kin in that movement, and practically all of whom had subscribed generously to funds in India to help the national cause, felt deeply moved on this occasion because for the first time free India had sent her own representative to Canada. They took a tremendous pride in this as they felt that they had played a part in bringing about this evolution.

Practically all the Indians in Canada, now about four thousand in all, are Sikhs. Most of them have settled down in Vancouver or Victoria in the

* Script of a talk which was broadcast over the All India Radio on November 22, 1955. Wing Commander Sadar Hardit Singh Malik was the High Commissioner for India in Canada from September 1947 to August 1949; leader of the Indian delegation to the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris 1951-52; and the Indian Ambassador to France since August 1949, accredited as Minister to Norway since May 1950.

Province of British Columbia. Some of them have done extremely well in the lumber trade and now own their own forests and lumber mills. Others are doing well in business, most of them being engaged in the business of supplying fuel, wood and coal, to the cities of Vancouver and Victoria.

The whole story of this Indian emigration into Canada is a fascinating one. It is one of great courage and enterprise, of many hardships suffered in the beginning, of many difficulties overcome. Now they have earned for themselves a real place among the various communities in Canada and are accepted as full citizens. The first emigrants were mostly young farmers. Weary of the back-breaking struggle in their own country, many of them mortgaging their all—their small land holdings—to pay for passages, they migrated to this new land. They were strong and tough and they worked in labour camps, on the road-gangs and on the railroads. I asked one of the first pioneers how they fared in the beginning and I said to him: "I suppose it was easy for you to get work because you were prepared to work for lower wages than the European emigrants." His reply astonished me. He said: "Oh, no, we worked for the same wages and indeed we claimed higher wages than the Europeans because we worked harder and on one occasion we struck for higher wages, on this ground we got higher wages."

Co-operative System

Naturally in the beginning their resources in a foreign country were limited and they were wise enough to adopt a co-operative system of living. They pooled their wages, bunked together and took turns at cooking and other domestic tasks. Of course it must be remembered that in the beginning they did not have their womenfolk with them. Living in this way they were able to save some money and indeed there was established in this way the beginnings of a co-operative system. This system was the basis of the comparative prosperity of Indians who settled down in Canada. This co-operative system was built up on a remarkable mutual trust which was established among the members of the community. They invested both money and labour; irrespective of the size of his financial investment each investor was an active participant in the common business enterprise. In addition the community lived co-operatively with their stores, housing and food arrangements and in most cases the members of the community worked without pay as shareholders in the common enterprise.

Today when you meet our Indian folks settled in Canada, you are struck by the success that they have achieved but this success story has not been an easy one. The demand of these people has always been that they should be treated in the same way, should have the same rights and responsibilities as other Canadian citizens. This fight for equal rights has been very real and at times heart-breaking—a chapter in the battle against racial discrimination. They have faced and overcome both bitter economic and political opposition as well as racialism. But all that is past history. The traditional friendliness, and sense of social justice of the Canadian people has helped and is helping to solve all the problems that stood in the way and today they live freely and happily, proud of their exciting vital new country—the country they have helped to build but proud too of their mother country and ever aware of the old civilization and traditions which are their inheritance, and of the place of honour and respect that the new independent India has built for herself among the great nations of the world.

The International Supervisory Commission in Vietnam: Fourth Interim Report

Since its inception in August 1954, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam has published four reports reviewing its activities in supervising the Cease-Fire Agreement in that section of Indochina. These reports have been rendered to the two Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference (the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.) for transmissions to the Geneva Conference Powers.

The Fourth Report, which was published in December 1955, is particularly significant since the period of activity which it reviews (April 11 to August 10, 1955) covers the concluding date for the completion of the most important military provisions of the settlement in Vietnam—the regroupment of forces on either side of the provisional demarcation line at the seventeenth parallel. Of special interest in Canada is the fact that the Fourth Report includes a Canadian Minority Note which brings to the attention of the Co-chairmen and the Geneva Conference Powers as well as the general public, the obstructionist tactics employed by the North Vietnamese in connection with the movement of refugees from the Northern zone of Vietnam.

One of the major tasks of the Commission has been to supervise the withdrawal of armed forces, equipment and supplies, and the transfer of civil administration on either side of the demarcation line without disrupting public services and without injury to persons or public property. This regroupment was to be completed within a three hundred day period—by April 20, 1955. According to the Fourth Report, this phase of the agreement was completed before the time limit expired and in a satisfactory manner, with public services handed over in running order and the withdrawal of military forces and supplies completed to the satisfaction of both parties. Indeed, the report states that the successful completion of the task improved the general atmosphere of co-operation and good will between the People's Army of Vietnam (P.A.V.N.) and the French High Command.

Freedom of Movement

While the regrouping of the military forces on either side of the demarcation line was carried out successfully, the Fourth Report indicates that the Commission was faced with many difficulties in the implementation of some of the political and administrative measures connected with this regrouping. Article 14 (c) of the Cease-Fire Agreement states that each side is to refrain from reprisals or discrimination against persons for their activities during the hostilities, and to guarantee their "democratic liberties"; Article 14 (d) states that persons wishing to change their zone of residence should be allowed freedom of movement to do so until the regrouping of military forces is completed. According to the Fourth Report, lack of co-operation by the authorities in both North and South Vietnam in the implementation and supervision of these articles greatly hindered the Commission's activities. With respect to the

provision for freedom of movement, the majority view (Indian and Polish) was that by May 18 the bulk of those wishing to do so had changed their zone of residence. As indicated in the Minority Note which is included in the Fourth Report, the Canadian Delegation did not accept this conclusion.

Canadian concern with freedom of movement had previously been expressed in a Note accompanying the Third Interim Report, recommending that the Geneva Conference Powers consult together to study such measures as might be necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Cease-Fire Agreement on freedom of movement were respected. As a result of this suggestion, an extension of the period allowed for the free movement of refugees was agreed to; however, owing to the failure of the parties to agree on details of the arrangements, only a comparatively small number of persons were able to move during the extended period which ended on July 20.

Communist Obstruction

The Canadian Minority Note illustrates by specific instances the extent of Communist obstructive tactics in the North and modifies the impression created by the majority report that the problem of freedom of movement was solved to a far greater extent than was really the case. According to the Canadian statement, the reports of the Commission's teams showed that individuals wishing to move South were not in fact permitted and helped to do so but in some cases were actually prevented from moving. An atmosphere of fear and suspicion, in part a legacy of the war years, had not been dissipated and served to inhibit and restrict effective investigation by the teams.

The Canadian Note states that reports of the teams also indicated that there was good reason to believe that Communist authorities in areas visited by Commission teams had taken special measures to prevent the complete facts from being brought to light and to inhibit effective contact between would-be evacuees and the Commission's representatives. Soldiers, political cadres and the local militia were frequently stationed in the homes of the Catholic population and prevented them from contacting the teams. In some cases, persons desiring to appear before the teams were called away to meetings organized by the local authorities to coincide with the arrival of the teams; in other cases, would-be evacuees were grouped in village churches and attempts made to keep the teams from interviewing them. In further instances of obstruction, organized groups presenting petitions complaining about forced evacuations demonstrated in such a fashion that the teams were unable to complete investigations and would-be evacuees were intimidated; and on at least a dozen occasions evacuees were physically molested and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity to meet a team, (on one occasion a crowd of 500 persons whisked away the director of a seminary before the eyes of the members of one team). In the Canadian view, these obstructive tactics on the part of local authorities were a part of an organized plan. However, it was impossible for the Commission to obtain absolute proof that such was the case.

Evasive answers and conflicting statistics also prevented the teams in the North from obtaining a complete picture of the extent of the non-implementation of the provision for "freedom of movement". However, it was evident by May 18 that action had not yet been taken on the majority of the more than 11,000 petitions in the North, and on about 1000 petitions in the South received from people wishing to change their zone of residence.

The Canadian Note states that the P.A.V.N. submitted 320,000 petitions claiming that people in the North had been forced to move to the South. After investigations which were carried out among 25,000 of a total of 121,000 persons in refugee camps in the South, the teams reported that these complaints of the P.A.V.N. were without foundation.

According to the Canadian Note, there was no problem with respect to "freedom of movement" in the South until the closing days of the 300-day period. During the 300-day period, 888,127 persons moved from the North to the South and 2,598 persons from the South to the North; during the extended period, (i.e. to July 20) 4,749 people moved from North to South and 1,671 people from South to North. Local administrative difficulties in the South prevented some persons who wished to do so from moving during the two-month extension. The Canadian Note indicates that the measure of co-operation offered by northern authorities was less than the Commission had a right to expect.

The Canadian Delegation considers that Article 14 (d) has still not been satisfactorily implemented and the Canadian Minority Note states clearly that the Commission has a continuing responsibility, particularly toward those persons who had expressed a desire to move by July 20 and were prevented from doing so. Full implementation of the provisions of the Article would mean that every individual wishing to move would have been helped to do so by July 20. In the Canadian view, the Commission is not only unable to report that full implementation in this sense had been achieved, but it should recognize that this problems has not yet been fully solved.

Another matter on which the Canadian Delegation entered a minority statement in the Fourth Report relates to the co-operation of the parties to the agreement, and particularly to difficulties which the Commission has encountered with respect to the implementation of some of its recommendations in South Vietnam. The majority view, as stated in the Fourth Report, is that the Commission's difficulties in the South are due solely to the "independent attitude" taken by the South Vietnamese government and its "categorical" denial that it is bound by the Cease-Fire Agreement. In the Canadian view, the situation is far more complex. The Canadian Note points out that with the completion of the regroupment of military forces, the Commission has become increasingly concerned with matters which in South Vietnam are not, for constitutional and administrative reasons, the direct responsibility of the French High Command, yet the French High Command remains the only party which is legally responsible to the Commission. The situation is complicated by the fact that in some matters the local authorities directly concerned are responsible not to the French High Command but to the Vietnamese government which did not sign the Cease-Fire Agreement and does not, at present, consider itself bound by its terms.

In the Indian and Polish view, the Commission cannot function effectively unless the Co-chairmen find some solution to these difficulties at an early date. The Canadian Delegation agrees that the situation adversely affects the work of the Commission but expresses the hope in its minority report that the negotiations between the French and South Vietnamese "will be able to work out a more durable and dependable arrangement which would place the Commission in a more favourable position to carry out its functions".


Canada Lends Three Frigates to Norway

ON December 20, 1955, the Canadian and Norwegian Governments concluded an Agreement by an Exchange of Notes between the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and the Norwegian Ambassador to Canada, His Excellency A. C. Gunneng, for the loan by Canada to Norway of three Prestonian class frigates. The three ships are the modernized anti-submarine frigates HMCS "Penetang", "Prestonian" and "Toronto".

These ships, which have formed part of the reserve of ships of the Royal Canadian Navy, will now be immediately available as part of NATO front line strength. Their loan is, therefore, evidence of the Canadian Government's continuing strong support of NATO, and demonstrates the type of co-operation between free and equal NATO partners which has enabled the Organization to develop to its present state of efficiency as a deterrent to aggression.

The first ship to be transferred by the RCN to the Royal Norwegian Navy was "Penetang". The ceremony took place in Halifax on January 25, when "Penetang" was re-christened "Draug" by Mrs. Gunneng. The ship's first port of call in Norway will be Oslo; a reception will be held on board for press and radio, in which the Canadian Ambassador to Norway, Mr. C. A. Ronning, will participate.

It is expected that "Prestonian" and "Toronto" will be handed over at Halifax at the end of March. They are to be re-named "Troll" and "Garm" respectively. The names "Draug", "Troll" and "Garm" are traditional in the Norwegian Navy.



KNM "DRAUG"

—National Defence

Canada and the United Nations

Assessment of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Effects of the "Geneva Spirit"

At the opening of the tenth session of the General Assembly, two factors helped to shape the attitude of the majority of delegations. One was the widely-heralded "spirit of Geneva" which had emanated from the meeting in July of the Heads of Government of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and France; the other was the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of these four countries which was to be held about the half-way mark in the scheduled timetable for the tenth session. The first factor encouraged the belief that the tenth session would prove to be a turning point in the struggle to achieve the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter; the second tended to hold in suspense the Assembly's discussion of the clearly controversial items on its agenda. The general desire of delegations seemed to be to preserve the Geneva spirit as long as possible and, in order to do this the Assembly was prepared to postpone discussion of controversial questions until after the Foreign Ministers had had an opportunity to pursue in detail the directives issued in July by their Heads of Government.

Accordingly, statements in the general debate in the Assembly contained many hopeful references to the improved international situation. These speeches were, on the whole, conciliatory in tone though, in many cases, coloured by over-optimism. There was a noticeable absence of propaganda in both Western and Communist speeches and many appeals were made for restraint in expressing strongly held opinions. Except for some discordant notes in the later stages of the session, there was general avoidance of extreme propaganda, which reflected a significant and welcome change from previous sessions. The Soviet delegation in particular seemed at pains not to provoke the acrimony of earlier cold war debates in the United Nations. However, this did not prevent them from pointing out whenever the opportunity arose the superior qualities of Soviet communism and the shortcomings of other ways of life. In the Second Committee for example, they deplored the alleged discriminatory trade-practices of the Western democracies against the countries of Eastern Europe.

The atmosphere of *detente* was of course more pronounced prior to the Foreign Ministers' meeting, which produced no positive results as regards the two most important subjects, on the agenda of the tenth session—disarmament and the admission of new members. After that meeting, however, there was no clearly discernible return to cold war tactics by the major contenders. It became less appropriate, perhaps, to refer to the new air of *rapprochement*. The behaviour of Messrs Bulganin and Krushchev during their Asian tour added to the doubt and dismay about East-West relations but there seemed to be little inclination to draw the lines for a renewed cold-war struggle in the General Assembly. Co-existence—by then clearly recognizable as competitive rather than co-operative co-existence—continued to be the preferred alternative. Exchanges between the United States and Soviet representatives

became more frequent and perhaps less restrained than earlier in the session, but on the whole the debates continued to be moderate. Clearly distinguishable however, in the Assembly proceedings after the Foreign Ministers' talks, was the acute disappointment of many delegations at the rapid evaporation of the Geneva spirit in which the tenth session had been launched.

Admission of New Members

Measured by any yardstick the admission of the sixteen new members was, for the United Nations, by far the most important achievement of the tenth session. Not only was a deadlock of long-standing broken; not only was new blood injected at a time when the Organization was debilitated from many years of cold war; but the General Assembly was able to reassert its claim to be a centre for harmonizing international action. In the immediately preceding years, a number of international arrangements had been negotiated outside the United Nations: the Indochina settlement, the Bandung Conference, and the Geneva talks were signs of the draft away from United Nations diplomacy.

This trend was broken by the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree in November. They had apparently tried and failed to reach agreement on the admission of new members, as a by-product of their Geneva talks. Unwilling to accept this particular failure because of the high hopes which had been raised, the majority of the General Assembly doggedly pursued the move initiated by Canada to admit eighteen new members. The pressure of opinion became so strong that it finally proved irresistible. There can be little doubt that the Soviet Government was strongly influenced by this pressure not to let the opportunity pass. Thus, by a sudden change of position they allowed admission of sixteen countries, after the original motion for the admission of eighteen had been vetoed by Nationalist China in the Security Council.

Colonial Issues

The determination of the new nations of Africa and Asia to press for the political and economic independence of all dependent peoples was evident at the tenth session at which they campaigned energetically both in the political committees and in the Third and Fourth Committees where the questions of self determination and colonial administration arose in several forms. And it was perhaps paradoxical that the session which succeeded in breaking the deadlock on new members should also have witnessed the withdrawal from the General Assembly of the French and South African delegations, by way of protest against Assembly consideration of matters which they held to be exclusively of national concern. Nevertheless, although the Afro-Asian countries undoubtedly feel it is the duty of the United Nations to deal with the urgent problems of colonialism, there were signs that they recognized that a succession of withdrawals from the General Assembly of important member countries would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the organization. Painstaking negotiations were therefore undertaken to bring about the return of the French, an accomplishment which required the co-operation, perseverance and tact of many delegations. The Afro-Asian delegations also displayed a spirit of accommodation on the questions of Morocco and West New Guinea, the plebiscite in British Togoland and the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa. In general, these delegations showed themselves willing to make temporary concessions in the interests of wider harmony without abandoning in any

way the colonial causes which they have espoused. They may have sensed that the majority in the General Assembly was not in the mood at this session for repetitious debates on colonial issues of long standing and that it would resist resolutions demanding radical action. In consequence the comparatively reasonable manner in which the Assembly dealt with colonial issues at this session appeared to be in large measure the result of shrewd and responsible judgment on the part of the Afro-Asian delegations.

Atomic Energy

The resolutions on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and on the effects of atomic radiation provided similar evidence that the United Nations could work together. The Western Great Powers were required, in promoting their ideas, to make modifications in order to meet objections mainly from the Arab, Asian and Scandinavian countries. The Soviet Union, however, had little success in gaining support for their point of view.

It would be unrealistic not to recognize the difficulties involved in implementing the resolutions on the atomic items. The complexities of running the proposed atomic energy agency have only begun to appear; the negotiations on its statute are likely to be protracted and it may therefore be some time before the agency comes into being; furthermore, the committee established to study the effects of radiation on man and his environment may not produce immediate results. However, both these bodies would appear to be essential in a world of atomic development, and the necessity for their success may compel the powers concerned to reach agreement. In any event, the tenth session not only demonstrated the continued interest of the U.N. in all matters relating to the establishment of an international atomic energy agency, but also created the committee on radiation. The majority of member countries are unlikely to relax their interest in these agencies, and will undoubtedly continue to press for a practicable solution to atomic problems.

Disarmament

The debate on disarmament was somewhat disappointing after the hopes raised at the ninth session. As between the major powers, it consisted mainly of a repeat performance of what had taken place during the discussions of the Disarmament Sub-committee in September and October where no progress had been made. This was perhaps inevitable in view of the deadlock reached a few days earlier in Geneva on the other outstanding issues between the East and the West. The truth of the matter is that the major powers and, for that matter, other member states had little time before the Assembly discussions to examine the situation resulting from the Geneva negotiations. In view of this, the Assembly seems to have taken a sensible step in recommending that priority be given to the implementation of "confidence-building measures" such as the Eisenhower plan for the establishment of a warning system through the exchange of military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection and the Soviet plan for establishing control posts at strategic centres.

Korea

A long debate held late in the Assembly disclosed lack of progress towards the goal of peaceful unification of Korea and was the occasion for perhaps the

harshest and most combative exchanges between Soviet and Western delegations. The Indian and Yugoslav representatives tried, without much success, to introduce an element of reasonableness and impartiality. The statement of the Canadian delegation suggested that, since United Nations military action to repel aggression in Korea had been successfully completed by the conclusion of the Military Armistice Agreement, the United Nations should make use of all its resources for conciliation and peaceful settlement in its search for a just and equitable procedure for unifying Korea. Countries which had unhesitatingly supported South Korea against aggression were not bound to support South Korea's approach to national unification as the only acceptable procedure.

Economic and Social Question

In the matter of economic development the results of the tenth session were, on the whole, satisfactory. It was generally agreed that encouraging progress was being made in the field of technical assistance, and this confidence was reflected in the promises of increased contributions to the Expanded Programme which were given at a pledging conference during the session. The forthcoming establishment of the International Finance Corporation was welcomed in the Second Committee, although some delegations expressed the view that the International Bank had acted precipitately in opening for signature the draft statute of the IFC before referring it to the General Assembly for consideration. The main difficulty in the Second Committee's proceedings related to the question of establishing a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The less economically-developed countries have in recent years applied increasing pressure for its establishment, and at this session it was only with difficulty that the chief supporters of the Fund were persuaded not to force an early decision in this matter. The compromise resolution on SUNFED, which was adopted unanimously, requested the Secretary-General to invite comments from member states and from the Specialized Agencies concerning the establishment, role, structure and operations of a special fund. An *Ad Hoc* Committee was appointed to analyze the replies of governments, and hope was expressed that the idea of SUNFED would win increased support.

At this session the Third Committee produced few useful results. In the discussion of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Soviet delegation, without abandoning in any way its basic position in favour of the early repatriation of refugees, modified its earlier attacks on the sincerity of purpose of the High Commissioner and accepted resettlement and integration as possible alternatives for a small number of refugees. A Soviet draft resolution was submitted which, among other things, instructed the High Commissioner to assist in the early repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to their countries of origin. The Soviet contentions were, however, so clearly contrary to the spirit of United Nations assistance to European refugees that they failed to commend themselves to the Committee, even though the Arab delegations showed considerable sympathy for the Soviet position. The Committee finally adopted a Nine-Power draft resolution which underlined the High Commissioner's responsibility to seek solutions for the problems of refugees through voluntary repatriation, resettlement and integration, and requested him to continue his efforts to effect solutions by these three means. However, because of the lack of response among many Arab, Asian and Latin-

American countries, the prospects for attaining the target figures for the United Nations Refugee Fund for 1955 and 1956 are not promising.

In the field of human rights the Third Committee devoted a large part of its time to debating the question of self-determination, mainly in the context of Article I of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights. The efforts of the Western Powers have been directed to preventing precipitate and questionable action on this subject in the various United Nations bodies which have been dealing with it. The Afro-Asian delegations have, however, been most assiduous in pressing, with the support of the Soviet bloc and many of the Latin-American countries, for universal recognition of self-determination as an inalienable right of all peoples and for legal formulation of such a right in the draft Covenants on Human Rights. These efforts were intensified during the tenth session and, as the outcome of a difficult and inconclusive debate, a text was adopted for Article I of the draft Covenants which was far from satisfactory to many delegations. The adoption of this article would seem to prejudice objective consideration of a constructive proposal of the Secretary-General for the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee which would attempt to reach agreement on certain basic principles concerning the whole question of self-determination. Prospects for achieving any real progress in this important matter are therefore most uncertain.

Trusteeship Questions

One of the many achievements of the Fourth Committee was the adoption of a resolution whereby the Assembly recommended that the United Kingdom organize and conduct without delay, under the supervision of the United Nations, a plebiscite in British Togoland. The plebiscite—the first of its kind to be held in United Nations Trust territory—is to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants concerning their political future; that is, whether the territory should be linked with an independent Gold Coast, or continue under trusteeship pending final determination. The Fourth Committee also endorsed the views of a visiting mission to French Togoland that implementation of the political reforms contemplated by the French would be helpful in enabling the inhabitants of that territory to decide their future status at an early date. In these developments the anti-Colonial powers showed a spirit of accommodation; but on the question of South West Africa they pressed their attack against the Union Government which had continued to resist United Nations efforts to bring the territory under the trusteeship system.


Legal Questions

The most important matter discussed by the Sixth Committee was the draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure. It was apparent that whereas most member states agreed that arbitration was a necessary means of solving disputes between states, few (and in particular the Soviet Union) were prepared to underwrite a provision of the draft Convention aimed at ensuring that an obligation to arbitrate once entered into could not be repudiated. The discussion on this subject—as was generally the case in the Sixth Committee this year—was free from political controversy.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the disappointment caused by the rapid evaporation of the Geneva spirit, most delegations seemed satisfied at the end of the session

that the General Assembly had been able to produce positive results of considerable importance and that the United Nations had been strengthened in the process. The withdrawal from the danger of thermo-nuclear chaos, which had already begun prior to the ninth session, was clearly continuing during the tenth session notwithstanding halting steps and backward glances. The General Assembly could take some pride in the admission of sixteen new members, the unanimous approval of the resolutions on peaceful uses of atomic energy and on the effects of atomic radiation, and the relative calm in which colonial questions were discussed and disposed of, at least for the time being. On the whole, the tenth session provided encouraging evidence of the capacity of the United Nations—by limiting its immediate objectives to areas in which a substantial measure of agreement can be achieved—to move forward towards the fulfilment of the high purposes to which the organization is dedicated.



—Capital Press

OTTAWA CLUB FOR COLOMBO PLAN AND UNITED NATIONS TRAINEES

Club rooms have been opened in Ottawa under the auspices of the Overseas Friendship Society for the use of scholars and fellows who are training in Canada under the Colombo Plan, the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies and Canadian Government post-doctorate fellowship schemes. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, formally opened the club, which is called "Friendship House" at a ceremony which took place on February 15, 1956 in the presence of a large number of foreign students.

The above photograph shows Mr. Pearson signing the visitors' book as Dr. James A. Gibson, President of the Overseas Friendship Society of Ottawa (left); Mrs. E. Ito, a Japanese scientist who is working with her husband at the Canadian National Research Council, Ottawa; and Mr. Muddappa Bettiah of Mysore, India, looks on.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Foreign Policy Statement

The following statement was made in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

Work of the Armistice Commission in Indochina

... I should say at least a word about the work of the armistice commissions in Indochina, which was referred to earlier in the sitting this afternoon. In that area of the world Canadians continue to make an important contribution to peace through their work with these commissions. Our men—there are some 170 of them in that area, mostly from the Department of National Defence, members of the armed forces—have discharged their extremely difficult and trying duties with great credit to themselves and to their country. In one of the countries, there, namely Cambodia, we have reached the winding-up stage of the commission, and we have been able to reduce the strength of that commission. Elections have been held in that country, and as a result the commission and its members can leave Cambodia with the satisfaction which they must feel at the stability which has been achieved in a country so recently a victim of war.

In Laos, one of the other countries, the situation is not so good. Elections have also been held there, but the communist Pathet Lao forces, which are grouped in the northern provinces of that country, have refused to accept the Laotian Government or the authority of that government and to take part in the election. Hence no reduction there has been found possible either in the numbers of the commission or in its activities up to the present time.

Political Aspects

So far as Vietnam is concerned—and that is probably the most important of the three countries—the military phases of the armistice work have been completed and with little disturbance. I think the commission deserves a good deal of credit for that result. The political aspects, however, present a less satisfactory picture. Little progress has been made in that country toward the national elections visualized by the Geneva conference, and which are scheduled to take place in July of this year. If they do not take place it is hard to say what effect that failure will have on our obligations in the commission.

This work in Indochina is arduous and difficult, as I have said, and it imposes a heavy burden on the armed forces of our country and upon the Department of External Affairs. We are most anxious to complete it at the earliest possible date. Nevertheless we shall not abandon that work so long as we are convinced that it is making an important contribution to peace.

Recognition of Communist China

I should also say a word about a problem which is very much in our mind these days, namely that of the legal recognition of the communist Chinese government in Peking. One of the most difficult questions which face this country and many other countries is that of determining our relations with the two rival and bitterly hostile governments of China. It is not as simple an issue to decide as some seem to think. There is more than one factor to take into account before any decision can wisely be taken. Such a decision requires a careful balancing of many national and international factors, moral, political and economic.

Some time ago—indeed, last summer—I expressed the view that we should have another look at this question in the light of the cessation of hostilities in Korea and in Indochina, in the light of the situation in and around the Formosa straits and in the light of the recent policy of the Peking Government in so far as it is possible to determine it. We have made this re-examination and we feel that the careful policy we have been following, and are still following, has been the right one; rejecting on the one hand immediate diplomatic recognition but rejecting on the other hand the view that a communist regime in Peking can never be recognized as the government of China.

The arguments for and against recognition of this government have more than once been discussed, and in detail, in this House, and I do not intend to repeat them at this time. I wish merely to state as briefly as possible the considerations which determine our policy as a government in this matter.

The first consideration is the interest of our country, remembering that the paramount interest of us all is international peace and security. In addition, we are obliged to give consideration to the interests and views of our friends and allies, some of whom are even more directly involved than are we in the consequences of diplomatic recognition. It is also important not to confuse recognition with approval. There are, of course, moral considerations involved and, in the case of a ruthless communist regime, these considerations inevitably must have a bearing on our attitude. But the decision remains predominantly a political one to be taken on the basis of enlightened self-interest, as in many other cases where we have recognized totalitarian regimes.

Paramount Interest

It should not, however, be assumed that Canadian recognition of the Peking government—even if it were to be granted at some time in the future—would extend to the island of Formosa. As we see it, the legal status of Formosa is still undecided and no step taken vis-a-vis the communist regime should prejudice that issue. In particular, we would not be a party to any action which handed over the people or the government on Formosa, against their will, to any mainland government, let alone to a communist Chinese government.

We condemn the cruelties and tyrannies of the Peking regime, and we continue to hope that the Chinese people will one day be governed by a more enlightened government of their own choice.

But, we must accept the fact of communist control of mainland China. That is one thing we cannot fail to recognize with the corollary that in certain

circumstances and in our own interests we may be obliged to deal—as we already have been obliged to do—at Geneva and elsewhere with that government in respect of certain problems which cannot be solved without it. Nor should we, I suggest, base our policy on the likelihood of the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek returning to power on the mainland. Furthermore, the anomaly of that government representing China at the United Nations, with a veto that can block any action desired by 52 other members, is becoming increasingly apparent. I believe also that we should accept no commitment to intervene on behalf of the nationalist government in the struggle for the Chinese off-shore island. Our view on this matter has already been made clear in this House, outside this House and in the United States.

As for Formosa, the only commitment—and this also has been stated in the House—we have is that which might arise out of our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. So far as diplomatic recognition is concerned, we should from time to time review the position in the light of conditions; of our interests and of the views of our friends and allies. However, I believe we should not get ourselves into such an inflexible position that a change in policy, if it were considered to be wise and necessary, could be brought about only with maximum difficulty.

I should like to express one further thought on this subject. We are all concerned, and rightly so, that the utmost in good judgment be applied to this complicated and controversial problem of legal recognition. As I see it, however, we must not let it distract us so much that we ignore the longer term issues which are raised by communist China's emergency as a new and powerful force in the world. The consolidation and growth of Chinese power under communist rule which is now taking place may be historically as important an event as the Russian revolution of 1917. The implications for us in China's determined drive to achieve military and industrial might and a position as a world power may be as far reaching as similar developments which have taken place in Russia. Indeed, one day in the future these two revolutionary forces may clash. It may now seem to us to be of great importance to recognize or not to recognize the communist regime in Peking. It is of far greater importance to recognize that a revolution of cataclysmic force has taken place in China as a fateful part of the emergence of a modern awakened Asia . . .

Objectives of Soviet Policies

Hon. members will recall the feeling of optimism that was developed at the summit meeting as it is now called, at Geneva last summer: It may well be that hopes at that time were too high and that thinking was too wishful. I remember, along with others, taking that view in this House in the discussion we had on July 23 last year. At that time I, along with a good many others, felt that the real test of the reality and importance of the Geneva spirit was to be the foreign ministers' meeting which was called for November in an effort to achieve some of the objectives of the summit meeting.

We now know that the results of that November meeting was almost 100 per cent negative. We learned at that time that Soviet words differed from Soviet deeds, and that Soviet tactics were not the same as Soviet policy. As hon. members will recall, as a result of that foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva in November, not a single basic objective of Soviet policy was changed.

What are those objectives? I believe myself that the fundamental objective of Soviet policy, the long-range one, is security for the Soviet Union and the triumph of communist ideology in a world of communist States controlled and dominated by Moscow. I believe this objective remains unaffected either by relaxation or by increases of tensions. The cold war in that sense goes on, and I suggest it is misleading to think of the cold war in any other terms.

This was very well put in an editorial in *The Economist* magazine last November, which reads:

“Cold war” is an even more misleading phrase than most of the monosyllabic slogans that headline writers love. It is commonly identified with such rudeness and crudeness as the Russians practised until lately. For those who make this over-simple identification, the “cold war” presumably ended when Vyshinsky’s diatribes gave place to Mr. Khrushchev’s waggery, . . . “Cold-war” in that sense need not now return, and it probably will not . . . But the phrase “cold war” was originally coined with reference not to a form of etiquette but to a policy—the policy of “struggle”, to borrow a communist keyword. This “struggle” is basically a contest for power over men’s minds, a political contest in which economic and military pressures are auxiliary. The “cold war” in this deeper sense never ended, and can never end while the communist rulers cling to their aim of worldwide victory. All that can change is the tactics employed, both by them and by the nations that are ready to defend their liberty.

These are very wise words indeed. But tactics, even on this interpretation of Soviet policy, have changed, and in one sense at least I think the change of tactics has effected a change of strategy, and in a sense that is very important indeed.

I believe myself, and I share that belief, of course, with many others, that the deterrent effect of the hydrogen bomb is now recognized in Moscow. It is now admitted there as in other places that hydrogen warfare means universal destruction, and it is now accepted in Moscow, as in other places, that a balance of terror has been achieved. No one, however, can take much comfort out of it as a solid foundation of peace.

Competitive Coexistence

I think, as I said a few moments ago, that the Soviet leaders do want peace in the sense that they do not want atomic warfare, and that they will not deliberately provoke or risk that kind of war with the certainty of mutual destruction. Yet I add that in my view their policy is still conflict short of war that is what they mean, surely, by competitive coexistence; not friendly co-operation.

It is always wise to go to the Soviet leaders’ own words to get inside their minds, especially the words they are aiming not at their potential enemies outside, but the words which they use for their own friends, their own people. In that connection, Mr. Stalin himself expressed what he meant by coexistence, and it is a definition that has never been disavowed by his followers, when he said:

The limits of coexistence are set by the opposite characters of the two systems between which there is opposition and conflict. Within the limits allowed by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreement is quite possible.

Then, more recently Stalin's successor, Mr. Khrushchev on September 17 last, in addressing an East German delegation in Moscow, said this, and these words are now pretty well known:

We always tell the truth to our friends as well as to our enemies. We are in favour of a detente; but if anyone thinks that for this reason we shall forget about Marx, Engels and Lenin he is mistaken. This will happen when shrimps learn to whistle.

He went on:

We are for coexistence because there is in the world a capitalist and a socialist system, but we shall always adhere to the building of socialism. We do not believe that war is necessary to that end. Peaceful competition will be sufficient.

That should be reassuring but it is not so reassuring when you try to analyse what is meant by the kind of competition which is referred to; competition under their rules, or under no rules. I suggest we must face the fact of their kind of competition.

Another objective which has not changed because of any Geneva spirit is to win over, subvert and eventually engulf the uncommitted millions of Asia and Africa. The recent visit of Soviet leaders to India is just one example of their determination to pursue their objective—a visit which I am sure did not deceive our Indian friends. Another example is the Soviet policy in backing Arab states military and politically.

Flexible Tactics

This objective, I think, is fixed but here again their tactics are flexible. They are willing to either take the peace approach to the achievement of their objective or the force approach. Mr. Khrushchev is an outstanding example of the ability to use either tactic. In India he could pay pious if unconvincing tributes to Gandhi, the great apostle of pacificism, on one day and the next day boast that one of their hydrogen bombs could destroy an Indian city. The most important tactic of all in the achievement of this objective is, of course, to exploit and lead, if possible through local communist parties, the insistent demand for political freedom, racial equality and social betterment which exists in that part of the world today. They are having too much success in the achievement of that objective.

The third objective which I suggest has not changed is to weaken, divide and eventually destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and drive the United States out of Western Europe. How do they expect to achieve that? Well, there is the tactic of smiling away our fears so we will throw away our arms and our unity, to convince us that the Soviet Union is merely a country of footballers, fiddlers and flowers.

There is another tactic, and that is the Soviet attitude concerning Germany and its relationship to NATO. This is specifically shown in the Soviet attitude toward the unification of Germany, where it is now quite clear that they will refuse to consent to that unification except on their own terms. And what are those terms, at least at the present time? Mr. Khrushchev said it was withdrawal from NATO. He told me that on more than one occasion, but I suspect that he told me only half the story and that Mr. Molotov told the other half

at the Geneva conference. It became clear as a result of the statements he made at that meeting that even a Germany out of NATO, even a Germany neutralized and disarmed, would not be enough as the price for unification. The present Russian position goes further than that, and I think we can take Mr. Molotov's words at face value when he said there will be no unification unless the social and economic benefits of the Germans of the East are preserved.

That means there will be no unification unless all of Germany goes communist, and that means there will be no free election. Surely that has now become clear, and I suggest we should keep it clear, so there will be no difficulty in understanding what the position is.

Now this policy of the Soviet Union in regard to Germany involves difficulties for the government and people of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is for that reason we all welcomed the searching examination which was given to that problem at the recent NATO Council meeting. So we welcomed the assurance that was given last December by the foreign minister of the Federal Republic that the present policy of that government had the overwhelming support of the German people; that notwithstanding—indeed, in a sense because of—the failure of the Geneva conference; that German opinion was steady and undeceived, that they now knew the Russian price for unification, and they would not have it on those terms.

It seems to me there is an awareness of this development even in the East itself—that is, Eastern Germany itself that may be one reason why last year 271,000 refugees from what is called by the communists the workers' paradise fled to Western Germany. It is true, of course, that the Soviet Government does try to misrepresent the situation.

Misrepresentations

It was misrepresented in our visit to Moscow, too, in the sense that we were told that the policy of the West was to insist that Germany shall remain in NATO as a price for unification. That, of course, is not the case. All we ask is that the Germans be allowed to make their own choice as a result of free elections. That choice might be membership in NATO or withdrawal from NATO, or any other course they may desire to follow; and it should be made perfectly clear that that is the position of the West. We should do our best to correct misrepresentations of that position from communist sources.

I have mentioned the NATO conference meeting. I do not have time today to give any detailed report of it, but I can say this. We agreed at that meeting, as you would have expected us to agree, that nothing happened to justify any relaxation in our defence or in our diplomacy. We felt that those who were opposed to NATO were counting on relaxation of the tension bringing about a relaxation of effort and a weakening in our unity. We agreed that we must do our best to remain strong and united and keep our diplomacy flexible and active. I hope there will be another opportunity when I can report in greater detail about the NATO developments, and especially the Council meeting last December.

The International Situation

In conclusion, may I just say a word on the general situation. The great combined effort to maintain peace and freedom goes on. The leadership in

that effort continues to rest with the United States of America, and that is why every other free nation, especially a neighbour and friend like Canada, must be intensely preoccupied with every aspect of American policy. That is why we must make our views clearly known to the people of that country on the issues which affect us both but in which their position is vital.

The two greatest factors today bearing on the danger of aggression in all parts of the world are, I think, first the nature and conduct of United States policy because of its position of power and leadership, and second the strength of United States arms. As the predominant element of power in the NATO alliance—where would we be today without it? United States strength, military and economic, has been of decisive importance during the past decade in maintaining peace in Europe, and hence in the world. It will be so, I believe, in the years ahead.

Similarly, the determination of the United States to give leadership in resisting aggression in Korea in 1950 saved collective security and probably the United Nations itself. We would be wise not to forget this when we dwell on present differences of viewpoint within the coalition—and we have them—particularly in connection with Far Eastern policy.

Indisputable Obligation

While our policy should, of course, be designed and carried out to make the use of force unnecessary; while tactics should be followed that are neither provocative nor rash, nevertheless, the maintenance of force in this unhappy world of today and the clear resolve to use it as a final necessity against aggression is an indisputable obligation on us all at the present time. The deterrent value of such force, as I see it, should neither be squandered by bluff nor made impotent by loss of nerve in a genuine crisis.

Our purpose and our policy must be to avoid crises and to solve international problems. But crises, in spite of all our efforts, may occur, and dangerous and unresolved problems may persist. It is important, therefore, that the communist bloc, which we fear and which we still have cause to fear, should not get the impression that free peoples in their passion for peace and their desire to secure it by negotiation and the resolving of differences would, under no circumstances, make use of the deterrent strength they have built up for security and defence in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

This strength, though centred in the United States, is the sum total of that of many free countries, all of whom are devoted and will continue to be devoted to the ideal of peace and will strive with all their power to find means of securing that peace. That strength, then, being collective, should be used collectively if it is to be effective. This requires that every member of the coalition should know about and, if possible, should agree with the policies of the leaders as to when and how the threat of aggression, as well as its actuality, must be faced and countered. On no other basis can there be solid unity, and unity is as much a part of our strength as bombs.

We are moving, I think, into a much more fluid period of relations with the communist world than those which characterized the hard and brutal rigidity and the tense isolation of the late Stalinist period. It must be quite clear now that the new tactic of Russia is one of manoeuvre and contact, of

trying everything that may help their cause; of smiles and scowls, of kicks and carrots. These tactics may be more dangerous and difficult to deal with than any ever employed by Stalin. They are certainly more complex. But at any rate, in the long run, they may offer some possibilities for negotiation and settlement. To meet them and to bring about that negotiation and settlement to which we would all give first place in our efforts, requires flexibility and imagination on our part. As "our" refers to a coalition of free states, with a cherished freedom even to differ, this is going to be difficult to combine with unity of purpose and co-ordination of methods.

We must, then, develop an imaginative yet realistic diplomacy, one based on a clear and unclouded understanding of the intentions and methods of the Soviet Union and its satellites and of their strengths and weaknesses; one based also on a staunch adherence to our own policies and principles.

There is now less reason for complacency on our part than ever, for the threat to the institutions and the society of the free world remains as strong as ever. There is, however, no reason for despair merely because Mr. Molotov said "Nyet" at Geneva and because Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev continue to level harsh and unfounded accusations at the Western powers, mixed with honeyed words and offers of peace pacts. The latest of these offers was made the other day to the Government of the United States through a message from Mr. Bulganin to President Eisenhower. I feel that I am voicing the impressions of most members of this House, though I know I should speak only for myself, when I say that I have read with admiration and respect the reply of the President of the United States to that offer. It was constructive not negative, and it was the sort of attitude that in a matter of this kind I am sure this government would be happy to support.

I have already mentioned the feeling of confidence and self-assurance of the Soviet leaders. If on our part we can show strength, steadiness and unity—a strength which is more than military, a steadiness which is not indifference and a unity which is based on common ideals and which requires careful and continuous fostering—we shall prove the communists wrong in their assurance that the future belongs to them.

If we do not, we shall have only ourselves to blame.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. A. E. L. Cannon posted from the Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires to Ottawa, effective January 3, 1956.
- Mr. J. E. G. Lalonde posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective January 5, 1956.
- Mr. J. W. L. H. LaVigne posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Pretoria, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 9, 1956.
- Mr. J. C. Y. L. Beaulne posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, effective January 10, 1956.
- Mr. J. J. M. Côté posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective January 16, 1956.
- Mr. N. E. Currie, DFC., posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bogota, to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective January 20, 1956.
- Mr. G. V. Beaudry posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective January 21, 1956.
- Mr. R. E. Collins posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective January 25, 1956.
- Mr. J. D. Foote posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective January 27, 1956.
- Mr. J. G. Hadwen posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective January 27, 1956.
- Mr. P. L. Trottier posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective January 28, 1956.
- Mr. P. M. Towe posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective January 20, 1956.
- The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers Grade 1:
- Mr. D. S. McPhail (January 3, 1956); Mr. R. L. Elliot (January 3, 1956); Mr. G. G. J. Grondin (January 31, 1956).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

Printed documents of the United Nations may be obtained in Canada at the following addresses: Agents: the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. W., Toronto; Sub-Agents: Book Room Ltd., Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Bookstore, Montreal; Magasin des Etudiants de l'Université de Montréal, Montréal; University of Toronto Press and Bookstore, Toronto; University of British Columbia Bookstore, Vancouver; Mimeographed United Nations documents are available to the general public by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York; and to university staffs and students, teachers, libraries and non-governmental organizations from the United Nations Department of Public Information, New York.

Complete sets of United Nations documents may also be consulted at the following centres in Canada:

- University of British Columbia (English printed and mimeographed documents).
- Provincial Library of Manitoba (English printed and mimeographed documents).
- University of Toronto (English printed and mimeographed documents).
- Library of Parliament, Ottawa (English and French printed documents and English mimeographed documents).
- McGill University (English printed and mimeographed documents).
- Laval University (French printed documents).
- Dalhousie University (English printed and mimeographed documents).
- University of Montreal (French printed documents).

Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto (English printed and mimeographed documents).

The United Nations Association in Canada, 340 McLeod Street, Ottawa, operates an unofficial United Nations information service. Introductory material on the United Nations is sent, free of charge, on request; questions about the United Nations are answered; and pamphlets of general interest are sold. Price lists enumerating the publications available can be obtained on request.

(a) Printed Documents:

Commission on International Commodity Trade. Report of the First Session. 17 January - 2 February 1955, and 25 April - 9 May 1955. E/2745, E/CN.13/10. N.Y., June 1955. 15 p. ECOSOC Official records: Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 7.

Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954. Summary Report. (Rome, 31 August - 10 September 1954). E/CONF. 13/412. N.Y., July 1955. 207 p. \$1.00. Sale No.: 1955.XIII.8.

International Review of Criminal Policy. ST/SOA/Ser.M/7-8: January-July 1955. 256 p. (English-French-Spanish).

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1954. ST/STAT/SER.G/5. N.Y., September 1955. 556 p. \$5.00. Sales No.: 1955.XVII:9.

First Expert Working Group on Technological Centres, Copenhagen, 10 May to 4 June 1954. ST/TAA/Ser.C/20. N.Y., January 1955. 119 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1955.II.H.2.

Third Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the South Africa. A/2953. N.Y., 1955. 105 p. \$1.25. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 14.

Social Progress through Community Development—United Nations. E/CN.5/303/Rev.1, ST/SOA/26. N.Y., November 1955. 117 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.18.

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. Volume V: Articles 92-111 of the Charter. N.Y., 1955. 417 p. \$3.50. Sales No.: 1955.V.2 (Vol. V).

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(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa 2, Canada.)

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UNESCO

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XVIIIth International Conference on Public Education 1955. 134 p. \$1.25. UNESCO, Paris/IBE, Geneva, Publication No. 167.

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International Bibliography of Economics. (Documents in the Social Sciences, Volume II). Paris, 1955. 384 p. \$7.50. (Bilingual).

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Catalogue of Colour Reproductions of Paintings Prior to 1860. Paris, 1955. 254 p. (English-French-Spanish) \$3.50.

The Positive Contribution by Immigrants. A Symposium prepared for UNESCO by the International Sociological Association and the International Economic Association (Population and Culture). Paris, 1955. 202 p. \$2.25.

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WHO—*Eighth World Health Assembly, Mexico, D.F., 10-27 May 1955.* Resolutions and Decisions. Plenary Meetings. Verbatim Records. Committees. Minutes and Reports. Annexes. Geneva, November 1955. 471 p. \$3.25. Official Records of the WHO, no. 63.

Proposed Programme and Budget Estimates for the financial year 1 January - 31 December 1957. Geneva, December 1955. 411 p. \$3.25. Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 66.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 55/33—*The Royal Commission of Canada's Economic Prospects*, an address by the Chairman, The Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Mr. Walter L. Gordon, to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, at Edmonton, August 29, 1955.

No. 55/37—*Canadian Television in Perspective*, an address by the chairman of the CBC Board of Governors, Mr. A. Davidson Dunton, at the Canadian National Exhibition, Toronto, on September 9, 1955.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 55/34—*The Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy*, a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, delivered in the First Committee, October 10, 1955.

No. 55/35—*Your Country and Mine—The Economics of Our Partnership*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the New England Council, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, and the New England Export Club, Boston, Mass., October 17, 1955.

No. 55/36—*Economic and Technical Assistance*, a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Second Committee, October 14, 1955.

No. 55/38—*The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa*, statement by Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Canadian Delegate to U.N., made in the Ad Hoc Political Committee November 9, 1955.

No. 55/40—*The Past Twenty Years in Canada*, speech by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Mr. J. W. Pickersgill, to the Canadian Society of New York, November 7, 1955.

No. 55/42—*Canada's Economy in 1955*, statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe.

No. 56/4—*Canada's Economic Outlook*, address by John H. Dickey, Parliamentary Assistant to Minister of Defence Production to Canadian Retail Hardware Association in Toronto, Ontario on February 6, 1956.

No. 55/39—*Self Determination of Peoples*, statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Third Committee, October 27, 1955.

No. 55/41—*The Visit to the Soviet Union*, text of the talk by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the "Special Speakers Series" of the CBC on November 27, 1955.

No. 55/43—*Some Aspects of International Affairs*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, before the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, November 1955.

No. 55/44—*Impressions of the Russians and their Leaders*, address given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson at Women's Canadian Club, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, December 8, 1955.

No. 55/45—*Admission of New Members*, statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, and the Minister of National Health and

Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Ad Hoc Committee, December 1, 1955.

No. 56/1—*The Middle East*, statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons on January 24, 1956.

No. 56/2—*Foreign Policy Statement*, statement made in the House of Commons on

January 31, 1956, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

No. 56/3—*The Economics of Peace*, address by Mr. L. D. Wilgress, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, to a meeting sponsored by The English-Speaking Union at Edinburgh.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Bilateral

Norway

Exchange of Notes respecting loan by Canada to Norway of three Prestonian class frigates.

Signed at Ottawa December 20, 1955.

Entered into force December 20, 1955.

Finland

Exchange of Notes respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visas fees.

Signed at Ottawa, December 19, 1955 and January 9, 1956.

Entered into force, February 1, 1956.

France

On January 3, 1956 France extended the terms of the Canada-France Visa Agreement of April 17, 1950 to include the French Departments in Tropical America of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyane.

Ireland

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ireland for the avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Dublin, December 20, 1955.

In force for Canada with effect from January 1, 1955.

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ireland for the avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Duties on the Estates of Deceased Persons.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Dublin, December 20, 1955.

In force December 20, 1955.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Signed at Ottawa February 29, 1956.

Entered into force provisionally, February 29, 1956.

Two exchanges of Letters relating to the Trade Agreement signed at Ottawa February 29, 1956.

Signed at Ottawa February 29, 1956.

Entered into force February 29, 1956.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS




April 1956

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada



Pakistan: New Republic in the Commonwealth

ON March 23, 1956, in its federal capital of Karachi, Pakistan was formally proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and special envoys for the occasion from Commonwealth and foreign countries presented their Letters to the new President, Major-General Iskander Mirza. The representative of Canada was the Hon. Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, Q.C. Canadian Ambassador to Japan.

Pakistan became an independent nation, retaining its membership in the Commonwealth, on August 15, 1947. The recent ceremony in Karachi and the promulgation of the Constitution which made it possible, thus represented the successful culmination of eight and a half years of unrelenting effort to create for the new nation of Pakistan a constitutional form of government. It is notable that while the Commonwealth is not mentioned in the constitution, the Constituent Assembly has passed, by a large majority, a resolution stating that it is the intention of Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth and to accept the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. In this respect the action of Pakistan parallels that taken by India in 1950.

Difficulties Overcome

The obstacles to the formulation of a constitution and the achievement of parliamentary government for Pakistan have been formidable but have been successfully overcome. Not the least of these obstacles have been the deaths of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the Qaid-i-Azam or founder of the new state and its first Governor General, in 1948, and of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, its first Prime Minister, in 1951. These difficulties are reflected in the emergency powers which the new constitution accords to the President. He is empowered, when faced by external aggression or by internal disturbances which he deems threatening to the security of Pakistan, to issue a proclamation of emergency under which he can take over the executive authority of the provincial governments and suspend fundamental rights. Such a proclamation is valid for two months, and may be extended for another four months by the National Assembly.

Perhaps the most easily discernible difficulty in framing a constitution for Pakistan was to find a set of principles which would be acceptable to both East Pakistan and West Pakistan and which would do equal justice to both areas. East and West Pakistan are physically separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, as well as by race, language and culture. They are united principally by their common allegiance to Islam. East Pakistan is populated by 42 million Bengalis, who have dwelt for centuries in the lower Ganges valley. In West Pakistan live some 37 million Punjabis, Sindis and representatives of tribal areas whose principal language is Urdu. The seven component parts of West Pakistan (the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, Karachi, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur and Khairpur) were united during the past year to form one administrative unit. In order to meet the sectional claims of both provinces (i.e. East and West Pakistan) each is now accorded equal representation in the

new unicameral, 300-member National Assembly. It is further provided that the National Assembly shall hold at least one session each year in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan.

Besides the sectional divergencies within the country, there has been, since independence, a massive refugee problem caused by the passing of hundreds of thousands of refugees back and forth between India and Pakistan after Partition. This problem, among others, was considerably aggravated in its initial stages by a severe shortage of trained administrators.

The choice of an official language was one of the most difficult problems facing the framers of the constitution. Bengali is the predominant language in East Pakistan and Urdu in West Pakistan, with English still being used for the transaction of much official business. The problem has been temporarily shelved by the constitution, which provides that both Bengali and Urdu will be considered official languages for the next twenty years but that English will be used for the transaction of most official business for the next ten years.

Basis of Constitution

The constitution is based upon a draft which was placed before the Constituent Assembly on January 9, 1956, by the Minister of Law, Mr. I. I. Chundrigar. The Awami League, which has its political strength in East Pakistan, led the opposition to the adoption of the constitution. Its criticism of the draft charged that its Islamic nature was discriminatory and that it would put the East Pakistanis perpetually at a disadvantage. The opposition contended that the clauses which decreed that the President and Vice-President must be Muslims would discriminate against all minorities in the country, and especially against the Hindus, who make up 14 per cent (some eleven millions) of the population. This criticism has been largely met by that section of the constitution dealing with fundamental rights. This section provides that all citizens are equal before the law and shall have the right of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, association, and the right to practice and propagate their own religion. The likelihood of communal controversies over the constitution has been further reduced by avoiding the question of whether there should be joint or separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims. It is merely provided that the National Assembly will legislate on the subject after the provinces have been consulted. Untouchability has been abolished outright. Another opposition criticism was that the draft put East Pakistan perpetually at an economic disadvantage in relation to West Pakistan. However, this objection was met by the provision of a Standing Economic Commission, which is to ensure equal treatment for East and West Pakistan.

The constitution provides for a President, who will be elected for a five-year term by an electoral college, consisting of all members of the National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies, making a total of some 900 persons. The President will then appoint as Prime Minister the man whom he considers most likely to command a majority in the National Assembly. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet he chooses are collectively responsible to the National Assembly. The President may refuse to assent to any bill, except a money bill, but if the bill is again passed by the Assembly by a simple majority, with or without amendment, he may no longer withhold his assent.



—Gov. of Pakistan

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Mohammed Ali, centre, and other members of his Cabinet being sworn in to office by the new President, Major General Mirza.


The constitution sets out the division of powers so as to give the federal government control over foreign affairs, defence (including all industries relating to it), citizenship, taxation, export and import duties, communications (excluding railways), foreign trade and currency exchange, petroleum and natural gas. The residual powers are left to the provinces, but the federal government is given the power of taking over executive authority from a provincial government by a proclamation. The provincial governments are charged with the maintenance of public order, administration of justice, police, land tenure, agriculture, local government, irrigation and flood control, education, railways, vital statistics, the disabled and unemployed, forests and fisheries, lotteries, gambling and electricity.

The Islamic nature of the constitution is evident in the sections dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy, such as the promotion of Islamic principles and the principles of social uplift. A commission is to be charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all legislation passed is in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah. An Institute of Islamic Research has been established for advanced religious and social study and to assist in the reconstruction of the Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.

The influence of the British tradition is also evident in certain aspects of the constitution, such as equality before the law, protection against retrospective offences and punishment, a separation of the judiciary from the executive, provision for collective responsibility in the Cabinet and the provision that the President may not withhold assent from money bills. The judicial

system, in particular, shows the influence of the British precedent. The Judiciary is completely separated from the Executive and the courts are given the power to issue writs of *habeas corpus*, *mandamus* and *certiorari*.

Thus Pakistan, with its population of 80 millions has become the world's newest republic, and has decided to retain its close association with the Commonwealth. In embarking on its new course, Pakistan carries with it the good wishes of the Canadian Government and people as expressed by the Governor General to President Mirza, and by the Prime Minister of Canada to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, in congratulatory messages for Inauguration Day.



—Gov. of Pakistan

The Hon. Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, right, presents his Letters to President Mirza accrediting him as Special Ambassador to Pakistan on the occasion of the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Italy's President Visits Canada

THE President of Italy, Giovanni Gronchi, arrived in Ottawa on March 3 for a three-day state visit. President Gronchi was accompanied by Signora Gronchi and by the Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino and Signora Martino.

The Presidential party was welcomed with full ceremonial honours by His Excellency the Governor General, the Prime Minister and Mrs. St. Laurent, members of the Cabinet and of the Diplomatic Corps. Following a luncheon at Government House, President Gronchi laid a wreath at the National War Memorial. The President and members of his party attended an afternoon reception given by the Speakers of the Senate and of the House of Commons and an evening reception at Government House.

On March 4, the visitors attended mass at St. Anthony's Church where they met members of the local Italian community; later in the day the President also received delegations from the Italian communities of Montreal and Toronto. In the evening Signor Gronchi was host at a dinner to the Governor General and held a reception at the Country Club.

On March 5, President Gronchi and Signor Martino held conversations with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson. Following a luncheon given by the Prime Minister and Mrs. St. Laurent, President Gronchi addressed the Members of the Senate and the House of Commons. The Presidential party then left Ottawa by train for Detroit.

Following are the texts of Prime Minister St. Laurent's introductory remarks and President Gronchi's statement at a joint meeting on March 5 of Members of the Senate and the House of Commons.

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister of Canada) Mr. President, on behalf of the members of our parliament and of the whole Canadian nation, I have the honour to welcome you most cordially in this House and to express to you personally and to the country which you represent our regards and our feelings of respectful and confident friendship.

We are glad to extend also our most cordial welcome to Mrs. Gronchi whose presence adds to the charm of your visit. May this visit, short as it is, be as pleasant to you as useful to the good relations between our two countries.

In presenting you to this joint meeting of the members of the Canadian parliament, I am introducing to my colleagues and friends a staunch Italian patriot and a European statesman who for close to

50 years has worked consistently and courageously for three great objectives—freedom, parliamentary democracy and a society based on Christian principles. As a very young man, when he took an important part in the activities of the new Christian democratic movement, and in the First World War and afterwards, he served those objectives and his nation with outstanding devotion.

During the difficult years of the Second World War, President Gronchi, working with the resistance, became one of the leaders for the strengthening of freedom in Italy, and later, in company with the late Alcide de Gasperi, he served on the central committee of the national liberation front. No newcomer to parliamentary life, he was minister for industry, commerce and labour in postwar Italian gov-

ernments, and he was speaker of the Chamber of Deputies for almost seven years before his election as president of the republic in April of last year.

In greeting Mr. Gronchi we pay tribute to the representative of a country from which has come to us so much of what makes up the richness of our Western civilization. We greet also in his person an able and ardent defender of the unity of the Western nations. We admire the part he has played in bringing about Italy's decision to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union.

We derive a great deal of satisfaction from our association with Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, within the last few weeks, in the United Nations, this vast organization which remains the basis of the hopes and peaceful aspirations of so many millions of men and women throughout the world.

We Canadians are convinced that the accession of Italy to the rank of member of the United Nations marks a step towards better understanding between nations, more encouraging prospects of a peaceful solution of differences and consequently towards a reduction of the hazards confronting the peoples of the earth.

It is therefore with great pleasure, Mr. President, that we welcome you on behalf of the Parliament of Canada and that we acknowledge on this occasion the return of your country to the place which is rightly hers in the councils of the nations.

Mr. Giovanni Gronchi (President of Republic of Italy): Mr. Speaker of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House of Commons, members of the Senate and the House of Commons, Mr. Prime Minister:

I must, first of all, thank you for your invitation, which, beyond the scope of mere formality, has brought me to this honoured parliamentary rostrum. I am particularly sensitive to this honour because, as many of you certainly know, I was for eight years President of the Chamber of Deputies. I need not add that when I can speak directly to freely elected representatives of popular will, I find myself on familiar ground in spon-

taneous and common agreement on the method of approach to various problems: all the more so in your Parliament which, by tradition and habit, can really be said to be one of the most noble expressions and at the same time one of the strongest bulwarks of democratic freedom.

I also consider it a fortunate privilege for me to speak on this occasion as first magistrate of my country: in this way, for the first time in history the voice of Italy, through this Assembly, can make itself heard by the people of Canada. I would like to take advantage of this singular privilege to bring you a warm greeting from the Italian nation, whom I have the honour to represent in its national unity.

It is the greeting of a friendly and allied people for whom all physical distances that separate them from you seem to disappear in the atmosphere of common ideals and harmony of interests between our two countries.

These ideals and interests, which have their deep roots in the same heritage of civilization and tradition and democratic way of life, find their ultimate expression in the manifestations of present-day relations between Italy and Canada.

The Atlantic Community

The most important of these manifestations is represented by a continuing solidarity of effort which the two countries carry on, ideologically and materially, within the framework of the Atlantic community.

This solidarity is perhaps the closest existing among members of the pact which unites so many countries of the West, from Europe to this continent, because the interpretation which Italy and Canada give to the general principles of NATO does not reduce its significance to a mere diplomatic instrument or to an exclusively military alliance, but extends it, in full agreement, to all other requirements suggested by the new course of international events.

Such an interpretation does not require statutory or other innovations, since already in the original context of the Treaty it was not by chance that Article 2—which today is so often referred to—was inserted



—Capital Press

PRESIDENT OF ITALY VISITS CANADA

The President of Italy, Giovanni Gronchi, accompanied by Signora Gronchi and the Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino arrived in Ottawa on March 3 for a three-day state visit.

Above, left to right: President Gronchi, Signora Gronchi, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino, His Excellency the Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, and the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent.

(largely through Canadian prompting) wherein it is said that:

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

As a logical consequence the treaty between free peoples must be rendered always more capable of expressing not only the language of force, but also that of truth and of right. As your Secretary of State for External Affairs said, in a speech that should not be forgotten, a

military alliance, by achieving balance of power, is not sufficient to establish permanent peace, but can only create the conditions under which this peace can be maintained and protected by an accepted equality of rights.

In fact, the solidarity between our two countries does not end in military and in material assistance: it is manifested and strengthened daily in numerous other fields such as politics, diplomacy, economy, cultural and social life. I would like to recall that in this city, in September of 1951, in one of the rooms of this very building, Italian and Canadian representatives found themselves in firm agreement on the desirability that relations between Atlantic Pact countries should depend not only on their alliance, but rather on their membership in a real community and that all Member countries

should be expected to give this reality the utmost consideration.

Since that time the Italian and Canadian governments, striving side by side in a common endeavour, have been in the forefront in upholding this necessity. The traditional universalism of Italian history and thought, and the ideological and political forces which have created from two different peoples and two histories the powerful unity of your country, have found common expression and a happy communion.

It is our conviction that the era in which we live demands solidarity among peoples, because one nation cannot live and cannot develop independently of other nations or without continuous and reciprocal exchange in which each gives and receives according to its capacities and its needs. The evils from which our era suffers derive from the fact that not all men have completely understood the essence of this truth. Human solidarity, that has achieved such extraordinary progress in the field of individual society, has not succeeded as yet in achieving universal and international solidarity.

On their part the democratic countries of the West have long since recognized that the way of international solidarity is the only path to follow in order to safeguard liberty and, with liberty, the possibility of civil and social progress for all peoples. The Atlantic Treaty has, from this point of view, something that is unique: never before has such an imposing array of Nations, so diversified in their resources yet so uniform in their ideals, merged their energies not to fight and win a war but to ensure the victory of peace over war.

More Needs To Be Done

And it is by virtue of this agreement that Western democracies have now trodden paths which our fathers not long ago would have considered hopeless illusions. But what has been done up to now is not sufficient. It is necessary that all nations—our own above all others—understand this reality: that with solidarity there can be universal progress and welfare—without

it there can be nothing but the prospect of destruction and misery.

My country is firmly resolved to continue to give its utmost to the efforts being made toward the strengthening of solidarity between democratic countries. We are convinced that they constitute the best contribution which can be made in the present circumstances for the maintenance of peace in the world, and that they represent the indispensable premise toward the establishment of a greater feeling of trust among all people.

Necessary Qualifications

In this spirit we were gratified at the recent decision which solved the deadlock on the question of new admissions to the United Nations, and which has, among other things, corrected the absurd exclusion of Italy from an organization for which she had all the necessary moral, juridical and political qualifications. That these qualifications are well founded, no evidence could be more eloquent than the proof of democratic maturity furnished a few days ago—thanks to the patient and broadminded exertions of Italian trusteeship authorities—by Somali populations who, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, have been able to establish in free and orderly manner their first representative institutions to which the basic responsibility of that country's future is now entrusted.

The Italian people, besides recognizing in the decision to admit new members to the United Nations organization a valuable step forward on the road to greater international solidarity, find an open door through which their voice can be heard in an important forum, along with those of friendly and allied countries, to serve in the interests of security, peace, international justice and progress, interests upon which the political action of my country and government is founded.

In this regard I cannot forget how much this favourable development, to which we owe the removal of the unfair discrimination to which Italy was subjected is also due to the consistent action of the Canadian government, who took the initiative and to whom I wish to express our most heartfelt thanks.

In this brief visit, I have been deeply, even physically impressed by the extraordinary vitality and potential energy with which your country is endowed. Canada has rapidly succeeded, through her will and effort, in achieving an international position of pre-eminence and responsibility, especially in that great and prosperous community of nations of which she is an integral and essential part.

Deeply Impressed

But what has impressed me most deeply and strengthened my trust in the possibility of an ever-growing co-operation between Canada and Italy, is the further evidence I have gathered from contacts with responsible Canadians in regard to their accuracy of judgment, their foresight and their firm attitudes. Furthermore I was not surprised to find such a keen interest in European affairs in a country whose history, position and characteristics make it the natural bridge between the Old and the New World.

I have taken advantage of these contacts to illustrate to leading Canadians some aspects of the Italian situation, in the same spirit with which two old friends, meeting after a long absence, compare their ideas and inform each other of their problems. In particular, I have told them—and I wish to repeat it again here—that my country, after the extraordinary effort of reconstruction, is now engaged in a work of renewal and development without precedent in its recent history. To accomplish this work, which is being carried out in a régime of true liberty and democracy, Italians must be able to rely upon two indispensable conditions: maintenance of peace in the world and the solidarity of friendly and allied countries.

It is my opinion and also that of my government that the new course of international events make it advisable that the next session of the Atlantic Council, already planned for May 4, should have the extent and implication of a Conference where an objective and therefore realistic examination should be made of all those political, economic, social and psychological requirements to which I have already referred.

Another opinion of my Government and of myself, is that the unification of the Western viewpoint is the indispensable premise for any action (in our opinion necessary) in order to confer upon joint policies a dynamic and flexible character to counteract the forces which have lately given proof of possessing such flexibility.

On the other hand, without a united directive, every bilateral contact of single Western countries with the Soviet bloc would not be conducive to useful and above all conclusive results, and would risk repeating the unwise tactics of ancient history, when Rome lost the Curiabi in the struggle against the opposing faction of the Oriazi.

But it is evidently in the general interest of Western solidarity that preventive consultations, which up to now have had an extraordinary character, should become the ordinary and permanent method of approaching problems of defence and peace. These problems are indivisible and it would be artificial and prejudicial not to recognize their interdependence and to believe that stable and conclusive solutions are possible for them without having been rationally co-ordinated. I have noted with pleasure that on this side of the Atlantic there is now general agreement on the need to associate all members of the Atlantic community in the responsibility of proposing and elaborating solutions for the major problems of our time, and in the effort to achieve in harmony the realization of such solutions.

Unified Efforts

I may therefore conclude without dangerous and undue optimism that at the end of this journey, after my visit to these two great countries of North America, I will be justified in bringing with me to Italy the reconfirmed and increased certitude that Italians are not alone in their efforts for a better future, for liberty and peace in the world and prosperity for our peoples.

The kindness shown me during my stay here and the reception that you, honourable sirs, have extended to me today, enable me to bring back to the Italian people your message of friendship and encouragement.

(Continued on page 101)

Canada - United States - Mexico Conference at White Sulphur Springs

AT the invitation of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines of Mexico paid an official visit to the United States on March 26 and 27. Mr. St. Laurent and Senor Cortines met with President Eisenhower at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, where the three government leaders held talks about recent developments in the international field and about questions of hemispheric concern. Among the officials who were present were the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, L. B. Pearson, Mexico's Foreign Minister, Luis Padilla Nervo, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, A. D. P. Heeney, and the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Manuel Tello.

There was no pre-determined agenda. Formal discussions were restricted to one tripartite meeting on the morning of March 27, and to short bilateral



—USIS
President Cortines of Mexico, left, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister St. Laurent, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.

meetings between the United States representatives and those of Canada and Mexico in the afternoon. There were, in addition, a number of informal discussions. At the tripartite meeting, Secretary of State Dulles reported on his recent trip to Asia and President Eisenhower, Prime Minister St. Laurent and President Cortines reviewed recent developments in international affairs, with particular reference to problems of the Far East and the Middle East, current policies of the Soviet Union, problems arising out of the emergence of new States in Asia and Africa, and economic assistance to materially under-developed countries. Following these general discussions President Eisenhower conferred separately with Prime Minister St. Laurent about bilateral questions such as those relating to the use of water power on rivers crossing the international boundary, Canadian-American trade relations, the proposed 20 per cent advertising tax on Canadian editions of United States magazines, and other questions of mutual concern.

As suggested above, the meetings at White Sulphur Springs were largely of an informal and friendly character. As a United Press correspondent put it, "the conference accomplished its objective of creating a bond of friendship between the leaders of the three nations" and that the "friendship would aid in solving any future differences".



Ottawa Resident Awarded NATO Fellowship

THE North Atlantic Treaty Information Service announced on April 4 that Dr. Stephen Alexander Czako of Ottawa has been awarded a NATO fellowship for research and study during 1956 and 1957. Dr. Czako, who was born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1899, received a doctorate in political science in Budapest in 1921 and a diploma in international law from Harvard University in 1929. An employee of the Department of Justice in Ottawa since 1949, he is part-time professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa.

The NATO scholarship programme, initiated under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is designed to promote the study of historical, political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, linguistic, economic and strategic problems which will reveal the common heritage and historical experience of the Atlantic countries, as well as the present needs and future development of the North Atlantic area considered as a community. This is the first year in which the programme has been in operation.

Indonesia's First General Elections

ALTHOUGH Indonesia's independence was formally recognized by the Netherlands more than six years ago, it was not until this month that the first elected Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia was convened. Since December 1949, when the Round Table Agreements between the Netherlands and Indonesia were signed,* the country had been governed by a Provisional Parliament composed of nominated representatives of the main political parties. One of the more important responsibilities of this Provisional Parliament was to arrange for Indonesia's first general elections, a task which took years of preparation during which great difficulties had to be overcome. That the election was held at all reflects great credit on the Indonesian people and demonstrates their firm determination to conduct their national affairs on a free and democratic basis.

As suggested above, organizational difficulties connected with the holding of these elections were formidable. In the first place, Indonesia consists of about 3000 equatorial islands. There were over 43 million eligible voters in 257 constituencies who had to choose from the representatives of some 150 parties, and a large number of independent candidates. Some of the electors lived in remote and almost inaccessible regions, isolated by thick jungle, swamplands and volcanic mountains. To compile the electoral rolls, officials had to travel through the islands on bicycles, in jeeps, sailing vessels, motor launches, canoes and aeroplanes. Those eligible to vote included all men and women over 18 and all married persons even if below that age.

The problem of geography was not the only one which confronted the election organizers. Some parts of the country are still harassed by armed rebels, supporters of local separatist movements and religious fanatics, who make periodic raids from the jungle on the villages, estates and plantations, and who it was feared might seriously hamper the holding of elections; extra security forces had, therefore, to be provided by the Government while the people went to the polls in areas where terrorists were known to be active. These were some of the reasons why the voting, particularly in the outlying areas, was extended over a two month period—from September 29 until the end of November 1955.

Political Parties:

The offices of the President and Vice-President were not in contest and the voting was for members of Parliament only. Since there are probably more political parties in Indonesia than in any other country in the world, the choice for most voters was by no means easy. Among the estimated 150 parties were a number of Nationalist and Socialist parties, several distinct Moslem parties, a Communist party and others pledged to protect the interests of special groups such as women, labour and landowners, or of minorities such as Catholics, Protestants, Hindus, Arabs and Chinese. Furthermore, there was a large number of candidates who had no party affiliation.

Another difficulty was that many of the voters were still illiterate, despite the great progress made by the Government's anti-illiteracy campaign. In

* See "External Affairs", February 1950.



INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

Election posters of the various political parties decorate cities and villages throughout Indonesia.

studying this problem, the Indonesian Government drew on the experience of other countries to see whether their techniques could be adapted to the peculiar needs of Indonesia. While the voting procedures of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States were considered, it was found that those followed in the general election in India three years ago were perhaps most suitable.* It will be recalled that in the Indian elections the parties had chosen distinctive symbols such as a bullock, a sheaf of grain, a tree, etc., which the voters could readily identify. This system was adopted in Indonesia. The ballots for each seat had printed on them the symbols of the parties contesting the seat and the voter indicated his choice by punching a hole with a nail or a bamboo stick through the symbol of the party he supported. Because of the large number of parties, it is not surprising that the ballots in some districts contained as many as 60 to 80 symbols and were over two feet square. Nor is it surprising that some voters had difficulty in choosing between the many symbols, among which were the bull of the Nationalist party, the star of the Socialists, the rosary of the Catholic party and the hammer and sickle of the Communists.

The Campaigns:

In the circumstances it might be doubted whether, in spite of the labour devoted to preparing the mechanics of the election, the Indonesian people had any real chance of making a meaningful choice. However, the basic principles and practices of democracy are not completely unfamiliar to Indonesians. Dutch colonial policy for some three centuries had preserved the indigenous

* See "External Affairs", January 1952.

local institutions of the islands and the people of the villages have always elected their own headman and local councils. A strong tradition of mutual assistance and co-ordinated community effort during the planting and harvest seasons and in periods of trouble exists in the Indonesian villages. The villagers are accustomed to discussing their common problems in order to find solutions which all can accept, a practice known in Indonesian as *mupakat*.

On this foundation the beginning of a more sophisticated political superstructure had been erected during the years since independence. The Provisional Parliament which sat during that time was dominated by the few parties which were national influential and at the same time well organized. These had become well known to the people, and their parliamentary record was a basis for judgment. In addition there was intensive campaigning of the kind familiar in democracies all over the world. Candidates travelled about the country for several months before the polling date, holding rallies, spreading slogans and jingles, broadcasting and distributing posters. There was thus ample opportunity for the electorate to form views on the issues presented, and the fact that some 80 per cent of the electorate voted indicates the active interest of the people.

The Voting:

In spite of all the difficulties, the election went off smoothly. On election day the voters stood waiting in two lines, while the electoral officers read speeches explaining the importance of the choice they were about to make. Then the ballot boxes were displayed to show that they were empty, shut and locked again and the voting began. The lines moved slowly through the booths as many of the voters puzzled out the complicated ballots; however, despite the delays, they remained patient and good-humoured. If there was little of the mechanical elaboration of many Western democratic elections, neither was there any disorder or rioting. Only occasionally would a confused voter try to mark the practice ballot on the wall of the booth instead of the real one, or stuff an unmarked ballot into the box in the belief that this was all he had to do to register his vote. By early afternoon the people in most districts had finished voting and returned to their homes.

Although the voting ended officially on November 29, it was some time before the actual allotment of seats to the various parties became fully known. The task was complicated by the fact that representation in the new Parliament is proportional. Indonesia was divided into sixteen districts for electoral purposes, and the quota of votes needed to elect a member was obtained by dividing the total number of votes cast in each district by the number of seats which were allocated for that district according to the density of the population. To further complicate matters, votes were transferable and provision had to be made to include appointed representatives of the Chinese and Arab minorities.

As recently announced, the results place the four major parties very close together. The Nationalist and Masjumi parties each won 57 seats out of the 257 seats in contest. The Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Teachers') Party obtained 45 seats, and the Communists 39 seats. The remaining 59 seats are divided among 24 minor parties.

The new Government is a coalition of the Nationalist, Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama parties, with Dr. Ali Sastroamidjoyo as Prime Minister.

Constituent Assembly:

Another election was held on December 15 to elect a Constituent Assembly, which will function independently of Parliament and which will have the task of drawing up a constitution for Indonesia. At present the Indonesian Parliament operates under a cabinet system with, however, a President and Vice-President as well as a Prime Minister. There has never been any rigid definition of the respective responsibilities of these offices and this is one of the matters which will probably occupy the attention of the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly might also study possible advantages of a greater or lesser degree of regional autonomy for units in the Republic.

The Assembly elections also passed off well, although interest seems to have been less than in the parliamentary election, probably because of the short time which had elapsed since the latter was held. Full figures of the popular vote are not yet available.

There is no doubt that both the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament will be faced with formidable difficulties. Indonesia, although rich in natural resources, is still technically under-developed and confronted with many pressing economic problems. It also has a difficult internal security problem. It will not, therefore, be easy to work out a stable and practical system of government for Indonesia or to realize the vast potential of her rich and fertile islands. Nevertheless, an important step toward these goals has been taken with the completion of the first national elections and the quiet and orderly fashion in which they were conducted. The whole process was a good augury for the future of the Republic.



—*Indonesian Elections*

INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

President Sukarno of Indonesia casting his ballot.

Trade Agreement Between Canada and the U.S.S.R.

A trade agreement was signed in Ottawa on February 29, by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for Canada and Sergei A. Borisov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This agreement was the result of discussions which took place during Mr. Pearson's visit to Moscow in October 1955, and subsequent negotiations throughout February of this year in Ottawa. When he was in Moscow, Mr. Pearson had trade talks with Mr. Kabanov, Minister for Foreign Trade, and it was found that there was a sufficient basis of agreement to justify entering into detailed negotiations in Ottawa. Accordingly after draft proposals had been exchanged and studied, a Soviet delegation of seven officials, headed by Mr. Borisov, came to Ottawa at the beginning of February.



SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION VISITS OTTAWA

—Capital Press

Mr. Sergey Alexeevich Borisov, First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister of the Soviet Union affixes his signature to a copy of the recently concluded Soviet-Canadian trade agreement. To his left, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson signs another copy. Holding the document open for Mr. Pearson is the Trade and Commerce Minister, Mr. C. D. Howe.

The Agreement provides for the exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of imports and exports (Articles 1 and 2), ships in port (Article 4), and the legal position of citizens of each country engaged in business activity in the other country (Article 5). Each country remains free, however, to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind directed to the protection of its essential security interests (Article 3). The provisions relating to most-favoured-nation treatment do not apply to exclusive advantages accorded by Canada to other Commonwealth countries and the Republic of Ireland (Article 7). The Agreement is subject to ratification within 90 days but came into force provisionally on February 29, the date of signature. It will remain in force for three years, and may be extended for a further period if both Governments agree. An accompanying exchange of letters records agreement that the U.S.S.R. will buy from Canada during the three-year life of the Agreement from 400,000 to 500,000 tons of wheat each year. Another exchange of letters reserves the right for Canada to fix under the Canadian Customs Act values of goods for duty in the event of serious injury (actual or threatened) to domestic producers.

Canada also has most-favoured-nation trade agreements with two Eastern European Communist countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the former dating from 1935, and the latter being the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947.

The full text of the Trade Agreement with the U.S.S.R. was tabled in the House of Commons on February 29 by Mr. Howe, who made the following comments: *

My colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), opened the way for this agreement during his visit to the U.S.S.R. last October. At that time it was agreed in exploratory talks that negotiations should take place in Ottawa. A delegation from the U.S.S.R. arrived here four weeks ago, and the negotiations have been in progress since then.

The agreement which has been reached is set forth in five documents.

The first of these documents makes provision for the exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment along lines similar to existing agreements with various other countries. It includes other provisions having to do with the conduct of trade between the two countries. It recognizes that either government may apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind for the protection of its essential security interests. Our strategic export controls are therefore not affected. This agreement provides in addition on a reciprocal basis for the non-discriminatory treatment of merchant ships while in port. On the Canadian side, the effect of this latter provision is simply to confirm the treatment which in fact has been available all along to ships of U.S.S.R. registry.

This agreement is to continue in force for a period of three years; agreement of both countries is required for any extension. It was signed on February 29 by accredited representatives of both governments and is now in force provisionally. By its terms, it is subject to ratification within 90 days from the date of signature and within this time opportunity will be provided for a debate in parliament. A resolution of approval will be introduced for this purpose.

The second document is a letter from the Canadian government reserving the right to establish values for ordinary and special import duty on any Russian product that might enter Canada in such increased quantities as to cause serious injury to domestic producers. In determining such values, the prices of similar


* The text of the Agreement will also be printed in the Canada Treaty Series.

goods imported from Canada from third countries are to be taken into account. This procedure is intended to deal with situations which might be created if Russian goods were to be sold in Canada at very low prices, even if they are not proven to be lower than their domestic values in the U.S.S.R.

The third document is a letter from the government of the U.S.S.R. acknowledging the Canadian letter on customs valuation.

The fourth of the five documents forming the agreement is a letter by which the government of the U.S.S.R. guarantees to purchase and take delivery from Canada, during the three years of the agreement a total between 1,200,000 and 1,500,000 tons of wheat, in annual lots of between 400,000 and 500,000 tons. The exact amounts to be purchased in the second and third years, within these annual amounts, will be determined by the government of the U.S.S.R., taking into account the volume of Soviet goods sold to Canada. The total over the three years, however, will amount to not less than 1,200,000 tons and the amount in any individual year to not less than 400,000 tons. The Russian purchases of wheat are to be made at the prices and on the terms at which the Canadian wheat board is making sales to its major customers at such times as the Soviet purchases take place.

The fifth document is a letter from the Canadian government, acknowledging the letter from the government of the U.S.S.R. on wheat.



NIGERIAN LEADERS VISIT OTTAWA

—*Capital Press*

The Right Honourable Chief Obafemi Awolowo (right), Prime Minister of West Nigeria, and the Honourable Chief C. D. Akran, West Nigerian Minister of Development, are shown here with the Right Honourable C. D. Howe, Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce, during an economic and trade survey of Eastern Canada by the two Nigerian leaders on March 26

Elections in South Vietnam

ON March 4 the people of South Vietnam went to the polls to elect their first Constituent National Assembly. The results gave a popular mandate to the existing government of President Diem which obtained a good majority in the 123-seat Assembly. Diem's own party, the Movement of National Revolution, obtained 66 seats; combined with the Can Lao Nhan Vi, which won 10 seats, the staunchly pro-Diem forces thus control a total of 76 seats, with the remaining seats divided among five other parties. Party lines will probably not be too well defined in the new Assembly, for the emphasis during the election campaign was on anti-colonialism and anti-Communism rather than on specific party platforms.

While the election campaign was a fairly quiet one, the government carried on a "get out and vote" campaign and this and the campaigning on the radio and at public meetings evidently was effective, for the voting was heavy. According to official reports half of the eligible voters had cast their ballots by 9:00 a.m. People came on foot, by bus, truck and taxi to vote, and small groups gathered to talk at the doors of polling stations afterwards.

An Orderly Election

Although the elections had the whole-hearted support of the people and the press of South Vietnam, both the authorities and the press in communist North Vietnam were strongly opposed, and the flood of propaganda during the weeks preceding the elections in the South raised some fears that Communist agents in the South might go to some lengths in their attempts to block or disrupt the elections. However, there were few incidents and the polling was quiet and orderly, although the Communists did distribute some anti-election handbills in parts of Saigon.

The Assembly elections in South Vietnam were not connected with those forecast in the 1954 Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement which provisionally divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel into two sections. It was also provided at Geneva that free, nation-wide elections should be held in July 1956 as part of the political settlement for Vietnam leading up to the reuniting of the North and South. Pending the holding of these nation-wide elections, the two sections of the country were governed on an autonomous basis.

The Assembly elections were a part of the process begun last fall to establish South Vietnam as a self-governing republic. Last October 23 the majority of the people of South Vietnam voted for the first time in their lives in a referendum to decide between ex-emperor Bao Dai and the then Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, as head of state. Diem won an overwhelming victory and immediately proclaimed the country a republic, with himself as President responsible for establishing a democracy. Of equal importance, Diem announced in his official proclamation that a Commission would be formed to prepare a draft republican constitution which would be submitted for the approval of a National Assembly. The recent elections have provided this Assembly and the way is now open for the approval, by elected representatives, of a constitution for the republic.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs, by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Disarmament

On March 20, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson made the following statement on the Anglo-French disarmament proposal:

The discussions of the United Nations disarmament subcommittee, of which Canada is a member together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, were resumed yesterday in London. As the House knows, the subcommittee meets in private in accordance with the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly. In view of this, I do not feel that it would be appropriate for me to comment on these highly important and delicate negotiations at this very early stage in the negotiations.

I can say that Western delegations have given earnest consideration to the various aspects of this problem during preliminary discussions which took place during last week, and that there seemed to be substantial agreement on the measures which should be taken as a first step in a disarmament program. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to add to this for the time being.

Together with the other Western members, Canada will do its utmost to widen the area of agreement which may already exist between the East and the West on this vital issue in order to bring about some measure, at least, of effective disarmament which would contribute to diminishing international tension and by the same token facilitate the settlement of other outstanding issues. Having said that, Mr. Speaker, I think I should add that a disarmament scheme on paper which did not include effective methods of control and supervision would not, I think, contribute to these desirable ends.

During the last twelve months a number of significant and constructive proposals have been made in this field, and the subcommittee will now be offered the challenging task of finding whether it will be possible to develop proposals which will be generally acceptable. The Canadian delegation at the London meeting will do its best as a member of the subcommittee to help bring about such agreement.



—Capital Press

NATO'S COMMANDER IN OTTAWA

General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, visited Canada on March 13 and 14 as guest of the Government. General Gruenther arrived from Paris at the RCAF Station, Uplands, where he was met by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, General Charles Foulkes, Chairman Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff and Ambassadors of NATO countries resident in Ottawa.

While in Ottawa, General Gruenther discussed NATO matters with the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, and the Minister of National Defence. He also addressed a luncheon meeting of the Canadian Club of Ottawa and held a press conference at the Parliamentary Press Gallery.

On March 14, General Gruenther addressed a closed meeting of Members of the Senate and Parliament, before flying to Montreal, where he spoke to a Canadian Club luncheon.

"Canada and the United Nations 1954-55"*

Canada and the United Nations 1954-55, the ninth in the regular series of reports prepared by the Department of External Affairs on the work of the United Nations is now available. The developments review in this volume occurred for the most part in the period July 1, 1954 to December 31, 1955, during which the General Assembly held its ninth and tenth sessions and the Economic and Social Council its eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth sessions.

Canada and the United Nations is a work of reference for those interested in United Nations affairs who may not have access to official reports and other more exhaustive sources of information. It is intended to present concise explanations of the problems with which the United Nations is dealing and of the work of the Specialized Agencies and other United Nations organs. Special attention is given to explanations of Canadian policy on specific issues. While the publication is concerned primarily with the period between July 1954 to December 1955, some background material is included when necessary for an understanding of problems and procedures.

Minister's Foreword

In a Foreword, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, had the following to say about the first decade of the United Nations and about the problems which confront the organization in the future:

No one, I think, would now maintain that the United Nations has been able to achieve all that was hoped for it at the time of its creation in 1945. In fact, a rather dismaying number of the problems considered at the first session of the General Assembly are still unresolved. Some of them, such as disarmament or human rights, have acquired over the years a great difficulty and a greater urgency than ever. There have been disappointments, setbacks and delays. Although at the 1955 General Assembly we and the other 59 members of the United Nations were happy to welcome 16 new members, two great countries, Japan and Germany, are still not represented. To this degree the United Nations is still not yet a universal body, and is consequently handicapped in its activities.

The effectiveness and the unity of the United Nations has on occasion been seriously tried. There has also been undoubtedly some short-circuiting of the world organization through the establishment of *ad hoc* councils to deal with certain immediate problems for which it was considered that the procedures of the United Nations were too deliberate or its authority too weak. There has, of course, been no lessening of the vast sums spent on defence preparations, and recent sessions of the Assembly have been

* *Canada and the United Nations* is available from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at 50 cents per copy.

held in the shadow of grim and fearful weapons unknown in 1945. The problems and the duties facing the United Nations in maintaining peace and, for that matter, in preserving the very existence of the civilized world, remain complex and difficult. These difficulties and the dangers inherent in them we now recognize pretty fully. We are now aware also that there are no easy ways to resolve the problems which confront us.

We should not forget however, that the United Nations has to its credit some very considerable achievements which should reassure us. First of all, throughout these turbulent ten years, many of the urgent economic and political problems of the world have been discussed fully and publicly and often constructively. Even in those problems for which adequate solutions have not yet been found, the earnest debates in the Assembly have undoubtedly clarified the principal issues, and the areas of disagreement have been narrowed. There has also been a vast increase in the scope of United Nations responsibilities. The Specialized Agencies and the many United Nations bodies for financial and technical assistance have been continued and developed their unspectacular work, and have made important contributions to the well-being of citizens everywhere,—in their health, their food, their education and indeed in most aspects of their lives. There is now, it seems to me, a much greater comprehension of how closely the nations of the world are bound together, and the more fortunate peoples of the earth have assumed increasing responsibility for the progress of less technically advanced countries. All this, and much more, constitutes a considerable body of achievement. If we have the wisdom and the courage to avoid the ultimate catastrophe of war, the United Nations can grow and develop as an effective and well-equipped organization for man's progress toward an incomparably better life.

The United Nations is now at the beginning of a new decade; one that is certain to bring new problems and perhaps great changes in our world. We enter this new period with no illusions that our tasks will be light or easy, but we can take confidence from what already has been accomplished and from what we now know can be accomplished by nations working peacefully together for their common welfare. Man has created a great instrument for his political and economic well-being, and it now remains for him to use it with all the wisdom and with all the sense of responsibility he can command.



ITALY'S PRESIDENT VISITS CANADA

(Continued from page 87)

I would like to consider as evidence of this friendship those Italians to whom you open your doors and who give to your cities and land their contribution of loyal and industrious activity.

May God guide and maintain our two peoples united on the road to progress and peace.

NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Excerpts from an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Red Cross Society, Toronto Branch, Sunnybrook Hospital, March 12, 1956.

... the Canadian Red Cross Society and its international associates are performing a humanitarian service which could not possibly be supplied by purely governmental action. In their work, whether on a national or an international scale, the Red Cross Societies illustrate strikingly what we are convinced is one of the greatest sources of strength of the democratic system—the voluntary co-operation of public-minded citizens. There is—and there can be—no substitute for this. It is an essential basis of our democracies. It deserves our full and whole-hearted support, in every way.

The Soviet Challenge

This brief but grateful reference to the work of the Canadian Red Cross Society and to the International Red Cross, which is concerned with aid and assistance in so many parts of the world, brings me to a matter of great international importance which I should like to talk to you for a few moments. This is the entry, with vigour and verbosity, of the Soviet leaders into the field of economic competitive co-existence, one aspect of which—and this is the particular phase of this subject I want to deal with—consists of alluring offers of help to materially under-developed countries, especially in Asia. This reflects a change of Soviet tactics, if not of policy, which is seen also in other fields. There is more emphasis now on “pulling” rather than “pushing” other peoples into the Communist orbit. This should cause us to reappraise our own policies and attitudes especially to those countries of Asia to which the Soviet Union is now directing its attention.

Active Soviet interest in the field of foreign aid and technical assistance is comparatively new. Before 1953, Russia's foreign aid was confined to communist countries, especially China, which had received considerable help in loans and technical assistance. Until 1953, the Soviet Union was too preoccupied with its own domestic development and its militant designs against Western Europe to use technical and economic assistance to Asia as an important instrument of policy. However, toward the end of that year there was a change, and since then Soviet Union offers of help to non-communist under-developed areas in Asia and elsewhere have increased very rapidly. This Soviet economic-political intervention in international affairs has important implications for us in the Western world.

We will not understand this development unless we realize the significance of the emergence since the end of the last war to complete political independence of a group of densely populated former colonies in Asia and Southeast Asia. As a consequence of their new political and international status, these countries have come to realize as never before the great gulf which separates their economies and their standard of living from those of the more technically advanced nations in the Western world. Their leaders, in a new spirit of national pride and confidence, have turned with dedication and determination to the vast problems of eradicating starvation, disease and ignorance which for so long had been the accepted lot of their fellow-countrymen. It is accepted no longer.

Help Provided

To solve these problems, they needed guidance and help in a wide variety of technical and scientific matters; as well as capital assistance. They could not secure these completely from their own resources. The normal methods of acquiring sufficient capital were not open to them, since the savings from one year to another were either slight or negligible; and, in view of the rapidly rising populations, to withdraw resources from consumption would have imposed severe hardship on standards of living already extremely depressed. So, Canada, together with other member states of the United Nations, have tried to help by providing capital and technical assistance and in other ways. This effort has been strongly supported by most of the nations of the world, with the noteworthy exceptions, until just a little while ago, of the countries of the Soviet bloc. These latter took little interest in the activities of United Nations Social economics and humanitarian agencies in this field, contributed little or nothing to their support, and criticized and depreciated their work. Support for them was left to the free nations of the world. In addition, of course, Canada, together with other members of the Commonwealth, financed the Colombo Plan in which many important countries outside the Commonwealth, notably the United States, now also participate. There were also other arrangements for economic assistance.

It has been upon this stage of international co-operative effort that the Soviet Union and its satellites have somewhat unexpectedly appeared, and have begun to play a role

which, while more effective as yet in the field of political propaganda than actual aid, has, nevertheless, important potentialities for good or evil. These communist newcomers possess very great resources and their achievements and capabilities in technical matters and in the sciences are far greater than many of us realize, or wish to realize. I wish that we could whole-heartedly welcome this new source of contribution to the world Community Chest. The task that remains to be done is enormous and it needs the mobilization of the world's entire resources. We would, however, be happier about accepting the Soviet Union as a new convert to the practice of co-operating with the rest of the international community in foreign aid and technical assistance, if we could be assured that the communist empire would be willing to abide by the rules which are generally accepted by those countries which have been trying to do their share in this field for some time.

Although a late starter in the field, and whatever its motives may be, the Soviet Union seems to be trying to make up for lost time. Already they have made important economic deals with Egypt, India, Syria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, the Sudan and Yemen. These various offers and proposals have been made with such shrewdness, and have often been so tied up with political appeal, that they have received publicity in the under-developed countries out of all proportion to their importance in economic or assistance terms. The Soviet Union has been trying with skill, determination and irresponsibility—and with too much success—to get the maximum of political advantage from its operations; in certain areas it seems to have gained more popular approval from its more offers than the West has gained from its much more generous plans and its far greater accomplishments over a much longer time.

Factors Favouring the Soviet Union

The fact is that in entering into this phase of competitive co-existence, the Soviet Union has some important immediate advantages in its favour.

Its leaders control vast resources, both human and material, which they can use for political or other purposes without any Parliamentary or popular restraint whatsoever. Their worries about public opinion are minimal. If political advantage so indicated, they could export, and in the past they have exported, food and other materials even if their own people were in short supply. They can, and do, in negotiating trade or commercial arrangements, make loans on easy terms without regard to economic considerations, and

they have provided capital goods at less than cost price. They are also prepared to accept commodities from their customers abroad, even though these commodities are of no great importance to them. Whatever commercial losses the Soviet bloc countries may incur in such deals are considered to be more than counter-balanced by any immediate or long-range political advantage. The Soviet Union can also accept and use many of the surplus raw materials which the under-developed countries are anxious to sell—for example rice, cotton, sugar and beef—while in the West, we have our own serious surplus problems. The Soviet bloc is, in fact, entering into the field of competitive co-existence in economic matters with many points in their favour and at a time very favourable to them.

Scarcity of Technical Experts

The Soviet leaders also have no difficulty in organizing and conducting programmes of technical assistance. Although the Western countries, including Canada, have sent to many countries of the world experts in a wide variety of technical matters, this part of our technical assistance programme has not been easy. It has been hard to secure qualified men. Much has been heard lately in the United States and Canada about our increasing lack of technical experts, and for the need to increase very considerably the number of technical and scientific graduates from our universities. In general, both for the Colombo Plan and for the various schemes of technical assistance directed by the United Nations, we have probably not been able to supply more than half the requests sent in for expert advice, or for students to receive technical training in the West. We operate in this as in other fields on a voluntary basis. This involves certain difficulties which the Soviet leaders do not have. Their technical or engineering experts are simply directed to go where ordered, and to stay there until told to come home.

In this way the Soviet leaders enjoy an advantage in what might be termed their communist missionary work abroad. They have only to decide what it is in their interest to do, and they can then give effect in their decisions.

It is, therefore, much easier for them than it is for us to make offers which sound very generous, not only to send their technicians abroad, but also to train technicians from those countries in Russia. The technical training of these trainees will be thorough. So will the communist indoctrination to which they will be exposed and which may be the main reason for inviting them. There will never be

any difficulty in finding room for them in Soviet institutions.

Another important advantage which the Soviet leaders enjoy is the undoubted anti-colonial feeling which still prevails and will prevail for a long time in many of the important countries of Asia. The Russians, ignoring that they are at the present time themselves the world's greatest colonial power, claim constantly and insistently that all of the ills of the former colonial possessions, whether in low health standards, inadequate food, and lack of technical progress; or floods or droughts or failure in football, all these are to be attributed to the earlier administrations of the capitalist colonial powers. They contrast this with the boasted achievements of the Soviet Union, whether in science, technical progress, or the arts; all of which they falsely claim stem entirely from the revolution of 1917. The implication is that what Russia has done in less than forty years of communism, other countries can also do. For this purpose, they should be sensible enough to negotiate special trade assistance pacts and accept technical advice from the Soviet Union; aid given, so they claim, without any political strings attached whatsoever; no pressures to join regional security organizations or to lease bases, or to restrict their trade with other countries in certain commodities. All these pressures, so they try to point out, are left to the capitalist and "colonial" powers which had oppressed them in the past. Nor should we dismiss this appeal as absurd because we know it to be distorted and dishonest.

Competitive Co-existence in Economic Field

From all this you will, I think, realize that the entry of the Soviet bloc into the arena of competitive co-existence in the economic field is certain to provide us with many difficult problems.

We will also make a grave mistake if we assume with excessive self-confidence that these Soviet promises and pretensions will soon be exposed because they will not be able to make good their offers of trade and economic aid to the under-developed countries. They may be more successful in this regard than we expect.

We can, in any event, be quite sure that the Russians are sufficiently astute to gain the greatest possible political advantage from their various operations abroad, while insisting that what they offer and what they are prepared to do comes in a spirit of pure and unconditional benevolence. In short, we in the West are facing a long and difficult period of competitive co-existence in this as in other

fields. The competition will be formidable in extent, and astute in its planning on the other side and is not likely to be conducted under Marquis of Queensbury rules. And the Communists think that they are going to win it.

One of the leaders in Russia told me when I was there last autumn that it was his conviction that we in the West were a pretty soft lot, and that we could not endure nearly so well as the Soviet people the rigors and the sacrifices which this competitive co-existence would involve. Indeed, this seems to be one of the strong convictions of the directors of Soviet policies. We should have no doubt that they will do everything within their power, short of atomic war, to prove that their convictions are valid, and their confidence justified.

What Can the West Do?

What then, can we in the West do, and what must we *not* do, in meeting this new and serious challenge:

- (a) We must continue to supply, and even increase, economic and technical aid for the under-developed areas. We should not attach political strings to that aid of a kind which would neutralize its value and prevent its good reception. We cannot purchase reliable allies or real friends among the peoples we are co-operating with and helping, and we should not try to do so.
- (b) We should not in our wisdom urge our friends in the technically under-developed areas of the world to reject out of hand offers of aid from the Soviet bloc. They will themselves have to assess and avoid the political or economic perils which may be involved. We must count on the good sense of the leaders of these peoples to make the necessary distinction between the type of aid being given by the Western world and that offered by the Soviet bloc. We must by our own policies ensure that this distinction is not only clear, but in our favour.
- (c) We must not enter into any kind of auctioning competition with the Soviet bloc, attempting to match or to out-bid their offers, and so be drawn into enterprises which may not be in themselves desirable. We can never hope to beat the communists in promises.
- (d) It is also very important, I think, that the United Nations should be brought more closely into the international economic assistance picture; as has recently been suggested by the U.N. Secretary-General and others. This will be the

best way of establishing the *bona fides* of those who wish to participate in this work.

I do not mean by this that all mutual assistance programmes should be administered by the United Nations. True, the present U.N. programmes are being effectively handled, without political or strategic considerations getting in the way, and they deserve more support than they are receiving. There are, however, things like the Colombo Plan, operated outside of, but within the spirit of the United Nations, which should be continued as they are.

What I would like to see is an agreement between all nations contributing to any form of international assistance that they would submit all their plans and policies in this field to the United Nations, where they could be examined, made public, and co-ordinated; where any suspicion that they were being used for political purposes could be challenged; and exposed as true or false.

This procedure would have the advantages of letting the world know what was being done, and by whom. It would separate the propaganda chaff from the wheat. It would also expose the motives of any nation which refused to co-operate with the United Nations in this way.

Careful consideration should also be given, as I have indicated, to further concrete support for United Nations schemes now actually in operation, and to any new proposals which have been or may be put forward. If the Soviet Union is sincere in its insistence on the peaceful character of its challenge to competitive co-existence, it might begin by doing something really worth while to help these United Nations assistance programmes.

- (e) In addition to capital assistance, the West also enlarge, improve, and make more international, the present arrangements for the provision of necessary technical and scientific experts for service in materially under-developed areas.

With our present procedures it is clear that we shall never have enough of them to meet in time the pressing need.

Why should we not consider establishing an International Professional and Technical Civil Service under the United Nations, with experts specially trained for work in these under-developed areas?

- (f) Furthermore, in our preoccupation with *what* should be done, we must not lose sight, of course, of *why* it should be done. "Know why" is as important as

"know how". Western motives in these aid activities may include considerations of enlightened self-interest which need not be at all unworthy. But it is true that in the Western world we are sincere and genuinely altruistic in our wish to help those who are less fortunate than ourselves; and that we have a deep sympathy with these people who are themselves making such great efforts to improve, with their own resources, their conditions of life. We must keep it that way, for without proper motives we could make serious and unnecessary blunders which would undo the effect of all we are trying to do.

The provision of large sums of money and of a host of technicians will never automatically or satisfactorily solve the world's distressing under-development problems. So, in providing the benefits of our more advanced techniques to the less developed areas of the world, we must do so with respect for ancient cultures, from which, incidentally, we have ourselves a very great deal to learn.

Our assistance should be given in a spirit of understanding and goodwill; and not determined by short-sighted considerations of our own political or strategic interests. On that plane, as well as on that of material support, we must meet and defeat this new Soviet challenge.

This spirit should not merely underlie our practical assistance to these other new nations in Asia and Africa, it should govern our whole political relationship with them.

A distinguished American journalist, Roscoe Drummond, writing to his own people, but in words which apply to others as well, has put the question this way:

"Shouldn't our relationship with these freedom-cherishing, poverty-plagued nations be that of the most friendly understanding senior democracy intent upon helping these new democracies to help themselves deepen their roots, guard their freedom, improve their economic lot and fashion their own free nations in their own image in their own way—as we did?"

The answer we give to this question will, in large part, determine whether there will be stability, progress and peace on our planet in the years ahead.

If governments can match the Red Cross in dedication, purpose, and zeal in the pursuit and achievement of noble objectives, then I think that the answer will be in the affirmative, and our hopes for a better world may one day be realized.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. S. D. Pierce, Ambassador, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, to Ottawa, effective February 15, 1956.
- Lt. Gen. M. A. Pope, C.B., M.C., Ambassador, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, to Ottawa, effective March 13, 1956.
- Mr. J. D. Foote posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective February 1, 1956.
- Miss E. M. Stock posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective February 6, 1956.
- Mr. G. C. Langille posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, effective February 11, 1956.
- Mr. G. V. Beaudry posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective February 13, 1956.
- Mr. N. E. Currie posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective February 13, 1956.
- Mr. L. V. J. Roy posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, to Ottawa, effective February 15, 1956.
- Mr. J. P. Sigvaldason posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, effective February 19, 1956.
- Mr. B. M. Williams posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective February 21, 1956.
- Mr. J. A. Dougan posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, effective February 22, 1956.
- Mr. W. P. McLeod posted from the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective February 25, 1956.
- Mr. G. Bertrand posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Ottawa, effective February 29, 1956.
- Mr. R. P. Bower, transferred from the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer, Grade 7 effective January 27, 1956.
- Mr. G. C. Cook posted from the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, to Ottawa, effective January 31, 1956.
- Mr. J. M. Cook posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, effective March 1, 1956.
- Mr. R. Campbell, DSC., posted from the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, to Ottawa, effective March 9, 1956.
- Mr. W. F. Stone posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective March 10, 1956.
- Mr. J. K. Starnes posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to NATO Secretariat, effective March 15, 1956.
- Mr. C. G. D. Roquet posted from the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, Egypt, effective March 22, 1956.
- Mr. L. V. J. Roy posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Beirut, effective March 24, 1956.
- Mr. A. J. Pick posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective March 27, 1956.
- Mr. A. J. Matheson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective March 29, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Resolutions of the Resumed Twentieth Session (5-15 December 1955) of the Economic and Social Council. E/2795/Add.1. 3 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Resumed Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1955. Bangkok, February 1956. 235 p. \$2.50. U.N. Publication. Sales No.: 1956. IIF.1 (Also Vol. VI, No. 4, of the Economic Bulletin for ECAFE).

Economic Development and Planning in Asia and the Far East. Problems and Techniques. E/CN.11/412. Bangkok, November 1955. 70 p. 50 cents. (Also Economic Bulletin for ECAFE, Vol. VI, No. 3).

Agreement on signs for road works amending the European Agreement of 16 September 1950 supplementing the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic and the 1949 Protocol on Road Signs and Signals, signed at Geneva on 16 December 1955. E/ECE/223, E/ECE/TRANS/481. Geneva, 1956. 5 p. (bilingual).

United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954. Report on Tanganyika together with related documents. T/1169. N.Y., April 1955. 136 p. 1.50. TCOR: Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 3.

International Court of Justice

Case of the Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943. (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America). *Pleadings.* Judgment of June 15th, 1954. (Preliminary Question). 236 p. Sales No.: 137.

Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon complaints made against the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (Request for Advisory Opinion). Order of December 5th, 1955. Pp. 127-129. Sales No.: 139.

Admissibility of Hearings by the Committee on South West Africa. (Request for Advisory Opinion). Order of December 22nd, 1955. Pp. 131-132. Sales No.: 140.

International Labour Organization

Resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference at its thirty-eighth session (Geneva, June 1955). Geneva, 1955. 15 p.

Records of Proceedings of the International Labour Conference, thirty-eighth session (Geneva, June 1955). Geneva, 1955. 758 p. \$8.50.

UNESCO

Trade barriers to knowledge. A manual of regulations affecting educational, scientific and cultural materials. (New and revised edition). Paris 1955. 364 p. \$5.00.

World Health Organization

Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board. (Third Edition covering the period 1948-1955). Geneva, January 1956. 309 p. \$3.25.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

List of Non-Governmental Organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (Category A, Category B, Register). E/C.2/INF.5. 6 January 1956. 57 p. and Annexes I to XI. (bilingual).

Report of the Eighth Session of the Sub-Committee on Prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities to the Commission on Human Rights (N.Y., 3 to 20 January 1956). E/CN.4/721, E/CN.4/Sub.2/177. 31 January 1956. 67 p. and Annexes I and II.

* Printed documents may be produced from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, or from the sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; Magasin des Etudiants de l'Université de Montréal, Montréal. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1956, p. 73.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information, done at Paris June 22, 1955.
Signed by Canada June 22, 1955.
Entered into force March 29, 1956.

Bilateral

Hungary

Exchange of Notes concerning the sale of wheat.
Signed at London, March 8, 1956.
In force March 8, 1956.



PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 9: Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America amending the exchanges of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952 and May 1 and July 31, 1953 for the establishment of United States global communications facilities in Newfoundland. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)
The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 56/8—*Canada's Health Programme*, a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, before the Committee on Estimates, House of Commons, Ottawa, March 16, 1956.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 56/5—*A Review of Canadian-U.S. Relations*, address by Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Banquet of the Young Men's Section, The Montreal Board of Trade, February 27, 1956.
- No. 56/6—*New Aspects of International Competition*, address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Red Cross Society, Toronto Branch, Sunnybrook Hospital, March 12, 1956.
- No. 56/7—*Canada's Role in the United Nations*, an address by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin to the Women's Canadian Club, Chateau Frontenac, Quebec City, Quebec, on March 19, 1956.
- No. 56/9—*Recent Developments in Foreign Affairs*, transcript of a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Television programme "Press Conference" held in Ottawa on March 21, 1956, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and members of the press participating.
- No. 56/10—*A Canadian View of Political Problems in the Near and Middle East*, an address by the Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Lucien Cardin, M.P. at the Kiwanis Club, Belleville, Ontario, March 27, 1956.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1956.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



May 1956

Vol. 8 No. 5

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

North Atlantic Ministerial Session — Paris, May 1956

THE North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Paris on May 4 and 5. The agenda was confined to a review of the non-military aspects of the work of the Alliance and the delegates were the Foreign Ministers of each NATO country together with their Permanent Representatives on the Council. Canada was represented by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Mr. L. D. Wilgress, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO.


Discussion at the meeting reflected a general realization among all the members of NATO of the threat posed to the solidarity of the Alliance by the new Soviet tactics of "peaceful co-existence". The Ministers recognized that the collective defence efforts of the Alliance, which had successfully deterred Soviet aggression, still had to be maintained in the light of what is known of Soviet military capabilities, and in the absence of progress in the settlement of outstanding problems, including the reunification of Germany in freedom and progress towards disarmament under an effective control system. However, it was also agreed that the Atlantic powers needed to examine what new measures they could take to strengthen their unity and render more effective the co-operation of the Alliance in the non-military field.

Special Committee Appointed

After reviewing the international situation and in particular the recent changes in Soviet tactics and their implications for the Alliance, the Council decided to appoint a special Committee "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community". Mr. Pearson, Mr. H. Lange, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, and Mr. G. Martino, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy were asked to serve on the Committee.

In commenting on the meeting in reply to questions put to him by *Le Monde* of Paris, Mr. Pearson said:

The Ministerial meeting just concluded could result in the strengthening of the solidarity of the Atlantic community, provided all the member governments are really prepared to make the necessary effort. As you know, a committee of three Ministers has been entrusted with the heavy responsibility of examining how the Atlantic community could best organize itself to advance the non-military objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. Some proposals have already been made in this direction and I would hope that every government will now set about giving urgent attention to the various ways in which the solidarity of our Alliance could be strengthened, especially through improved methods of consultation. In so far as this task is approached by all the members with imagination and sincerity and in no spirit of complacency, I believe that this meeting could mark the beginning of a new advance towards the building up of the Atlantic community.



L. B. PEARSON

H. LANGE

G. MARTINO

The special committee appointed by the North Atlantic Council "to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and develop greater unity within the Atlantic community" is made up of, left to right above, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. H. Lange; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. G. Martino.

Following is the text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial meeting:

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 4-5 1956

Final Communique

The North Atlantic Council met in Paris on May 4 and 5 under the chairmanship of Dr. Gurmundsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland, and issued the following communique:

The Atlantic Powers, seven years ago, entered into the North Atlantic Treaty in face of the communist threat to their common ideals and civilization. For they had seen imperilled all the human rights which their peoples regard as essential for their life and freedom, particularly representative government, freedom of the individual, the rule of law and liberty of the press.

With the disappearance of the last free regime in Eastern Europe, that of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade in 1948, and two years later, the invasion of Korea, the concern of the Free World reached its climax. The need for collective military defence was all the more obvious because at the end of the Second World War the free world had disarmed.

These were the circumstances which led to the creation of NATO and its military strength, and this is why the sacrifices necessary for the defence of the Atlantic community have since then been borne in common.

II. The collective defence efforts of the Atlantic Powers have not been in vain. They have successfully deterred Soviet aggression in Europe and have contributed to the adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-called policy of co-existence.

To the extent that this policy involves a certain easing of tension and the admission by the Government of the U.S.S.R. that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic Powers, who have always supported this idea. It is now possible to hope that those principles of the United Nations Charter which have regulated the relations between the peoples of the Atlantic community may eventually also regulate between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.

III. The reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic Alliance have not, however, disappeared. No progress has been made toward solving certain vital European problems, including the reunification of Germany in freedom, which have to be solved on a basis which would satisfy the legitimate security needs of all. The Western Powers cannot relax their vigilance until these problems have been solved and until a disarmament plan providing the necessary guarantees to all and an effective control system has been put into effect. Soviet military power continues to increase. Security remains therefore a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength initiatives on the part of the Atlantic Powers. They are determined to pursue these initiatives with the same energy that they displayed in building up their defence organization and with which this will be maintained.

They solemnly affirm that this policy will be pursued in common, and based on the unity, solidarity and co-operation of peoples sharing common ideal and standing together in the cause of freedom.

IV. The Atlantic Council consider it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interest. The Atlantic Powers already possess in the North Atlantic Council an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding policies of general interest. In order to enable the Council better to perform these tasks, the Ministers agreed to appoint a committee of three ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community. The committee of three was requested to submit its report as soon as possible.

V. In the meantime, the Council agreed:

- (a) To undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems;
- (b) To strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to promote conditions of stability and well-being;
- (c) To instruct the permanent representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by M. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority,

(Continued on page 134)

Canada-India Atomic Reactor Project

ON April 28 Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and Mr. Escott Reid, the High Commissioner for Canada in India, signed in New Delhi an inter-governmental agreement on the Canada-India Atomic Reactor project. This agreement was forecast on September 16, 1955, in the joint announcement by the Governments of India and Canada that in April 1955 Canada had offered to India under the Colombo Plan a high powered atomic research and experimental reactor similar to the well known NRX reactor at the Canadian atomic energy establishment at Chalk River, Canada, and that India had accepted this offer shortly thereafter. Since the time of this announcement preliminary work has been going ahead at the site at the same time as further consultation between the two Governments.

The Canada-India Atomic Reactor will be erected at the atomic energy establishment of the Government of India at Trombay near Bombay. The building to house it will be a rotunda in the shape of a hermetically sealed steel shell some 135' high and 120' in diameter, which will be surrounded by buildings for auxiliary equipment and attached laboratories. Representatives of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited who have visited the site have been most favourably impressed by the location and the general facilities available in the area to carry out the work.

A Joint Enterprise

The reactor project is a joint Indo-Canadian enterprise and costs and responsibilities are being shared between the two countries. When it is completed full title and complete control will pass to the Government of India. The total cost of the project will be about 7 crores of rupees or a little over 14 million dollars; the value of the Canadian contribution is about seven and a half million dollars, and the value of the Indian contribution over six and a half million dollars. The general principle is that Canada pays for the external costs, India for the internal costs.

Thus Canada is providing the reactor itself and the steel for the rotunda which will surround it. Canada is also designing the reactor, the steel rotunda, and the foundations of the reactor. Indian contractors and Indian labour will carry out the major part of the construction work at the site while Canada, represented by the publicly owned company, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, will be responsible for the supervision of the engineering and erection.

The Department of Atomic Energy of the Government of India will be responsible for building the reactor's foundations and basement, work on which has already started. The Department of Atomic Energy expects to have the work on the foundations and basement of the reactor completed before the end of June. Erection of the steel rotunda to house the reactor will start soon after the monsoon this year and is expected to near completion by the end of 1956. It is hoped that the reactor will be completed early in 1958 and that it will be in full operation by the middle of that year.



—NFB

ATOMIC REACTOR AGREEMENT SIGNED

The High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott Reid, left, and the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, sign the intergovernmental agreement on the Canada-India atomic reactor project.

Arrangements have been made to send an adequate number of selected Indian technical personnel to Canada to obtain first hand experience and training in the operation of the NRX reactor at Chalk River, the Canadian Government's atomic energy establishment. Indian technical personnel will also be seconded to the engineering staff in Canada which is designing the reactor, the steel rotunda and the reactor foundations.

Thus, Canada, through the agency of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, will provide Indian scientists and engineers with every opportunity to become fully familiar with all aspects of the work. The visit of Indian scientists and engineers to Canada will be paid for by Canada under its normal technical assistance programme.

The Canada-India Atomic Reactor will add an advanced and versatile research facility to India's atomic energy programme. It is specifically designed to provide excellent facilities for fundamental research in physical, chemical, biological, and metallurgical problems relating to atomic energy. It is an efficient producer of radio-active isotopes for use in medical therapy, agriculture, and industry and for tracer element studies in chemical, biological, and medical research.

Above all, the reactor is specially suited for making engineering studies and research on reactor materials which can be tested under the conditions

of high neutron intensity met inside reactors. The research and development facilities of the reactor will enable advanced engineering experiments to be performed in connection with the design of future power reactors.

India has offered to make the experimental facilities of the reactor available to scientists approved by the Government of India from other countries, including those belonging to the Colombo Plan in South and South-East Asia. Thus the installation of this reactor in India will advance the development of atomic energy not only in India but in the entire region.

Following are the texts of messages exchanged between the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. St. Laurent and the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru:

Mr. St. Laurent's Message

"I would like you to know how much I welcome the signing in New Delhi today of the Intergovernmental Agreement covering our atomic energy project.

"I am gratified to learn that Canadian scientists will be associated with Indian scientists in the good work now under way at Trombay. Through this friendly co-operation a reactor will be constructed which will serve the cause of human welfare far beyond the boundaries of our two countries. The research undertaken at Trombay in collaboration with work being carried on in other parts of the world should provide lasting benefits for agriculture, industry and medicine.

"Our joint endeavour in this matter is another reminder that the origins of atomic science have been international and its development for peaceful purposes requires the kind of friendly co-operation between nations which so happily exists between India and Canada."

Mr. Nehru's Message

"I am happy to receive your message on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement between our two Governments covering the atomic reactor project.


"Under this Agreement, Canada makes available to India a high powered atomic research and experimental reactor, and I should like to express to you the warm and sincere appreciation of the Government and the people of India of this generous gift. The provision of this new and important research facility in India has been made possible by the friendship and good will existing between our two countries, which will now be further strengthened by the close association of Canadian and Indian scientists and engineers in the construction of the reactor and in its uses for the progress of civilization and for the benefit of mankind.

"It is our hope that the research centre at Bombay will prove useful to scientists from other countries in this region and beyond. To the fellowship of our own scientists will always be welcomed men and women from other lands moved by the same vision and dedicated to the pursuit of similar ends.

"The research and technical facilities afforded by this reactor will promote advances of knowledge in agriculture, biology, and medicine, which, but for

the use of radio-isotopes, would have taken decades to achieve. The reactor will also enable Canadian and Indian scientists and their colleagues from other countries to do advanced experiments in the technology of atomic power generation, which, we hope, will accelerate the practical use of atomic energy for the generation of electric power.

"This close collaboration in a highly complicated field between the scientists and engineers of two countries, geographically as far removed as Canada and India, is a symbol of the manner in which the world has shrunk through modern technology, and a token, I hope, of the peace, understanding and co-operation, which will one day spread throughout the world."



CANADA-INDIA ATOMIC REACTOR

Preliminary work has been started on the site at Trombay (near Bombay), India on which will be erected a hermetically sealed steel building, 135 feet high and 120 feet in diameter to house a high powered atomic research and experimental reactor being built as a joint Indo-Canadian enterprise under the Colombo Plan.

Above is an artist's cutaway drawing showing how the reactor will be installed in the completed building.

General Election in Ceylon

THE General Election in Ceylon which was held in April 1956 resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the United National Party (U.N.P.), under the leadership of Sir John Kotelawala, by the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (Popular United Front—M.E.P.) under the leadership of Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. The victorious M.E.P. is a coalition composed of four groups: (1) The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (S.L.F.P.), Mr. Bandaranaike's own party; (2) the Sinhala Basha Peramuna (Sinhalese Language Front—S.B.P.), conservative Buddhist nationalists; (3) the Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samajists Party (V.L.S.S.P.), Sinhalese extreme Trotskyites; and (4) Independents, a group of very conservative Sinhalese Buddhists. The new M.E.P. Cabinet contains eleven members of the S.L.F.P., two V.L.S.S.P. and one Independent.

Second to the M.E.P. coalition in the number of seats won was the Nava Lanka Sama Samajist Party (N.L.S.S.P.) a group of moderate Trotskyites under the leadership of Dr. N. M. Perera, who has now become Leader of the Opposition.

Voting

The following table shows the extent of the landslide and indicates the probable composition of the new House of Representatives (the figures are unofficial).

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats Gained</i>	<i>Seats Lost</i>	<i>Seats Retained</i>	<i>Total Seats</i>
M.E.P. coalition	1,046,362	40	—	11	51
(Bandaranaike)					
N.L.S.S.P.	247,204	9	—	5	14
Federalists	142,036	6	—	4	10
U.N.P.	738,551	—	52	8	8
(Kotelawala)					
Communists	119,715	1	—	2	3
T.R.F.	6,853	1	—	—	1
Tamil Congress	8,914	—	—	1	1
Others	304,189	4	5	4	8

The Federalists, the T.R.F. (Tamil Resistance Front) and Tamil Congress are all Tamil speaking groups, advocating equal official standing for their language along with Sinhalese. The M.E.P. and the U.N.P., on the other hand, want Sinhalese to be the sole official language. The N.L.S.S.P. sides with the Tamil parties on this important issue.


The pre-election manifesto of the victorious M.E.P. coalition called for:

- (1) Establishment of a republic;
- (2) Definition of "democratic and economic rights";

- (3) Sinhalese as the only official language;
- (4) Reconsideration of the role of the Senate;
- (5) Abolition of Appointed Members in the House of Representatives;
- (6) Recognition of the special position of Buddhism "as the faith of the large majority of the people", while guaranteeing "freedom of worship and conscience";
- (7) Encouragement of all non-citizen residents of Indian origin to return to India;
- (8) Nationalization of "all essential industries, including foreign-owned plantations, transport, banking and insurance";
- (9) Full employment;
- (10) Repeal of restrictions on trades unions, security legislation, etc.

After the election Mr. Bandaranaike stated that he was opposed to the expropriation of either foreign or locally-owned assets, and that any scheme of nationalization would involve just and fair compensation. The new Prime Minister said that the position of the Royal Navy base at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force station at Katunayake would have to be reviewed. He also indicated that the questions of whether Ceylon became a republic and whether it seceded from the Commonwealth might lie dormant because they would involve a change in the Constitution, which would necessitate a two thirds majority vote in Parliament. Regarding the language issue, Mr. Bandaranaike stated that his party was committed to introducing Sinhalese as the State language without delay, and would consider effective means of doing so.

(Continued on page 144)



The Hon. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Ceylon.

Canada and the International Labour Organization

THE International Labour Organization is one of ten intergovernmental organizations which are linked with the United Nations through special agreements arranged by the Economic and Social Council and approved by the General Assembly and by the organization concerned. The "Specialized Agencies" of the United Nations are expert in their respective fields: labour, health, education, food and agriculture, finance and banking, civil aviation, postal matters, telecommunications and meteorology.

History

By 1815, the Industrial Revolution had produced many problems in such fields as control of child labour, industrial health and safety, working conditions in mines and factories, and limitation of hours of work. A number of European countries, including Britain, tried individually to reform some of the worst abuses in factories and mines; but the belief spread that international action was needed since the problems were the same in all industrialized countries. Robert Owen, British cotton manufacturer and social reformer, urged the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference of European powers in 1818 to draw up international standards for conditions of work in all their countries, and in the next eighty years various workers' international congresses passed resolutions demanding action. Several industrial conferences were held between 1890 and 1913 attended by representatives from European countries, to discuss international labour conventions designed to prevent night work and to establish a maximum ten-hour workday for women and young people. These conferences, however, were not very effective.

The World War of 1914-1918 required all-out production, and the working people loyally helped to achieve victory for the Allied countries. By 1919, inflation, unemployment and starvation had made the life of the workers miserable in the war-ravaged countries of Europe. Faced with this situation, the Allied Governments realized the need for a Labour Charter in the Peace Treaty of Versailles, not only to help in improving living and working conditions, but also to help in maintaining peace and prosperity throughout the world. The British Empire delegation at the Peace Conference (including Canadian government and labour leaders) took the initiative in drawing up the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. Although an autonomous organization, the ILO was associated with the League of Nations. In 1946, the ILO became one of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations through an agreement with the United Nations.

Objectives

The ILO's aim, as reflected in the preamble of its constitution, is to contribute to universal and lasting peace through the promotion of social justice. In order to achieve this objective, ILO is "tripartite" in character bringing

together the representatives of government, labour and management from the 71 member-nations, a feature unique in the United Nations Specialized Agencies. It has gradually built up an International Labour Code dealing with such matters as: employment and unemployment, conditions of employment, industrial relations and labour inspection, freedom of association, employment of children and young persons, industrial safety and health, maternity protection and employment of women, social insurance and security, and maritime labour.

This Labour Code consists of (a) 104 Conventions, and the ratification of any one of these by a member government obliges that country to bring its legislation in the particular field up to the Convention standards, and to report annually to the ILO on its implementation; and (b) 100 Recommendations which set forth general principles to guide governments and organizations in drafting legislation or administrative orders if they desire to do so.

The ILO has also aided migration for employment and has studied problems of special importance referred to it by the United Nations, such as forced labour and freedom of association. However, the most significant extension of ILO activities since 1950 has been its operational programme designed to increase regional productivity and to raise economic levels in the less-developed member countries. The ILO has spent over \$5,000,000 under the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme for this work, and has also financed additional manpower training projects from its own budget. There has been close co-operation with the other Specialized Agencies in all aspects of the ILO programme.

Structure and Activities

The ILO has three main organs:

(1) The Governing Body consists of 40 members (20 government, 10 employer and 10 worker members). The ten nations of chief industrial importance (including Canada) have permanent government members, while the other ten government members, the ten worker members and the ten employer members are elected every three years. There are also 10 deputy members for each of the three groups. This executive council meets three or four times a year to formulate policies and programmes, to supervise the activities of the various conferences and committees, and to review the work of the International Labour Office.

(2) The International Labour Conference is a world assembly of about 700 delegates, advisers and observers, meeting each year to discuss urgent world labour problems, to survey the general activities of the Organization, and to approve the annual budget. Each member nation may send four delegates (two government, one worker, and one employer) plus technical advisers. The Conference draws up and adopts International Labour Conventions and Recommendations for the voluntary guidance of legislatures and employers' and workers' organizations.

(3) The International Labour Office at Geneva, Switzerland, acts under the Director-General as the permanent secretariat, the research and information center, and the publishing house for the Organization. Branch Offices represent the ILO in various parts of the world (including a Canada Branch at 95 Rideau

Street, Ottawa), and Field Offices have been set up in certain under-developed areas to carry out the technical assistance programme.

In addition to these three principal organs, there are numerous conferences, commissions and committees to meet specific needs. Regional Conferences of American, European Asian, and Near Eastern countries are held every three years. Eight Industrial Committees, established after 1945, also meet every two or three years to discuss special problems affecting particular industries. There are Advisory Committees in many fields such as forced labour, freedom of association, migration, social security, women's work, juvenile employment, occupational safety and health, labour statistics, co-operation, etc.; every year groups of experts meet to study urgent problems in some of these fields. The most important conclusions of these bodies are eventually referred to the annual Conference for more thorough discussion, with a view to the adoption of Conventions and Recommendations.

Canadian Participation

Canada's participation in international labour affairs dates from 1910, when Mr. Mackenzie King attended a labour conference at Lugano, Switzerland. The next year, as Minister of Labour, Mr. King acted on one of the conference Recommendations by introducing a bill in the House of Commons to prohibit the use of white phosphorus in making matches. As already mentioned, Canada took an active part in the discussions which led to the establishment of the International Labour Organization in 1919 and has supported it fully ever since. Canada has been represented by government, employer and worker delegates at every annual Conference and has participated in many other ILO activities.

As early as 1926 Canada ratified four ILO Maritime Conventions, and by 1955 had ratified a total of eighteen Conventions dealing with conditions of employment of seafarers and dockers, hours of work and weekly rest in industry, minimum wage-fixing machinery, and employment service organization. Canada reports annually to the ILO on the measures that have been taken to implement these Conventions. Our legislation on these subjects is considered to equal or exceed the requirements of the various Conventions. Canada is a federal country and the fact that most labour matters are wholly or partly under provincial jurisdiction places obstacles in the way of the federal government ratifying many of the ILO Conventions.

In the past Canada obtained helpful advice from the International Labour Office when such matters as conciliation in labour disputes, unemployment insurance, and establishment of employment services were being considered. More recently, Canada has been able to repay this assistance by contributing to the development of the less-industrialized nations. The ILO has used Canadian experts in its technical assistance programme in under-developed countries, and has sent trainees from such countries to Canada for study and on-the-job training. A manual on "National Employment Services—Canada" is used by the ILO in setting up employment services and training employment office staff in less-industrialized countries.

From 1940 to 1948 the ILO maintained temporary headquarters in Montreal, and a bronze plaque at McGill University commemorates this phase of the Organization's history. In 1946 the Minister of Labour for Canada was elected President of the Annual Conference, and in 1955 the Deputy Minister

of Labour for Canada was elected to the chairmanship of the Governing Body for the ensuing year.

While the Department of External Affairs has the general responsibility for handling Canada's international relations, including our United Nations commitments, the Department of Labour is the official liaison agency between the Canadian Government and the ILO. With the expansion in ILO activities after the Second World War, a special branch of the Department of Labour was established to work in close co-operation with the Department of External Affairs, with other federal departments, with the provincial Departments of Labour, and with the employers' and workers' organizations, all of which have an interest in the ILO. In this way, the ILO is kept informed on the progress of industrial and economic conditions in Canada, and the Canadian governments and organizations concerned are kept in touch with developments in the international field. Each year some progress is made towards uniform and higher labour standards in Canada, in line with the International Labour Code, and thus Canada plays its part in furthering the purposes of the ILO.



—P. van Breukelen

The Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. T. A. Stone, discussing Canadian Eskimo Art with Queen Juliana.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs, by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

White Sulphur Springs Conference

The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, made the following statement in the House of Commons on April 9 regarding his visit to White Sulphur Springs:

... This visit took place at White Sulphur Springs on March 26 and 27 between the heads of governments of the United States, Mexico and Canada. The host at this meeting was the President of the United States who in his invitation and subsequently emphasized that it would be of an informal character without agenda for the purpose of exchanging views on matters of mutual interest and of getting to know each other better.

In view of the character of the meeting, no decisions were reached and none was expected. It was, however, from my point of view, both helpful and agreeable to be in a position to discuss current international affairs with the presidents of the United States and Mexico in this informal way. There was also an opportunity to bring up one or two subjects of specific Canadian-United States concern with President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles.

No Basic Differences

The general discussion centered largely upon the comprehensive report which Mr. Dulles made on his recent visit to Asia. It has been stated in the press that in the subsequent exchange of views there was an emphatic expression of policy difference between the United States and Canada in respect of communist China. The reports in that form are without foundation. It is quite true that both President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles explained very frankly the reasons why recognition of the communist government at Peking could not be contemplated under present circumstances and why they felt their support should be continued to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. However, there was nothing said about the Canadian position which would suggest any change whatsoever from that stated in the house by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on January 31 either in respect of recognition or of our attitude toward the islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of China.

Each government is fully aware of the position of the other in these matters as indeed they were before the meeting at White Sulphur Springs. It is true, however, and this was recognized at our recent meeting, that there are many countries which have recognized the Peking regime, and that this has created a problem as to which regime should represent China at the United Nations, a problem which may be expected to grow more acute as time goes on.

There was considerable discussion over the position in the Middle East, the seriousness of which, of course, everyone recognized. It was agreed that, while all possible steps to reduce immediate tension should be taken, peace could only be secured there by an agreed political settlement between Israel and its neighbours. In this connection, the three governments welcomed the

expected intervention of the United Nations at this time, since formalized through the resolution which has just been passed unanimously by the Security Council. I am sure that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has our best wishes for success in the very important mission on which he is now engaged in consequence of this resolution.

There was also general discussion of the possible consequences of recent communist party developments in Russia. I got the impression that it was felt that any firm conclusion in regard to the long-range importance of these changes would be premature but that, in any event, they would not warrant any relaxation of effort on our part, either in defence or diplomacy or negotiation.

Consideration was also given to the problems arising out of the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa, States which are as sensitive about their national independence as they are insistent on greater human welfare for their people. In this connection there was an exchange of view as to the desirability of continuing international economic assistance to materially under-developed countries, and especially as to the importance of removing any feeling that such assistance on the part of Western countries had any ulterior motive or was inspired by any other spirit than good will and understanding. On the Canadian side, we expressed the view that it might help to remove any suspicions of ulterior motives if the United Nations were brought more into the picture than it had been, at least from the point of view of using the organization as a clearing house for plans and policies and information in regard to international assistance schemes. We felt that this had been done with good results in the annual meetings of the ministerial committee of the Colombo Plan, and that possibly this practice could be usefully extended to the wider field of the United Nations, so that it would become clear to the whole world community what various countries were doing in this matter and why they were doing it.

Importance of Trade Balance

In our bilateral talks, I emphasized once again to the President the importance of better-balanced trade between our two countries. I referred to the existing unfavourable balance in our visible trade, and I mentioned that the compensation or correction of this imbalance by capital movements occasionally was the cause of some concern in this country lest the control of our economic development, which should remain in Canadian hands, might be prejudiced thereby.

I also suggested to the President that the time seemed to have come when problems regarding the use of water power on rivers crossing the international boundary might well be studied at a conference between representatives of the two governments. Here I might perhaps extend this a little to answer a question of which notice was telephoned to my office by the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton). There was no discussion of the problem, but merely the suggestion that it would probably be desirable at this time to have it studied by a joint conference representing the two governments, to try to get at something which would make for the possibility of expeditious use of these water powers to the best possible advantage of the people who might derive advantage from their use. It was left at that, with the understanding that the subject would be further pursued in discussions between our Department of External Affairs and the Secretary of State of the United States.

Needless to say, the President expressed a very warm feeling for this country and gratification at the way in which relations between our two peoples were based on mutual respect and friendship and frank statement of diverging views, when there were diverging views. He took advantage of the opportunity to

mention some concern over the proposed 20 per cent advertising tax on Canadian editions of United States magazines. My explanation to him of the nature and purpose of this proposal will serve, I hope, to lessen his concern about it.

Having to make this statement, I would not want to end it without expressing once again my grateful thanks to the President and the government of the United States for the kindness and friendly hospitality which they showed us during our visit. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation of the opportunity thus afforded to me to become acquainted with the President of Mexico and to renew my acquaintance with the foreign minister of Mexico. It should be a source of real gratification to all Canadians that the relations between Canada and Mexico are developing in such an important and satisfactory way.

Distant Early Warning Line

The following statement was made in the House of Commons on April 11 by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, regarding the manner and operation of the Distant Early Warning Line:

On March 20 the Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Defence made a statement respecting the manning and operation of the Distant Early Warning Line and a number of questions were asked afterwards which I should like to deal with at this time. I wish to emphasize at the outset that this Distant Early Warning Line and other radar stations which have been discussed from time to time are for continental and not exclusively Canadian defence, just as certain joint defence projects in Western Europe are for collective rather than merely national defence. That being the case, it seems to be appropriate that the United States, as the larger country with the most at stake, should have a major share of responsibility for these joint defence projects, even though they may be situated in Canadian territory.

As hon. members will recall, on February 22, 1955, I explained Canada's role in providing our share of these continental early warning arrangements. I pointed out then that as part of the over-all effort Canada had undertaken to finance, construct and operate the Mid-Canada line. I also indicated that following joint Canada-United States announcements, which were made some months previously, and copies of which I tabled at that time, the United States had undertaken responsibility for the construction of a distant early warning line. Subsequently, an agreement, in the form of an exchange of notes, was made with the United States covering the construction of this line in Canadian territory. That agreement was tabled by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on May 20 last. It outlines in detail the conditions under which the United States was authorized to build the line in the interest of defence of our two countries. It also preserves, as the minister said, the principle enunciated in the joint declaration of February 12, 1947, on defence co-operation that all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its own territory.

If hon. members will recall, it was indicated in the exchange of notes that the United States would carry out construction of the distant early warning system through a management contractor appointed by the United States, and that in fact is what happened. They will also note amongst other things that Canadian contractors would be extended equal consideration with United States contractors in the awarding of construction contracts; that, as far as practicable, electronics equipment would be manufactured in Canada; that preference would be given to Canadian labour; that nothing shall derogate from the application of Canadian law in Canada

Experience with respect to the construction phase of that line has been very satisfactory. Contracts have been awarded to two Canadian construction firms, Foundation Company of Canada Limited and another, the Northern Construction and J. W. Stewart Limited, who are employing Canadian labour. A large number of sub-contracts for goods, materials and services connected with construction have gone to Canadian firms. Very substantial contracts for air transportation have been placed with Canadian carriers, and a number of contracts for electronic material have been awarded to Canadian firms. The closest liaison between the appropriate United States and Canadian authorities has been maintained from the outset of the programme, and is still being carried on to ensure that the progress of the work is facilitated and the terms and the spirit of the agreement are observed.

This agreement for the construction of the line also stated, in paragraph 7, that the extent of Canadian participation in the initial operation and manning of the DEW system would be a matter for later decision by Canada after consultation with the United States. That consultation took place and a decision covering the first three years was announced, the announcement that was made on March 20 by the Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer).

The same general terms and conditions laid down in the agreement for the construction of the line are to apply in its manning and operation, and these, as has been pointed out, fully safeguard Canadian rights and laws.

Now, I come first to the question the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra (Mr. Green) asked about contractors. The answer is that, while the civilian prime contractor for the DEW line, for the construction phase was a United States firm, there was, as I have pointed out, a very large participation by Canadian firms in the execution of the contract

Operation and Manning Phase

With respect to the operation and manning phase, proposals were invited from Canadian and United States firms and the best bid was that of the United States firm, and we were satisfied that this firm was properly selected to manage that part of the operation. In awarding this contract to the firm it has been understood that as far as possible Canadian personnel and facilities will be used in the execution of the contract. Perhaps hon. members will remember reading that within the last few days there have been applications to our employment agencies specifying the kind of qualifications that would be required and endeavouring to get as many Canadians as possible with such qualifications to take on work in that connection.

There has been close co-operation between the two Governments in arriving at all decisions and this co-operation is expected to continue throughout the implementation of these decisions. I think the visit of inspection that has been made over the weekend by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) and the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe) with the Secretary of Defence of the United States and his deputy is just an example of the close co-operation that is maintained in that regard.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart (Mr. Coldwell) asked if there were any other agreements of the same nature as the one dealing with the DEW line allowing, as he put it, United States contractors appointed by the United States Government to take over. The hon. member also wanted to know if these contractors and their employees were subject to Canadian laws or if there was some agreement with regard to the legal standing of those people. I have perhaps

gone beyond the express terms of the question because I wanted to be sure that I was not leaving out any information that hon. members might wish to have.

Defence Agreements

In addition to the DEW line agreement and the leased bases agreement which I shall deal with separately there are, apart from projects for which Canada is responsible itself, eight Canada-United States defence agreements under which contracts might be let by United States authorities; but there is a stipulation in all the agreements that Canadian contractors are to be treated on the same basis as the United States contractors. Those agreements, which in every case have been tabled in the House, are as follows:

The first is the Pine Tree radar agreement made by an exchange of notes of August 1, 1951. These notes were tabled on February 25, 1953.

The next is the global communications agreement made by an exchange of notes of November 4 and November 8, 1952, and tabled on February 25, 1953.

The third is the Goose Bay lease made by an exchange of notes of December 5, 1952, tabled on December 16, 1952, for a certain area within the RCAF station at Goose Bay.

The next is the Haines-Fairbanks pipe-line agreement made by an exchange of notes of June 30, 1953, tabled on November 19, 1953.

Another exchange of notes of May 1 and May 3, 1954, deals with the Loran station at Cape Christian, Baffin Island, tabled on February 22, 1955.

Another exchange of notes of June 13, 1955, provided for an extension of radar stations from the Pine Tree radar line, tabled on February 10, 1956.

Another exchange of notes of June 15, 1955, provided for gap filler radar stations in the Pine Tree line, tabled February 10, 1956.

Finally, an exchange of notes on September 22, 1955, in connection with a Pepperell pipe-line from the harbour of Saint John to the base which is just outside Saint John to avoid the inconvenience and the possible danger created by trucks carrying oil moving through the city of Saint John.

It will be appreciated that Canadian contractors have been employed on the construction of a number of these installations authorized by the above agreements.

For the sake of completeness I will mention one further installation even though it does not actually appear to come within the purview of the hon. gentleman's question. On July 9, 1954 the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) announced the establishment of an oceanographic research station at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, which is now being operated jointly by the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy under Canadian command.

As hon. members will note when referring to the documents which were tabled, the terms of these agreements vary somewhat, but latterly we have been trying to cast them in a more or less standard form, similar to the terms of the Distant Early Warning Line agreements. In each case, except in the case of the leased bases agreement which was originally made between the United Kingdom and the United States as a wartime necessity in 1941, Canadian law is fully applicable, and it is expressly stated that Canadian law shall apply.

With respect to the leased bases agreements, it will be recalled that on May 1, 1951, I announced in this House that agreement had been reached through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for the voluntary relinquish-

ment by the United States of certain rights conferred by the Leased Bases Agreement relating to income tax, customs and excise duties, postal privileges and, most important, the jurisdiction of the courts. A formal agreement to this effect was concluded by a subsequent exchange of notes which were tabled on May 2, 1952.

In all these arrangements for the providing of facilities on our territory Canadian sovereignty is fully recognized by the United States.

Canada-Soviet Trade Agreement

On April 18, in the House of Commons, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe moved "that it is expedient that the Houses of Parliament approve the ratification by Canada of the agreement on Trade between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Ottawa on February 29, 1956, and that this House do approve the same". Mr. Howe continued as follows:

On February 29 I took pleasure in announcing the conclusion of a trade agreement between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I stated at that time that an opportunity would be provided for a debate on this trade agreement in advance of its ratification. Now that the time has come for this debate, it is appropriate for me to make a few remarks.

One of the principal features of this agreement is the exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment between the two Governments. The effect of this is to put Canadian commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. on a basis comparable to our relations with most other countries. Hon. members no doubt understand what is meant by "most-favoured-nation treatment". In the time-honoured terminology of the tariff, this means that imports from a particular country will be treated no less favourably than those from any other country. Most-favoured-nation treatment has reference to tariffs and related matters in the field of commercial policy. Most-favoured-nation treatment does not entitle another country to any unique advantages but merely guarantees that the country will not be discriminated against in trade matters.

Imports into Canada from the U.S.S.R. are now admitted, under the provincial application of this agreement, at the rates of the most-favoured-nation tariff schedule. Most-favoured-nation treatment does not involve, of course, the application of the British preferential rates of duty to imports from the U.S.S.R.

In our country, most trade is conducted under private auspices. Most decisions regarding purchases and sales abroad are made by private people. The Government, of course, plays a most important part. In promoting trade relations with other countries, by tariff policy and by other means the Government establishes a framework of arrangements to expedite trade and sometimes to regulate trade. It is an inherent feature, however, of our business system and of the Government's policy that the Canadian people shall be as free as possible to decide what they will buy

It follows that in negotiating a most-favoured-nation agreement with the U.S.S.R., or any other country, the Government does not attempt to stipulate that certain things shall be imported into Canada and that other things shall not be imported. Aside from the effects of the tariff, such matters are not in general subject to governmental regulation. Canada does not undertake in this agreement, therefore, to purchase any specific goods from the U.S.S.R. The major undertaking given by Canada is that imports from the U.S.S.R. may com-

pete on equal terms with imports from other countries in the most-favoured-nation category.

Under the agreement, Canada also receives most-favoured-nation treatment from the U.S.S.R. The meaning of this undertaking is quite different in a state trading country than it is in a private enterprise country such as ours. Soviet purchases and sales abroad are made within a framework of governmental policy by officials of state trading organizations. Accordingly, the agreement includes a general undertaking whereby each government accords most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to sales or purchases involving exports or imports. This clause offers to Canadian exporters a prospect of competing on commercial terms for sales to Soviet state trading organizations.

Escape Clauses

Certain escape clauses are included in the agreement, to be used if unanticipated difficulties should arise. These escape clauses are comparable in their effect with those contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For example, provision is made for the imposition of import restrictions, even on a discriminatory basis if necessary, in the event of balance of payment difficulties. In this connection, I should also mention the letter from the Canadian government which forms a part of the agreement, reserving the right to establish values for import duty if any Russian products should enter Canada in such increased quantities as to cause serious injury to domestic producers. This letter is similar in purpose to the multilateral escape clause which is included in the GATT and it is similar in its terms to a letter which forms part of our separate trade agreement with Japan.

When I first announced this new agreement, I made clear that it will not affect our strategic export controls. A provision is included which recognizes that either government may apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind for the protection of its essential security interests. This provision would take precedence, if necessary, over any other provision of the agreement.

One of the clauses in the agreement refers to the treatment of merchant ships. This clause was studied very carefully before we agreed to include it. The practical effect is to give a continuing assurance to the Russians, for a period of three years, that their ships will continue to enjoy in our seaports such as Vancouver as favourable treatment as the ships of other countries. In other words, the provision simply confirms the kind of treatment which has been available all along to ships of U.S.S.R. registry.

I should also say something about the provisions which refer to the legal status of persons, access to courts and arbitration. These do not establish any new procedures for settling disputes that might arise in the conduct of trade between Canada and the U.S.S.R. They merely indicate the facilities that are available if any such disputes should arise. These provisions will, no doubt, be recognized as useful to traders and trading organizations in both countries. There is nothing in this agreement that might force Canadians to go before Russian courts, rather than to Canadian courts, nor force them to choose arbitration for the settlement of disputes. I mention this because there might otherwise be some misunderstanding about these particular provisions on the part of people who may not have had an opportunity to examine the legal problems which are involved.

From the Canadian point of view, by far the most important part of this agreement is the letter by which the Government of the U.S.S.R. guarantees to purchase and take delivery from Canada, during the three years of the agreement, a total between 1,200,000 and 1,500,000 metric tons, i.e. between 44.1

million bushels and 55.1 million bushels of wheat, in annual lots of between 400,000 and 500,000 tons, i.e., between 14.7 million bushels and 18.4 million bushels. The exact amounts to be purchased in the second and third years, within these annual amounts, will be determined by the Government of the U.S.S.R., taking into account the volume of Soviet goods sold to Canada. The total over the three years, however, will amount to not less than 1,200,000 tons and the amount in any individual year will not be less than 400,000 tons. The Russian purchases of wheat are to be made at the prices and on the terms at which the Canadian wheat board is making sales to its major customers at such times as the Soviet purchases take place. The U.S.S.R. has already purchased more than 400,000 tons for delivery during the present year.

The agreement is written to terminate at the end of three years. At that time the two Governments could agree to extend it. The conditions governing an extension would have to be worked out in the light of our experience in the three-year period.

I shall not attempt to predict to what extent there may be a long term demand for Canadian wheat in the U.S.S.R. This agreement provides a demonstration that the Government is prepared to move vigorously, on commercial terms, into any market that develops. If there should prove to be a continuing market in the U.S.S.R. that we can satisfy, then we shall be all the more pleased. To the extent that it is possible to do so, we are establishing ourselves in a good position at present. It is reasonable to expect that there will be at least some continuing basis for Russian purchases of wheat from this continent, even if that country should not be short of grain. From the point of view of transport, it is cheaper to ship wheat across the Pacific to far eastern ports of the U.S.S.R. than to transport it overland from the major wheat growing areas in western Russia.

As for other Canadian commodities, it may well be possible to develop trade in non-strategic goods that the U.S.S.R. needs and that are competitive. The very fact that a trade agreement has been concluded indicates perhaps a willingness on the part of the U.S.S.R. to trade more with this country. To a very large extent, Canada and the U.S.S.R. export similar things. The potentialities of trade, while valuable we hope to both countries, would thus seem to be fairly limited. I do not wish to create the impression, therefore, that there will be a large market in Russia for very many Canadian products. At the same time, it is realistic for exporters to be alert to such opportunities as may develop and to take advantage of them.

My colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) will no doubt wish to take part in this debate. I would like to refer particularly to the part he played in making this agreement possible. During his trip to the U.S.S.R. late in 1955, the Secretary of State for External Affairs initiated the discussions on trade which led later to the negotiations which took place in Ottawa.

I am informed that the U.S.S.R. was represented by able experienced officials who conducted themselves throughout the negotiations in a straightforward, businesslike manner.

Mr. Pearson's Statement

Later on the same day, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, spoke as follows:

Before the motion carries I might say a few words in connection with it, and deal with one or two points that have been raised. This discussion, which

has shown, I think, that there is unanimity in all quarters of the House that the motion should be carried and that the treaty should be ratified, as one which will be to the advantage of our country; may even carry with it some political, as well as economic, advantages.

The question of the background of the negotiation of this treaty has been raised. The negotiation of the treaty goes back to last autumn, when an invitation was extended to me to visit the Soviet union. I was asked at that time what I would like to see and what subjects I would like to discuss with representatives of the Government in Moscow. After consultation with my colleagues, it was suggested to the authorities in Moscow that one of the subjects would be the development of trade between our two countries. For that purpose an official of the Department of Trade and Commerce accompanied me to Moscow. Possibly I can add at this time my tribute to that which has been paid by others to the excellent work done by that official, the Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, and other officials of that Department and other Departments of Government, including External Affairs, who were concerned with this matter.

No Strategic Materials

These preliminary discussions in Moscow made it clear that there was a reasonable possibility of negotiating a mutually advantageous treaty between the two countries. We made it clear in Moscow, before the negotiations were referred back to Ottawa, that there could be no inclusion of materials on our strategic list in any trade negotiations and, on the other hand, that we would expect a commitment from the Soviet Government for the purchase of wheat. It was also made clear in Moscow that the negotiations should be resumed in Ottawa and brought to a conclusion, if possible, here. As the House knows, that was done.

The Soviet Government sent a team of trade experts to Ottawa where there was quite a serious and indeed at times difficult negotiation of details of an agreement, with eventual success. It was found by those on our side that those who were representing the Soviet union were competent, straightforward and frank negotiators and, as has been mentioned already this afternoon, personally very agreeable people to deal with. I think we can take satisfaction that the negotiations have resulted in the treaty which is now before the House.

There were difficulties, of course, as would be natural and, indeed, inevitable when negotiations are taking place between representatives of countries which are so different economically, politically and in every other way as those of the Soviet Union and Canada. Some of these difficulties were honest ones arising out of misunderstandings of constitutional procedures. For instance, we are today asking the House of Commons to approve ratification of this treaty. In Soviet practice no such approval is, of course, required and, indeed, legally and constitutionally under our own system no such approval is required because ratification is an Executive act. It was hard to make the Soviet representatives understand that while legally the executive could ratify and the agreement could go into effect at once, it was our constitutional practice—and a very good practice it is—that no international treaty or agreement of any significance at all, whether political or economic, should be ratified by the Executive without the approval of the Legislature.

This particular agreement is substantially the same as those which we have in the field of trade and commerce with most other countries. For instance, for some years we have had most favoured nation treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is true that these arrangements were made before the communist

party took over the governments of those two countries, but the treaties remained after the governments became communist. No special difficulties have been found in the application of the treaties since that time and they have, I think, been of value to our country. There are a good many trade agreements of this type between the Soviet Union and Western countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria and the Scandinavian countries. It is true there is no such agreement between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. but hon. members will know, of course, that the administration in Washington is now seeking congressional authority to dispose of surplus agricultural products to the Soviet Union.

Agreement Advantageous to Canada

I think it will be agreed that this agreement is advantageous to our country in the field of trade and commerce. I think it will also be agreed that no wider Canadian interests, political or economic, are likely to be jeopardized in any way by it. It certainly does not make us unduly dependent, for instance, on the Soviet Union as a market for our wheat. Desirable as it is to find markets wherever we can it would, I think, create some uneasiness if this particular market were too large in relation to our total sales, but there is certainly no danger of that happening under this agreement. As hon. members know, the commitment in any one year will amount to between 15 million and 18 million bushels of wheat, which is comparable to our exports to Belgium or to the Federal Republic of Germany, and compares with a figure for last year of 31 million bushels to Japan.

During the course of the discussion the question has been asked, what commodities are we likely to receive from Russia as a result of the trade which we hope will develop between the two countries? That, of course, is a very difficult, indeed an impossible question to answer, especially in the case of trade between two countries in one of which trade is conducted under our system of individual enterprise and free initiative and in the other by a state trading organization. But, as has already been pointed out, production is developing, production is growing in the Soviet Union, and it may well be that during the course of the agreement it will be possible for the initiative of Canadian traders to express itself in the development of trade, including imports from Russia, which will be of benefit to this country. I myself have no idea in what direction that trade will move but it is, I think, certainly safe to say that we are beginning a new era of trade development with a country which is already showing increasing strength both in the field of industry and in the field of agriculture.

Productive Capacity Greater

While it is perfectly true, as my colleague the Minister of Fisheries has pointed out, that under our system of free enterprise and initiative our per capita production capacity is much greater than that of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union or, indeed, of other communist states because of the nature of our social and economic organization, nevertheless while that may be true per capita the figures for production in the Soviet Union in recent years and the planned figures for the next five years are very impressive indeed. In this connection may I quote some remarks made by the president of the Massey-Harris Company who visited the Soviet Union last year, as members know, and who has made some very interesting reports on his visit since his return. In a speech in Ottawa not many weeks ago he said:

"Agriculture is one of the weakest spots of the Russian economy. The process of regimenting the peasant, dispersed as he is over large areas,

with his natural yearning for the ownership of a piece of land, and his greater independence and individuality than the city worker, has proven to be a difficult nut to crack.

"But I do not wish to weary you with details. I will go no further than to state that, to our eyes, the Russian system of agriculture is under-mechanized, bedevilled by bureaucracy, cumbersome and wasteful of manpower."

But he went on to say this:

"The vitality and drive of the Russian dictatorship and of its people is, however, clearly illustrated in this field also—

That is the field of agriculture.

—by the fact that during the years 1954 and 1955, they brought under the plow 70 million acres of virgin land, an area so vast that it exceeds by 10 million acres the size of the United Kingdom."

Then as to what had been done in the field of industrial production he had this to say:

"Thus it is that having largely recovered from the damages of war, Russia's economic strength has taken a great step forward during the past five years, and you may have seen in the press only a few days ago that her new five-year plan includes an all-out drive to increase her industrial production by 1960 to two-thirds of the U.S. figure for 1955. In this plan, Russia now declares that she has it within her means to become the world's mightiest industrial nation. Having observed the manner in which Russia in the past has met and frequently exceeded her five-year objectives, I am not prepared to shrug off these recent assertions as being mere boastfulness."

That is what Mr. Duncan says. He continues:

"Do not let us forget, when one considers the amazing increase of Russian industrialization in recent years, that it is based in no small measure upon the good old premise of hard work, to which we also used to be dedicated. Much can be accomplished by a nation where all men and all women work 48 hours a week."

So when we are approving a trade arrangement with the Soviet Union we are approving an arrangement with a country which is making great strides forward in industry and in agriculture. There are political as well as economic implications in that fact

It may be asked—indeed it has been asked, though not in this debate—whether the Soviet Union will carry out the obligation which it has undertaken to Canada with respect to wheat purchases. I think we may have confidence that it will do so. Self-interest, if no other reason, would dictate that it should do so. Apart from its need for wheat, a failure to do so would damage its international reputation in trade matters, and it would appear to be a little bit more sensitive about that reputation now than it was some few years back. Certainly we would regard any failure to fulfil its wheat obligations as a violation of the trade agreement itself. The exchange of letters re purchase of wheat is as binding—and it is understood to be so—as are the articles of the agreement itself.

It should also be emphasized—and this has been pointed out also this afternoon, more particularly by the hon. member for Eglinton—that in this

agreement there is nothing which would prejudice in any way our security interests because of the safeguards that have been written into the agreement. It may well be that because of this agreement the Soviet Union may wish to set up in this country certain trade facilities for the carrying out of the agreement, more particularly the obligation to purchase wheat. For that purpose it may wish to open a trade office in this country.

Indeed the Government has already received from the Soviet Government a request to that effect, namely for the opening of a small trade office more particularly for the purpose of purchasing wheat. That request is now under consideration and a decision with regard to it will be taken very shortly. No request has been made for the opening of any office with diplomatic privileges or immunities, and the Government would not be disposed to agree to the establishment in this country of any diplomatic office outside of the embassy in Ottawa.

Trade is one field in which it is possible for us to bring about at this time a more normal relationship with the Soviet Union without prejudice to our own security or our own ideals, and without diminishing in any way our close association with our friends in other parts of the world. In this treaty we are not, of course, giving the Soviet Union anything that we have not at least in equal measure given to all friendly countries long ago. It would have been unreasonable, in my opinion—and I think this opinion is shared in all quarters of the House—for the Canadian Government to have failed to take advantage of this opportunity to enter into a sensible and useful agreement. I think we would have been open to justifiable criticism from responsible and moderate people, both here in Canada and abroad, if we had turned our backs on the possibility of a reasonable working relationship with the Soviet Union in this field.

We all long for the day when there may be sufficient mutual trust that reasonable arrangements of this kind, even with communist countries, not only in trade but in many other fields, will become the rule rather than the exception. If this trade agreement and the experience of both countries with its operation over the next three years help toward that end by reducing suspicion, we shall have good cause to be satisfied with it on political as well as economic grounds.



NORTH ATLANTIC MINISTERIAL SESSION

(Continued from page 112)

VI. The members of NATO are by their treaty dedicated to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

Their first seven years of working together have resulted in marked success and have strengthened the bonds between them.

The members of NATO are determined to remain united and steadfast to their ideals. They face the future with confidence.

Thermal Power Plant for East Pakistan

IT was announced recently that agreement had been reached between the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Canada for co-operation under the Colombo Plan in the provision of a thermal station for generating electric power at Khulna in East Pakistan. The Canadian Government has agreed to participate in financing the external costs for the erection and construction of the steam generating station.

As its contribution Canada will provide generating units and other related equipment as well as the services of Canadian engineering personnel to carry out the design and supervision of installation of the power station. The estimated total of the external costs for which Canada will assume responsibility is \$2,000,000. Pakistan will take care of all local costs involved in the project, including all preliminary construction work and the provision of local labour and materials.

When the Khulna power plant is completed, it will have a capacity of 20-thousand kilowatts of power. The power will be employed for important industrial and agricultural uses in East Pakistan.



NEW TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION DIRECTOR

Dr. Nathan Keyfitz, new Director of the Colombo Plan Bureau for Technical Co-operation, on arrival at Colombo Airport, shakes hands with Dr. J. de Fretes, Charge d'Affaires for Indonesia in Ceylon, and President of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia, with the High Commissioner for Canada in Ceylon, Mr. J. J. Hurley, in the centre.

United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation

THE first session of the United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation was held in New York between March 14 and 23. The Committee, which was established in December 1955, by a unanimous resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, consists of 15 scientists representing the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union. The Canadian representative to the Committee's first session was Dr. E. A. Watkinson, Chief, Occupational Health Division, Department of National Health and Welfare. Dr. R. Appleyard of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, acted as consultant.

Problems Examined

During its first session the Committee surveyed the scientific problems involved in carrying out the mandate of the General Assembly for it to examine "The Effects of Radiation on Man and His Environment". In accordance with the Assembly's directive to receive and assemble radiological information, the Committee requested the Secretariat to collect, by August 1, 1956, from Member States of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies, preliminary measurements of natural radiation and of environmental contamination caused by man-made radioactivity; it also requested Governments to assemble information in other scientific fields for evaluation by the Committee at its next meeting. The Committee, in addition, considered statements by representatives of the World Health Organization, the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization on ways in which these Specialized Agencies might co-operate with the Committee in its work. Working Groups of the Committee discussed the following topics: genetics, the effects of irradiation by internally absorbed isotopes, the effects of external radiation, natural radiation background, exposures during medical procedures, occupational exposure, and environmental contamination.

The importance of the task confronting the Committee was emphasized by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at its opening meeting. He was convinced that the introduction of concrete scientific material would help to move the subject of atomic radiation out of the area of emotional sensationalism and place it squarely on the solid footing of scientific knowledge, which will, in turn, change unconsidered fear into sober precaution. The Secretary-General pointed out that public interest in a new scientific subject is a basically desirable and encouraging feature of modern civilization. "However," he declared, "in this case, as in many others where the scientific basis has not yet been properly worked out, there is a lack of knowledge which has caused in many instances an unwarranted reaction to the whole subject. For this reason", he continued, "it has been found wise to make an international effort to give the widest possible distribution to all available scientific data concerning ionizing radiation and its effects upon man".

The next meeting of the Committee has been scheduled for October 1956.

SOME ASPECTS OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Club, Montreal, April 27, 1956.

You will not be surprised, I am sure, especially in view of the current attention being given to the matter, if I talk to you today about some aspects of our relations with the United States.

It is a subject with which Canadians have always been intensely preoccupied; and, I expect, always will be, as long as the facts of history and geography, economics and politics, remain as they are.

This preoccupation, while natural and, indeed, inevitable, at times seems to occupy a disproportionate share of popular interest. If we are not careful, we will soon be spending more time in thinking negatively about what the Americans have done or may do to or for us, than in thinking positively about our own plans and policies.

Close Relationship

Canadian-American relations are today the most important single item in the foreign policy of our country; apart, of course, from the transcendental issue of peace and war. Moreover, these relations will probably grow in difficulty and complexity as the importance of each country to the other increases, as is happening. After all, we share most of a continent, and one which is today not on the periphery, but in the very centre of the world. Its northern half—the Canadian half—is growing steadily in strength and influence.

Today there are no two countries in the world whose contacts are so varied, so close and so compelling, as those between Canada and its neighbour.

When Professor Leacock retired from McGill, he was invited to return to England, and pass the rest of his life there. His reply, courteously and humourously declining the invitation, included the following sentences:

"There's another reason for not wanting to leave Canada for England. I'd hate to be so far away from the United States. You see, with us it's second nature, part of our lives, to be near them. Every Sunday morning we read the New York funny papers, and all week we read about politics in Alabama and Louisiana, and whether they caught the bandits that stole the vault of the national bank, and—well, you know

American news—there is no other like it. And the Americans come-and-go up here, and we go-and-come down there, and they're educated just as we are and know all about Kilowatts but quit Latin at the fourth declension

"Our students go and play hockey with their stoo-dents and our tourists going out meet their towrists coming in. The Americans come up here and admire us for the way we hang criminals. They sit in our club and say, 'You certainly do hang them, don't you!' My, they'd like to hang a few! The day may be coming when they will. Meantime we like to hang people to make the Americans sit up.

"And in the same way we admire the Americans for the way they shovel up mountains and shift river-courses and throw the map all round the place. We sit in the club, fascinated, and listen to an American saying, 'The proposal is to dam up the Arkansas River and make it run backwards over the Rockies.' That's the stuff! That's conversation.

"... We are 'sitting pretty' here in Canada. East and West are the two oceans far away; we are backed up against the ice cap of the pole; our feet rest on the fender of the American border, warm with a hundred years of friendship. . . .

"... Thank you, Mother, England, I don't think I'll 'come home'. I'm 'home' now. Fetch me my carpet slippers from the farm. I'll rock it out to sleep right here."

I do not wish you to infer from all this that the ties that draw us across the Atlantic, that link us with our mother countries, Great Britain and France, and with the nations of the Commonwealth, are weakening. On the contrary, they are stronger than ever. The old problems arising out of our development from colony to nation, and from the impact of imperial policy on that development, have been solved. There is now little to worry us and very much to satisfy us in the Commonwealth relationship. It is a relationship which we must maintain and strengthen.

On the other hand, our problems with the United States are, if not new, at least expressing themselves in new and, at times, per-

plexing forms. They constitute a challenge to both countries. It will be easier on our part to meet that challenge successfully — as we must—if we keep a sense of proportion; avoiding excessive touchiness or assertiveness; if we show ourselves to be not only alert but also nationally mature.

We are not, of course, a mere economic or political extension of any other state. We stand firmly on our national feet and we must stand up for our own national interests. When these interests are endangered by the policies and practices of any other country, however friendly, we must speak out and, if necessary, act. The record shows that we are not afraid to do this. Other countries—especially the United States—would not have much respect for us otherwise.

There is a tradition of forthright but friendly exchange of views across our border, which is uniquely valuable. We do not want to lose it. That loss, however, could be brought about from abuse by exaggeration or over-indulgence, on the one hand, or by super-sensitiveness or morbid suspicion on the other. We should guard against both.

Increasing Importance

This increasing importance of Canada and the United States to each other is two-fold. Not only is our relationship in a bilateral sense of great and growing significance, there is also the fact that the United States through its power and resources is the country best equipped to give political leadership to the Western world, which includes Canada, in the search for peace and security against aggressive communism. Canada, therefore, and the other members of the coalition, have an obligation in their own interest not to act without considering the major responsibilities for collective security now being borne by the United States.

This realization that we must stand together or fall separately explains why today in our defence policies we do not, indeed cannot, rely on national action alone, which would be totally inadequate, but on collective arrangements, especially through NATO.

Among other things, this means that our continent, which is one great sector of the NATO area, must be treated as a single zone for defence, and that Canada and the United States must co-operate closely in that zone for their common protection. It means also that Canadians have no more right to be cool and suspicious when that co-operation brings American soldiers or American instal-

lations to Canada, than would be the case when it brings Canadians to France or Germany.

In other days, and under other conditions, we would have assumed complete responsibility for the building, manning, operating and maintenance of every defence facility in Canada. But now that defence installations on our territory protect both countries, the cost and the responsibility is shared by both governments. This is the right and proper course, especially in view of the magnitude of the requirements for continental defence. In the circumstances, the policy we have adopted is, I think the right one. There is full consultation with the United States on all aspects of collective defence, especially continental defence. It is accepted without question that no non-Canadian activity on Canadian soil in connection with such defence shall take place without the agreement of the Canadian Government. Before giving such agreement, we must be convinced that the activity in question is necessary.

Canada accepts responsibility for as much of this continental defence work on Canadian soil as it can undertake, having regard to our other defence commitments. That which we cannot do ourselves—and which we agree should be done in the common interest — is either a joint effort or is done by the United States alone. Furthermore, in every defence arrangement that we have made with our neighbour, and which involves American activity on Canadian soil—this is very important—Canadian rights and Canadian sovereignty are fully preserved.

Defence Co-operation

Surely we should welcome whole-heartedly, as something in our own as well as the general interest, United States defence co-operation on such a basis. This being the case, it is no service to good relations and friendship between our countries, or to peace and security generally, to whisper or insinuate that every time the Stars and Stripes flies with the Canadian flag at some Arctic base, this is a further step in the United States conquest of our country. "Canada, we stand on guard for thee", is something to act on—as well as to sing about. But it doesn't mean that we have to declare war when an American soldier stands guard over his crashed plane on Canadian soil!

The sudden flare-up of this ancient fear that we are about to become "the 50th state of the Union" may have been encouraged by

the feeling that defence co-operation with our neighbour and within NATO is no longer so necessary, now that there is a new and better look in Moscow. Joseph Stalin has been degraded by those men who bowed so low before him when he was alive. Therefore, it is suggested we can take it easier now and even indulge in the luxury of suspecting each other. This feeling that is now safe to relax is a dangerous delusion and, if persisted in, would weaken the unity and strength of the free nations which has itself been a main reason for the improvement which has taken place.

Cult Remains

The cult of personality may for the time being have become a communist heresy; but the cult of communist domination remains. So the non-communist world cannot yet afford to indulge in weakness or division or complacency.

There are conclusions to be drawn from this in respect of Canadian-American defence relations, as well as in wider fields.

If worries over United States participation in certain joint defence arrangements in Canada seem recently to have increased, that is at least partly due to the feeling that the menace of communist imperialism has decreased. As Mr. Dulles said in his speech in New York on Tuesday, "Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to submerge differences as when they faced together a clear and present danger". The danger, however, has not disappeared. It may be taking new forms, but it still faces us.

Similarly, if anxiety over certain economic aspects—particularly the foreign investment aspect of Canadian-United States relations—seems also to have increased—or at least to become more vocal—in certain Canadian quarters, that may be due, paradoxically, to the very abundance of the evidence of the economic progress that Canada has been making in recent years. We have been going through our greatest period of development. We can as a people take our full share of credit for this. But we should also remember that it could not have taken place in the way and in the time that it has, without outside participation, especially by investors from the United States, but also from Great Britain and other countries.

We have recently been reminded in Ottawa—and elsewhere—that participation of this kind brings its own problems and poses a

threat to that national control, indeed to that independence, which we rightly cherish and intend to maintain.

These reminders can be salutary because the problems are real. But there is no excuse for the assertion—either careless or calculated—that the economic and political domination of our country by the United States is imminent; or for dragging up old anti-American prejudices. The War of 1812 was fought a long time ago, and "54-40" is now more impressive as a football signal than as a call to conflict across the border, or even as a peroration in a House of Commons speech. The times are too serious and the problems too real for irresponsible exaggeration.

Canada has been urged recently to declare its economic independence of the United States. I wonder what that means. Surely not that our tariffs, our budgets and our laws are now made across the border and that we are a mere satellite or dependency of our great neighbour. Ask them in Washington about that!

Certainly we are not independent of the United States in the sense that we can isolate our economy from hers, at least without tragic consequences.

But what country in the free world can be or would wish to be economically independent of the United States in that sense? Canada least of all. The trade figures with our neighbour are themselves enough to refute any such idea.

Neither Country Independent

Furthermore—and this should comfort the Jeremiahs who predict our new colonialism—the United States in its turn is today by no means economically independent of Canada, and will become less so in the future. The fact is that the economic interdependence of our two countries, and indeed of most important trading countries, is both inevitable and beneficial. It is usually forgotten, for instance, as an illustration of this interdependence, that Canadian *per capita* investment in the United States is almost twice as great as American in Canada.

I know that anxiety is also felt—and it may be very real—because, as it is put, we have too many of our economic eggs in the American basket. It is worth reminding ourselves, however, that it is the strongest basket in the foreign market. I do not like to think what we would have done without it in recent

years; which does not mean that we have sought—or must not continue to seek—to fill other baskets.

Perhaps, however, by economic independence is meant protection against excessive United States investment in our capital development.

Last year, 1955, capital expenditure in Canada reached the figure of \$6.2 billions. The estimate for 1956 is the unprecedented figure of \$7.5 billions, or 23½ per cent of our gross national production. The rate of increase of new investment in industry is higher in Canada than in most other countries, including the United States.

For several years now, our savings have not equalled our investment, even though the proportion of such savings in relation to our Gross National Product has been also greater than in the United States.

Capital Inflow

The deficiency has been made up by an inflow of capital from abroad, largely from across the border. In 1955 this amounted to over \$600 millions, but our total capital investment, it should not be forgotten, was over six billions. Unless we wish to slow down or alter the pattern of our development; or unless we save and invest more ourselves, especially in speculative developments—as I hope we will do—this capital investment by our neighbour—far from being unnecessary and dangerous—is of essential importance.

Do these American investments mean that we are going to lose our national identity; to become—as it has been said—a “banana republic”?

I have too high an opinion of the sturdy patriotism and the national pride of my fellow-Canadians to admit that any attempt by the United States to secure control of or unduly influence our economic or political destiny by its investments in Canada could possibly be successful. We are not the kind of people to accept pressure of that kind.

But I have also far too high an opinion of the common sense and the genuine goodwill of our neighbour to the south to believe that they would ever make such an attempt.

Let us be neither defeatist nor demagogic in these matters. When the growing need in the free world is for close co-operation, for mutual trust, for standing together, this is no time for political or economic jingoism.

Perhaps pleas to preserve our independence are based on fears, genuine or self-induced, that we are losing control of our natural resources to American interests; that we are becoming, as the current phrase puts it, “hewers of wood and drawers of water”, as well as—and this is a more original expression — “diggers of holes” for Americans. Incidentally, a hewer of wood is today no underpaid, unskilled labourer. He is a highly skilled, respected workman who can make fifteen to twenty dollars a day; more than many of his fellow-Canadians working in factories or offices or schools.

This humiliating suggestion that we are in danger of being exploited by and of doing the rough work for the benefit of economic overlords from across the border is one which few Canadians will accept.

It is well to remember that \$1.00 out of every \$3.00 of our national income comes from manufacturing, and that our country of 16 million people now ranks sixth in the world in terms of the total value of manufactured commodities produced. These figures will help us to keep things in perspective.

We are often reminded, however, and again the reminder can be salutary, that our natural resources, though great, are not unlimited; that they should be prudently used and wisely conserved for future generations. Hence the questions: Are the Americans not dissipating too much of them for their own gain? Should we not export less and process more in our own country?

These are very important questions and have to be taken seriously. Where there are trends or tendencies which suggest answers to them that might prejudice our national development, governments should try to correct them.

Control of Natural Resources

I do not, however, have to remind a Quebec audience that control over the development of our natural resources rests largely with provincial governments who bear, and rightly, a major share of responsibility for the manner and extent of their exploitation. Moreover, in a free country like ours, and in the present circumstances of our development, would it be wise, as has been suggested, for the Federal Government to impose restrictive controls designed to ensure that we should export from Canada a greater proportion of finished products and less of our

raw materials? Such controls could easily do us more harm than good. Surely at this stage of our economic development we should continue to export large quantities of raw materials as essential to our prosperity and employment, and also to our steadily increasing industrial strength itself.

We are steadily increasing, as we should, the manufacture of raw materials in Canada, and this will grow as we develop new markets at home and abroad, new skills and new manufacturing facilities. This process should be assisted by carefully designed governmental policies, but should not be stimulated by artificial expedients. We have had enough unhappy experience over the last thirty years to recognize the fallacies and the perils of trying to force economic industrial and agricultural growth in the name of economic nationalism.

Economic and trade policies based on short-sighted considerations could do more harm to Canada than to most countries. It is because we have taken the long view of our national interest that the foundations of our economic structure are strong; until today Canada has achieved an important position among the nations of the world; a position which has been buttressed by the development since the war of basic industries. This development, which has been unprecedented, would not, I think, have been possible without the participation of United States venture capital and technical knowledge. We should be very careful, therefore, not to discourage such participation by ill-considered and unfriendly talk. We can't kill the goose, but she may decide to lay her dollar eggs somewhere else.

I am not suggesting that the possible impact of outside and, above all, American investments in Canada may not have important results for our future; or that great care must be taken by governments on all levels to ensure that those results are good. Corporations and investors from outside who come to Canada should be warmly welcomed, but if they are to share in our national progress, they should become rooted in the national community to the maximum possible extent. The experience of recent years has shown that there is no other sound basis for foreign investment.

But this does not mean adopting on our side a narrowly nationalistic and prejudiced attitude; indulging in intemperate language, or striking suspicious attitudes at the expense of those whose co-operation—political and economic—we need.

It is far better to adopt a positive approach to this problem of national development and by our laws, policies and actions to encourage Canadians to supply more and more venture capital and management for enterprises in Canada.

This will be a more helpful and constructive course than merely to lament over the extent to which Americans contribute what we need, but which we do not or cannot ourselves provide.

With pride in our development, with confidence in our future, with satisfaction in the position we have achieved in the world, pessimism of the kind which sees Canada falling under the grasping domination of any other country is both unrealistic and dangerous. After 1867, the weak and struggling Canadian federation, in many respects still a colony, with its very existence as a state uncertain, did not allow sterling from London to prevent it becoming a united strong and free nation; indeed, used that sterling to help bring it about. Who then would dare to suggest that the Canada of 1956, a strong and self-reliant member of the family of nations, and recognized as such, is going to be submerged by the "Yankee dollar"?

Today, in many important respects, the Western nations, and especially those in the North Atlantic community, are more dependent on one another than they were before the threat of communist aggression led them into closer association, both economic and political. We need not be frightened of that development. In the small atomic world of today this move toward co-operative interdependence is to be welcomed rather than feared; is beneficial rather than harmful. This closer association, however, should not be confused with the loss of our political freedom. The destiny of the Canadian nation will not be blocked because Canada co-operates closely with her neighbour in continental defence, and because United States corporations operating under Canadian law, subject to Canadian policies, and behaving much like Canadian corporations, are playing an important part in our development.

I end, therefore, on a note of optimism, based on the story of Canada's past, nourished by the evidence of its present and to be justified, I am confident, by the achievements of the future.

I make no apology for this optimism and to those who reject it, I would merely point out that if it weren't for the optimist, the pessimist would never know how fortunate he wasn't.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. L. Mayrand appointed Canadian Ambassador to Spain. Proceeded to Spain April 4, 1956.
- Mr. J. B. C. Watkins, Ambassador, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to Ottawa, April 15, 1956.
- Mr. A. E. Blanchette posted from the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Cape Town, effective April 1, 1956.
- Mr. M. N. Bow posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, effective April 4, 1956.
- Mr. D. C. V. A. Arnould posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective April 10, 1956.
- Mr. J. E. Thibault posted from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, to the Canadian Embassy, Oslo, effective April 10, 1956.
- Mr. J. H. Cleveland posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, to Ottawa, effective April 11, 1956.
- Mr. G. L. Hearn posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Lima, effective April 16, 1956.
- Mr. C. M. Bedard posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Los Angeles, effective April 18, 1956.
- Mr. F. Clarke posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, effective April 27, 1956.
- Mr. C. J. Woodsworth appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer 5, effective April 3, 1956.
- Mr. C. J. Webster appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer 3, effective April 3, 1956.
- Mr. H. B. Singleton appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Junior Administrative Officer, effective April 9, 1956.
- Mr. M. E. Grant appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 7, effective March 29, 1956.



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- | | |
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| <p>No. 56/11—<i>Defence and the North</i>, an address by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, to the Empire Club of Toronto, April 12, 1956.</p> | <p>dress by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Holy Blossom Temple Brotherhood, Toronto, February 20, 1956.</p> |
| <p>No. 56/12—<i>Recent Developments in the Soviet Union Affecting East-West Relations</i>, excerpts from a statement made on April 12, 1956 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Standing Committee of External Affairs.</p> | <p>No. 56/14—<i>Some Aspects of Canadian-American Relations</i>, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Club, Montreal, April 27, 1956.</p> |
| <p>No. 56/13—<i>Brotherhood Between Nations — The Colombo Plan</i>, excerpts from an ad-</p> | <p>No. 56/15—<i>The Atlantic Community</i>, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the English Speaking Union, London, England, April 30, 1956.</p> |

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Statute and Rules. AT/11. N.Y., January 1956. 14 p. (booklet). Sales No.: 1956.XI.1.

United Nations Conference on Olive Oil, 1955. Summary of Proceedings. E/CONF. 19/5. December 1955. 29 p. Sales No.: 1956.II.D.1.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1955. E/ECE/ 235. Geneva, February 1956. 247 p. and Appendices A,B,C. \$2.50. Sales No.: 1956.II.E.2.

Demographic Yearbook 1955 (Seventh Issue). New York, 1955. 781 p. (bilingual). \$7.00. Sales No.: 1955.XIII.6.

Regulations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. JSPB/G.4/Rev. 1. U.N. 1956. 20 p. (booklet).

Age and Sex patterns of Mortality. Model life-tables for under-developed countries. ST/SOA/Series A/22. U.N., December 1955. 38 p. Sales No.: 1955.XIII.9.

Manuals on Methods of Estimating Population. Manual II: Methods of appraisal of quality of basic data for population estimates. ST/SOA/Series A/23. N.Y., October 1955. 67 p. Sales No.: 1956.XIII.2.

International Court of Justice

Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952 (United States of America v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Order of March 14, 1956. 6 p. Sales No. 145.

Aerial Incident of March 10, 1953 (United States of America v. Czechoslovakia). Order of March 14, 1956. 6 p. Sales No. 144.

Antarctica Case (United Kingdom v. Argentina). Order of March 16, 1956. 6 p. Sales No. 146.

Antarctica Case (United Kingdom v. Chile). Order of March 16, 1956. 6 p. Sales No. 147.

Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) Order of March 13, 1956. 5 p. Sales No. 143.

International Labour Organization

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa 2, Canada.)

International Labour Conference, Thirty-ninth Session, Geneva, 1956:

Report I—Report of the Director-General. Geneva, 1956. 130 p.

Report II—Financial and Budgetary Questions. Geneva, 1956. 82 p.

UNESCO

Report of the Director-General on the activities of the Organization in 1955. Paris 1956. 215 p. \$3.50.

Compulsory Education in the Arab States. (Studies on compulsory education — XVI) Paris 1956. 83 p. \$1.00.

The teaching of the social sciences in India. (Teaching in the social sciences) Paris 1956. 197 p. \$2.50.

World Health Organization

Executive Board, Seventeenth Session, Geneva, 17 January-2 February 1956: PART I—Resolutions. Annexes. Geneva, March 1956. 182 p. Official Records of the WHO, No. 68.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries:

(a) *Survey of Current Work on Industrialization and Productivity.* E/2816. 2 March 1956. 106 p. Appendix, 45 p.

(b) *Proposals for a Programme of Work on Industrialization and Productivity.* E/2832. 17 March 1956. 47 p. Annex, 20 p.

Teaching of the purposes and principles, the structure and activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in schools and educational institutions of Member States (Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of UNESCO). E/2837. 16 March 1956. 76 p.

WHO—Executive Board, Seventeenth Session, Geneva, 17 January-2 February 1956. MINUTES. Geneva, March 1956. 516 p.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, or from the sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; Magasin des Etudiants de l'Université de Montréal, Montréal. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1956, p. 73.

GENERAL ELECTION IN CEYLON

(Continued from page 118)

The new Parliament was opened by the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, on April 20. The Speech from the Throne indicated that Ceylon would not join in alliances with any power blocs and confirmed that the position of the British naval and air bases on the island would be reviewed. Proposed internal measures were to include nationalization of transport, extension of social services, and encouragement of agriculture. Legislation would, as forecast, be introduced to declare Ceylon a republic and to make Sinhalese the official language of the state. Later, Cabinet decided that the Colombo Plan Exhibition, originally scheduled to take place early in 1957, has been indefinitely postponed.



INAUGURATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL

The Minister of Public Works, Mr. Robert H. Winters, left, and the former Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Sydney D. Pierce at the inauguration of the new President of Brazil, His Excellency Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira. Mr. Winters was designated as Special Ambassador for the inauguration ceremonies.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1956.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Visit of Indonesia's President to Ottawa

HIS Excellency Dr. Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, arrived in Ottawa on June 4 following a visit to Washington and other centres in the United States. President Sukarno was greeted at Uplands Airport by the Governor General, the Prime Minister, members of the Diplomatic Corps and other dignitaries and officials; included in the Presidential Party were the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ruslan Abdulgani, Members of the Indonesian Parliament and the Chief Justice of Indonesia.

During his two days in Ottawa, President Sukarno was a guest of the Governor General at Government House where he also attended a dinner and reception given in his honour by Mr. Massey. Included in his Ottawa programme were an address to a special joint session of the Senate and House of Commons, visits to the National Research Council, the RCMP Barracks at Rockcliffe and the Indonesian Embassy. Dr. Sukarno also laid a wreath on the National War Memorial and was host at a dinner and reception at the Royal Ottawa Golf Club. On June 6 the Presidential Party left Ottawa for Chalk River, Arvida, Quebec City and Montreal, where on June 8 an honorary degree was conferred on Dr. Sukarno by McGill University. The following day the Presidential Party left Dorval Airport for Rome.

Dr. Sukarno's Address

The text of Dr. Sukarno's address to Parliament is reproduced below.

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity of addressing the distinguished Parliament of this great country. I am also deeply grateful for the invitation which has brought myself and your other Indonesian guests to these hospitable shores.

In one very important sense Canada and Indonesia are neighbours. Your country is both an Atlantic Power and a Pacific Power, and travelling west from your shores the Republic of Indonesia is a neighbour of yours. Nothing is more important than knowing one's neighbours; that is one more reason why I was so glad to receive this invitation to visit you.

I feel that there is a close link between Canada and Indonesia. Both of these countries are on the verge of a great new period of development, and I am firmly convinced that the future of both countries will bring increased prosperity and increased happiness for all mankind.

Perhaps there is another link between us. In terms of history it is not so very long since Canada released herself from colonial bonds. If I am not mistaken, the uprisings in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada in 1837 did not immediately bring national independence, but they did bring a new political constellation, which led directly to the granting of responsible government to those colonies we now know as Canada. That new political constellation was a direct ancestor of the British North American Act which even today serves, with its amendments, as your constitution.



—NFB

PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA ADDRESSES CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

A highlight of the busy programme during the first visit to Canada of President Sukarno of Indonesia was his address to both houses of the Canadian Parliament at Ottawa. The above photo was taken in the House of Commons during President Sukarno's address.

With us it was different. My nation still had almost one hundred years of colonialism to undergo after the Canadian people had assumed the mantle of nationhood. Our independence did not come smoothly, but it came eventually as a result of war, of enemy occupation, of revolution, and most important, of a national struggle lasting decades. But now that great struggle is partly over. The Republic of Indonesia has joined the family of nations and seeks to play a full part in the joint tasks and joint responsibilities of that family.

Standing before the members of this parliament and before you, my thoughts inevitably fly to the far-flung homes of the Canadian people who have chosen you as their representatives and who have handed to you the responsibilities of government. I would like to convey to those people, spread over this vast country, the most sincere greetings from myself, from members of my party, and from the Indonesian people. Further, I wish to convey to you the most grateful and heartfelt thanks of the Indonesian people for your assistance in the past, and our hope that this visit will lead to even closer relations in the future. It would not be surprising if even closer relations should develop between neighbours, even though they are separated by the thousands of miles' expanse of the Pacific Ocean.

Mr. Speaker, allow me to say a few words to the French-Canadian members,—*permettez-moi de m'adresser aux membres canadiens-français. Je me sens vraiment privilégié en tant que premier citoyen de mon pays de vous transmettre avant tout les vœux les plus sincères et cordiaux du peuple indonésien*

que j'ai l'honneur de représenter ici. Ce sont les vœux d'un peuple ami dont les idéaux et les intérêts sont presque identiques aux vôtres. Cette similarité est bien logique étant donné que les racines des civilisations dans tous les pays démocratiques sont en principe les mêmes.

De plus, je profite de l'occasion qui m'est offerte aujourd'hui—unique dans notre histoire—pour vous remercier de l'accueil chaleureux que vous m'avez accordé.

Mr. Speaker, it is obviously true that the land, the climate and the people are the basic elements for the making of any nation. The future of that nation depends greatly upon what is done with the land and its resources. The political future of the nation depends, it is clear, upon the organized strength of the nation, and the social and cultural development of the nation can be measured only by the people's victory over their environment.

Indonesia's Natural Wealth

Like Canada, Indonesia is a vast country. We have more than 3,000 inhabited islands and our archipelago runs from Malaya to the north of Australia. It is a vast country of eighty-two million people and,—I do not say this in any boastful spirit,—it is today the third largest democracy in the world. Our nation is young in this modern world of ours, but it does not enter the family of nations empty-handed. I know that Canada is just beginning to exploit the great wealth bestowed by God upon this country: we of Indonesia are in the same position. The difference between us is that Canada's great natural wealth could not be exploited until science and technology had reached their present level. Indonesia's natural wealth could have been exploited—to the benefit of humanity—long ago. But we laboured under colonialism.

Now we can see no limit to the possibilities of development. It is no exaggeration to say that even we of Indonesia do not know the wealth of our country. It is no exaggeration to say that many of the islands composing our archipelago have hardly been explored, let alone exploited. When modern technology and modern science are devoted to the task of extracting the maximum from those islands, then I say with no fear of contradiction that Indonesia will contribute very, very greatly to the material well-being of this inter-dependent world of ours.

Furthermore, it is my belief that Indonesia and the other newly reborn countries of Asia and Africa have other gifts to bring to the world. I would like to quote to you a passage—a very short passage, but a very important passage—from a booklet distributed by the Canadian Government. This booklet was distributed three years ago throughout the countries of South-East Asia, and, speaking of Asia, it stated that: "Although we may have something to give and to teach, we have also much to receive and to learn. In this vast country of ours, we have found out how we may live and prosper, but from the east, with its ancient cultures, we have much to learn of the abiding things that bring comfort and delight to the mind and heart."

Mr. Speaker, that may well be true. What is equally true is that from the east also can come great material benefit, material benefit for all countries, material benefit both for the west and the east, material benefit for the whole world!

I know that it is a truism to talk of the inter-dependence of nations; I know that almost every speaker today refers to this, but it is sometimes difficult to appreciate just what it means in cold reality. The Government of Canada has obviously a real understanding of the position: this is shown clearly by the fact

that each year Canada contributes more than twenty-five million dollars to the Colombo Plan. As the representative of a country, and as the representative of a nation benefiting from the aid, I know what the Colombo Plan means, and please believe me, I express the gratitude of my people for this example of the brotherhood of nations and the interdependence of mankind.

We are indeed grateful for all assistance which comes to us, from whatever quarter of the globe it may come. We struggled long for our national identity. We love that national identity, we hold that national identity dear as life itself. We aim, therefore, above all things, to maintain and preserve that national identity. I assure you in all seriousness: nothing will ever take that from us. No hope or promise of quick reward will persuade us to barter one scrap of our independence, for to us that independence, that national independence, is more precious than any other thing in this world.

Nationalism in Asia and Africa

When I first set foot in the United States, I expressed my hope of observing America, amongst other things, as a state of mind. It is important that Asia and Africa be seen as a state of mind. And what is that Asian and African state of mind? Essentially it is the determination that the nations of Asia and Africa develop their own national reality. I use the word "reality" advisedly, because a nation is a reality.

Who could doubt that, after observing the post-war world? In particular, perhaps, who could doubt that after observing the Asian and African Conference which was held in Bandung a year ago? That great and historic meeting of twenty-nine States showed clearly the path of history in this post-war and troubled world. Representatives of more than half mankind, pre-representatives of one billion six hundred million people, met together in one of Indonesia's mountain cities, and discussed problems common to them all.

Those national representatives of Asia and Africa discussed the basic problem of where their nations stood in this modern world. I know that it is not necessary for me to tell you of the result of that Conference. You know that a long and all-embracing resolution was unanimously adopted. That result answered the basic question of where those nations stood. It answered the question of what the peoples of Asia and Africa sought and desired. Those assembled representatives of the majority of mankind clearly expressed their opposition to colonialism in all its forms, that is a basic fact in the mid-twentieth century.

Above all things, this is the period of Asian and African nationalism. This is the era when the old conditions, the old and hated pattern of world society is undone. Who can be surprised by the fact that colonialism, whatever form it assumes, whatever mask it may hide behind, however it may disguise itself, is indeed a hateful and disgusting thing? I will tell you this: colonialism left Indonesia with a heritage of illiteracy, a heritage of human sickness, of human ignorance, of human degradation, which was a disgrace and a menace to the twentieth century. We had the highest illiteracy rate in the world. We had the highest mortality rate in the world. We had the lowest living standard in the world: one "gobang" a day, two and a half guilder-cents a day—not even one dollar-cent a day. Our country was rich, but its wealth did not serve to alleviate the misery and ignorance of our people. Having achieved independence, we still feel the consequence of three hundred and fifty years of colonialism. And those consequences are not light ones.

Illiteracy, sickness which science has long known how to control, technical backwardness, great social inequality, great economic backwardness, were our

inheritance, but under a national Government, under a Government dedicated to the uplifting and progress of our people, these things are not insupportable or unchangeable.

Proud of Nation's Progress

Just eleven years ago almost all of our people were illiterate; today less than half of our people are illiterate. Perhaps it may seem that I am boasting. I do not intend to boast, but I am immensely proud of the achievement in this field, and I am immensely proud of our national progress in other fields. We a nation previously numbered amongst the voiceless and the unconsidered in the world, a nation previously numbered amongst the unregarded, we have, for example, but recently completed, to our great satisfaction, the very first general elections in our country. This is a considerable achievement, and I am proud of it. I am proud of it because it shows a degree of political progress which could hardly have been expected of a nation which, only eleven years ago, was not even considered by the world.

We elected, under conditions of universal suffrage and secret ballot, a Parliament and a Constituent Assembly. Although I know well that those things alone are not a guarantee of democracy, I know equally well that without those things democracy cannot exist. We have chosen, and chosen after proper consideration, the democratic path to national fulfilment and national emancipation. We have chosen the path of Pantja Sila, the five principles of our State. They are: Belief in God; Nationalism; Humanitarianism; Democracy, and, last of all, Social Justice. It is our belief that this path will lead us most rapidly to the full and useful life which every nation ought to contribute and enjoy in our present-day world.

We all know that there is more than one road to participation in the world's affairs. We have chosen this Pantja Sila road. It is our sincere hope, our most sincere hope, that it will lead to success.

An Independent Foreign Policy

I am told that people are sometimes surprised at our attitude towards certain international problems in the world. We do not automatically accept the views of any group of people. We do not join in any military organization. We intend to be ourselves. It is true, it is very true, that we are enthusiastic members of the United Nations, and we see in the United Nations the faint outlines of a future world organization. We call our foreign policy not a "neutral" foreign policy; we call our foreign policy "independent" and "active". We call it so, because we take an independent line in accordance with what we see as the best interests of the world and our own nation, and we act upon that.

One of the draftsmen of Canada's greatness, Sir Wilfred Laurier, said in the year 1900: "I claim for Canada this: that in future Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act." In those words that great Prime Minister, that architect of the future, summed up the foreign policy which we of Indonesia choose to follow today.

We seek to follow a policy which will give the greatest benefit to all mankind, and if that foreign policy should sometimes run counter to what you believe and act upon, believe me when I say that what we do, and how we vote, is dictated by our ideals, and not by any spirit of opposition.

Yes, we are separated, as I said, by the Pacific Ocean. But we are also joined by the Pacific Ocean! We are neighbours, and nothing is more important than that neighbours should understand each other. I have not come to your vast country to negotiate any treaty. I have come with the hope that this short



—NFB

DR. SUKARNO VISITS OTTAWA

During his stay in Ottawa, on his first visit to Canada, Dr. Sukarno of Indonesia visited the Parliament Building, where he addressed Members of Parliament and Senators in the House of Commons Chamber. Above, he is shown with the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent (centre), during his call on Mr. L. Rene Beaudoin, Speaker of the House of Commons.

visit of mine will lead to a better understanding between our nations. If this should be so I will be content. You have a great future with your neighbour and friend to the south, the United States of America, that vast country which I so recently visited. There is a saying that "an unseen frontier of friendship" exists between Canada and the United States. It is my prayer that between us of Indonesia and this country of Canada a similar frontier of friendship may develop and grow strong.

Again I say: If our foreign policy should sometimes run counter to what you believe in or act upon, it is dictated by our ideals and not by a spirit of opposition. So let our friendship be strong.

Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen: I beg you, do not under-estimate the force of the nationalist torrent which is today pouring over Asia and Africa. It is

a mighty torrent, and one thing is certain: we are in the midst of an historical change which is vital for the whole future of mankind. It is a nationalist torrent, and that torrent is not directed against anyone or any nation. It is a torrent whose object is the greater freedom, the greater liberation, of mankind. I say this in all seriousness: any attempt to stand against that torrent will be vain, just as every attempt ever undertaken to stand against an historical process has been vain. This torrent is directed only against the outworn principle of colonialism. You may call it a destructive torrent, but it is one which is destructive only of colonialism, and one which will lead to a greater and wider horizon of freedom for all men everywhere and in every country. In the framework of history it is constructive and progressive.

Today most of my own country is free, most of my own nation is enjoying the fruit of independence, but to our sorrow and continued dissatisfaction a part of our nation and country still suffers under colonialism, that plague on mankind's fulfilment. West Irian—perhaps you know it better as West New Guinea—is still unfree. Until West Irian is rejoined to the rest of my country, Indonesia will feel herself incomplete and insecure. There can be no question that West Irian is part of Indonesia, and indeed until 1950 no one in the world would have dreamed of denying that fact. Until we are united with our still unfree brethren, we of Indonesia will never be content, because we know just what colonialism means in terms of human unhappiness, in terms of human misery and human degradation.

In this world of ours, troubled and uneasy though it is, there is still much success and many gains for the peace and security of men. Whatever we have gained has been won because man's understanding of other men as brothers has increased.

This is essential. Mankind the world over is basically the same whatever culture or ideological details may appear to divide him. Understanding and sympathy are necessary. Active understanding and active sympathy will help relieve the strains and tensions in the world. This is really my message to you. Give us your understanding and your sympathy. Give us, if you can, your active understanding and your active sympathy. If you do that, and if we of Asia and Africa retain that active sympathy and understanding, then the future of the world can indeed be bright.

Yes, mankind is basically the same, whatever racial or ideological details may appear to divide him. Why should mankind divide himself? Look, Indonesia is a country with many religions and many faiths. We have in Indonesia Moslems, we have Christians, we have Civa-Buddhists, we have peoples with other creeds. We have many ethnic units, such as Javanese, Achenese, Balinese, Madurese, Sundanese etc. But thank God, we have our will to unity.

We try to practice our State motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika", which means "Unity in Diversity". We are tolerant to each other, we are one nation. One of the most remarkable phenomena in modern history is that we of Indonesia, although living on three thousand islands, are united in one nation, without pressure, without compulsion, without civil war.

What, then is our unifying force? It is the will to unity, it is "le désir d'être ensemble", instead of suspecting each other, dominating each other, threatening each other and colonising each other—living at each other's expense.

We of Indonesia try to practice "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" amongst ourselves. Let us try to practice "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" amongst nations.

Then, only then, can we look up again to the stars, and say: "Thank God, for You have given us this world, and we have lived according to Your Word."

The Baghdad Pact

THE Baghdad Pact is a regional defensive grouping of four Middle Eastern powers—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan—allied for this purpose with the United Kingdom. It came into being on February 24, 1955, with the signing of a "Pact of Mutual Co-operation" between Iraq and Turkey, in Baghdad. The agreement provided that the signatories would co-operate for their security and defence. It was declared to be "open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace of this region"; and under this clause, the United Kingdom formally acceded to the alliance in April 1955, followed by Pakistan in July and Iran last November.

Although Canada is not directly involved in the affairs of the Baghdad Pact, we have a natural interest in any defensive grouping of friendly countries. Moreover, with two of the Pact's members—the United Kingdom and Pakistan—we have Commonwealth affiliations, and there are also our North Atlantic Treaty ties with the United Kingdom and Turkey.

The Baghdad Pact has been criticized on the grounds that it is a sketchy defensive structure and that it exerts a divisive influence in the Middle East, since most of the Arab states, including Egypt, have not joined it. On the other hand, it represents a concrete stand against aggression and subversion; and furthermore, its increasing emphasis on economic assistance is not confined to members of the Pact but is directed towards the general area.

Development of the Pact

The alliance had its origin in the efforts of the veteran Iraqi statesman, Nuri el Said, to "make Iraq's co-operation with foreign countries conform to the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, under which relations of all sovereign countries are organized for the safeguarding of world peace." During the closing months of 1954, Nuri held discussions with Colonel Nasser in Cairo and with Turkish leaders in Istanbul on the possibility of establishing a collective defence for the Middle East. He also visited the United Kingdom. His theme in these talks was that the Arab countries were not strong enough to remain strictly neutral between the Eastern and Western blocs, that they could not collaborate with Communist countries; but that they could collaborate harmoniously with the West if satisfactory solutions to the problems of Suez and Palestine could be found.

Nuri al Said's approach met with a favourable response from Turkey, which had already displayed interest in a regional defence arrangement by the signature of a mutual co-operation and defence pact with Pakistan in April 1954. Accordingly the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey, subsequently to be re-christened "the Baghdad Pact," was concluded on February 24, 1955.

In addition to the terms already mentioned, the agreement specified that a permanent Ministerial Council of the Pact was to be set up as soon as it had at least four members. An exchange of letters between Iraq and Turkey at the time of the signing placed on record their understanding that the treaty meant they would jointly resist aggression directed against either of them; and also



that, "to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East Region," they would seek the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.

Soviet Reaction

Following the accession of the United Kingdom and Pakistan, it remained for Iran to complete geographically the "northern tier" concept of Middle Eastern defence, with her accession to the Pact early in November. The United States welcomed Iran's accession as "a normal development which should promote peace, stability and well-being in the area." However, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union greeted the event with a vigorous denunciation of the Baghdad Pact, describing it as "a military alignment which is a tool of certain aggressive circles that are not interested in the strengthening of peace and international security." Mr. Molotov also declared that the Pact had for its objective the retention and restoration of the colonial dependence of the countries of the area. Iran's accession, he said, was incompatible with the interests of strengthening peace and security, and was in contradiction with her "good-neighbourly relations" with the Soviet Union.



The Iranian note in reply to this initial Soviet Union attack on her adherence to the Pact was polite but firm. The Baghdad Pact, it stated, was concluded with due regard for the principles of the United Nations, and Iran's accession to it had no object but self-defence. As for Mr. Molotov's reference to restoration of colonialism in the Middle East, the note pointed out that anti-colonialism was a cardinal feature of Iran's foreign policy. Her adherence to the Pact, it continued, need not mar her "friendly relations and good neighbourliness" with the Soviet Union, and did not conflict in any way with the terms of existing agreements between the two powers.

The Soviet Union since has made several further protests against Iran's adherence to the alliance, and the Iranian replies have continued to emphasize the peaceful aims of the Pact.

The accession of Pakistan had brought into operation the article in the Pact under which a Council at Ministerial level was to be established when at least four powers had joined. The inaugural meeting of the Council was held in Baghdad on November 21 and 22, 1955, under the chairmanship of Nuri el Said. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey were represented by their Prime Ministers, and the United Kingdom by her Foreign Secretary, Mr. Harold Macmillan.

The United States had accepted an invitation to take part in the proceedings as an observer and was represented on the Council by her Ambassador in Baghdad. A United States service representative also sat with the Military Committee. The communique issued at the close of the meeting expressed the appreciation of the Pact members for the steps taken by the United States to establish permanent political and military liaison with the Council, and to keep in touch with its economic activities.

Economic Co-operation

A feature of the first Council meeting was the emphasis laid upon economic co-operation. It was decided that an Economic Committee should be set up, to develop and strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region. In particular it was to consider ways of sharing experience in the field of development, and of discussing common problems on a regional basis with the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other Specialized Agencies. The Council viewed with satisfaction the practical economic progress which had been made already, noting for example that the United Kingdom had decided to assist Iraq by helping her build up a £5 million gold reserve during the next two years, and by other forms of economic co-operation. The United Kingdom also offered, at the Baghdad meeting, to assist Baghdad Pact countries in the application of atomic techniques with special reference to local and regional problems." It was made clear that this assistance would involve only peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Council welcomed the United Kingdom offer, and directed the Economic Committee to consider its practical application.

The formative meeting of the Economic Committee was held on January 10 and 11, 1956, in Baghdad, and was attended by United States observers as well as representatives of member states. It was agreed that special studies should be made on a number of subjects, including trade relations, communications, agriculture, joint development projects, technical education and health. The Committee decided to propose the establishment, with British assistance, of an atomic energy training centre at Baghdad for the benefit of all member countries.

The report of the Economic Committee was adopted "for implementation without delay," at the second meeting of the Ministerial Council, which was held in Tehran last April. The meeting again stressed the economic objectives of the Pact. The Council decided to set up a Working Party to consider means whereby regional economic projects of interest to two or more members could be studied, and implemented through economic and technical assistance. The United States delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed his country's intention to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to Pact members and indicated that the United States would consider ways to assist joint projects undertaken by member countries.

At the same time it was observed that the basic objectives of international communism had not changed, and that efforts to strengthen the defensive capacity of the Pact powers could not be relaxed.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Ministerial Council should be held in Karachi in January 1957. Actually the Council is deemed to be in continuous session, and each member Government maintains a deputy representa-

tive to it with ambassadorial rank. A permanent secretariat is established in Baghdad.

Future of the Pact

Mr. Harold Macmillan commented on the future of the Baghdad Pact in a statement delivered last December 12 in the United Kingdom House of Commons. The Pact, he said, was not intended to act as a divisive influence in the Arab world, and in the long run can be hoped to unite it, when "countries who now seem doubtful, or even antipathetic, may be willing to associate themselves with us and our friends." The alliance, he continued, refutes the Soviet Union's propaganda assertion that there was an inherent divergence of interest and motive between Western and Asian peoples; for it constituted "an equal and loyal partnership between Great Britain, with the United States as her associate, and four great Eastern powers—Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq."

Sir Anthony Eden took up the same point. It was unique of the Baghdad Pact, he declared, that it has brought a western nation to the conference table with several eastern nations, trying to work out not only military problems, but "much more important still in this context," economic problems which might alter the whole future of the area. Perhaps it is this final point which suggests the highest hope that may be entertained for the Pact's future—that through its economic provisions, extended in due course to other countries as well as its present members, it may contribute to and enhance the well-being of the whole Middle Eastern region.



CANADIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR LEBANESE EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS

Officials of the Lebanese Government, the Lebanese Red Cross, and the Canadian Legation were on hand at Beirut airport recently for the arrival of an RCAF transport plane carrying relief supplies for earthquake victims. The shipment, which was part of the \$25,000 contribution made by the Government of Canada through the Canadian Red Cross Society for earthquake relief in Lebanon, also included some of the \$10,000 worth of medical supplies provided by the Canadian Junior Red Cross. Above, the supplies are unloaded from the aircraft.

Canada and the United Nations

Economic and Social Council: 21st Session

This year, after a three-year absence, Canada re-occupied a seat on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for a third three-year term. At the Council's twenty-first session, held at headquarters in New York from April 17 to May 4, Canada was represented by a delegation headed by Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, and including Dr. O. J. Firestone, Economic Adviser, Department of Trade and Commerce; Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Department of External Affairs; and Mr. W. H. Miller, Director, Surveys and Mapping Branch, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.

Mr. Hans Engen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations, was unanimously elected President for 1956, with Dr. José Vicente Trujillo, Permanent Representative of Ecuador, and Mr. Said Hasan, Permanent Representative of Pakistan, as Vice-Presidents. (The two Vice-Presidents acted as Chairmen of the Social and Economic Committees of the whole).

The session was businesslike and the atmosphere, for the most part, cordial. Basic differences between Communist and non-Communist states nevertheless came to light in the debate on forced labour and on two occasions when the wording of "members of the United Nations and/or of the Specialized Agencies" in regard to conventions and invitations to conferences was challenged by the U.S.S.R. as being too restrictive. It was noted that all Soviet bloc countries emphasized two themes: the possibilities for fruitful trade with under-developed countries; and the value of regional economic commissions and inter-regional co-operation.

In addition to representation by various specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, observers were present from Australia, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, the Philippines, Poland, Venezuela and from three new members of the United Nations, Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. The latter three did not fail to find occasion to make statements in plenary session.

Energy Sources and Economic Development

Useful ground work was done on three aspects of power production in relation to economic development, namely water resources, the application to economic development of atomic energy, and other new sources of energy. Although this was the first session in which Canada had participated since 1952, the Canadian Delegation played an active role, particularly on the items dealing with industrial development and the improvement of industrial productivity, international co-operation on cartography, the United Nations Children's Fund, and international co-operation with respect to water resource development.

Both in committee (with Dr. Firestone as Rapporteur of the Working Group) and in plenary, the Delegation contributed substantially to the drafting



—United Nations

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL MEETS

Dr. R. A. Mackay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, left, and Mr. Christain X. Palamas, Permanent Representative of Greece, at the 21st Session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

of a resolution on industrialization which was unanimously adopted. It requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council at its twenty-second session his views on the most suitable organizational arrangement to deal with matters relating to industrialization, and a report on the financial and other implications of the work going forward in this field. It also provided for special attention to be given to the needs of the Middle East and Africa.

Unanimous approval was given to a resolution jointly sponsored by Canada and Ecuador providing for the convening in Tokyo of a second regional cartographic conference for Asia and the Far East in 1958 and the establishing of cartographic committees under the regional economic commissions, as desired by the countries concerned. The resolution was further designed to assist the production of base maps for the location and exploitation of natural resources in less developed areas, to further the establishment of a universal system of writing geographic names, and to produce a universally acceptable set of specifications for the one-millionth map.

The Delegation co-sponsored a resolution, which was adopted unanimously, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare for the twenty-fourth session of the Council a report on the experience and studies available on atomic energy as a factor in economic development. The resolution also called for consultation with the United Nations Advisory Committee concerned with a second inter-

national conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy with a view to determining whether this conference could devote attention to the practical application of atomic energy to economic development, or whether a special conference should be convened.

A French resolution, also unanimously adopted, requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council at its twenty-fourth session on the prospects for practical utilization of energy developed from the sun, wind, and tides, and of geothermal and thermal energy of the sea, and conditions for convening an international conference.

The Council noted with approval the annual reports of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The Canadian Delegation voted for a French-United States resolution urging the Secretary-General and the Specialized Agencies to continue consultations on water resource development, calling the attention of governments to the importance of de-mineralization of saline waters, and providing for the establishment of a panel of experts for reviewing the implications of river basin development. The Delegation abstained on a Netherlands amendment envisaging an international conference on river basin development. It was however adopted by the Council. Two Canadian suggestions were incorporated in this resolution, one emphasizing the need for co-ordination between the Specialized Agencies and the Secretary-General, and the other facilitating unanimous approval of the resolution by the inclusion of points of substance advanced by the Pakistan Delegation.

Need for Co-ordination

In its statement on the above items, the Canadian Delegation drew special attention to the need for co-ordination among the Specialized Agencies and the United Nations and for an increased use of facilities made available through the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.

A resolution on the item "Teaching of the purposes and principles, the structure and activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in schools and other educational institutions of member states" was adopted unanimously by the Council. It took note of the Secretary-General's report and requested him, in collaboration with the Director-General of UNESCO, to compile a similar report, based on enquiries to member states, for consideration by the Council at its twenty-ninth session.

The Council, in considering the applications of a number of non-governmental organizations for consultative status with ECOSOC, accepted the recommendation of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations and rejected an application for re-instatement of the Women's International Democratic Federation, a Communist-dominated organization which had made propaganda against the United Nations in the Korean War.

The Council adopted a resolution recommending that governments ratify promptly the 1949 United Nations Convention on Road Traffic and that they continue for three more years to recognize as valid those driving permits that conform with provisions of the two earlier conventions on international traffic. The Canadian Delegation abstained on this resolution.



—United Nations

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SUNFED MEETS

Members of the General Assembly's sixteen-member Committee on a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) confer prior to recent meetings at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Above, left to right: Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, Canada; Mr. J. G. Hadwen, Department of External Affairs; Mr. Hans Singer, United Nations Bureau of Economic Affairs, Committee Secretary; Dr. M. A. Anis, Egypt; and Mr. Ali Yavar Jung, Chairman of the Committee.

The Canadian Delegation abstained on a resolution approved by the Council which, on the grounds that there was at present not enough support throughout the world to justify adoption of a new world calendar, adjourned *sine die* consideration of the reform of the Gregorian Calendar.

Social and Humanitarian Questions

The Delegation voted for a resolution on advisory services in the field of human rights approving plans for a two-week seminar for news personnel which will be held this summer in Geneva in conjunction with the twenty-second session of the Council and will give "due emphasis to the promotion of freedom of information". The programme of advisory services provides further for assistance in improving the status of women, preventing discrimination and protecting minorities and generally for advice on human rights problems. The Secretary-General is to report on developments under this programme to the Council at its twenty-third session.

The Council approved a resolution calling for a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva this summer to complete the drafting of a supplementary

convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery, and to open it for signature. After making the necessary reservation with respect to Canada's federal constitution, the Canadian Delegation voted for this resolution and joined with the majority in voting down a proposal that the convention be referred in the first instance to the General Assembly.

The Canadian Delegation abstained on a resolution approved by the Council which provided for a conference of plenipotentiaries to conclude a convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The Conference was held this month and Canada was represented by an observer.

The Council adopted, with three abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, and U.S.S.R.) two resolutions jointly sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada which recommended to the General Assembly that it amend its resolution of 1950 in order to release the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency from the obligation of submitting a report to the Council. The activities of the Agency will continue to be under review by the Advisory Committee and by the General Assembly itself.

Children's Fund

The Council noted favourably the report submitted by the Chairman of the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and approved unanimously a resolution jointly sponsored by Canada and France providing for the divorcing of the Executive Board of the Children's Fund from the Social Commission and for the direct election to the Board of all its twenty-six members. Eighteen of these had previously sat on the Board by virtue of their membership on the Social Commission.

In the elections to the functional commissions of the Council, Canada was re-elected to the Population Commission by a unanimous vote. While we were not standing for election to the Commission on the Status of Women until 1957, Canada was given two write-in votes. Canada is at present a member, in addition to the Population Commission, of the Statistical Commission (second year of term) and the Executive Board of UNICEF.

The three new members of the United Nations most interested in election to the functional commissions all obtained one seat—Austria (Narcotic Drugs), Italy (Human Rights), and Spain (Social Commission). Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary were also elected respectively to the Transport and Communications Commission, the Statistical Commission, and the Narcotic Drug Commission.

The question of the expansion of the Economic and Social Council and the membership of its functional commissions as a result of the increase in United Nations membership was not raised officially during the session.

Tunisia

All Delegations welcomed Tunisia to the confraternity of sovereign nations and the Council approved unanimously a French resolution informing UNESCO that it had no objection to the admission of Tunisia to this Specialized Agency.

The Council concluded its twenty-first session by approving the provisional agenda for its twenty-second session to be held in Geneva from July 9 to August 10. Two sub-items relating to land reform and to co-operatives were transferred to the agenda of the twenty-third session next spring. Two items, the election of members to the Commission on International Commodity Trade and a portion of the item on Industrialization, were added to the agenda of the twenty-second session, and the election of members to the Executive Board of UNICEF was added to the agenda of the resumed twenty-second session to be held during the eleventh session of the General Assembly this winter.



BRAZIL'S VICE-PRESIDENT VISITS OTTAWA

On May 10 and 11 Joao Belchior Marques Goulart, Vice-President of the United States of Brazil, and Madam Goulart paid a visit to Ottawa. Members of the Vice-Presidential party included Mr. Joao Lima Teixeira, Leader of the Brazilian Labour party in the Senate, and Mr. Roberto Silveira, Vice-Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro.

During his stay in Ottawa Vice-President Goulart paid calls on Governor General Vincent Massey and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent; he also held talks with Mr. Milton Gregg, V.C., Minister of Labour, and Mr. R. H. Winters, Minister of Public Works. On May 10 Mr. Goulart was guest of honour at a dinner at the Country Club with Mr. Winters as host, and on the following day attended a luncheon given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson. On the evening of May 11 Vice-President Goulart was guest of honour at a dinner given by the Ambassador of Brazil, His Excellency Afranio De Mello-Franco; a reception followed the dinner.

The Colombo Plan: A Progress Report

On May 3 the Administrator, International Economic and Technical Co-operation Division, Department of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Nik Cavell, reported to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, House of Commons, on Canada's Colombo Plan participation as follows:

At my appearance before you last year I told you that generally speaking our aid programme to South-East Asia was going forward in a satisfactory way. I put before you the efforts the various countries of that area were making to help themselves. Actually something between 85 and 90 per cent of their total development effort is being borne by these countries, poor as they are, and you will perhaps remember that I outlined to you some of the assistance we were giving to help them to better themselves. I told you then that in this endeavour we had inaugurated 38 projects and that a number of others were under discussion. The total number of our capital projects, large and small, has now mounted to 60, in addition to which there is a certain amount of equipment which has been provided under technical co-operation in an endeavour to make our experts in the field under the technical co-operation programme more efficient and therefore more productive.

* * * *

Technical Assistance

I would like to start first with the Technical Co-operation programme. Last year when I was before you I talked about our work in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, but you will remember that we received an extra million dollars last year which was to be spent on technical assistance in the new countries which had joined the Colombo Plan but had received no assistance from Canada. These were Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina . . .

I would like to point out that we are training young people and we are bringing them here in increasing numbers and exposing them to our democratic way of life. We do all we can for them and send them back, but it will be some years before we can evaluate their usefulness, and more and more we realize that they are exactly like our own young people—some are brilliant, some do an average job and a small percentage are failures. But all the time I feel we are adding slowly but surely to the technical skills, agricultural, medical and other knowledge which these countries must have if they are to better the lot of their people. After residence with us here in a free and democratic society which has raised the standards of its own people to about the highest in the world, they certainly go back with a very different point of view from that which they hold when they arrive. We hope that their influence will be very considerable for at least 20 years to come, which will be their average working life.

Our greatest difficulty is to find the fields in which we can best help. To aid us in this we send our research missions composed of the best men we can find in their field, or in some cases we send individuals who have had teaching or technical experience here in Canada, and they go to one or two countries

and try to discover for us in what area of education Canada can be most effective . . .

Problems in Burma, Indonesia, Indochina and Malaya

I would like to take a moment here to bring to the notice of the Committee a few facts about the countries of Burma, Indonesia, Indochina and Malaya. They are not nearly as stable or advanced as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, where we have until now done most of our work. Burma fell into terrible chaos both during and after the Japanese occupation. Her communications were destroyed, what little business she had was completely disrupted, and from being the largest exporter of first class rice in the world, her agriculture fell to such an extent that she was hardly growing enough rice for her own needs. This of course meant that she virtually had no exports from which to earn foreign currency, with the result that she was compelled to cut down her development programme very considerably. The situation has very much improved but she is still not in the fortunate position she was before the war. She has now succeeded in bringing to an end the three civil wars which were raging in her own country after the Japanese left. Slowly the government is regaining control, but even today it is not safe to move about many parts of Burma without a military escort and obviously this situation impedes our work and makes it difficult for us to know where we can head in and help . . .

Indonesia is better off; she has now settled most of her difficulties with the Dutch and is gradually evolving a better and stronger government. That government is beginning to turn its attention to a different system of education and to the needs of the people. But here again recent events of history make it difficult for us to see exactly where we can best assist.

Canada has a specially advantageous position with regard to the Indo-Chinese States; they were under the French and therefore, outside of their indigenous languages, their language is French and not English as in India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. We can be of great assistance here because outside of France we are the only nation with a large established French population, having schools and universities teaching in the French language. We are able, therefore, to offer training to their young people who speak French as their second language. Forty Vietnamese students are going to Ste. Anne de la Pocatiere, which is the agricultural school of Laval University . . . This will be the largest single group from any country to arrive in Canada under our Technical Co-operation programme. Personally I am very happy that this largest group should come from the war-torn country of Indochina, which certainly needs all the help we can give it to get on its feet.

As you all know, the agreement achieved last February between Malaya and Great Britain looks for Malaya to be an independent state within the Commonwealth by August 1957, if possible. A constitution has to be written and Canada has been asked to send one man, together with the United Kingdom, Australia, India and Pakistan, for this purpose. This would tend to develop and expand the sources of aid to Malaya. So far as Singapore is concerned, that island is not included in this agreement and, as you all know, a Singapore delegation headed by David Marshall is now in the U.K. trying to reach agreement for self-government. All these factors, it seems to me, would tend to diversify the nature of aid both to Malaya and to Singapore, but one must



LARGEST GROUP OF COLOMBO PLAN TRAINEES ARRIVES IN CANADA

Prior to the start of their training at the Laval University Agricultural School at Ste-Anne-de-la-Pocatière, Quebec, a party of 38 Colombo Plan Trainees, 37 from Vietnam and one from Laos, spent several days in Ottawa last month.

During their visit to the Canadian Parliament Buildings, the trainees were received by Hon. I. Rene Beaudoin, Speaker of the House of Commons. He is shown above (right) answering the questions of Phan Thank Nguyen, spokesman for the party (left). Standing at the rear are Nguyen Duy Lien, Counsellor of the Vietnamese Embassy, Washington, and Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell, head of Canada's Colombo Plan Administration.

These trainees, who represent the largest single group to come to Canada under Canada's Technical Co-operation Programme, will follow a 3½ months course in the operation, maintenance and repair of agricultural machinery.

Canada is in a particularly advantageous position among Colombo Plan countries since it is the only one which can offer extensive training facilities in the French language, the second language of the Vietnamese trainees.

not forget that the overall percentage of Chinese is 50.8, a potent factor which cannot be ignored in the aid or any other field.

Capital Projects

You might be interested to know how our technical assistance training fits in with our capital projects. Our cement plant in Pakistan which, you will remember, was built in Montreal, is now producing on an experimental basis. Pakistan has been unable to find sufficient personnel to run it and so we are finding some supervising people and helping under technical assistance to make sure that the plant does not break down from want of trained people. By the way, you might be interested to learn that the Pakistanis have called

the cement plant we have built for them "The Maple Leaf Cement Plant". And so with the various electrical generating plants in which we are engaged. We send out Canadian technicians to help run them if required and there is a continuous co-operation with the engineers of the country concerned when we are building them.

However, it would not be right for me to let you think that all this works automatically and always with absolute accord. You must remember that what is happening here is that one of the most technically advanced nations in the world—ourselves—is co-operating with nations still 80 per cent and sometimes 90 per cent agricultural; they are short of technicians, short of engineers and have a mass population which, for the most part, has no machine training or technical background whatsoever. We are in trouble, for instance, at our Warsak Project on the North-West Frontier because enough Pakistanis with technical training cannot be found to co-operate with our people. We have the same problem in East Bengal where we are bringing into being at the present time two badly needed thermal plants. This is no one's fault, neither is it an easy situation to remedy. There is, of course, a limit to the number of Canadians we can find and send out. In this connection, of course, the boom situation in Canada mitigates against us. It is not easy in the first place to find these highly trained men in Canada; if they are good they already have well paid jobs and if they are not good they are useless to us. It is difficult to persuade such men to leave those jobs and go off to countries about which they know little or nothing, to face bad climates, perhaps disease and a standard of living below that to which they are accustomed. So, gentlemen, do not go away with the idea that there are not serious problems. They most certainly are and they are likely to continue. All we can do is deal with them on a day-to-day basis as they arise. So far we have been able to persuade high calibre men to work for us and we hope to continue to find them and to persuade them that the experience will be good for them.

We are still continuing to work on projects which we feel Canada can best supply. Since we are probably the world's most experienced people in hydro electric generation, it is perhaps natural that we should have embarked on five hydro-electric stations in the area, as you will see from the report I have tabled. Remembering the difficulties I have just mentioned, we have found consulting engineers, hydro-electric experts and such-like people to design and get these projects built. In addition, we have undertaken electrical distribution systems and some thermal generating plants. We have done this firstly because, as I have already said, we are experts in the power field, and, secondly, because power is the fundamental requirement of South-East Asia. Given power, they can have agricultural pumping, small industries, etc., and so lead to a better way of life for which power is a first vital necessity.

We have also, as I told you last year, gone into the communication field because communications are another vital necessity in the betterment of the lot of any people.

Co-operation With Other Agencies

The co-operation with other aid agencies, which I believe I mentioned to you last year, still continues. In fact, it improves. There is, every year, the Annual Meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan. Last

year this was held at Singapore and this year it will be held in New Zealand. At this meeting, as you know, the economic situation of Asia is studied and the nations concerned as donors try their best to match their technical assistance and capital projects with the individual needs of the various countries in the area. In addition, there is co-operation with the United Nations Assistance Programme, the International Co-operation Administration and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Here on the North American Continent, there is a continuing co-operation between me and my officers and the officers of these agencies, and particularly with the International Co-operation Administration and the International Bank. The International Co-operation Administration is the organization through which the United States administers its aid. All this co-operation, of course, is organized to prevent overlapping and to keep each other informed on economic and other problems which arise continually.

We are also in very close touch with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose reports are probably the best prepared of any and which is most co-operative. This kind of co-operation, of course, cuts down time and expense because we then do not have to go out and seek so much information for ourselves.

Atomic Reactor for India

You will recently have seen in the press that Parliament this year is going to be asked to increase our appropriation to \$34.4 million from the \$26 million at which it now stands. This is very largely to take care of the Atomic Reactor which we are giving to India. This is a research type of reactor, in fact an exact copy of the research reactor we have at Chalk River. There are several good reasons why this reactor should have been supplied by us. Atomic power is going to be of the utmost value to these under-developed countries. They have very few hydro-electric sites which they can develop and some of those which they have are in areas where profitable development would not be possible. Many of them are short of coal and oil and obviously under these conditions atomic power will be invaluable to them, but no one can jump into atomic power without a lot of experimental work and careful scientific training. The atomic reactor of the type we are sending to India is just the research reactor which affords this training. India has undertaken to train young scientists there from all over the area and this reactor will therefore, we hope, play a very great part in the future development of these countries. With such great scientists as Dr. Bhabha it was inevitable that India would develop along these lines and it was therefore appropriate that a country such as Canada, which is well regarded in India, should help her on her way.

I do not know whether any of you gentlemen have read a book called "Soviet Professional Manpower", which was put out by the Russian Research Centre of Harvard University. This book seems to me to show—and I presume we can take it as being reasonably accurate—that Russia is getting ahead of the West in training young scientists, engineers and other technical people, and whilst, as I have already told you, we are having considerable difficulty in finding the proper people to go to South-East Asia, the Russians as you know are now offering to send almost any number the South-East Asians will take, and are also offering training in Russia. Of course they can order their experts

anywhere they want them to go and make them accept any terms they want to force on them, but it does seem to me worth noting that there is now quite a likelihood that any experts we cannot supply, the South-East Asians can, should they so wish, obtain from the Soviet area.

There is one more point I would like to make and that is that we have tried to disperse the trainees we receive from South-East Asia as widely as possible around Canada and so far as possible we have tried to do the same in the selection of technical experts, and there has been a definite reason behind this. It seems to me that not only are we giving training to South-East Asians but we are an exporting country and are likely to be so for many years to come. South-East Asia will, we hope, when its people acquire a little more wealth, be purchasers of our equipment, and it is therefore good that as many as possible of our business men and professional people should become acquainted with the area, apart altogether from the humanitarian issues which are also involved. British, German and American contractors have had a lot of experience in foreign fields and now under Colombo Plan auspices some of our contractors are obtaining like experience in South-East Asia.

I do not think I have anything more to tell you today except this: that the more I see of this operation, the more I believe it to be vitally necessary if we are to maintain a free world and not see huge chunks of it succumb to the totalitarian doctrine. However, I would also like to say that the glamour and excitement of finding proper operational paths and of beginning our first projects have long ago given place to the hard grind of keeping a large number of projects up to schedule and dealing with the multifarious problems which, of necessity, arise from them. This is so not only in our Canadian operations; it is so in the whole field of Western aid to South-East Asia and other under-developed areas. The merging of highly technically advanced nations in the aid field with very under-developed and non-technically minded people presents an enormous number of very complicated problems. Whereas the first thing a child in our home stumbles over is his mother's vacuum sweeper or some other piece of electrical equipment, the only thing the child in the Asian village knows is how to twist the bullock's tail to make him go a little faster. The two states of mind are vastly different and to bring them together and, still more important, to forge a friendship between them in the process, is not an easy task. But I think I can say that we are slowly accomplishing it.

The end has come to the first Five Year Plan in India and by and large it has been successful. Now they embark on their Second Five Year Plan, which will again enmesh them in more hard work, and vast expenditures on development and still leave millions of their people in the agricultural villages in a state of insecurity and great poverty, not judged by our standards but by almost any standards; and so it is in all these countries—what is being done is slow and all too little.

The task to which we have set our hand is by no means finished.

Canada, United States to Discuss International Boundary Waters

THE following statement was made on May 23 in the House of Commons by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean Lesage. A similar announcement was made in Washington.

The Canadian and United States Governments have decided to examine together the subject of waters which flow across the international boundary between the two countries.

The last time both governments examined this matter thoroughly together was before the conclusion of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. During the forty-six years which have elapsed since its ratification, the International Joint Commission, which was established by the Treaty, has worked with outstanding success in solving water problems within the framework of this treaty.

It has recently appeared, however, that the development of the resources of such basins as the St. John, the Columbia and the Yukon, requires, among other things, the solution of various complicated legal, economic and engineering questions. In agreeing to examine the matter of waters which cross the boundary, the two governments realize that there may be no easy or quick answer to the problems which are arising today in such areas and that the studies may reveal that the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is sufficiently broad to meet present problems. The two governments believe, however, that a full and confidential exchange of views may contribute to the resolution of these problems and it is in this spirit that the discussions have been agreed to. At the same time, the two governments desire that the International Joint Commission shall press forward its studies under the Columbia River Basin Reference of 1944 and the other similar references which it has under consideration.



CANADIAN OFFICERS TO PALESTINE

Five Canadian Army majors have been named to serve with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. Above, left to right they are: Majors A. K. Paton, Vancouver; R. P. Yelle, Quebec City; S. M. Pinkerton, Hamilton; G. W. Graham, Calgary; and L. M. Stone, Vancouver.

—NDHQ

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the English Speaking Union, London, England, April 30, 1956.

It has long been an agreeable and innocent diversion to the student of history to observe man's curious blindness to important and even revolutionary events in the contemporary scene. Almost any age—certainly including our own—provides numerous examples to give us that curious but common pleasure known as wisdom after the event.

At the very moment when Aristotle was designing the best possible constitution and economy for the City-State, his most renowned student, through his conquest of the civilized world, was making the City-State concept of Society obsolete. Long after the time when the introduction of gunpowder had completely changed the facts of war, moated castles continued to be built throughout Europe, even though their interest had become more picturesque than strategic. Early in the 19th century, as I recall, there were grave misgivings in England concerning the increasingly acute shortage of boxwood, with which alone the hubs of stage coach wheels could be satisfactorily made: this at the time when a network of railways was beginning to spread throughout the country. You will remember, too, that as late as 1917 in the First World War, the Allied Command kept in readiness a division or so of cavalry for the break-through to Berlin, yet one would have thought that by 1917 it would have been evident that cavalry, although continuing to give "an air of distinction to what would otherwise have been disorderly brawl", had largely gone the way of the crossbow and the muzzle-loader. In our own day, it is probable that none of us can fully apprehend the implications for war or peace of the release of atomic energy. A century or so hence, historians, if there still are any left, may wonder at our astonishing shortsightedness.

The fact is that man's inherently conservative nature and his tendency to think in wishful terms not infrequently blinds him to developments which are bound to bring about the most profound and unsettling transformations to his familiar world. That is one reason why it is so hard to bring political action into line with those developments.

Today, for instance, we may not have fully realized the changes that have occurred which render obsolete many of our old concepts of national sovereignty and which, on the other hand, make essential the growth and acceptance of the idea of supra-national association: changes which require that we

give priority to interdependence over independence.

Security, peace and ordered progress call for action on a wider basis than that of the national community. This does not mean, however, that we should move at once into world government or some form of atlantic union or broad political federation with a central legislature and executive, a common citizenship, currency, and budget, a single foreign policy and defence establishment under central control: in short, with all the institutions of a federal state.

Need for Security

Those who advocate such schemes of federation do so from the highest of motives. They perform, I think, a good and useful service in preparing public opinion for the political changes which will undoubtedly be called for in the future to promote international co-operation. As a practising and, I hope, practical politician, however, as well as a quondam student of political science, I confess that I sometimes find some of the blue-prints of the brave new international world so far removed from the possibilities of the present that it is difficult to consider them in realistic terms. Our ultimate destiny—to safeguard our very existence—may require some form of federalism on a regional or even a wider basis. But meanwhile we have to work with the institutions which exist today and attempt to adapt them for the more ready and efficient and equitable solution of our current problems. This is, I suggest, a necessary and practicable task, and the insistent demand for something more far-reaching to be achieved immediately may at times be an obstacle to its accomplishment. In any event, the formal surrender of sovereignty, in its old form, is not now so decisive an issue as the provision of a new assurance through adequate international measures that power, traditionally the main attribute of sovereignty, will not be used for wrong purposes and against the general interest. The decisive factors, therefore, are those which determine policy: above all, which bring about a sound and sensible public opinion which alone makes it possible for democratic governments to adopt sound and sensible policies: or should the sequence be reversed?

Power, in the sense of capacity to wage nuclear war against another nuclear state, or on the other hand, to abandon the rest of the world and retire into complete isolation with-

out disastrous economic consequences, is now, in practice, limited to two or three states. Even with those, the consequences of nuclear victory would be about as disastrous as those of nuclear defeat.

Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrent

Realization of this fact has put an effective curb upon the freedom of choice and, therefore, the sovereignty of even the super-states. The concept of power-balance has given way to the doctrine of nuclear deterrent. Even the Soviet Union, rather belatedly, seems to have realized that it is not entirely free to throw its atomic weight around and, making a virtue out of necessity, is offering us 'peaceful co-existence'.

If the great have been limited in this way, how much less freedom of choice remains for smaller states. Indeed, whatever power these states now have can perhaps be most effectively used by the influence they may exert, either alone or even more in association with others, on the policy of the super-power. I suppose, in essence, that—and fear—are the main reasons which now hold coalitions of free states, such as NATO, together.

Smaller and newer states are often more sensitive about their sovereign rights even than larger and older ones. That is understandable. If a smaller power were not jealous of what it has, it soon might not have anything. And it is not surprising if a country which has only recently gained freedom and sovereignty is not as aware as an older state should be of the limitations, as well as the responsibilities, of that freedom.

I do not suggest, of course, that nationalism should not find expression in political freedom until these limitations and responsibilities are sure to be accepted. Nevertheless, if they have any sense of political or economic reality, smaller powers must recognize that isolation or neutralism or whatever they may call it, is today not likely to get them very far in controlling their own destinies. It is primarily by working with others that smaller countries can exercise influence on the big decisions by the big powers which so largely determine their own fate. This should strengthen their belief in international co-operation and international organization. It may also make them insistent on a voice and authority within this co-operation and these organizations, in the effort to recapture some of the control over their own fortunes which they may once have possessed but a large part of which, it must be admitted, most of them have now lost. While this is true, the atom bomb has also become itself a leveller

even among those states that possess it. It has for instance, because of its total destructive effects for which there is no adequate defence, made military superiority almost meaningless and armament races irrelevant. As Mr. L. L. White has put it in his wise little book *Everyman Looks Forward*:

"The bomb has exploded the concept of quantity in the military field. Belief in military power may continue as a comforting conviction, just as men still believe in gold and move it carefully from place to place. But the real contest for supremacy will meantime be carried on in the field of policy and ideas.

"With the discovery of the bomb power itself has become powerless before the will of a few. The human mind, by discovering prodigious destructive power within an ounce of mineral has recovered its mastery over quantity. From 1600 to 1945 physical power grew in arrogance, and policy often became the servant of the needs of power. But the bomb has burst the myth of power. It is policy not power, human motive not quantity, which is ultimately decisive in human affairs.

"To be a great power no longer means to be secure. Small nations have never been secure, nor will great nations be so in the future unless their policy is wise. Competition in military strength may continue, but it will no longer dominate world politics. Those who have no policy are at a loss, and have to do some hard thinking.

"While power was dominant, those who lacked an adequate policy could sit back and blame power-politics. But now the bluff of power has been called, and the choice is race-suicide or race-policy. Can it be that the future lies with those who can best think?"

Supra-national Communities

It surely does not take much hard thinking to come to the conclusion that in their own interest, nation states should work together toward supra-national communities.

Such communities can grow in different ways and from different sources. Our Commonwealth of Nations, for instance, has evolved from an imperial centre through the transformation of colonial dependencies into free states who have chosen to remain in political association with each other and with the parent state. Evolution without revolution has been of unique value not only to the nations most directly concerned, but to the world at large. That world should not forget

what it owes to the United Kingdom for originating and directing this process—which, of course, has not been completed. I can assure you that Canada is happy about its position in the Commonwealth and has no desire to see that position weakened. To us it means independence to which something else has been added.

Not a Static Association

The Commonwealth has never been a static association. It has been able to adapt itself to changing conditions and thereby influence those conditions. In recent years its value has increased, and taken on a new significance, by the membership of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and by the steady move toward qualification for such membership of other Asian and African political groups.

In this way the Commonwealth provides a bridge—at a time when there are all too few of them, and when they are desperately needed—a bridge between Asia and the West.

Another impulse to international community development comes from the realization by contiguous nations, with shared political ideas and traditions and interests, that they would be much more adequately equipped to face the political and economic problems, and exploit the political and economic possibilities of today if they could remove the boundaries and barriers between them: in short, become integrated.

The contemporary illustration of this trend which first springs to mind is, of course, the move toward European unity. It is a move which must surely commend itself first of all to Europeans themselves, who must remember best how much their continent has suffered from disunity; more especially from the tragic feud over the centuries between Gaul and Teuton. The movement will also, I believe, be welcomed by non-Europeans of good will—this certainly includes Canadians—who see in it not merely the strengthening of the shield against aggression from the East, but also a more solid foundation for the prosperity and progress of the united peoples of Western Europe who are such a vital part of the Atlantic community. I hasten to add, however, that as a strong believer in the freest possible kind of international trade, Canada's approval of the economic aspects of European integration, without which I suppose the political could not take place, is given on the assumption that in this case the whole, while greater, could not be higher, more restrictive, than its parts. I am thinking of restrictions in the way of trade, of course, about which a country which exports as Can-

ada does, about one third of its gross national product takes a somewhat jaundiced view, one which would be fully understood by a country like the United Kingdom which has flourished and grown great by its commerce with all parts of the world.

We should, I think, favour European unity for another reason. Western Europe has great resources of wisdom, strength and energy which, along with its traditions of freedom and culture, qualify it to play a powerful and constructive part today in world affairs. It can play this part most effectively, if the area of united or at least closely co-ordinated political action is enlarged.

This enlargement therefore is something which, I think, we should encourage and support, without—and I am talking now about North Americans—being too insistent in our advice as to how it should be done, or becoming too impatient if it is not done overnight. After all, as Mr. Bulganin reminded us last week, 'Moscow was not built in a day'. I do not myself see anything in this move to European unity which should hinder in any way the growth and coming-together of the Atlantic community. Quite the contrary. Nor do I see anything necessarily inconsistent between the closest possible association of the United Kingdom with this European development, and the maintenance and even strengthening of its ties with the rest of the Commonwealth.

I appreciate, of course, that while this country is part of Europe—history provides grim as well as glorious reminders of that connection—it has also a wider destiny and wider interests. The world owes much—some states indeed owe their very existence—to the fact that the vision of the British people has ranged across the oceans as well as across the channel. I do not forget this debt when I express the hope that this country, so rich in political sagacity, so steeped in political experience, and which has provided Europe with with imaginative leadership more than once in history, will play an active and constructive part in the efforts now being made by European states to adapt themselves to new conditions which require their closer association. Such a part would represent an important contribution to the development of something more important and far-reaching even than European unity itself—namely the Atlantic community.

Three Essential Parts

I see in that community three essential parts: a North America which must not lapse into continentalism; a Europe whose free and democratic countries must achieve the

greatest possible unity, both for defence and development and to ensure that no one of them will dominate the others; and finally, the United Kingdom, the bridge between the two, linked to Europe indissolubly by many ties and perhaps, above all, by the complete disappearance of the Channel in the air-atomic age; but linked also to North America in a unique way, because that continent—I hope that I will not be misunderstood in putting it this way—is now occupied by two former English-speaking colonies; one of which is proud to retain its political and monarchical association with the 'Old Master'.

We have now laid the foundations of this Atlantic community in NATO. Indeed that may be the most important thing that we did when we signed in Washington seven years ago the treaty bringing this international organization into being. On the other hand, what we did then may prove to have been as insubstantial and ephemeral as the signatures attached to many an international agreement which at the time seemed a veritable Magna Charta, but whose very name can now be found only in some doctrinal thesis. The near future will tell. There is no assurance yet that NATO will survive the emergency that gave it birth. That emergency was itself born of the fear—for which there was sufficient evidence—that unless the Atlantic countries united their resources and their resolve to defend themselves, they might succumb to aggression one by one. It seemed clear when the NATO Pact was signed, even to the mightiest power, that national security could not be guaranteed by national action alone. So we built up our collective defences and by our unity and strength have made NATO into a most effective deterrent against aggression. In doing so we have removed the greatest temptations to aggression: disunity and weakness.

If however, international tension now seems to ease, and the threat of direct military attack to recede, the fear which brought NATO into being in the first place will also recede; and the temptation to relax our defence efforts and indulge in the luxury of dissension and diversion will increase.

We may, in fact, be approaching a period—if, indeed, we are not in it—when NATO will lose much of the cohesive force which has hitherto held it together. There are those who are counting on this loss being fatal to the whole concept of NATO and the Atlantic community.

These dangers must be faced. Defence strength and unity must be maintained, yet we may not now have for this purpose the same incentive which we have had before.

We must, therefore, develop a stronger bond of unity than a common fear. As the challenge of the Communist nations to our free institutions takes new forms, avoiding tactics and policies which risk nuclear devastation, NATO should in its turn, while maintaining whatever collective military defensive strength is necessary, develop new impulses for unity and community.

NATO cannot live on fear alone, nor can it become the source of a real Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being. A new emphasis, therefore, on the non-military side of NATO's development is essential. It would also be the best answer to the Soviet charge that it is an aggressive, exclusively military agency, aimed against Moscow.

We are now faced by the challenge from the Communist bloc of competitive co-existence: or, to put it another way—of all conflict short of full scale war. This may be an improvement on the imminent possibility of nuclear devastation, but it is a long way from the security of co-operation co-existence and it has not removed the menace of Communist domination.

Answer Must Be Found

The NATO countries must find the answer to this new challenge; by demonstrating the quality and value and sincerity of their co-operation, between themselves, and with all members of the international community. We have here a new opportunity as well as a new challenge, and if we do not take advantage of it, speeches about the Atlantic community will, before long, have as little meaning as those about the lost continent of Atlantis. As the material and technological gap between the NATO countries and the Soviet bloc diminishes, it will be all the more important to maintain the distinctions in other and more important respects: and to ensure that these are more fully understood and valued.

This will require closer co-operation—political and economic—within NATO than has been the case; finding new ways by which we can build up and strengthen our own sense of community—and show others that what we are building is no selfish and exclusive way.

I hope that the meeting of the NATO council later this week will find the answers to some of these questions. And begin a serious and practical search for the others. So it should be an important meeting, if not an easy one. At it we may find ourselves discussing policies rather than power: aims rather than arms: division rather than divisions.

NATO, in truth, is now at the crossroads of its existence. If it is to be forward, and in the right direction, it must concentrate on ways and means of bringing its members closer together politically, without weakening its defence unity and strength. For this purpose the Council must become a more effective agency for consultation and co-operation than it has been.

It must be given more authority and its meetings, with ministerial attendance, should be more frequent. Through the Council, consultation should be developed into an accepted custom, to the point where no member would think of taking action which affected the others in any substantial way—either politically or economically—without prior discussion with those members in NATO.

No Great Changes Needed

For this purpose I do not see the need for any substantial organizational changes or for any amendments to our treaty. Nor do I think that NATO should try to make special economic arrangements between its members or be charged with the duty of removing trade barriers. There are other international agencies which have been specially set up for this purpose—such as GATT and OEEC—and we do not want duplication. I doubt also whether NATO is the agency best equipped actually to provide aid to materially under-developed countries. In this matter, the United Nations should, I think, be brought more and more into the picture. I do not mean that the World Organization should be the sole or even possibly the major executive agency for international aid or replace practical and successful operations like the Colombo Plan. Its special value would be to provide a forum where all assistance plans could be co-ordinated and policies discussed. I think also that the

U.S.S.R. should be encouraged to participate fully in such United Nations discussions. It would give us a very good opportunity to test the nature and the substance of her participation in this field of international economic assistance.

The Role of NATO

In political and economic consultation NATO's role, as I see it, is more limited, but more precise and politically more significant in that here discussions are between closely co-operating friends who are trying to bring about not merely the co-ordination, but the closest possible identity of plans and policies. As the mechanism for this process NATO can become the foundation for the Atlantic community of the future. It must in fact develop along these lines or it will drift into futility and may ultimately share the fate of other international agencies which disappeared because their roots were not deep enough for survival and growth.

May I close with a story, substituting only one or two words in the original, to fit this particular occasion:

"Making her debut at a NATO meeting, a young matron sat silently through a two hour discussion of the Atlantic community. Afterward, she thanked the women to whose spirited pros and cons she had listened.

'I'm awfully glad I came,' she said, 'because I was so terribly confused about the Atlantic community. Of course, she confessed, 'I'm still confused, but on a much higher plane.'"

If after my talk you are still confused, as you may well be, I dare to hope that it is on a much higher plane.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. D. M. Johnson, Commissioner, posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective May 15, 1956.
 - Mr. S. H. Nutting, DFM, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Lima, to Ottawa, effective May 9, 1956.
 - Mr. N. F. H. Berlis posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, effective May 11, 1956.
 - Mr. J. A. McCordick posted from the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, to Ottawa, effective May 18, 1956.
 - Mr. M. Gordon-Fisher posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Los Angeles, to Ottawa, effective May 20, 1956.
 - Mr. F. B. M. Smith posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective May 23, 1956.
 - Mr. L. A. D. Stephens posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective May 25, 1956.
 - Mr. F. Charpentier, MBE, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Montevideo, to the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, effective May 26, 1956.
 - Mr. W. A. Jenkins, posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Detroit, effective May 26, 1956.
 - Mr. G. A. Rau posted from the Canadian Embassy, Oslo, to Ottawa, effective May 30, 1956.
 - Mr. J. E. G. Hardy posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective April 22, 1956.
 - Mr. A. G. Campbell appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 5, effective May 28, 1956.
- The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers 1: Mr. R. W. Nadeau (May 7, 1956); Mr. M. Heroux (May 22, 1956); Mr. D. W. Stevenson (May 28, 1956).



DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT SIGNED

—*Capital Press*

Dr. Werner Dankwort, German Ambassador to Canada (left) and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter E. Harris, prepare to sign an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada for "the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income."

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1956.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Tunisia and Morocco

ON June 19, Canadian recognition of Tunisia and Morocco was extended in the following messages of congratulations from Prime Minister St. Laurent to the Prime Minister of Morocco, Si Embarek Bekkai, and to the Prime Minister of Tunisia, Mr. Habib Bourguiba:

To the Prime Minister of Morocco:

On behalf of the Government and people of Canada I extend to you my warmest congratulations on Morocco's independence as a result of the Protocols signed on March 2 between the French and Moroccan Governments, and on April 7 between the Spanish and Moroccan Governments.

May I extend our best wishes for a happy and prosperous future for your country and the people of Morocco.

To the Prime Minister of Tunisia:

On behalf of the Government and people of Canada I extend to you my warmest congratulations on Tunisia's independence as a result of the Protocol signed on March 20 between the French and Tunisian Governments.

May I extend our best wishes for a happy and prosperous future for your country and the people of Tunisia.

Telegrams in reply have been received from the Governments of Tunisia and Morocco thanking the Canadian Government and reciprocating the good wishes expressed in the Prime Minister's messages.

Mr. St. Laurent also sent the following message to M. Guy Mollet, President of the Council of Ministers of France:

I am happy to transmit copies of telegrams which I am addressing today to the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Prime Minister of Morocco. I should like to take this opportunity to extend on behalf of the Government of Canada my warmest congratulations on the occasion of the signature of the Franco-Moroccan Protocol of March 2 and of the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of March 20.

In the Franco-Moroccan Agreement of March 2, 1956, which formally ended forty-three years of the protectorate regime established by the Treaty of Fez in 1912, France recognized the independence of Morocco as an equal and sovereign state. On April 7, Spain, which had exercised a protectorate in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, also formally recognized the independence and unity of Morocco and the full sovereignty of the Sultan. The Canadian Ambassador in Madrid was asked to convey to the Foreign Minister of Spain the congratulations of the Canadian Government on the Spanish-Moroccan Protocol of April 7.

France in Morocco

France's special interests in Morocco came to be recognized by a succession of treaties and agreements after 1880. Under the Protectorate established by the Treaty of Fez, a Resident General, representing the Government of the



French Republic, was put in charge of foreign affairs and defence with power to approve decrees promulgated by the Sultan. The Treaty gave France the authority to undertake the military occupation of Moroccan territory in order to maintain order. The pacification of Morocco took 27 years, and it was not until 1934 that all recalcitrant tribes were finally brought under control and Morocco was unified under the Sultan's authority.

The Empire of Morocco was in principle an absolute monarchy, with the Sultan exercising spiritual and temporal authority and having a central government under his authority. The French Resident General was in effect responsible for the administration of the French Zone. During the Protectorate the French administration reclaimed land and improved agricultural methods, developed mineral resources, established manufacturing industries, and improved communications. The administration also carried on a successful campaign against epidemics, provided hospital facilities, and introduced modern health practices. During this period thousands of European colonists—the colons—settled in the Protectorate.

A growing movement for the independence of Morocco was spearheaded by the Istiqlal party, which was formed in 1937. The Sultan's open support of the Istiqlal dated from 1947, when he called for a revision of the Treaty of Fez. Subsequently, agitation for independence grew more intense, the situation being complicated by the opposition to the Sultan of the tribal chiefs, the most important of whom was El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh. Growing disorders resulted, in 1953, in the disposition of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef,

who was replaced by Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, to whom the nationalists were violently opposed. In 1954, terrorist activity in Morocco increased and for the fourth time a number of Arab and Asian nations brought the Moroccan question to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly. In view of the indications that negotiations between France and Morocco were to begin, the Assembly expressed the hope that a satisfactory solution would be achieved.

The sharp division of opinion on the dynastic issue made it difficult to implement reforms promised by the French Government, and disturbances for a while became worse. In August, 1955, however, talks were held at Aix-les-Bains between representatives of the French Government and representatives from Morocco of the Istiqlal and other political parties, of El Glaoui, and of the French colons. As a result of these talks, a Council of the Throne was formed and Sultan ben Arafa abdicated. A short while later, El Glaoui announced his intention to support the former Sultan ben Youssef and declared that he should be re-instated on his throne. Thus no powerful native leader nor native political group remained opposed to the return of the former Sultan.

After further consultations with Moroccan representatives, the French Government, on November 5, 1955, accorded official recognition to ben Youssef as Sultan of Morocco. The Sultan then declared his intention to form a representative provisional government whose main tasks would be to make Morocco a democratic state with a constitutional monarchy and to negotiate with France a new status for Morocco as an independent state associated to France by links of inter-dependency. Sultan ben Youssef returned to Morocco on November 17, amidst general acclaim.

On December 7, 1955, the first independent Moroccan government was constituted under the leadership of Si Embarek Bekkai. On December 9, the powers of the French directors of the administration were transferred to the Moroccan ministers, with the French Resident-General acting as Minister of National Defence and Foreign Affairs to the Sultan. The way was now open for comprehensive negotiations on the future of Franco-Moroccan relations.

The Franco-Moroccan Agreement of March 2, 1956

The Agreement of March 2 between France and Morocco provided that they would conclude new agreements to define their inter-dependence in fields in which they have common interests, to organize their co-operation on the basis of equality, especially in matters of defence, foreign relations, and economic and cultural affairs, and to guarantee the rights and liberties of French citizens settled in Morocco and of Moroccans settled in France. The negotiation of these supplementary agreements is now proceeding, and France and Morocco have already concluded a diplomatic convention re-affirming their permanent friendship and agreeing to consult together on foreign affairs. Under the terms of the convention, Morocco will assume the obligations resulting from treaties concluded by France in the name of Morocco, as well as those resulting from international acts concerning Morocco on which it has made no observations. France has undertaken to support the candidacy of Morocco for membership in international organizations.

Negotiations are also in progress between Spain and Morocco, whose representatives are working out detailed arrangements for the transfer of power

in Spanish Morocco in implementation of Protocol and Declaration of April 7 in which Spain recognized the independence of Morocco.

Tunisia

The negotiations leading to the transfer of a large degree of local autonomy to Tunisia were described in the December, 1955, issue of *External Affairs*.^{*} Although the Franco-Tunisian Conventions of July 1955 had envisaged a gradual transfer of power over a period of twenty years, throughout which France would remain responsible for Tunisia's defence and external relations, events, in fact, moved very swiftly. Three weeks after the proclamation of Morocco's independence, Tunisia, in turn, became an independent state. In a protocol of agreement signed on March 20, France recognized the independence of Tunisia and the two countries agreed to plan future co-operation, particularly in matters of defence and foreign relations. On June 15, a diplomatic agreement between France and Tunisia providing for the exchange of Ambassadors and consultation on questions of mutual interest was signed in Tunisia. France also promised to support Tunisia's candidacy for membership in international organizations.

The two new states of Morocco and Tunisia have already commenced the exchange of Ambassadors with a number of other countries, established their own armies, and become members of several United Nations Specialized Agencies. The political evolution of the two countries has been greatly assisted by the courageous policy of France and it is encouraging to know that, in spite of all the past difficulties, leaders of both states have re-affirmed their warm attachment for France, which has contributed so much to their political and economic development.

^{*}*External Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 12.

Kundah Power Development

URGENTLY needed to provide power for irrigation, industry and other purposes, and thus to reduce the threat of famine and raise the standard of living of more than 30,000,000 residents of the State of Madras in India, the Kundah-Hydro Electric project was formally inaugurated at ceremonies held on June 29 at the site of the project.

The first stage of the Kundah development, a joint Indian-Canadian project under the Colombo Plan, is expected to cost \$60 million, of which Canada will be paying up to a maximum of \$20 million to be allocated over two or three years. The Canadian contribution will include the provision of turbines, generators, and other power house equipment; specified materials and construction equipment for the civil works, and possibly some sub-station and transmission equipment for the transmission line. In some instances, where practicable, equipment may be fabricated in India at Indian expense from materials supplied from Canada. Canada will also provide the services of Canadian consulting engineers to supervise certain aspects of the work and assist the Indian Department of Electricity in the execution of the project.

India will be responsible for the construction of all civil works, the provision of labour and local materials, and the supply of housing, roads, and other facilities at the site. To help India meet the local costs of this project, Canada has agreed to the use of counterpart funds, available in rupees, resulting from Canadian aid to India under the Colombo Plan.

In a message read at the inaugural ceremonies by the Governor of Madras, Shri Sri Prakasa, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed satisfaction that Canada and India were embarking on another important co-operative endeavour under the Colombo Plan. Mr. Pearson's message continued:

"I am sure that the Canadian engineers who will be working along side of the Indian engineers at the project will be proud to be associated with the work of the Madras Department of Electricity, which has such a splendid record of achievement in the development and distribution of power in your country. On behalf of the Government of Canada, may I wish you every success in your new undertaking, which will make a notable contribution to the courageous programme of economic development which the people of India are now embarking upon in the second five-year plan."

Actual terms of the understandings between the governments of India and Canada are now being negotiated, and it is expected that an inter-governmental agreement recording them will be signed shortly in New Delhi.

The Need for Power

The existing electric power system of the State of Madras supplies the City of Madras (the capital city and principal seaport) and a thickly settled, intensively cultivated farming area in southern India, which extends 370 miles from north to south, and 340 miles from east to west. While the rate of power

development has been rapid in recent years, Madras State still has a long way to go before its supply of electrical energy will approach the levels reached in other parts of the world. Only 2,500 of its approximately 30,000 villages have electric service, and electricity generated in the State is only 30 kilowatt hours per capita per annum, as compared to average rates of 1,000 kilowatt hours in Western Europe and 2,400 kilowatt hours in North America.

Because of the vital importance of maintaining food production in those parts of Madras where rainfall is light, irrigation has a prior claim on electrical power, large quantities of which are required for pumps used to bring water to areas not reached by irrigation canals (25,000 of these pumps are now in service and 3,000 more are being added each year). Hydro and steam plants devoted to power production can be operated whenever required throughout the year to meet load demands within the limitations of their plant capacity and the water available. However, since water is more important than power, hydro plants using irrigation water can only be operated as and when water is required for irrigation. Hence, during the irrigation season of about seven months each year (July to January) there is abundant water for power generation at these plants, but during the remaining five months, when irrigation requirements are reduced and water is being stored in the reservoirs, the output of electric energy is drastically restricted. It is, therefore, essential that the power system have substantial generating capacity which can be used as desired at any time of year.


The Canadian engineers who studied the Kundah development have reported to the Canadian government that it will help materially to make up existing shortages, to provide for the industrial and agricultural expansion of the State, to raise the standard of living, and to reduce the threat of recurrent drought and famine.

The Project

The Kundah River is in the Nilgiri Hills, 300 miles west of Madras. Its main stream is formed at an elevation of about 6,200 feet above sea level by the confluence of the Avalanche and Emerald Rivers near the southern edge of the Nilgiri Plateau. It then cascades down the mountain side in a southeasterly direction for a distance of some 14 miles to join the eastward flowing Bhavani River at an elevation of 1,340 feet. The Bhavani in turn joins the Cauvery River and empties into the Bay of Bengal. Although the Kundah is a relatively small stream and its drainage area above the confluence of the Avalanche and Emerald is only 24 square miles, three tributaries downstream make significant contribution to its flow.

Above the confluence of the Avalanche and the Emerald the gradients of both rivers are relatively flat and the valleys widen out into basins with gentle side slopes that lend themselves to the construction of reservoirs. Below the confluence the valleys are deep and narrow, and are separated by high ridges.

The Kundah River possesses most of the attributes of a good power river—good rainfall, steep gradients, high ridges on each side, and sound underlying rock. On the other hand, as pointed out above, the drainage area is relatively small, and only the flow from the area above the confluence of the Avalanche and Emerald can be controlled in storage reservoirs.



The initial investigation of the Kundah River was undertaken by the Madras Department of Electricity in 1949, and the first report was issued in 1951. However, the proposals incorporated in that report have been modified and the project will now be developed in the following four stages (see sketch of project area on page 184):

STAGE I

Masonry dams about 190 feet high will be built across the Avalanche and Emerald Rivers to form storage reservoirs that would merge into one lake at upper levels. Two power plants will also be constructed with installed capacities of 40,000 kilowatts and 105,000 kilowatts respectively. In addition, a pondage and diversion dam is to be built on the Kundah River below the junction with the Kanara River to make the unregulated flow between that point and the Avalanche-Emerald available to the lower plant.

STAGE II

A storage reservoir, involving the construction of two dams, is to be created on the headwaters of the Upper Bhavani and its water carried by tunnel through the height of land to the Avalanche-Emerald reservoir. The generating capacity of the lower plant will be increased to 140,000.

STAGE III

A storage reservoir would be created on the east and west Varahapallam Rivers and the water carried by tunnel through the height of land to the Avalanche-Emerald reservoir. A small drainage area on the western slope of the Nilgiri Hills, known as the Western Catchment, would also be diverted into the Porthimund basin high up on the Pykara drainage area and either used elsewhere or diverted by tunnel to the Avalanche-Emerald reservoir. The generating installations in the upper and lower plants might also be increased to 60,000 kilowatts and 175,000 kilowatts respectively in this stage. Under present planning Stage III would involve the construction of ten dams.

STAGE IV

A third power station would be added near the confluence of the Kundah-Bhavani Rivers. The capacity of this power station has not yet been specified, but it will probably be of the order of 100,000 kilowatts.

In addition to the four stages described above, it has been suggested that power may also be developed on the three drops between the Upper Bhavani, Porthimund, and Varahapallam storages and the Avalanche-Emerald reservoir.

New Zealand Prime Minister Visits Canada

THE Prime Minister of New Zealand, The Right Honourable S. G. Holland, C.H., P.C., accompanied by Mrs. Holland and by Mr. A. D. McIntosh, New Zealand Secretary of External Affairs, spent the period June 6 to June 19 in Canada before attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, England.

After arriving on the West Coast, Mr. Holland was entertained at Government House, Victoria, by the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, was honoured at luncheon by the Vancouver Board of Trade, paid a visit to the University of British Columbia, and attended an informal reception given by the New Zealand-Australian Association.

Following a two-day stay in Banff, Mr. Holland proceeded to Ottawa, where he paid a courtesy call at Government House, called on Prime Minister St. Laurent and on several Cabinet Ministers, held a press conference, and attended a luncheon given in his honour by Mr. St. Laurent in the Parliamentary Restaurant. Mr. and Mrs. Holland were honoured at a dinner given by Mr. and Mrs. C. D. Howe at the Chateau Laurier Hotel, and at a reception held by Mr. T. C. A. Hislop, New Zealand High Commissioner, and Mrs. Hislop.

Mr. Holland and party left Montreal for England on Tuesday, June 19, after a brief stay in the Laurentians.



FRIENDSHIP RENEWED

Government leaders of two Commonwealth countries renewed their friendship when Prime Minister S. G. Holland, of New Zealand, called on Prime Minister L. S. St. Laurent, of Canada, during Mr. Holland's recent visit to Ottawa.

Seen above are Mr. St. Laurent, left, Mr. Holland, centre, and Mr. T. C. A. Hislop, New Zealand High Commissioner.

Recent Developments in Disarmament

Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, represented Canada at the July meetings of the Disarmament Commission held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Commission met to consider the report on the disarmament negotiations, held this spring in London, submitted by its Sub-Committee which comprised Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Martin, whose responsibilities include the co-ordination of civil defence in Canada, represented Canada at the session of the Sub-Committee held in New York during September and October of last year and at previous meetings of the Commission. He headed the Canadian delegation to the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1955.

Recent developments in disarmament were reviewed by Mr. Martin in an address at the annual convention of Ontario Retail Pharmacists Association, held at Windsor, Ont., on June 18.

Excerpts from Mr. Martin's address follow:

... It will be recalled that during the past few years, United Nations efforts to achieve some measure of agreement on the reduction and control of armaments have been centred in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in the work of which I have had occasion to participate. This Sub-Committee, which is made up of the representatives of five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and Canada—has now held four series of private talks, the latest taking place in London earlier this spring. In all, no less than 86 individual meetings have been held. The forthcoming New York meeting of the Disarmament Commission itself is for the purpose of receiving and considering the report of the Sub-Committee's work.

While the results of these prolonged discussions have in some respects been disappointing, they have demonstrated that there is substantial agreement among the Western nations as to the provisions which should be included in any satisfactory disarmament scheme.

At the same time, they have provided evidence that the Soviet Union does not yet appear willing to accept measures which the Western nations consider essential to the successful implementation of even preliminary steps towards disarmament. In particular, I have in mind the Soviet Union's negative reaction to the proposal put forward

by President Eisenhower providing for joint aerial inspection and the exchange of blueprints for military installations.

In the past ten days, the inadequacy of the Soviet Union's position on the matter of controls has been given added emphasis. In letters addressed to the Heads of Government of the other four powers represented on the Disarmament Sub-Committee, the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Nicolai Bulganin, has called on the Western nations to follow the Soviet Union's "initiative" of May 14 by embarking on unilateral reductions in the strength of their armed forces. Such an action, the Soviet Premier has suggested, would be "of decisive importance" in leading to the creation of conditions more favourable to the achievement of a universal disarmament program.

While these proposed cuts are to be welcomed as far as they go, this invitation would be more meaningful, it seems to me, if we had some concrete evidence that the announced reduction in Soviet forces would actually take place and that it would, in fact, be the expression of a genuine desire to follow a more moderate policy in the future and to renounce aggressive designs. Even if Soviet forces were to be reduced in numbers, the Soviet Union might still be left in possession of forces vastly superior to those available to the Western nations. And there would be no assurance that the demobilization would be

accompanied by a corresponding reduction in equipment or that the savings realized as a result of these cuts in manpower would not be used for financing other projects to increase the war potential of the Communist world. Above all, the Soviet proposal does not touch the central problem which concerns us all—the threat of nuclear warfare.

The Western Powers surely cannot assume that a mere declaration on the part of the Soviet Union of its intention to reduce forces is a peaceful gesture that will promote greater confidence. Such a move could equally be interpreted as a shrewd attempt to lure the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to advance along the road of unilateral and uncontrolled disarmament to the point where they would be unable to provide for their security and where their very unity would be seriously compromised. Indeed, the Soviet leaders themselves have frankly admitted that their opposition to NATO has not changed and that they will continue their efforts to weaken it, if possible, to break up the alliance.

It would seem to me that this latest Soviet move points very clearly to the need for achieving disarmament through an agreed and safeguarded programme. If Mr. Bulganin and his colleagues are sincere and really wish

to reduce their armed forces, why will they not agree to the establishment of adequate and effective controls as the Western nations have done in the proposals they have made in the United Nations Sub-Committee?

By adopting a more open-minded and positive approach to this central problem of control, the Soviet Union could do more to establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence than they could ever hope to achieve through the mere announcement of reductions which cannot be checked. I submit that our final judgment should await such indications as will be provided by the Soviet approach to the future negotiations: this will be the acid test of their sincerity.

The problem of disarmament, like many of the problems facing the world today, cannot be solved by action on the part of one nation or group of nations alone. A solution can only be achieved through the whole-hearted co-operation of all members of the international community, whatever their political structure or ideological leanings. We can only hope that when negotiations are resumed, the Soviet Union will see fit to lend its support to collective measures which, in the words of the New York Times, "will make disarmament a blessing and not a trap in which freedom can die".



AT DISARMAMENT MEETINGS

Mr. Paul Martin, Canadian Delegate to Disarmament Commission meetings held in New York this month, chats with Mr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, centre, of Cuba, Commission chairman for July, and Mr. Jules Moch, of France.

Geneva Tariff Agreements

As announced in the House of Commons on June 7, new tariff agreements were negotiated by Canada with the United States and twelve other countries in Europe and Latin America at the GATT tariff conference held in Geneva, and were signed on May 23 on behalf of Canada by the Canadian Ambassador to NATO, Mr. L. D. Wilgress, who was chairman of the Canadian delegation.


Twenty-two countries participated in the Geneva negotiations. The new agreements concluded represented a further step in the general reduction of tariff barriers which had been carried forward in earlier conferences held at Geneva in 1947, at Annecy in 1949, and at Torquay in 1951. Under the most-favoured-nation principle, which is basic to GATT, all tariff concessions agreed to at Geneva will become available to Canada whether or not these concessions were negotiated directly with Canada. Similarly, Canada will extend its own tariff concessions to each of the other participating countries, and to non-GATT countries with which Canada has most-favoured-nation agreements.

The complete schedules of all tariff concessions are incorporated in a Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the GATT signed by representatives of participating countries at Geneva. A detailed summary of the concessions may be found in an Appendix to the Official Report of House of Commons Debates of June 7, 1956.

In a statement made in the House of Commons on June 7, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, said that the new GATT agreements represented a further addition to the significant and substantial progress already achieved in previous GATT conferences in the reduction of tariff barriers throughout the world, and that the benefits obtained by Canada would lead to useful, practical gains for Canadian exporters of a wide range of products and in many markets.

Continuing, Mr. Howe said:

"These new agreements will further strengthen the basis of confidence and co-operation so essential in world trade. It is appropriate at this time to reaffirm Canada's view of the usefulness of the GATT as a framework for the conduct of trade and for the development of common trading policies. In this



Signing for Canada.

connection, the establishment of the Organization for Trade Co-operation to administer the GATT on a continuing basis would render the agreement more effective and would have a most encouraging influence on international relations.

"The Canadian Government has consistently supported this proposed organization, and is prepared to take steps to provide for Canadian participation at the appropriate time. The United Kingdom has already indicated its acceptance, and it is our hope that all the members of GATT, and particularly the other leading trading countries whose support is essential, will similarly find it possible to join in its establishment."

Referring to concessions obtained by Canada, Mr. Howe said that the agreement concluded between Canada and the United States was one of the major agreements resulting from the conference. He explained that concessions that could be made by the United States were limited by United States legislation to maximum tariff reductions of 15 per cent, spread over the next two years, and that there were a number of items, particularly in the agricultural and fisheries fields, on which the United States was not then prepared to negotiate. Within these limitations, however, the agreements concluded should be most satisfactory to both countries, Mr. Howe said. Canada has obtained maximum concessions on a large number of products, including various chemicals, certain metals, some agricultural items, and a number of manufactured products, the Minister stated.


Speaking of the traditional and important trade relations with Europe and Latin America, Mr. Howe said it was Canada's intention to continue to strengthen these relations and to work with the countries of these areas in expanding trade in both directions. Under terms of agreements concluded with Austria, the Benelux countries, Denmark, Western Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, Canadian exporters will obtain useful benefits, the Minister stated. Mr. Howe noted that in the course of the negotiation it was necessary for both Canada and the United Kingdom to alter certain of the tariff preferences accorded to the other. He added that most of the reductions in margins of preference of interest to Canadian exporters in the United Kingdom were relatively minor.

The Minister of Finance, Mr. W. E. Harris, also commented on the new agreements in a statement in the House of Commons on June 7. Mr. Harris said that tariff concessions made by Canada covered 180 items or sub-items. Of these, 115 were reductions in the most-favoured-nation rates of duty, and 55 were undertakings not to raise existing rates of duty.

Mr. Harris told the Members that Canada's imports during the calendar year 1955 from all countries under the 115 items or sub-items on which the most-favoured nation tariff was reduced at Geneva amounted to \$91 million, and, from all countries under the items which were bound but not reduced, to \$88 million.

The reductions in the most-favoured-nation tariff covered a wide range of products, such as textile machinery, orange juice, lettuce, newsprint, shelled oysters, shrimps, spectacle frames, cigars, sawmill machinery, adding machines, cash registers, road building machines, electrical precision apparatus, such as is used in oil refineries and chemical works, cameras, and tobacco pipes.

The new tariff concessions will come into effect in the various countries on dates to be announced by each government. It was not expected that any country would bring its concessions into effect until June 30 at the earliest. United States concessions will be implemented in three stages over the next two years, as required by United States legislation. Under the terms of the GATT, all the concessions agreed upon are bound against increase, subject to certain procedures permitting countries to re-negotiate particular concessions from time to time.



FIRST BURMESE COLOMBO PLAN TRAINEES IN CANADA

First Burmese to receive training in Canada under the Colombo Plan, U. Than Gywe, left, 31, and U. Maung Maung Win, 27, of Rangoon, being instructed in the use of the timber press by D. E. Kenney at the Forest Products Laboratory, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Ottawa. The Burmese, who are engineers employed by the State Timber Board, Burma, will visit plants and research laboratories in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and British Columbia before returning to Burma.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

IN one of the most important international conferences since the end of the Second World War, representatives of more than 80 countries will meet in September at United Nations headquarters in New York to consider detailed proposals for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency within the framework of the United Nations.

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, President Eisenhower of the United States first proposed formally "that the governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials" to an international atomic energy agency in order to further the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world.

President Eisenhower's proposal was debated at the ninth session of the General Assembly which on December 4, 1954, approved unanimously a resolution expressing the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be established without delay.

During the first half of 1955, representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, at a series of meetings at Washington, prepared a draft statute for the proposed international agency which was given general circulation in August 1955, to other countries. The question of establishing the new agency was subsequently considered at the tenth session of the General Assembly, which on December 3, 1955, adopted a resolution, (co-sponsored by Canada), noting with satisfaction the progress being made toward the establishment of the Agency and welcoming the "extension of invitations to the governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, and the U.S.S.R. to participate as governments concerned with the present sponsoring governments" in further negotiations.

Drafting the Statute

The representatives of the eight co-sponsors and of the four countries named in the Assembly resolution began meetings in Washington on February 27, 1956, using as a basis for discussion the draft statute which had been circulated to governments in August of the preceding year. The Canadian delegation was led by Canada's Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, with Mr. G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Minister at the Embassy in Washington, as his alternate. Advisers were Mr. W. J. Bennett, President, and Mr. D. Watson, Secretary, of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; Dr. J. D. Babbitt, Scientific Attaché at the Embassy in Washington; Mr. S. Pollock, of the Department of Finance; Mr. M. A. Crowe, of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, and Mr. W. H. Barton and Mr. D. H. W. Kirkwood, of the Department of External Affairs.

The negotiations in Washington were brought to a close on April 18, when the representatives of the 12 countries agreed unanimously on the text of a new draft statute to be considered at the forthcoming international conference in September. (Some of the delegates, however, specifically reserved their positions on certain articles pending final consideration at the conference, and it was generally accepted that participating governments were not formally committed to the text at this drafting stage). As noted above, it is expected that this conference will be attended by more than 80 countries which, as provided by the draft statute, would be eligible for initial membership in the Agency by virtue of their membership in the United Nations or in the Specialized Agencies.

Principal Provisions

Following are some of the principal provisions of the draft statute to be considered at the conference in September:

1. **Membership:** The initial members of the Agency shall be those members of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies which shall have signed the statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification. Other members shall be those states, whether or not they are members of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of the statute and which have been recommended and approved for membership by the Board of Governors and the General Conference. In this connection, these bodies shall determine that the states are able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership, giving due consideration to their ability and willingness to act in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. **General Conference:** The General Conference shall consist of representatives of all members of the Agency. It shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each annual session and they shall hold office for the duration of the session. Decisions shall be taken by a majority of those present and voting, and a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum.

The functions of the General Conference shall be: to admit and suspend members and to elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions of the statute; to consider the annual report of the Board; to approve, or to return with recommendations for re-submission to the General Conference, the budget of the Agency, reports to be submitted to the United Nations, and any agreements between the Agency and the United Nations, or other organizations, and to approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing powers by the Board, and amendments to the statute. The General Conference shall also have the authority to make recommendations to, and to request reports from, the Board on any matters relating to the function of the Agency.

3. **Board of Governors:** The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

- (1) The outgoing Board shall designate for membership on the Board the five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source materials, (Canada, France, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., United States), and the members most advanced in these respects in each of the following areas not represented by the above-mentioned five:
 - 1) North America
 - 2) Latin America
 - 3) Western Europe
 - 4) Eastern Europe
 - 5) Africa and the Middle East
 - 6) South Asia
 - 7) South-East Asia and the Pacific
 - 8) Far East
 - (2) The outgoing Board shall also designate two members from among the following other producers of source materials—Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal—and one other member as a supplier of technical assistance. No member in this category in any one year will be eligible for re-designation in the same category for the following year.
 - (3) The General Conference shall elect ten members to the Board, having regard to the equitable representation of the members in the geographical areas listed above so that the Board shall always include in this category a representative of each of these areas except North America. No member in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category for the following term of office.
 - (4) Decisions shall be by a majority of those present and voting, except as otherwise provided in the statute, and two-thirds of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
 - (5) The Board shall have the authority to carry out the functions of the Agency in accordance with the statute and subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference, and to prepare the annual report of the Board as well as any reports to the United Nations or to any other organization.
4. *Supplying of Materials:* Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special fissionable materials as they deem advisable on such terms as shall be agreed with the Agency.

On the request of the Agency, a member shall deliver without delay to another member, or members, such quantities of such materials as the Agency may specify, and to the Agency itself such quantities of such materials as are necessary for the Agency's operations and scientific research. In this connection, the Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery, and where appropriate, the form and composition of the

materials. The Board shall determine the use to be made of materials made available to the Agency.

The Agency shall ensure that the materials in its possession are safe from the effects of weather, unauthorized removal, diversion, forcible seizure, damage, or destruction, and are dispersed geographically to avoid large concentrations in any one country or region.

5. *Agency Projects:* Any member may seek the assistance of the Agency in securing materials, services, equipment, and facilities required for setting up any project for research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The Board, may, with the approval of the recipient, send experts into its territory to examine a project, and before approving it shall consider such factors as its usefulness, the adequacy of funds, plans, and technical personnel, and of health and safety standards for handling and storing materials and operating facilities, as well as the inability of the recipient to secure the necessary assistance otherwise, and the equitable distribution of resources available to the Agency. Once the project is approved, an agreement will be entered into between the recipient member and the Agency setting forth the terms and conditions of assistance in conformity with the provisions of the statute.

6. *Agency Safeguards:* With respect to any Agency project, or where the Agency is requested to apply safeguards by the parties concerned, the Agency shall approve the design of equipment and facilities; require the observance of Agency health and safety standards and the maintenance of records and preparation of reports to help the Agency in accounting for materials; approve the means of chemical processing of irradiated materials and the disposition of special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product; and send into the recipient state or states inspectors with the right of access to all data, persons, and places, to determine whether or not Agency regulations are being complied with. Inspectors shall report non-compliance to the Director-General of the Agency, who shall report it to the Board for transmission to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. If the offending member does not, within a reasonable period of time, accede to the Board's request to comply, then the Board may curtail or suspend assistance to the member and withdraw materials and equipment. Any member persistently violating the provisions of the statute or of any agreement made under it may, upon the Board's recommendation, be suspended from membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.

7. *Relationship of the Agency to the United Nations:* The Board, with the approval of the General Conference, is authorized by the draft statute to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing relationships with the United Nations and any other organizations whose work is related to that of the Agency. Such agreement or agreements between the Agency and the United Nations shall provide for the submission of reports to appropriate organs of the United Nations, when requested, and consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by the General Assembly or by other councils of the United Nations.

Views of the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General's views on the relationship of the Agency to the United Nations were made known in a study circulated to all the governments concerned prior to the conference in Washington. The study outlined those basic principles which the Secretary-General considered should be included in the agreement to be entered into by the General Assembly, on behalf of the United Nations and the General Conference, on behalf of the Agency.

It was suggested by the Secretary-General that the United Nations should recognize that the Agency is responsible, "under the aegis of the United Nations", for taking action to accomplish the objectives set forth in the statute, and that "by virtue of its international character and international responsibilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency should function as an autonomous international organization under its statute and in the working relationship with the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies set out in the Agreement."

The Secretary-General was of the opinion that the Agency also should submit reports of its activities to the General Assembly, the Security Council, when appropriate, and to the Economic and Social Council and to other organs of the United Nations on matters within their competence. He proposed that the Agency should consider resolutions relating to the Agency adopted by the General Assembly or by any of the councils of the United Nations and, when requested, submit reports on any action taken by the Agency or its members as a result of such consideration; that it should also provide the Security Council with such assistance and information as may be needed to maintain or restore peace and security; and that it should co-operate with the United Nations and its organs to ensure co-ordination of its activities, including administrative matters, with those of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies.

The Secretary-General considered that he or his representatives should be entitled to attend and to participate without vote on matters of common interest in sessions of the General Conference, of the Board of Governors, and of other meetings of the Agency at which matters of interest to the United Nations are discussed. In his view, representatives of the Agency should also be allowed to attend and to participate without vote in meetings of the General Assembly and its committees, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and their subsidiary bodies; they might also attend meetings of the Security Council, at its invitation, to lend assistance on matters within the province of the Agency.

Other suggestions in the Secretary-General's study were that items proposed by the United Nations should be included on the agenda of the General Conference and the Board of Governors; that the Secretary-General should bring to the attention of the appropriate organs of the United Nations questions proposed by the Agency; and that the General Assembly should take action to enable any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's activities to be submitted to the International Court for an advisory opinion when requested by the Board in accordance with the statute of the Agency.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs, by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

A Compelling Deterrent

Excerpts from an address on Canada's defence given by Mr. R. O. Campney, Minister of National Defence, in Committee of Supply of the House of Commons, June 20, 1956.

A year ago, when I opened my remarks on the defence estimates, I did so by referring to the profound effect that nuclear weapons and fast, far-ranging jet bombers to carry them were having on all our thinking about defence. This, again, must be my opening thought today.

It is now 11 years since the first atomic explosion marked a new departure in warfare—more startling perhaps than any other since gunpowder first came into use some 700 years ago. And then, almost before we could begin fully to comprehend the terrifying possibilities of atomic weapons, the H-bomb added a vastly more far-reaching formidable dimension of terror and destruction—so comprehensive indeed that we cannot yet begin to assess its full magnitude.

No simple, clear-cut, complete answer to the defence problem thus poised has yet been found; and, frankly, as far as I can see, none is yet in sight. Is it any wonder, then, that throughout the free world there is dispute and controversy as to how this problem can be resolved? Is it any wonder that protagonists of this view or that, of this service or that service, of this defence element or that defence element, are so eagerly and at times vociferously projecting their particular views on a confused and worried public.

This active preoccupation with finding answers to the new weapons may ultimately bring us to the point where defence catches up with the offensive, which is now so far out in front in the race. I suppose that, if this balance is redressed, as it has been from time to time over the years in the past, war must then become an even less attractive adventure to aggressively-minded nations than it is today.

No nation ever wants to risk defeat; and that revulsion is made so much the stronger by awareness of how terrible defeat in thermonuclear war could be. And yet the threat of war continues. As long as this is true, our best hope is, undoubtedly, in the maintenance of a strong compelling deterrent. Primarily, of course, this deterrent at present is based on the strategic air force of the United States, now being augmented by that of Great Britain. But, to be effective, such strategic air forces must be supplemented by warning lines to enable their retaliatory planes to get off the ground immediately an attack is launched on the free world anywhere. They must also be supplemented by fighter air power to blunt the edge of the thermonuclear attack. They must also be again supplemented by well-trained, efficient ground forces to form a shield to prevent Europe being suddenly overrun by ground forces of an

aggressor. All these factors are just as much part of the deterrent as the thermo-nuclear retaliatory forces themselves.

To maintain the deterrent power of the free nations will not be an easy task, essential though it is to our survival. Paradoxically, as the existence of the deterrent continues to protect the peace, the continuance of that peace itself may tend to soften up the very deterrent force on which it depends, for it tends to give credibility to smiling assurances and friendly, folksy visits, all propagating the view that the day of world brotherhood has dawned at last, and suggesting that we can now safely set aside our defence programmes, with their heavy costs, and concentrate on the much more pleasant task of raising our material standard of life.

To thus relax our defence effort might be an inviting policy for the free nations, but it would be a very dangerous policy. We would be foolish indeed to neglect those defensive measures that have created the deterrent that has so far kept us all safe from a major war. Rather, we should, I think, make sure that those defensive measures are kept bright and strong.

Our opponents have a very keen understanding and appreciation of the importance of strength. This we have reason to know. They also have perhaps a better understanding than we of the subtle, insinuating effects of persuasive propaganda. If we must sup with the Kremlin, we should always be careful to use a very long spoon.

Change in Defence System

Today I should like briefly to touch on a few of the more notable ways in which Canada is building and maintaining a defence effort that is really out of all proportion to our status as a middle power. Hon. members have in their hands the white paper in which Canada's defence programme is spelled out in greater detail than I could hope to do in the time at my disposal today. My main purpose today, therefore, is to supplement what is in the white paper by drawing attention to some of the highlights, and by telling hon. members something of the changes taking place in our own defence system. In the discussions to follow, hon. members' questions will, I hope, enable me to give a more complete picture of that programme, and their suggestions will as always, I can assure them, receive not only my own consideration but that of my service advisers.

Change has been operative in many fields of defence activity in Canada, but particularly so in our air defence arrangements. Arising from continuing reassessment of Canada's part in the joint United States-Canada air defence programme, I can today announce two major developments: the re-organization of our auxiliary air force and an increase in the number of our regular interceptor squadrons.

Last year I drew the attention of hon. members to the studies being undertaken by the Royal Canadian Air Force to determine whether it was practicable to expect the part-time air crew of the Royal Canadian Air Force auxiliary, however skilled and devoted, to operate all-weather jet interceptors of the complexity of the CF-100 in the role of air defence. This important question, in relation to the overall problem of air defence generally, has con-

tinued to receive thorough reassessment by the Royal Canadian Air Force in the light of the thermonuclear air threat to this country.

This threat is such that defending forces must be able to operate in all conditions of weather by day or by night, must be on immediate alert status, and be trained to a very high standard of proficiency; and must, in peacetime, be deployed at their war stations. Our experience now forces us to the conclusion that these conditions are far too exacting to impose on auxiliary forces who are engaged on their civilian duties throughout the week and whose flying therefore is limited mainly to week-ends. Consequently, the ten auxiliary squadrons that were to have been re-equipped with CF-100 all-weather fighters will no longer comprise part of the first-line forces in the North American air defence system . . .

New Interceptor Squadrons

The conditions that have brought about the withdrawal of these auxiliary flying squadrons from the first-line air defence force necessitates increases in the regular force units assigned to this role in Canada. Accordingly, I can now announce that steps will be taken to establish, over a period of time, three new all-weather interceptor squadrons equipped with CF-100 aircraft. This increase, with the 12 squadrons in Europe, will bring to 24 the number of regular force fighter squadrons. The size and composition of Canada's contribution to the continental air defence system continue, of course, to be under review.

Towards the end of this year we will replace one of our Sabre squadrons in Europe with a squadron equipped with CF-100 all-weather interceptor aircraft. And at intervals thereafter, during 1957, three more Sabre squadrons will be thus replaced. This will fulfil our undertaking to NATO to provide four squadrons of all-weather interceptors. Throughout, our commitment in Europe remains at 12 squadrons.

As for new equipment, the Air Force, working in conjunction with the defence research board, is making good progress with its new supersonic delta wing all-weather fighter interceptor, the CF-105, being developed by A. V. Roe, Limited which, with the very advanced and powerful PS-13 engine being designed for it, is expected to constitute a very fast and formidable fighting plane.

The development and preproduction work at Canadair Limited on the CL-28, the new maritime anti-submarine aircraft developed from the Britannia aircraft, is also proceeding very well, and the prototype is expected to fly next spring. By the production of successively improved marks, both the Sabre and the CF-100 are still, and will continue for some time to be, of their sort and for their purpose, first class and effective fighter planes.

The job of the Royal Canadian Air Force is certainly now a widely diversified one, including the interception of enemy bombers, the transport of troops and supplies, the support of anti-submarine activities and defence of shipping operations . . .

The Royal Canadian Air Force is also responsible for the building of the Mid-Canada line, one of the greatest construction projects ever undertaken in

Canada and one that, apart altogether from its defence implications, is dramatically contributing to the opening of the great Canadian north.

The Mid-Canada line and the DEW line, as the committee know, will form part of a warning system anchored on the Pinetree stations already in operation, all linked together by a vast complex of communications. The Pinetree system itself is being strengthened by additional stations. On both the DEW line, being built largely by Canadian contractors working for the United States Air Force, and the Mid-Canada line, being built by Canada, admirable progress is being made. These are projects of great difficulty and magnitude—costly, but we believe worth the cost. For they will buy us time—time to get the big United States deterrent force of bombers with their nuclear weapons winging away on their missions should the need arise, time to get our defences activated, time to prepare our people for impending attack.

Another purpose of this system is to alert our sister NATO nations if the Canadian north should be chosen as the first point of any attack. It is hoped that in the near future the early warning system of North America will be linked with an early warning system in Europe, to which NATO is giving high priority, thus forming an integrated comprehensive early warning system covering the whole of the NATO area. These warning lines cannot—I want to be very frank about this—buy us absolute protection. Their searching beams are not steel barriers. In a determined attack some enemy planes would run the gamut of the defending fighters and many lives would undoubtedly be lost. But these lines will nevertheless contribute very materially to NATO air defence plans generally and to Canada-United States effectiveness in particular. In defence terms any enemy invasion of our northland is of immediate concern to every Canadian, but—and this we should not forget—I think it is of equal concern to the citizens of the United States. Realistic policy for continental air defence requires the closest co-operation between our two countries.

Let me assure the committee, there is the closest co-operation. Our defence plans are closely integrated. Our relationship is a friendly one, founded on mutual respect and full understanding of each other's particular rights and interests, and dedicated to the defence of our common continental home against present, indisputable and continuing grave dangers.

Both of the new northern lines are rapidly approaching completion. The United States is now recruiting civilian technicians, for the most part Canadians, incidentally, to assist in manning the DEW line for the initial period. Recruiting and training of civilian technicians will shortly begin to assist the Royal Canadian Air Force servicemen, already trained, in manning the Mid-Canada line.

May I turn now to the Canadian Army. I can advise the committee that the note of change that is evident in Air Force plans applies with equal force to the Army. Indeed, for all the services, the changing shape of our defence problem requires constant re-examination of our defence plans and organizations.

For many months a number of the most senior officers in the Canadian Army have been examining the organization of field formations that would best meet Canada's needs in the light of our commitments, both present and possible, and under conditions of either so-called conventional or nuclear warfare.

The Army has also been closely following recent reviews of army organization in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other countries which are intended to take account of new weapons and conditions of war, and the army has had observers at large-scale NATO divisional tests in Europe.

Increased Mobility

It is generally accepted that, in the use of ground forces, we must work toward a greater degree of flexibility and increased mobility. In particular, practical assessments are being made by the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army of those types of aircraft that would be most suitable for rapid deployment, supply, and support of Canada's ground forces.

As the committee knows, Canada for some time has had a mobile striking force of three battalions of infantry with supporting arms and services, largely trained as parachutists and transportable in C-119 aircraft known as flying box cars. The established role of this force has been to deal with possible small diversionary raids in the Canadian north . . .

Turning next to the Royal Canadian Navy, there is less by way of change to report this year since the Navy has so recently reviewed its place in modern war, with sweeping changes in ship design, equipment and tactics. But there is every evidence that this arm of our forces will continue to have an important place in our defence planning.

We are all well aware of the tremendous size, modern design, and readiness of the Russian submarine fleet, which could be used not only to destroy shipping but also perhaps to make long-range missile attacks, using nuclear weapons, on the coastal areas of this continent. Remembering, of course, that the submarine is primarily an offensive weapon, we are continuing to improve as rapidly as possible the anti-submarine capabilities of our fleet. To this end, we can look forward this year to the addition of about nine new operational ships to the fleet, and several supporting crafts as well.

The most noteworthy of the additions to the fleet will be the commissioning of HMCS *Bonaventure*, a light fleet aircraft carrier of the latest design, which will replace HMCS *Magnificent*. The *Bonaventure* will be armed with the Banshee jet-fighter aircraft, which have begun to come forward, and the Canadian-made CS-2F anti-submarine aircraft. These fine modern aircraft will replace the Sea Furies and Avengers formerly in the naval service.

Other additions to the fleet will be three and possibly four destroyer escorts of the *St. Laurent* class, specially designed to meet the conditions of nuclear war. You will recall that the first of these ships, HMCS *St. Laurent*, was commissioned last autumn. Earlier this year she went down to the United States and carried out successfully a very comprehensive series of performance trials and exercises. I am pleased to say I have seen fine reports on this.

Subsequently, the *St. Laurent* visited the United Kingdom for the same purpose, and during this visit participated in escorting Her Majesty the Queen on her visit to Sweden. This Canadian destroyer-escort is probably the finest and most modern anti-submarine vessel in the world today.

In summary, I would emphasize that we are vigorously pursuing our policy of enhancing the anti-submarine capabilities of the Canadian Navy, which is its specialized NATO role . .

After training more than 3,800 aircrew, at a cost of \$328 million to date, Canada's NATO air training programme is being reviewed and probably will be adjusted downward starting in 1958.

The original plan was to provide trained pilots and navigators to build up the frontline strength of aircrew in the NATO countries. This has now been achieved and the training of aircrew for replacement purposes can now be taken over by most of the NATO nations themselves.

Besides what has been done to train NATO aircrew under Canada's mutual aid programme, this programme since its inception in 1950 has done much to strengthen the defences of our allies in Europe. As their own capability increases, our programme of aid is being scaled downward. More and more the equipment we are supplying is from current production rather than from existing stock.

The value of mutual aid to our NATO partners now totals more than \$1,274 million. This includes, as an example, the provision of more than 600 modern fighter planes and more than 1,000 aircraft engines...

Forces in Being

I might remind the committee that NATO places great emphasis on forces in being. This has been asserted again and again by NATO leaders.

In 1939 we were quite unready for war. Today we have in full fighting trim an army brigade and an air division in Europe and at home a mobile striking force and three infantry brigade groups in the Army; an effective air defence system and other supporting units with more than 3,000 planes in the Air Force; and a Navy with 40 fighting ships at sea and a still greater number under construction or conversion or in reserve...

As more and more the requirements of modern war tend to become inter-related, the Department of National Defence, through the co-ordinating efforts of the chairman, chiefs of staff and the joint staff organization, has brought the three services into ever closer working relationship. More than 900 officer cadets are in training at our three tri-service colleges.

It is certain that this trend towards a more unified approach to the defence problem must continue if all the services are to make their maximum contribution to the defence effort and most efficiently manage the defence systems that they are best fitted for. As we move into the use of guided missiles it is more important than ever to have the Navy, Army and Air Force in close co-operation, agreeing on their particular fields of endeavour...

The U.S.S.R., by shifting emphasis from quantity to quality, also seems to be working towards more streamlined and professional forces.

For some time now Canada's armed forces, I believe, have had a higher percentage of fully trained personnel than those of most other countries. In recent years, without undue difficulty, and without lowering our selectively high standards of recruiting, we have been able to maintain our forces at about planned size, and we have been able to persuade a relatively high percentage of our recruits to make the services their career—a most important factor in the build-up of first class regular forces...



NATO COLOUR PARTY

Flags from 11 nations, flying in the wind on the tarmac of an RCAF station, graphically illustrate Canada's NATO partnership. As one of Canada's NATO commitments, the RCAF trains aircrew from 10 other NATO countries, who learn to fly alongside fledgling RCAF aircrew. Since 1951, the RCAF has trained more than 4,000 airmen from other NATO countries.

In the difficult time since World War II, it has not been easy for the free nations to keep their freedoms intact. It has not been by chance, certainly, that this has been achieved. It has, indeed, been only because of the resolute determination of the free peoples working together toward a common end. As a partner in two great organizations looking to the maintenance of peace, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canada has given abundant proof of her sincere desire to avoid war and of her active concern for the correction of conditions which might lead to war.

Despite its failure to measure up to the first high ideals it set itself, the United Nations has still helped to prevent and, at the least, to limit war. There is the historic example of Korea, where, incidentally, a small group of Canadians still serve on, the rear guard of that valiant force that fought, successfully, in the Korean war. Canadian officers also, under United Nations auspices, are today serving the cause in Indo-China, in Kashmir and in Israel.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is founded on the truth that in union there is strength. In Canada we subscribe to that truth. In stationing Canadian servicemen in France and Germany, in training aircrew from nine NATO countries here in Canada, and in welcoming United States troops to stand beside our own in defence of our common continental home, we give evidence of our conviction that, in the NATO family, a "stay at home" policy and a "visiting forces not wanted" policy have no place and, indeed, if given effect to, could endanger us all.

The great defensive system that we have built in NATO with so much labour must not be allowed to fall into disrepair. Honest assessment of the world situation tells us that we cannot safely rest on what we have done. We must go on working together for the common good with undiminished zeal and equal determination.

Despite our considerable defence expenditures, and despite our best defence endeavours, there can be, for Canadians, no such thing as absolute safety. That must be sought, not by standing alone in our defence preparations, but in the collective strength and evident capacity of the free nations to survive attack and to strike back with desperate, devastating force. For, paradoxically, it is in the awareness and abhorrence of nuclear war that we must probably look for our best defence against its breaking out . . .

Surely no one could look forward, with equanimity, to year after year of uneasy expectation of that dread day when the first H-bombs might fall. However futile our best attempts may have proved so far, we must keep on trying for disarmament. And we must come to grips with some of those central problems that have led to war: ignorance and hate, disease, privation and poverty.

For it is clearly evident—and it is on this note, and not a defence statistic, that I want to end my opening remarks to this committee—it is clearly evident that, for us and for the generations that will follow us into the wonders and hazards of this thermonuclear age, there must be some surer guarantee of peace, some less uncertain protection against disaster, than military might can hope to provide.

Canada and the World Meteorological Organization

THE World Meteorological Organization is one of ten intergovernmental organizations which are linked with the United Nations through special agreements arranged by the Economic and Social Council and approved by the General Assembly and by the organization concerned. The "Specialized Agencies" of the United Nations are expert in their respective fields: labour, health, education, food and agriculture, finance and banking, civil aviation, postal matters, telecommunications and meteorology.

History

The earth's weather and climate do not respect political frontiers and they create many similar problems all over the world. Realizing that large-scale international co-operation was necessary to solve these problems, the nations of the world have made a common effort to apply available knowledge of the weather and its evolution to the main activities of man. Canada, occupying as it does a considerable portion of the northern hemisphere, including a large part of the meteorologically vital Arctic, became one of the earliest participants in this international exchange of weather data.

From 1853 efforts were made to draw up a programme of meteorological observations over the oceans, based on the collaboration of shipping belonging to most of the maritime countries. This was still fourteen years before Canada attained her national status.

In 1878, the International Meteorological Organization, composed of the Directors of National Meteorological Services, was created during an international conference at Utrecht in the Netherlands. The infant Meteorological Service of Canada, established in 1871, was not represented at this meeting.

In 1882 the head of the Canadian Meteorological Service, C. Carpmael, sent a full report on the state of the Canadian service to the second meeting of the International Committee held at Copenhagen that year. By 1885 European meteorologists, recognizing the importance of data from Canada and the United States, were studying ways and means of getting weather reports from North America by cable.

During the present century the tremendous development of means of transport and communications (sea and air navigation, radio-telegraphy) and the increased requirements of modern economic activity have given rise to a large number of technical problems and have emphasized the importance of meteorology. At the same time, the surprising development of technology has enabled this relatively young science to make considerable progress. These new developments showed that reorganization at an international level was necessary in view of the increased interest in meteorology.

Consequently the Conference of Directors of the national Meteorological



FAR NORTH WEATHER STATION

Most northerly in Canada, the weather station at Alert, on the northeast tip of Ellesmere Island, is one of five operated jointly by the United States and Canada in the Arctic.

Services, which met at Washington in 1947 under the auspices of the International Meteorological Organization, adopted the World Meteorological Convention establishing a new organization founded on an agreement between governments. Just prior to this Conference, Canada had played host to the sessions of the Technical Commissions of the IMO which met in Toronto in the summer of 1947.

The Convention adopted at Washington was ratified by a large number of states and in 1951 the new World Meteorological Organization became active, the former organization having been dissolved. Furthermore, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved, in December 1951, the agreement between the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization. The latter was thus recognized by the United Nations as a Specialized Agency.

The objectives of WMO are:

- (1) to facilitate world-wide co-operation in establishing networks of stations for making meteorological observations or other geophysical observations related to meteorology, and to promote the establishment and maintenance of centres for providing meteorological services;
- (2) to promote the establishment and maintenance of systems for rapidly exchanging weather information;

- (3) to promote standardization of meteorological observations and to ensure the uniform publication of observations and statistics;
- (4) to further the application of meteorology to aviation, shipping, agriculture, and other human activities;
- (5) to encourage research and training in meteorology and to assist in co-ordinating the international aspects of such research and training.

Structure and Activities

WMO's administrative and technical machinery consists of:

- (1) a World Meteorological Congress in which 86 member countries are represented by the heads of their meteorological services. It meets once every four years to adopt technical regulations on meteorological practices and procedures and to determine general policy;
- (2) an Executive Committee which supervises the carrying out of resolutions of the Congress, initiates studies, and makes recommendations on matters requiring international action. It provides members with technical information, advice, and assistance. Meeting at least once a year, its membership includes the President and Vice-President of WMO, the President of WMO's six Regional Meteorological Associations, and six elected members;
- (3) six Regional Meteorological Associations (Africa, Asia, South America, North and Central America, Europe, and the Southwest Pacific) composed of member countries whose meteorological networks lie in or extend into the Region.
- (4) Technical Commissions established by the Congress to study and make recommendations on technical subjects.
- (5) A Secretariat under the direction of a Secretary-General.

It is necessary, for the practical use and the comparison of observations made at weather stations throughout the world, to standardize and co-ordinate them. Today, all stations make their observations at the same time in all countries of the world with instruments standardized and compared with international standard instruments. Reports from over 200 Canadian stations are included in the international exchange.

However, WMO does not merely draw up regulations and standardize. In 1953, the Organization's programme included the preparation of world thunderstorm maps and the publication of an international cloud atlas. WMO also takes part in arid zone research and contributes to the development of arid land by studying climatic conditions. The Organization actively collaborates in planning "World days" during the International Geophysical Year to study, on a world-wide basis, the properties of the upper air. Locust control and the protection of crops from this pest is a collective undertaking to which WMO contributes. Another important activity of the Organization is to encourage scientific research and instruction in meteorology by all possible means. The WMO collects and makes available to all national meteorological services information on the regional and international organization of meteorological activity. It may be said that the role of WMO is to provide technical assistance in order to facilitate technical progress within the general field of economic

development. In putting its programme of technical assistance into effect, as well as in other fields of its activity, WMO collaborates closely with the United Nations and with other Specialized Agencies.

Canadian Participation

The Canadian Meteorological Service has always played an active part in international meteorology. The first meetings of some of the Technical Commissions, after the WMO was founded, took place in Toronto in 1954. The head of the Canadian weather service, Dr. Andrew Thomson, is a member of the Executive Committee, and is also President of Regional Association IV (North and Central America). Members of the Canadian weather service have served on all Technical Commissions, either as chairman, full member, or technical adviser.

Canadian ships on the high seas report their weather by radio to the nearest land station, and receive in return forecasts and storm warnings for the area through which they are sailing. In return, vessels of foreign registry frequently provide reports of their local weather to Canadian coastal stations, and receive Canadian forecasts and storm warnings for marine areas contiguous to the Atlantic and Pacific shores of Canada. There is no charge made for any of these transmissions to the ships. The national weather service in question bears the cost of transmitting the ship reports to its own forecast centres and to those of neighbouring states. Under the aegis of the WMO, a substantial increase has also taken place in international co-operation by the facsimile exchange of analyzed weather maps among the countries of the northern hemisphere.

Through the good offices of the WMO, and other organizations, there exists an agreement to operate ocean weather stations by which ships are maintained at locations in the Atlantic and Pacific. Reports from these ships greatly facilitate trans-oceanic flights by Canadian air carriers. For its part, Canada operates an ocean weather station in the Pacific, Station Papa, 100 miles west of Vancouver.

The fact that the Canadian Meteorological Service, as well as the weather Service of the United States and the West Indies, could accurately track and forecast the life history of hurricane "Hazel" (October 1954) is a tribute to the co-operation achieved internationally through the WMO. The meteorological history of Canada, and of other member countries, is filled with similar, almost daily examples of the benefits of international co-operation in the field of meteorology.

Canada pays 2.43 per cent of the regular budget of the WMO. In 1955 the net budget of the Organization for assessment purposes was \$314,809 (U.S.).

Ninth World Health Assembly

THE World Health Organization (WHO), one of the ten Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, has as its objective "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health". Once a year WHO holds an Assembly attended not only by delegations from member states but also by representatives and observers from other United Nations bodies as well as from non-governmental organizations and medical and scientific associations. The ninth World Health Assembly met in Geneva from May 8 to 25. Representatives from 70 states attended, and the Canadian delegation was led by Dr. G. D. W. Cameron, Deputy Minister of National Health.

This year's Assembly was notable for a number of accomplishments. Already one of the largest of the Specialized Agencies, WHO expanded its membership to 88 states when the Assembly agreed to grant full membership to the newly independent states of Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia; in addition the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were admitted as associate members. The ninth Assembly also approved the terms under which nine members of WHO which had been inactive for a number of years again will be eligible to participate in the work of the Agency. Five of these members—Roumania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland—had withdrawn from WHO in 1950, and four of them—U.S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., Byelorussian S.S.R., and Bulgaria—had taken no part in Agency work since 1949. When these states indicated they were again prepared to co-operate with WHO, it became necessary for the ninth Assembly to work out a formula covering their arrears and contributions.

As decided by the Assembly, the WHO programme for 1957 will again give high priority to malaria eradication. WHO is assisting with malaria control in more than 20 countries by providing technical guidance and setting up demonstration and training projects and model clinics. Particular emphasis is being placed on the urgent task of destroying malaria mosquitoes before these insects develop resistance to insecticides.


The Assembly noted with concern that, especially in highly industrialized areas of the world, rheumatic, hypertensive, and coronary groups of heart diseases are a leading and ever-increasing cause of death and that they are affecting wider segments of the population. These diseases will be given increased attention by the Agency's panels and expert committees, which will also give further study to occupational health, cardiovascular diseases, cancer, rheumatism, and geriatrics. The Assembly also approved a programme in the field of atomic energy which includes the training of public health personnel and studies of various health risks connected with radiation and radio-active waste disposal.

The Assembly decided to abolish those parts of the WHO international sanitary regulations dealing specifically with the Mecca pilgrimage. This decision will be of particular importance to countries with Moslem populations.

Special technical discussions were held on the education of nurses and their role in public health programmes.

As proposed by the Director General, and approved by the Assembly, the WHO budget for 1957 is about \$11 million. If, however, the nine inactive members resume participation in time, an additional \$1.5 million will be added to the budget. Although this amount of money will not, of course, meet all the health needs of the world or even the most pressing needs of the underdeveloped areas, the budget reflects the amounts which member states are able or willing to contribute. Canada's share of the 1957 budget will be approximately \$382,940.

Canada was elected, for a three-year (1956-59) term, to the 18-member Executive Board which gives effect to the decisions and policies of the annual assembly.



VISIT TO HAITI

His Excellency General P. E. Magloire, President of Haiti, extended a warm welcome to Canadian personnel when HMCS Magnificent and destroyer escort paid a recent call at Port-au-Prince. Chatting with Gen. Magloire are, left to right: Commodore E. P. Tisdall, senior Canadian Officer Afloat (Atlantic); E. P. Bellemare, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. at the Canadian Embassy, Port-au-Prince; and Capt. A. H. G. Storrs, Commanding Officer of the Magnificent.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND A NEW NATO

Excerpts from an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Commencement Exercises, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 3, 1956.

... I wish that I had time to discuss with you some . . . problems; particularly in the international field, where I am supposed to be more or less at home, having been working in it now for about thirty years. I will mention, however, only two.

The first of these problems is the current—and I hope searching—re-appraisal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—in its non-military aspects, and of ways and means of developing greater unity in the North Atlantic community. This work is being undertaken by a committee of three NATO Foreign Ministers who, incidentally have begun their work with one strike against them by being dubbed “The Three Wise Men”.

NATO stands today at the very heart of the security of the free world, but a lot of people are so ignorant about it that they think it is a kind of breakfast food. Its defences protect the moral and spiritual basis of a vital segment of that world—as well as its physical security. Those defences are still needed. The danger of military aggression remains. So does the importance of collective strength to deter and, if necessary, repel it.

New Challenge

NATO also faces, however, at this time, a new challenge in the all-out political and economic offensive from Moscow. Our methods, especially in the fields of closer political and economic consultation must be adapted to meet this new challenge.

When NATO's task was almost exclusively military, the ways and means of providing defence against aggression could be thought of in terms of men and missiles. But the strength which NATO now needs, to cope with competitive co-existence has to be cultivated also in terms of public attitudes and of consultation and of voluntary and close co-operation between all member governments.

To this end, the first task of NATO is to look to its internal strength and unity, and to resist those forces which would weaken it. This means that our cohesion must find a more durable basis than the fear which originally brought us together in 1949. We must seek out new ways of providing not only for the continued maintenance of a defensive shield against aggression, but also for strengthening the existing ties which bind

members of the Atlantic Community more closely together. These ties, moreover, are not artificial creations; they existed long before NATO.

Since the war, the nations of Western Europe, with their vast reserves of knowledge, skills, and initiatives have moved toward a closer unity, the outward and institutional expression of which takes many forms.

Viewed against the background of narrow concepts of sovereignty and ancient enmities, the progress which has been made in the last ten years towards European unity is encouraging, though it is not as fast as some impatient souls would desire. Furthermore, expressed in practical forms, it gives Europeans more—not less—authority in playing their proper role on the world stage. And that is all to the good.

Bridging the Gap

The island state of Britain, with its world as well as European responsibilities, can play an important part in this move to European integration by helping to bridge the gap between the interlocking and developing communities of Europe and the Atlantic. At the same time, the North American countries—the United States and Canada—must more than ever before realize that their destinies extend across the Atlantic.

While the other countries concerned have their part to play, it is, I think, true to say that European integration and the cohesion of the Atlantic Community—neither of which excludes the other—will proceed as far and as fast as the United States and the United Kingdom make possible by recognizing the importance of their own roles in bringing it about; and in a way which will strengthen the Atlantic area as a whole.

This, then, is the first task of the new NATO—to strengthen the internal unity of the alliance, to prevent centrifugal forces from sundering it; to build upon the existing foundations of European and Atlantic unity, and to aid and assist the various initiatives to this end within the framework of the Atlantic community, and against the background of the broader international arrangements in which the Atlantic countries are participating as good citizens of the world.

Its second task will be to take advantage of any and every opportunity new soviet tactics

may present to break through the vicious circle of suspicion and fear in the "cold war", in an effort to test Soviet aims and to bring about genuine negotiation. If we cannot do this by a forward looking and flexible diplomacy, and without yielding to the temptation to relax our defence effort, (though we may have to alter its character), then NATO will hardly survive.

Testing Period

We cannot move, of course, from open hostility or sterile "co-existence" to constructive international co-operation without the searching testing period which would be provided by attempts to settle the several important issues which still unhappily divide the Communist and non-Communist world. These issues will not settle themselves; nor will they be settled either by brandishing our swords, or by throwing them away. We must be certain in NATO that if they are *not* settled, it will not be *our* fault.

The unification of Germany by the free choice of its people; effective and agreed disarmament, the right of captive European peoples to decide their own future; a European security system; a united effort by the major world powers to make the United Nations work as it was originally intended to work; all these are the testing grounds of the future on which the Soviet peace offensive must be judged.

It would be rash indeed to be dogmatic, either positively or negatively, about the real significance of the changes which have taken place in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin. We should avoid unreasonable optimism, for orthodox communist revolutionary tenets may still be dominant in Russia, and there is no peace in them. But also we would be unwise to reject out of hand the possibility that a new and pragmatic approach to internal affairs may be developing among the Soviet leaders, combined with a desire on the part of their peoples to return to a more normal relationship with other peoples. If this tendency were to extend, or could be made to extend, to the conduct of Soviet foreign relations and to the many problems which still divide us, we could at last begin to see more solid grounds for hope and confidence than we have now.

Therefore without illusions or without despair we must hold ourselves ready to strengthen and encourage any elements which wish to deal with the world as it in fact exists rather than as Marxist dogma pictures it. We must also be prepared, however, for the contingency that no such elements do exist, at least in a form seriously to influence policy.

This process of testing—of examination and discovery may be a long and difficult one. During it there is an obligation for NATO to maintain itself in readiness to deal with any emergency, military or diplomatic. By doing so, by steadfastly maintaining its basic purposes, and by demonstrating to the world that its continued existence is essential to the future of free men, it can play a vital part in leading the way forward from the bleak prospects of "cold war", or of a harshly "competitive co-existence", to the more distant horizons of world co-operation.

Mutual Assistance

There is one other problem that I would like to mention, which these words, "world co-operation", bring to mind. It is that of international economic assistance. The problem here is to reconcile our obligations to the international community with those to our own people, to whom a government owes its first duty. But it is more than that. It is a problem, not only of what to do (and no country in the world has ever done as much as this country); but of how and why to do it.

The need for assistance to those countries which have not shared in our industrial and technical advances is real and demanding. It will never be satisfactorily met, however, merely by pouring in assistance in a form which, economically, may be a way of putting people on the dole; politically, may give rise to suspicion that there are strings attached to it; and technically, is beyond the capacity of the receiving peoples to administer effectively.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations uttered some wise words on this subject the other night when he said:

"We should not forget that it may be more difficult to live on the dole than to pay it. Few friendships survive a long drawn-out economic dependency of one upon the other. Gratitude is a good link only when it can be given and received without an overtone of humiliation."

A cynic might doubt whether gratitude, so often a "lively anticipation of favours to come", is a good link at all. The feeling of mutual assistance and co-operative effort is surely better. But that requires careful and sensitive planning; a clear understanding of why you are helping and are being helped.

This understanding can surely best be achieved by using the United Nations more and more as the clearing house for all forms of such assistance; as a place where plans can be discussed and related to each other; where purposes can be clarified and, if necessary,

exposed. Where, on the other hand, suspicions can be removed when they are unjust and unwarranted.

This does not mean that bilateral aid such as Point IV, or aid under such arrangements as the Colombo Plan, should be abandoned, or taken over by the United Nations. That would be unnecessary and undesirable as well as politically unrealistic. But the United Nations should be brought more and more into the picture, and all its members pressed to accept their full responsibility. In this way, as Mr. Hammarskjöld put it, we may find "a sound basis for the reconciliation of the natural national interest with valid international considerations."

Enlightened Self-Interest

But why bother at all? Haven't we enough to do at home? I could spend an hour or so on this question. Here I can only say that while the element of goodwill and neighbourliness does enter into these matters, as it does in their domestic manifestations, equally or more important is the long-term consideration of our own enlightened self-interest.

Today we all want peace; more anxiously, perhaps, than ever before, because the alternative could be total annihilation. But we are not always willing to do the things or make the sacrifices that ensure peace. Are we willing to accept, for instance, the proposition that there will be no peace in this small world if it consists of "residential areas surrounded by slums."

The domestic analogy applies here. Every free democratic government today accepts the fact—and most of them act on it—that national stability, welfare and progress are not possible if the poor are allowed to get poorer while the rich get richer. Inequalities and deprivations that are considered intolerable mean unrest, ferment and ultimate explosion.

The same result will inevitably and inexorably occur internationally, if hundreds of millions of people feel condemned indefinitely to an existence below or on the edge of subsistence; hopeless and helpless and bitter; the easy victims for extreme ideas and extremist agitators.

The main and the final responsibility for avoiding this situation lies with the governments and the peoples concerned. We in more favoured parts of the world can only supplement their efforts, unless of course, those efforts are hostile to us. But, we would be well advised to do that, and primarily in our own interest.

Nor should we expect, as I have just said, much gratitude; least of all the United States of America which, I think, deserves it most, in terms of the magnitude of the assistance given.

The United States is the most powerful and the richest country in the world. Yet while great national wealth and power can achieve international recognition and respect, it rarely gains affection—and not too often even understanding. This is something to which the giant has to become accustomed.

All history shows this to be the case, and most recently, the history of the British Empire.

I was reading the other day an article by Mr. Eugen Weber, a British Professor at the University of Iowa, entitled, "European Reactions to American Policies", which contained some witty and perspective reflections on this score. I will quote two paragraphs, while refusing to take responsibility for all the expressions he uses:

"The Greeks despised the Romans as Barbarians; no doubt the Egyptians in their turn despised the Greeks. We British have also had our time of greatness—our time of world supremacy. What were we in those days? We were perfidious Albion. We were a nation of long-shanked, long-toothed milords; of lean and angular spinsters; patronizing Cook's tours, gaping at European culture (which we were not supposed to understand), and calling loudly wherever we went for tea and for porridge. Now we are decaying, and only the memories of this great tradition still live on. We have gathered the distinction of decay. People prize us, like one of the riper sorts of cheese. We are supposed to enshrine and guard admirable traditions, a great cultural heritage, which no one seemed to suspect (or at any rate admit) a generation or two ago. It is wonderful what a little failure can do!

"Meanwhile, the Americans have taken over, more nilly than willy, the banner with the strange device of the white man's burden. They provide the perfidy, they provide the comic relief, they provide the gaping, uncultured tourists chewing gum and sipping cokes. They are the powerful and the rich, and for this they must pay the penalty; and one part of the penalty is that they cannot be loved when they are feared . . . or exploited."

On a day like this, however, I would not like to end on a note which suggests that one cannot be loved. Everything about this com-

mencement suggests a happier and more hopeful mood. I know that you who are graduating are the beneficiaries indeed the very centre of that mood today. I hope that it may

follow you in the months and years ahead when you will be privileged to put into action the sound principles and the good training that you have received at this University.



—*Capital Press*
Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery is shown during his recent visit to the Canadian capital, in conversation with Prime Minister L. S. St. Laurent.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. D. M. Johnson appointed Ambassador of Canada to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Proceeded to Moscow June 29, 1956.
- Mr. R. M. Tait posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Athens, effective June 1, 1956.
- Mr. S. D. Pierce posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective June 1, 1956.
- Mr. R. H. Jay posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva, effective June 5, 1956.
- Mr. G. L. Seens posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Indochina, effective June 9, 1956.
- Mr. J. B. R. Chaput posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective June 13, 1956.
- Mr. O. A. Chistoff posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Indochina, effective June 16, 1956.
- Mr. R. E. Reynolds posted from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva to the Canadian Embassy, Copenhagen, effective June 26, 1956.
- Miss M. I. M. Dunlop posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Vienna, effective June 28, 1956.
- Mr. G. Mathieu appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 4, 1956.
- Mr. A. D. Bryce appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Information Officer 3, effective June 11, 1956.
- Mr. D. R. Hill appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 12, 1956.
- Mr. E. H. Norman, High Commissioner, posted from Wellington to Ottawa, effective May 10, 1956.
- Mr. J. F. X. Houde posted from the Canadian Embassy, Athens, to Ottawa, effective May 31, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

- Printed Documents: ...
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- United Nations Refugee Fund.* Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1955 and Report of the Board of Auditors. A/3128. N.Y., 1956. 8 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 6D.
- Commission on Human Rights.* Report of the Twelfth Session (5-29 March 1956). E/2844, E/CN.4/731. N.Y., April 1956. 28 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 3.
- Commission on the Status of Women.* Report of the Tenth Session (12-29 March 1956). E/2850, E/CN.6/286. N.Y., April 13, 1956. 21 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4.
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* Printed documents may be produced from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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- International Labour Conference, Fortieth Session, 1957:*
- Report VII(1)—Discrimination in the field of employment and occupation,* Geneva, 1956. 42 p.
- Report VIII(1)—Conditions of employment of plantation workers.* Geneva, 1956. 96 p.
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—Associated Press

Her Majesty and HRH the Duke of Edinburgh, accompanied by HRH Princess Margaret, the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester, and Lord and Lady Mountbatten, paid a private visit to the Canadian Embassy, Stockholm, on June 12. The Royal Couple are seen above with Mr. and Mrs. Chapdelaine. The painting shown is entitled "Laurentian Landscape, Shawbridge," and was done by Jacques de Tonnancour, of Montreal.



Royal Visit to Sweden

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II paid a state visit to Sweden June 8-10 and was an unofficial guest of that country June 11-17. Activities during the visit underlined in many ways the fact that Her Majesty has other realms besides the United Kingdom, and the Canadian Ambassador, Mr. J. A. Chapdelaine, and Mrs. Chapdelaine, with other Heads of Commonwealth Missions and their wives, were present on all important occasions during the official part of the visit.

Above—Her Majesty is seen with Mr. Chapdelaine on her arrival at the Canadian Embassy.

—National Defence

Right—The Queen and HRH the Duke of Edinburgh, followed by Admiral the Earl Mountbatten, Britain's First Sea Lord, come aboard HMCS St. Laurent at Stockholm. The St. Laurent escorted the Queen in the Royal Yacht Britannia during Her Majesty's visit to Sweden. It marked the first time a Canadian ship had the honour of carrying out these duties.



Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer

INTERNATIONAL issues as they affected each of the countries represented and the Commonwealth generally were discussed in London June 27-July 6 at the seventh meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held since the end of the Second World War.

Succeeding Sir Winston Churchill, chairman of the last meeting held in January-February 1955, Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain, was in the chair. Among the Commonwealth colleagues he welcomed to the deliberations were three Prime Ministers attending in that capacity for the first time—the Hon. J. G. Strydom, of South Africa, Mr. Mohamad Ali, of Pakistan, and the Hon. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, of Ceylon. The Canadian Delegation was led by Prime Minister St. Laurent, who was accompanied by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs. The other Prime Ministers in attendance were the Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, of Australia, the Rt. Hon. S. G. Holland, of New Zealand, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, of India, and Lord Malvern, of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Reporting to the House of Commons on July 9 following his return from London, Mr. St. Laurent said that, as is customary, the conference did not seek to reach any collective decision or take definite action. Its main purpose, he pointed out, was “to assist in bringing points of view closer together”. Earlier, Mr. St. Laurent had tabled the communiqué issued on July 6 at the close of the conference. The texts of the communiqué and of Mr. St. Laurent’s statement are given below.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUÉ

During the past ten days Commonwealth Prime Ministers have together reviewed the current state of international affairs. Their discussions have again revealed a sense of common purpose in their approach to the major problems of the day. The peoples of the Commonwealth all share the common heritage of parliamentary democracy. They respect aspirations for freedom and self-government, and they take pride in what they themselves have done in helping to fulfil those aspirations.

This meeting has been held at a significant stage in the development of international relations. A new element has been introduced by the growing recognition of the devastating power of thermonuclear weapons. Other developments of importance have taken place in the world, including changes in the Soviet Union. The common understanding which the Prime Ministers have reached in their review will form a valuable background which will assist each government in the formulation and pursuit of its national policies.

Despite the high hopes with which the world emerged from the last war, new international tensions developed. These have given rise to increasing fears and suspicion. They have resulted in vast expenditures on armaments and economic distortions which have delayed the full development of the world’s natural resources for the common good.

The governments and peoples of the Commonwealth are united in their desire for peace. They seek friendly relations with all the peoples of the world and have no aggressive intent or design. War would bring disaster for many; world war could mean destruction for all. The policies of all Commonwealth countries will at all times be devoted to preserving and consolidating world peace. The Prime Ministers emphasized the importance they attach to the search for a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

The Commonwealth governments will strive for a progressive improvement in the standards of life of their own peoples and will assist in similar efforts in other parts of the world. Since the end of the war, in addition to furthering their own economic development, they have done much to assist the development of other countries, through the United Nations and such organisations as the Colombo Plan, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara and by other means. They will continue in their efforts to secure prosperity as well as peace for all the peoples of the world.

In the course of the meeting the Prime Ministers reviewed the significant developments in the Soviet Union in the context of international relations and world affairs. In this assessment they were helped by the reports made by those Ministers who have recently visited the Soviet Union or have held elsewhere personal discussions with the new Soviet leaders. The Prime Ministers considered the recent decisions of the Soviet Government to reduce the numbers of their armed forces, their willingness to facilitate increased contacts between the Soviet Union and other countries, and their expressed desire for improved relations with other governments. They welcomed these developments. A progressive improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the other great powers would help to remove the fear of war and serve the interests of world peace. They believe, however, that the removal of the causes of tension and the creation of mutual confidence and goodwill are essential if peace is to rest on secure foundations. The governments of the Commonwealth countries will persevere in the search for just and lasting settlements of outstanding international problems. Unless such settlements can be reached, resources which might otherwise be used to improve the lot of man will continue to be devoted to armaments; and the fears which impel the peoples of the world to accept the burdens of defence will continue to distract and weaken mankind.

The Prime Ministers noted with regret that, since their last meeting, no progress had been made towards German unity. They were informed of current proposals regarding the political and economic activities of the North Atlantic Alliance and the development of closer economic co-operation in Europe.

The Prime Ministers considered the situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed their interest in the peace and stability of this area. They welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ensure observance of the terms of the armistice agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. They agreed that all practicable steps should be urgently taken to consolidate the progress thus made and to seek a lasting settlement of this dispute.



THE QUEEN WITH HER PRIME MINISTERS

Her Majesty the Queen photographed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers for whom she gave a dinner party at Buckingham Palace. From the left are: Mr. Strydom (South Africa), Mr. Mohamad Ali (Pakistan), Mr. Holland (New Zealand), Mr. St. Laurent (Canada), Sir Anthony Eden (Britain), the Queen, Mr. Menzies (Australia), Mr. Nehru (India), Mr. Bandaranaike (Ceylon), and Lord Malvern (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland).

—UKIO

The Prime Ministers were informed of the situation in Cyprus, and welcomed the unceasing efforts of the United Kingdom Government to find a solution acceptable to all concerned.

The Prime Ministers reviewed the situation in the Far East and South-East Asia. They noted the part which was being played by certain Commonwealth governments in seeking to maintain peace in Indo-China. They looked forward to a continuing relaxation of tension in the Formosa area, and expressed the hope that unremitting efforts would be made to this end. Peaceful settlements of the problems in this area are imperative for stability in the Far East and for removing the dangers of conflict which would frustrate the hopes of peace. The Prime Ministers heard with interest a report from the Prime Minister of New Zealand on his recent visit to Japan. They were informed of the progress of constitutional advance in Malaya and of the negotiations on constitutional development in Singapore.

The Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that Ceylon and certain other countries had recently been admitted to the United Nations. They recognized the important part which members of the Commonwealth had played in securing this extension of the organization. They expressed the hope that its membership could be broadened still further so that it might command a wider allegiance throughout the world.

The Prime Ministers agreed that it was of first importance for their countries to maintain and increase their economic strength. Each country, through sound internal economic policies and steady development of its resources and earning power, could help to strengthen the Commonwealth and the sterling area, and move steadily towards the agreed objective of the widest practicable system of trade and payments. The Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the United Kingdom's determination to maintain and improve its capacity to serve as a source of capital for development in Commonwealth countries. They received reports on the development programme of certain members of the Commonwealth.

The Prime Ministers exchanged views on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They agreed that the civil use of nuclear energy constituted a valuable new sphere of co-operation within the Commonwealth, as well as with other countries, and they noted with satisfaction the progress already made in this field. The Commonwealth countries are already a major source of world supplies of uranium and thorium, and their resources in these materials are increasing. In most of these countries research organizations have been established to develop the use of nuclear energy as a source of power.

During the course of the meeting, the Prime Minister of Ceylon stated that, in accordance with their declared policy, the Ceylon Government proposed to introduce in due course a republican constitution for Ceylon. He also stated that it was their intention that Ceylon should continue to be a member of the Commonwealth. The other Prime Ministers took note of this statement, and expressed their agreement to Ceylon's remaining a member of the Commonwealth.

The Prime Ministers considered the particular position of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in relation to meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Taking into account the 20 years' attendance first by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and now by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, they agreed that they would welcome the continued participation of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

Apart from the consideration of matters which are of common concern to all Commonwealth countries, these meetings also afford opportunities for discussions outside the formal sessions. Advantage has been taken of these opportunities on this occasion. The continuing exchange of views on matters of common concern is an important element in the relationship between the member countries of the Commonwealth. It is of the utmost value that this should be supplemented at intervals by personal contacts between the political leaders of the Commonwealth countries, and in a rapidly changing world the need for these direct consultations has assumed a new importance.

LONDON,

6th July, 1956.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

The statement of the conference—which, as always, represented a lot of work in achieving points of substance and forms of expression to which all could agree—indicates that the main subjects of discussion were in the field of international affairs. Problems of the Commonwealth, as such, did not require very much attention. It is functioning as we expect it to function and adapting itself to changing conditions. It is primarily an association of nations having a common heritage of British parliamentary institutions, and many elements of common purpose in their approach to the problems of the day, despite the great differences in the geography, history and cultures of the various constituent nations.

The purpose for which we meet is the important and constructive one of exchanging information and opinions, in the hope that thereby the governments and parliaments of member countries can and will make wiser decisions. The conference does not seek to take any collective decisions or actions itself, but hopes to assist in bringing points of view closer together.

The Commonwealth of today has not been the product of any political theory. It has developed from the practical response of sensible men to the desire for a continuing and close political relationship which adds to rather than detracts from the independence of its members. For most member countries, a common allegiance to the same Crown is a link between us which we hold very dear. For the other, republican members, the Queen is none the less the Head of the Commonwealth. In discussion around the table, there is no distinction between members, and all Prime Ministers joined in frankly and fully setting their views in confidence before their colleagues, and in questioning one another.

I should like to lay special emphasis upon the value I find in having the Prime Ministers of the Asian members of the Commonwealth at our conference table. The histories and cultures, the people and problems of these nations, are so different from our own that it is of great value in dealing with major international affairs to have the benefit of discussions with their leaders.

The development of Asian nationalism is one of the great historic movements of our time. Indeed, in some ways it is more comprehensive and significant than the rise of militant communism. The wise counsel of the outstanding Commonwealth Asian leaders of this great movement is something I find most helpful in trying to understand the perplexities of this complicated world in which we must now accept our share of responsibilities.

The London communiqué indicated the main subjects we discussed. They include our relations with Soviet Russia, the problem of security and stability in Europe, the current situation in the Middle East, the developments in South-East Asia, our relations with China, the economic position of the countries in the sterling area and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, there were many private talks on a variety of subjects, and those members of the Commonwealth who are linked by special defence agreements, such as NATO, met to consider certain aspects of defence policy.

I cannot, of course, give a detailed account of the discussions which were held in confidence and on which we issued this agreed statement. I should like to take a minute or two, however, to say a little from my own point of view about several of the matters we discussed.

First, on relations with Soviet Russia, the communiqué makes clear that we all felt that the changes that have been taking place in the Soviet Government, and its attitudes and policies, may have more than merely a feigned or superficial significance. Events will tell. This situation offers opportunities for improvement in our relations with Russia and perhaps opportunities for the settlement of outstanding difficulties between Russia and the Western nations. All Commonwealth governments plan to seek and use such opportunities and will welcome any improvement in relations with Russia which they may make possible. But the changes that have taken place are not such that we can have confidence that the danger of war has been removed. In view of this and of the tremendous Russian military power, and the evidence we have had in the past of the possibility of aggressive intentions, I believe we must continue to maintain an effective modern armed strength, primarily of course as a deterrent against attack. Such preparedness, however, need not prejudice an improvement in our relations and the development of a greater degree of mutual confidence which would be a more secure foundation for a lasting peace.

In the discussions on China we exchanged views, of course, on the recognition of the government on the mainland. While the views of most of us are already fairly well known, I found the discussions both informative and helpful. I recognise the force of the arguments about the importance to Asia of having its largest country fully participating in the

councils of the world. To that view, of course, we must give great weight and we shall. But there are other considerations as well which must weigh in determining Canada's policy and course of action. I see no reason strong enough to justify changing our policy on this matter at this time.

Our discussions in regard to the Middle East naturally centered on the danger of conflict between the Arab states and Israel. On the whole I was somewhat reassured by what I heard. We all recognize that the situation there is dangerous, but the danger has become a little less acute as a result of Mr. Hammarskjöld's mediation. I feel that every effort should be made now through the Security Council of the United Nations to secure the collaboration of the Soviet Union in helping to find a peaceful settlement of this Palestine issue. I think they realise the danger there would be to them as well as to the rest of the world from war breaking out in that area.

Our discussions of economic affairs were in the nature of interim reports and analyses of the situation in the sterling area members of the Commonwealth. They were naturally of very considerable interest to us, for the situation of all these countries, particularly of Britain, affects our trade. I gave a brief resume of some aspects of our situation likely to be of interest to others. The United Kingdom Government is persevering in its efforts to find solutions to its own economic problems that would permit an increasing freedom of trade between us and the continued elimination of discrimination against imports from the dollar area. We recognized and valued the progress made already in this direction and naturally we expressed the wish to see this progress continue. We were assured that the United Kingdom intended to persevere with this policy and I think the events and public statements in the United Kingdom in recent weeks make this determination quite evident. I am convinced that our policy should continue to be to seek the removal of the remaining restrictions on the imports of Canadian goods into the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the sterling area and to encourage the development of sound competitive export trade from the United Kingdom to Canada.

This trade remains under the detailed scrutiny of our continuing joint committee of senior officers which was established for that purpose and which met in London earlier in June.

There was no discussion at this conference about the time or place of our next meeting. I have been asked whether a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers might be held in Canada and to this I would reply that we should be glad and honoured to have a future meeting here but the time and place of any particular meeting must be determined primarily by the convenience of the busy men who are required to attend. London has proved to be a convenient site but this does not mean that the conference should not be held in other Commonwealth capitals when that is the general desire.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to express again the gratitude of all the Canadians attending this conference for the hospitality and friendliness with which we were received by Her Majesty the Queen and by all those in the United Kingdom who joined in making the conference a success.

Iceland and NATO

IN a statement made public on August 3, the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced that the Government of Iceland had formally requested the Council to review the continued necessity for the stationing of United States security forces in Iceland and "to make recommendations to the two governments concerning the continuation of the Defence Agreement between Iceland and the United States of America within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty".

Iceland is one of the original members of the North Atlantic Alliance and her then Foreign Minister, Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson, was among the twelve signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on April 4, 1949. When Iceland joined the Alliance, it was recognized that it would not be necessary to have NATO forces stationed in the country in time of peace. By 1951, however, the international situation had seriously deteriorated and, following the outbreak of war in Korea, Iceland agreed that it would be desirable to play a more active role in NATO defences. At the request of NATO, she consequently concluded the 1951 Defence Agreement with the United States which provided for the stationing of United States security forces and the establishment of United States defence facilities in Iceland. The preamble to this Agreement noted that NATO had requested the two countries to make these joint defence arrangements "having regard to the fact that the people of Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defences, and whereas experience has shown that a country's lack of defences greatly endangers its security and that of its peaceful neighbours".

From the first, the United States forces in Iceland maintained good relations with the Icelandic people. However, the recent relative improvement in the international situation led a number of Icelanders to question the necessity of having foreign armed forces remain in their country. This view was also expressed in the Icelandic Parliament which, in March of this year, adopted the following resolution:

"That the foreign policy of Iceland should as hitherto be formulated so as to ensure the independence and security of the country, that friendly relations be had with other countries and that the Icelandic people co-ordinate their defence matters with those of their neighbour nations, i.e. through co-operation with NATO. In view of changed conditions since the Defence Agreement of 1951 was concluded and in view of the declaration made to the effect that foreign armed forces should not be in Iceland in time of peace, revision of the system then adopted should immediately be initiated so that the Icelanders themselves would perform maintenance and security functions (other than military) connected with the defence installations, and that the Defence Force be withdrawn.

"If agreement is not reached concerning these changes, the Defence Agreement should be terminated in accordance with Article VII thereof."

On June 24, general elections were held in Iceland. The possibility that, as a result of these elections, Iceland might seek changes in the 1951 Defence Agreement led to a question in the Canadian House of Commons on June 28.

In reply, Mr. Paul Martin, the then Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, commented as follows:

The Secretary of State for the United States has recently stated:

"The United States has bases in Iceland, not in its own right but acting as an agent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

I may say it is a question in which Canada and other NATO countries have a definite interest. The treaty provides that either the United States or Iceland may, at any time, on notification to the other government, request the NATO Council to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two governments concerning the continuation of this agreement. If, six months after the review by the Council, no understanding is reached between the two governments, either government may at any time give notice of its intention to terminate the agreement which will cease to be in force 12 months from the date of such notice.

The resolution passed by the Parliament of Iceland before the recent elections in that country, which called for a revision of the defence agreement, referred specifically to the appropriate article in the agreement, and at the same time reaffirmed the decision and the intention of Iceland to support NATO.

The Canadian Government hopes that if a new Icelandic Government should decide to ask for a revision of the defence treaty, as envisaged in the resolution of the Parliament of Iceland, it will be possible to reach a compromise satisfactory to Iceland and all of the NATO partners . . .

As a result of the general elections, the three chief parties which had favoured the withdrawal of the United States forces—the Progressive, Social Democrat and Labour Alliance (Communist) parties—commanded a majority in the new Parliament and combined to form a Coalition Government in which each is represented by two members. The new government therefore includes two Ministers with communist affiliations. Although the composition of the Government has changed, there was no major swing to the left on the part of the Icelandic electorate. None of the major parties either increased or decreased its representation in the Althing by more than two seats and, indeed, the Conservatives still remain the strongest party, both in terms of seats (19), and of the popular vote, with 42.5 per cent (an increase of 5.1 per cent over 1953).

In accordance with the procedure provided in the Defence Agreement, the new Icelandic Government formally requested the NATO Council to review the situation and to make recommendations to the United States and Iceland concerning the continuation of the Defence Agreement. At the same time, the Government declared its intention of remaining in NATO.

NATO Council Statement

The Council's statement of August 3 was made after a careful and thorough review which took into account the various strategic and political factors of the present situation. The statement reads in part as follows:

In the view of the Council, the present international situation has not improved to such an extent that defence forces are no longer required in Iceland. Under the present circumstances, the withdrawal of U.S.A. forces, now in Iceland on behalf of the Alliance as a whole, would leave the island completely undefended.

A major deterrent to aggression in the North Atlantic area would no longer exist and a gap would be opened in the chain of defence which maintains our security.

It is the tangible and visible evidence of forces and installations in being, in place and ready, which constitutes an effective deterrent against aggression. An effective deterrent is our greatest safeguard against the outbreak of war.

The North Atlantic Council, having carefully reviewed the political and military situation, find a continuing need for the stationing of forces in Iceland for the maintenance of the facilities in a state of readiness. The Council earnestly recommend that the Defence Agreement between Iceland and the U.S.A. be continued in such form and with such practical arrangements as will maintain the strength of the common defence.

The Council trust that in the proposed bilateral talks between Iceland and the U.S.A. full weight will be given to the Council's finding and to the consideration set forth in this review.

The views of the NATO Council are now under consideration by the Icelandic Government. Discussing these developments in the House of Commons on August 1, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, commented as follows:

... the situation in Iceland is one, of course, which is worrying to the NATO organization, and it is one that has been discussed already in the NATO Council. I am hopeful that as a result of those discussions, this difficulty over the United States air base in Iceland can be solved, and that Iceland will continue to give strong and steady support to the organization. It is an important matter because the base is an important one; but probably just as important as the air base itself is the situation of Iceland in so far as radar communication and installations are concerned. Therefore we must hope, and do everything we can in NATO to resolve this difficulty, and I have some expectation that this will be possible before long.

It is quite true that one of the reasons for discontent, if you like, in certain sections of the Icelandic population about the NATO association is the trade dispute between Iceland and the United Kingdom in respect of fish and concept of territorial waters

Also there is uneasiness on the part of certain of the people of Iceland in having a United States air base on their territory at a time when the sense of imminent danger seems to be somewhat removed. The trade dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland did result—and this is an interesting illustration of Soviet tactics—in the Soviet moving in and offering to take all the surplus catch of Iceland's fish, thereby possibly saving them at that particular time from economic distress.

I hope that situation can be rectified but as I said a few moments ago, I feel that the discussions which are now taking place inside NATO and with the Iceland Government will at least provide a solution for these difficulties which will permit that small but important NATO country to support an organization which is as important for Iceland's security as it is for the rest of us.

The Reply to Mr. Bulganin

ON June 6, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed a letter to the Prime Minister on the question of disarmament. After referring to the absence of "positive results" from the discussions in the United Nations, Mr. Bulganin expressed the view that measures taken by states for reducing their armaments and armed forces before an international agreement was reached would strengthen international confidence. It was such considerations, he said, which had led the Soviet Union to decide to reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men and its armaments and military expenditures correspondingly. The letter also drew attention to the statement of the Soviet Government of May 14, announcing the intended reductions, which was enclosed. Similar letters were addressed to the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.

The Prime Minister's reply, which was transmitted on July 16, reads as follows:

Thank you for your letter of June 6 on the question of disarmament with which you forwarded the statement of May 14 of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Government of Canada has given earnest consideration to the contents of your letter and the accompanying document.

We have noted with interest the announcement of reductions in the armed forces of the Soviet Union to which you refer in your letter. However, our satisfaction over the announcement is somewhat tempered by the reflection that these reductions would have been more timely 10 years ago, when the Western Powers demobilized the great armies they had brought together in the common interest of the United Nations, and that the Soviet Union will continue, even after the reductions, to dispose of a far greater number of divisions in Europe than the Western Powers have stationed there. We have also, of course, considered your letter and the related documents in the light of a number of recent statements on the part of Soviet authorities concerning the modernization and expanding might of the Soviet armed forces.

It is because of such considerations that Canadian representatives have consistently expressed our firmly held view that, if they are to contribute to international confidence, reductions in forces should be part of an agreement providing for machinery to reassure all signatories that the reduction measures are in fact carried out. We believe that the need for such controls together with an adequate system for warning of preparations for surprise attack has become more pressing during the last few years when, as you observe in your letter, new and increasingly destructive weapons have been developed.

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, Canada has been directly associated with the search for an agreement ever since the United Nations General Assembly in its first resolution created the Atomic Energy Com-

mission and laid upon Canada, as a permanent member of the Commission, a part of the continuing responsibility for finding a solution to the problem of disarmament. Our participation in the negotiations in that Commission and more recently in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee has made us acutely aware of the difficulties which beset the problem; it has also enabled us to associate ourselves intimately with the repeated efforts and initiatives on the part of the Western Powers to bring about a general disarmament agreement. This is not the place to recapitulate these successive endeavours which stand in the records of the United Nations. However, you will understand, Mr. Chairman, that my colleagues and I are impelled to state that we cannot accept the charge of a negative stand, as alleged in your Government's statement of May 14, on the part either of Canada or of the other Western Powers.

The Government of Canada shares the regrets you have expressed that the discussions on disarmament have not been productive of agreement. However, it is our impression that the more recent negotiations, particularly in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, have given some cause for encouragement. We therefore differ with the stated views of your Government that the discussions in the Sub-Committee have been marked by futility. It would, in our opinion, be unfortunate if these negotiations were to be interrupted. We favor the continuation of efforts through the United Nations to reach an agreement covering limitation, reduction and control of armaments including nuclear weapons. We consider that discussions in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission as well as in the Commission itself are more than ever necessary in order to reach an agreement which will ensure the security of all by means of an adequate system of international control.

It is the belief of the Government of Canada that the international situation which we hope ultimately to achieve can be created only through the establishment of greater mutual confidence progressively and by stages. In any comprehensive programme directed to that end there should be arrangements designed not only to cover disarmament and control but also to solve urgent political questions, in particular the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security.

The Government of Canada is strongly of the opinion that if a mutually satisfactory agreement on disarmament can be negotiated an important contribution will have been made to the development of greater confidence between nations. I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that for our part, we will continue to exert every effort in negotiations within the framework of the United Nations to draw closer to an agreed solution. We are the more prepared to make these efforts to reach agreement because of our conviction that the disarmament problem is becoming even more intractable with the passage of time, but that if there is a corresponding willingness to co-operate in these negotiations on the part of the Soviet Government, significant and gratifying results can still be attained.


Distinguished Visitors to Canada

THE Right Honourable R. G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., Prime Minister of Australia, and his wife, Dame Pattie Menzies, were guests of Canada July 25-29 on their return from London, where Mr. Menzies had attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

After arriving in Ottawa July 25, Mr. Menzies called on Prime Minister St. Laurent, on Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and on the Speakers of the Senate and House of Commons, attended a luncheon given in his honour by Mr. St. Laurent, and, in the evening, attended a dinner held by the Australian-Canadian Association. Dame Menzies was guest of honour at a luncheon given by Mrs. Pearson at the Country Club.

A busy schedule awaited Mr. Menzies in Quebec City the following day. After calling on Prime Minister Maurice L. Duplessis, Mr. Wilfrid Hamel, Mayor of Quebec City, and the Most Rev. Philip Carrington, D.D., Anglican Archbishop of Quebec, Mr. Menzies received an honorary degree from Laval University. In the evening the Australian Prime Minister was honoured at a dinner given by the Most Rev. Maurice Roy, O.B.E., Archbishop of Quebec and Chancellor of Laval.

After visiting points of historic interest on Saturday, July 28, Mr. Menzies and party left Quebec City for Chicago by air the following morning. Mr. Jean Lesage, Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and Mrs. Lesage accompanied the distinguished visitors on their trip to Quebec City.



WELCOMED TO CANADA

—Capital Press

Mr. Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, received a warm welcome from Mr. L. S. St. Laurent when he called on the Canadian Prime Minister at the Parliament Building during his visit to Canada last month. Later, Mr. Menzies visited the House of Commons and, when welcomed by the Speaker, Mr. Rene Beaudoin, rose from his seat in the diplomatic gallery and bowed to the applauding Members of Parliament.

United Nations Disarmament Commission

THE United Nations Disarmament Commission met between July 3 and 16 to consider the report of its Sub-Committee on the discussions held in London between March 19 and May 4. Canada was represented by Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare and the then Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs.

At the opening meeting Mr. Anthony Nutting introduced in the name of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States a joint draft resolution which reaffirmed the six basic principles enunciated in a declaration at the close of the Sub-Committee session. Those principles were:

- (1) The disarmament programme should proceed by stages. Progress from one stage to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.
- (2) The programme should begin, under effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces to such levels as are feasible in present unsettled world conditions. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved.
- (3) The programme should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the build-up of stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear material devoted to peaceful uses.
- (4) The programme should provide for a strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measures. The control measures should also provide against major surprise attack. This is particularly important so long as it is impossible to account for past production of nuclear material.
- (5) Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system and could bring nearer agreement on a disarmament programme.
- (6) Provision should be made for the suspension of the programme, in whole or in part, if a major state failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should occur.

Mr. Gromyko then introduced for the Soviet Union a "Draft declaration of States regarding measures on strengthening universal peace and the security of peoples". The declaration noted with satisfaction "the substantial relaxations of international tension" which have recently taken place. It declared that the

rejection by states of war or the threat of war as an instrument of policy and the repudiation by them of the use of nuclear weapons would facilitate further improvement of the international situation. It then called on members of the United Nations to assume a solemn obligation to refrain in their international relations from the use or threat of force and the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Finally, it called upon non-members of the United Nations to join in the declaration.

In the course of the debate, Australia submitted amendments to the four-power draft. These were accepted. Australia also joined with the four sponsors in submitting an amendment which provided for adding to the third principle a provision that, at the appropriate stage, limitations would be imposed on the testing of nuclear weapons.

Also circulated was a Yugoslav draft resolution which urged the members of the Sub-Committee to continue their endeavours to reach agreement on general disarmament and to seek an early agreement on and implementation of such initial disarmament measures as are now feasible and such forms and degrees of control as are required for these measures, more particularly with regard to (a) a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces (b) the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons, as well as other practicable measures in the field of nuclear armaments and (c) a reduction of military expenditures.

The Commission also heard a submission on behalf of India by Mr. Krishna Menon concerning an Indian proposal for suspension of nuclear weapon tests and an armaments truce.

At the conclusion of the debate, the Commission did not vote upon any of the substantive proposals submitted but adopted by 10 votes to 1 with 1 abstention a resolution advanced by Peru which had the effect of requesting the Sub-Committee to study all the proposals submitted and to report back.

The Canadian Position

In presenting the Canadian position, Mr. Martin stated in part that the general approval of the Canadian Delegation to the present problem of disarmament could be stated in the following propositions:

(1) Because the complete elimination of nuclear weapons cannot at present be effectively controlled, it cannot be part of any programme of disarmament capable of implementation in the immediately foreseeable future. This blunt scientific fact does not, however, modify Canadian policy to seek, as an ultimate objective, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, an objective which we continue to support as part of a comprehensive general disarmament scheme provided that adequate control is both technically feasible and acceptable to all states concerned. We will co-operate with all our energies in the search for any practical measures in a determined effort to devise the means whereby such control could be made effective in the future.

(2) Because the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons cannot be made effective at the present time, the efforts to arrive at negotiation of an agreement in the field of controllable disarmament, including its nuclear aspect, should not be abandoned. There remains before us a broad area in the field of conventional armaments which is susceptible of effective limitation and control, and impor-

tant segments of the nuclear field, such as the future production of fissionable material and its application to peaceful rather than military uses, which can be subjected to extensive checks and verification. These and other objectives could in fact be translated into a working agreement on disarmament which would go a long way to reduce tensions, and develop the necessary basis of confidence which would enable us to take further steps when our inspection measures and control techniques are adequate to the task.

(3) The Canadian Government attaches very great importance to the establishment of effective warning systems against surprise attack as an integral part of such a disarmament programme. For this reason, we welcomed the initiative taken at Geneva in July of last year by President Eisenhower and the proposals by Premier Bulganin. We consider that the early application of the procedures envisaged through a reciprocal programme of aerial reconnaissance and observation from control posts on the ground should be an integral part of the early stages of such a disarmament programme. These measures would not only help to lay a basis for the effective control of an agreed programme of disarmament, but would greatly reduce, if not prevent the possibility of surprise attack. Such a reciprocal warning system is needed if we are to move forward from a co-existence based on mutual fear, to the prospect of co-operation based on mutual confidence.

(4) We recognize that in the light of the new positions which have been indicated to the Sub-Committee and which are now before this Commission in the Sub-Committee's Interim Report, the search for a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would fit neatly into an international convention to be concluded at some future date in a happier world should not preclude urgent efforts to reach early agreement on the measures which can be made effective in the immediate circumstances. In other words, time may not be on our side. Without abandoning our ultimate objective of comprehensive disarmament, but without waiting for agreement on the whole of its complex features, the Canadian Delegation considers that an earnest effort should be made in the Sub-Committee to determine what "initial steps" can and should be taken without delay. Such an approach is wholly consistent with the resolution of the General Assembly of December 16, 1955, which urged the Sub-Committee, while continuing their endeavours to agree on a comprehensive plan, to give priority, as initial steps, to early agreement on confidence-building measures as envisaged in exchanges between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin, and to "all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible".

(5) We consider that both in the conventional field and in the nuclear field as well it should be possible now to make an important beginning, under agreed measures of inspection and verification, on reciprocal first-stage reductions of armaments and manpower applicable to the principal military powers and to other states. First-stage measures should provide for reciprocal early warning and for as much progress in the nuclear field as can be agreed between the powers principally concerned. Such an agreement, capable of being carried out in the present state of international relations, would be largely of a stabilizing character, although some reduction in manpower, in material and military expenditure would be possible. The existing balance of power—the relative position of one side to the other—could not be substantially affected, nor would there be any real change in the state of mutual deterrence which arises from the possession by both sides of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, such a limited agreement could serve to stabilize the military situation and strengthen the possibilities for more far-reaching political settlements. Subsequent and more comprehensive disarmament measures could be taken as tensions reduce,

and confidence based on substantive progress in the settlement of disputes is allowed to develop.

Soviet Union Proposals

Commenting on views advanced by the Soviet Union at the Sub-Committee discussions, Mr. Martin said:

The Soviet proposals represent on their face a shift in previous Soviet positions which had long emphasized the nuclear aspect and the importance of nuclear prohibitions. For the first time the Soviet proposals insofar as they relate to the general problem of disarmament made almost no mention of control in the nuclear field, but were restricted to far-reaching measures of conventional disarmament to be carried out virtually on an automatic basis between 1956 and 1958.

To a certain extent the Soviet proposals represent a step forward insofar as their acceptance of certain limited control procedures is concerned. I do not minimize the importance of this; I welcome it. But they contain a number of basic weaknesses which make them unacceptable, in our view, as a basis for general agreement:

(1) Parts I and II of the proposals divorce measures of conventional disarmament from measures of nuclear disarmament and contain no provision even for a beginning in the nuclear field. To proceed in this manner would serve only to accelerate the nuclear arms race and cause more and more states to join in it.

(2) On the question of force levels, they proposed the figures of 1 to 1.5 million for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. According to the Soviet plan, these levels would be reached by 1958 without regard to whether or not a reduction in international tension had been achieved through political settlements. The Soviets claim to have accepted proposals of the Western Powers in putting forward these levels and superficially this appears to be so. However, when the earlier Anglo-French proposal for fixing numerical ceilings for all armed forces was originally advanced, it was intended that these levels should be the ultimate agreed objectives to be reached by *successive stages* allowing for the growth of confidence and parallel political settlements; for *effective nuclear prohibitions and controls*; the whole being arranged in a *comprehensive* disarmament programme. This is a vastly different proposition from the Soviet use of the figures in a plan limited to a single phase having no nuclear control provisions nor any provisions for beginning upon nuclear disarmament. It is vastly different from the proposal that these reductions be carried out without regard to the international situation.

(3) The Soviet proposals are contained in four sections. Sections I and II deal with what might be described as general conventional disarmament. Sections III and IV, however, which according to the Soviet delegation may be considered separately from the first two sections, and are described as representing "desirable" steps, contain proposals which have important and wholly unacceptable implications. The Soviet plan in these latter sections contains a number of elements which would have the effect of crippling NATO forces in Western Europe, denying atomic weapons to any forces stationed in Germany and placing a tight rein on German rearmament. The proposal set forth in Section III for a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments to be established in Europe, including territory of "both parts" of Germany and states adjacent to them, is yet an-

other unacceptable element, since it raises far-reaching political issues and problems of European settlement, which can only be settled in a wider forum.

(4) The proposals are inadequate because they ignore the close connection which should exist between progressive disarmament and the growth of international confidence through the practical settlement of political questions such as the key problem of the unification of Germany in freedom. To enact the Soviet proposals without such settlements would mean that within three years most United States and United Kingdom forces would have been withdrawn from Europe, the strength of NATO would have been sapped, and Germany would remain permanently divided.

(5) Finally, the Soviet proposals are inadequate on the question of control. They relegate the concept of aerial surveys to a mere "possibility" to be considered after a disarmament agreement has been signed and disarmament measures are under way. The delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that it would be impossible to supervise the operation of a disarmament agreement, especially where vast territories are involved, unless aerial surveys are an accepted part of the inspection system from the start. The aerial survey requirement is not new; it has been a basic element of our common position since the beginning of disarmament discussions.

Agreement on Initial Steps Needed

Continuing his remarks, Mr. Martin said:

In proposing that the Sub-Committee should concentrate immediate efforts on a limited or first-stage approach, I must make it plain that the Canadian Government has abandoned none of its long-range disarmament objectives. In the Canadian view, however, although efforts should continue towards reaching final agreement on the implementation of a comprehensive programme, time is crucially short. There are compelling reasons for seeking agreement now on immediate "initial steps". While indicating in the Sub-Committee that the contents of such a first-stage programme were matters for careful study and negotiation, it was suggested by the Canadian Delegation that such initial steps might include:


- (1) a first-stage stabilizing agreement on levels of conventional forces and armaments,
- (2) preliminary steps for testing and inspection procedures such as proposed by the United States delegation,
- (3) adequate control and machinery including aerial reconnaissance which would also have the advantage of providing early warning facilities,
- (4) at the same time, we made it clear that a first-stage agreement should include a nuclear component, and at least a start should be made on the international control of nuclear weapons, and the use of fissile materials.

In his closing remarks, Mr. Martin referred to the Soviet approach to world affairs as follows:

There is some evidence that new forces are at work in the Soviet Union, that the rigidities of thought and policy of the Stalinist era are now dark


(Continued on page 250)

July 1 in South-East Asia



IN CEYLON

Mr. J. J. Hurley, Canadian High Commissioner, welcomes distinguished guests at a reception held to mark Canada's national day. Left to right, above, are Mr. U Ba Lwin, Burmese Minister to Ceylon; Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Governor General of Ceylon; Mr. Hurley; and Hon. H. H. Basanayake, Chief Justice.



IN CAMBODIA

Members of the Canadian Delegation in Phnom Penh held a reception for some 250 guests in the auditorium of the Hotel du Gouvernement. Above, centre, Mr. Arnold Smith, Canadian Commissioner, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, receives guests. To his right is Mr. Lorne Lavigne, who is now Acting Commissioner.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs, by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

At meetings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs during the current session of Parliament, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed recent developments in international affairs. Given below are reports of Mr. Pearson's comments on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris last May; the situation in Formosa and the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu; the recent developments in Indochina, and the work of the International Supervisory Commissions in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

REPORT ON NATO

Reporting on the two-day session of the North Atlantic Council in Paris early in May, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that in his opinion the importance of these ministerial meetings, from the point of view of consultation, had increased. The Ministers had not only discussed a prepared agenda in formal meetings, but also had had an opportunity to discuss recent developments informally between meetings. These informal discussions were often as important as the more formal ones.

The Minister reported that the agenda which had been drawn up for this meeting, although a short one, covered a considerable range of topics. The first item was discussed under the following headings: "trends and implications of Soviet policy including the political and economic penetration of underdeveloped countries;" political and economic questions arising from current Soviet tactics"; and other matters of common concern in the international situation".

The first item consisted primarily of an analysis by the Foreign Ministers of the change in tactics of the Soviet Union and the new conditions brought about by "competitive co-existence". The Ministers had discussed the effect that these new developments would have on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in particular, and on international relations in general. While it had been generally recognized that Russian tactics had changed significantly, the Ministers had agreed that it would be premature and unwise to come to any dogmatic conclusions with regard to the long-range significance of these changes. Some members of the Council had been inclined to attach greater importance than others to the shift in Soviet tactics. There was also general agreement that, whatever the immediate significance might be, it should not result in any lessening of effort on the part of NATO, and that the need for maintaining adequate defences remained no matter what happened in Moscow or what might be likely to happen there. It was still a primary objective of NATO to resist any weakening of its defensive strength, although efforts would be made to adapt the Alliance to changed conditions.

Non-military Co-operation in NATO

The Council had also concluded that because of the relaxation of tension and the removal of some of the more urgent and immediate fears which had been felt a few years previously, the non-military side of NATO co-operation was now more important than ever and should be developed, strengthened, and deepened. With the lessening of fear and tension, the main incentive which had led to the creation of NATO was being modified and attempts should therefore be made to strengthen the other bonds which held the NATO countries together. This idea had been reflected in the communiqué at the end of the ministerial meeting.

Mr. Pearson reported that the Foreign Ministers had spent almost a day discussing the item "what can we do to extend non-military co-operation between the NATO countries". In particular, Mr. Dulles had underlined the importance of this aspect of NATO co-operation and had made a very searching and serious statement about the future of NATO in the light of the new developments. Mr. Dulles had not been unduly pessimistic about the future, but he had stated that NATO had reached a new stage of its development and that NATO unity could no longer be based on fear.

The Minister pointed out that it was easier to talk about these subjects than to agree on immediate action which might be taken. It had become clear as the discussion developed that the Ministers would not be able to come to a final agreement at that time as to what should be done. The Council, therefore, decided to set up a Committee of three Foreign Ministers, who would continue to examine the problems of non-military co-operation and report back to the Council.

It was hoped that the three Ministers would be able to get in touch with the various member governments during the following two or three months and hold discussions which would be a continuation and amplification of the talks held in Paris. The three Ministers would then meet and prepare a report to the Council with specific recommendations as to what might be done to strengthen non-military co-operation between NATO countries; they would also examine the relationship between NATO and other international agencies. In addition, Mr. Pearson continued, the Committee of Three would look into the economic aspects of non-military co-operation as envisaged in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. He reported that the French Foreign Minister had submitted proposals at Paris for economic action through the United Nations. This plan called for the NATO countries to initiate, although not necessarily to sponsor, a new programme of international economic assistance. The Italian Foreign Minister had made proposals of a somewhat similar nature and a very good discussion of this subject had ensued.

Mr. Pearson said that the NATO Council had also considered a report on the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London and had held a useful discussion of the situation in the Middle East and its relation to NATO, with particular reference to North Africa and Israel.

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Mr. Pearkes, M.P. for Esquimalt-Sannich, asked whether the Minister foresaw any large increase in the financial contribution which Canada would be required to make to NATO in view of the new emphasis being placed on

the non-military aspects of the Alliance. Mr. Pearkes wondered whether a sort of European Colombo Plan was envisaged, under which the more fortunate countries of the NATO Alliance would make contributions towards the economic development of the less fortunate countries. Mr. Pearson replied that he did not see any such immediate requirement. There had been general agreement that NATO in its present form was not the best agency for economic planning for assistance to other countries, nor for discussions in order to bring about increased trade and commercial relations between its members. Other economic agencies such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had been designed for this purpose and were working effectively. It would be wrong for NATO to duplicate the work of these and other international agencies. The Minister said that there was already enough international machinery and that the problem was rather to make this existing machinery work. He did not think that NATO as such would be a very effective agency for international economic assistance because the political and defensive character of NATO might give rise to doubts in the minds of some of the receiving countries, especially in Asia, as to the objective character of any assistance which might be given. The NATO Foreign Ministers had agreed that, while the NATO countries should take a lead in providing international economic assistance and the NATO Council provided a good forum for an exchange of views on this subject, existing machinery such as the Colombo Plan and the United Nations should not be duplicated or superseded. However, this was one of the questions which would be examined further by the Committee of Three.

Mr. Stick, M.P. for Trinity-Conception, enquired whether political co-operation as distinct from economic co-operation had been discussed at the ministerial meeting. Mr. Pearson replied that the Ministers had had the best and most comprehensive discussion on political consultation inside NATO that he had attended since the NATO Council was formed. There had been general agreement that the NATO Council had not been used for political consultation by its members to the fullest extent, and that they should try to develop political co-operation in the Council by holding more frequent meetings and by increasing the authority and prestige of the Permanent Council. Mr. Pearson stated that member countries should develop the habit of consultation to a point where no member government would take any major step in foreign policy which had consequences for the other members of the Alliance without first discussing it in the Council. However, although this was agreed in principle, it would not be easy to work it out in practice. One of the Council members had pointed out that consultation, in order to be effective, must sometimes lead to commitments. The Minister felt that a distinction should be made between two kinds of consultation: consultation through which the member governments simply exchanged information about what they were doing individually without asking for assistance or advice, and consultation designed to bring about uniformity in policy which often involved assuming additional commitments.

Mr. Stick then asked whether there had been any developments towards closer economic co-operation between France and Germany. Mr. Pearson replied that an illustration of closer economic co-operation between these two countries could be found in the discussions which began at Messina, and which were continuing between the six countries of the Western European Union,

including France and Germany, who were trying to work out a common market and common machinery for the development of atomic energy. The Minister considered this to be one of the most hopeful developments which had occurred in Europe in the last ten years.

Mr. Knowles, M.P. for Winnipeg North Centre, asked Mr. Pearson whether he had any comment to make on the statement, attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, that in view of the new attitude of the Soviet Union it might be possible for the Soviet Union to join in the spirit of NATO. The Minister replied that Sir Winston was, as usual, looking a long way ahead. It was generally agreed that it would be desirable to bring about a situation where the Soviet Union or any other country could be associated with the spirit of NATO because this spirit was essentially defensive and co-operative; Sir Winston's language had, however, been chosen very carefully and the association of the Soviet Union or any other country with the spirit of NATO was not quite the same thing as an invitation to the U.S.S.R. to join NATO at the present time. The Minister recalled that when he had been in the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev had asked him "Why don't you let us join NATO if it is such a fine organization?" At that time Mr. Pearson replied that if a state of confidence, co-operation and friendship between the Communist and non-Communist world had been reached which would enable countries of the Atlantic Alliance to invite the Soviet Union to join with them and to share their most secret defence information and planning then NATO would not be necessary at all and there would be no point in asking the Soviet Union to join it.

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Mr. Starr, M.P. for Ontario, requested the Minister's opinion on whether NATO was growing in strength or whether some laxity might be developing among the member nations. Mr. Pearson replied that in his opinion NATO as an organization was changing in character, as the situation in the world was seemingly changing. He thought that NATO had reached a point where its defence goals were not likely to increase. He would hope that the collective strength of NATO could be maintained but he did not think that there was likely to be a desire to build that strength up above the present point. For this reason, the urge to achieve a high level of defence strength which had manifested itself so clearly a few years ago was now less evident. The feeling of urgent and immediate danger had been lessened and this had brought about a change in the climate of NATO. There was a danger that people would begin to lose some interest in NATO. This was one of the problems with which the Council would now have to deal.

NATO Information

Mr. Decore, M.P. for Vegreville, stated that the Soviet claimed to be champions of national freedom and supporters of freedom from colonialism although they were in fact the worse offenders with regard to colonialism and the worst oppressors of freedom. He wondered whether consideration had been given to exposing the basic contradiction in this Soviet position. The Minister replied that a great deal of consideration had in fact been given to this matter in the last two or three months and that one of the subjects discussed at the recent ministerial meeting had been NATO information policy and propaganda. The Foreign Ministers had discussed how to make their information

policies more effective and they had all thought that one of the things which should be emphasized most strongly in NATO information work was the fact that the Soviet Union, far from being the champion of oppressed people struggling to be free, was the greatest colonial power in history. The Ministers had agreed that every attempt should be made to expose the falseness of Soviet intentions. The Committee of Three would look into the possibility of a collective information policy for NATO countries, but even if this proved to be impossible, the national information policies of the governments which had resources for that purpose should emphasize this inconsistency in the Soviet position.

There were many glaring examples of the colonial oppression practised by the Soviet Union—for example, the peoples now living in the U.S.S.R. as Soviet States had not been given a chance to express their own view as to whether or not they wished to be part of the Soviet Union. Then there were the satellite states which were still under Moscow's control. Above all, there was the graphic example of East Germany, which was a communist colony. The Soviet Government had made it perfectly clear that they would not permit any expression of the will of the people in East Germany at the present time, not merely because it might mean that East Germany would join with a United Germany in NATO, but also because they had insisted that the social and economic benefits of the East Germans must be preserved. Thus there could be no unification of Germany unless all of Germany is willing to become a Communist State and partake of these "social and economic benefits", even though the East Germans have so little regard for these benefits that about 1,000 of them are trying every day to cross the border into West Germany in order to escape them.

Mr. Stick enquired whether any consideration had been given by NATO to means of reaching the people in the U.S.S.R. and satellite states in order to inform them of our conception of freedom and Western democratic ideals. Mr. Pearson replied that there was no suggestion that this should be done by NATO itself at the present time. NATO had not the resources to do this and the governments which were in a position to engage in this type of activity, particularly the United States, had not yet come to a point where they would prefer a propaganda effort planned and carried out by an international agency such as NATO to their own national propaganda effort. Mr. Pearson pointed out that this whole question of NATO information policy was one of the many subjects which the Committee of Three would have to look into.

NATO and the U.N. Security Council

In reply to a question by Mr. Fleming, M.P. for Eglinton, Mr. Pearson stated that he believed that many people in India and other Asian countries considered NATO to be not an alternative to the United Nations Security Council but a substitute for it. Many Asian people believed that the Western nations preferred the NATO arrangement because they could work better together in a western organization of this kind than in the United Nations where Asian and Communist countries were represented, and that the members of NATO were trying to replace the Security Council by the NATO Council. Mr. Pearson stated that this had not been the intention of the Western nations. They had always stated that NATO was the foundation of their collective defence policy *now*, but that it was a "second best" arrangement and that when it was possible to bring about collective security on a United Nations basis, there would be no need for NATO as a security organization. There would,

however, always be a need for NATO as an instrument for building up North Atlantic co-operation and development. The Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that he did not think it unwise to emphasize that the United Nations still remained the primary basis for international co-operation and peace if only it could be made to work, but that until such time as the United Nations became a fully effective organization for these purposes, it would be necessary for the Western nations to support NATO.

Mr. Fleming said that he agreed with part of what the Minister had said but that he did not think it was wise to give the impression that we were weakening in our support of NATO, or in our estimate of the danger which led to the creation of NATO in the first place. The Minister agreed, and emphasized the fact that NATO remained the sheet anchor of the Canadian defence policy at the present time and that the Canadian Government was not likely to abandon NATO unless something better could be obtained.

FORMOSA, QUEMOY AND MATSU

Mr. Pearson said that during the past year there appeared to have been little outward change in the situation in Formosa and the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Nationalist Government continued to hold these islands with large forces. Most of the men who made up these forces were still drawn from those who were evacuated from the mainland in 1949, but a few had escaped from the mainland in recent years and there was an increasing proportion of Formosans in Chiang Kai-Shek's forces.

Mr. Coldwell enquired whether or not the Formosans were being conscripted. The Minister replied that he thought so, but he would endeavour to obtain more definite information. He went on to say that the United States, under its mutual defence treaty with the Nationalist Government, was helping to train and supply Chiang Kai-Shek's forces and provide sea and air protection for Formosa in accordance with United States policy which had already been declared. A substantial proportion of the Nationalist forces were stationed on the offshore islands, in order to defend them against attack from the mainland. Mr. Pearson stated that in his opinion the principal change which had taken place in this area during the past 12 months had been the growth of the hope that the Chinese Communists had realized that there would be serious repercussions if they were to attempt an attack on Quemoy and Matsu. There was still some irregular firing between the islands and the mainland, but the hope had grown that the Communists would not attack the islands.

Mr. Coldwell enquired how far the islands of Quemoy and Matsu were from the mainland and how far from Formosa. Mr. Pearson replied that the nearest off-shore island was about 4 miles from the mainland and about 80 or 90 miles from Formosa. He continued by pointing out that the United States was committed to the defence of Formosa against attack by the Chinese Communists and stated that the fact that no such attack has materialized during the last year would suggest that the Chinese Communists realize the probable effect of such an attack.

Mr. Pearson pointed out that the United States position in regard to Quemoy and Matsu was less clearly defined than was the case with Formosa. The United States has assumed the responsibility of protecting territories which in the judgment of the President of the United States were related to the de-

fence of Formosa. Mr. Dulles had made it clear that this was not in itself a commitment to defend the coastal islands. Mr. Pearson thought that the Chinese Communists might have decided that an attack on Quemoy or Matsu or an attack on Formosa would be too dangerous, but he was unwilling to come to a categorical conclusion on this matter. Although the possibility of a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu still remained, there was reason to hope that the Peking authorities had decided that any advantage which they might gain from such an attack would not justify the risk involved. There was no evidence that a full-scale attack on either the off-shore islands or Formosa was imminent.

Mr. Pearson went on to say that the Canadian Government made a clear distinction between an attack on Quemoy and Matsu and an attack on Formosa. An attack on Formosa could conceivably be aggression if it were so determined by the United Nations, because the position of Formosa had not been finally decided in international law. The Canadian Government did not necessarily accept the Chinese Communists' position, or indeed the Chinese Nationalists' position, that Formosa was part of China. The Canadian Government did think, however, that if a decision were to be made, the wishes of the Formosans should be considered. Mr. Pearson then stated that if an attack on Formosa were considered by the United Nations to be an aggression, Canada as a member of the United Nations would be under an obligation to take appropriate part in any action which the United Nations might decide. If, however, the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu were attacked, the Canadian Government would have no obligation to intervene in any way because it considered these islands to be part of continental China. The Minister felt that the Canadian policy had been clearly laid down.

THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

In response to a request made by Mr. Patterson, M.P. for Fraser Valley, the Minister gave the Standing Committee an account of recent developments in Indochina and the work of the International Supervisory Commissions. Mr. Pearson reported that the work of the three Commissions in Indochina had not diminished in any substantial way since he had last referred to this matter in the Standing Committee, although a few of the military officers had been withdrawn. He went on to say that there were still about 160 Canadians serving on the three Commissions. The Minister said that these Canadian servicemen and officials had performed valuable and efficient services in Indochina, often amid difficulties and dangers.

Vietnam

Mr. Pearson pointed out that in Vietnam a new situation had arisen because of the imminent departure of the French forces. The termination of French authority in Vietnam had raised the problem of the position of the successor government of South Vietnam with relation to the Armistice Agreement which had been signed at Geneva in 1954, and of the transfer of responsibilities which France had undertaken. Mr. Pearson pointed out that the Government of South Vietnam had not signed the Agreement and that, therefore, it did not accept responsibility for its implementation. The withdrawal of French forces also raised the question of the legal position of the Commis-

sion in Vietnam and made it essential to determine whether the Commission could rely on the co-operation of the Government of South Vietnam with regard to the provision of supplies and transportation.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs reminded the Committee that Mr. Diem's government had issued a statement a few weeks previously outlining their attitude toward the Commission. This statement could be interpreted as an invitation to the Commission to remain in Vietnam, but it made clear that the South Vietnam Government did not accept any legal responsibilities under the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Pearson stated that the future of the Commission in the light of the new situation in South Vietnam was being examined by the representatives of the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, who were meeting at London at that time. The Co-Chairmen were, of course, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, who were being represented at the London meeting by Lord Reading and Mr. Gromyko.

The Minister then expressed some uncertainty as to whether the position taken by the Government of South Vietnam would provide an adequate legal and practical basis for the future work of the Commission. He also reported that it had not yet been decided whether the articles of the Geneva Agreement which were concerned with elections in Vietnam had been, or could be implemented in such a way that certain members of the International Commission could be persuaded to remain there. The Canadian Government would be willing to continue to participate in the work of the Commission in Vietnam as long as there was any possibility that the Commission's work would be useful in maintaining peace and establishing conditions of stability. He thought that the whole situation in Vietnam should become clearer when the report of the Co-Chairmen had been received.

Laos

Mr. Pearson then turned his attention to Laos, where the main difficulty arose from the situation in the two strategically located northern provinces. The Pathet Lao, whose forces controlled these two provinces, had not accepted the authority of the administration of the Royal Laotian Government, nor had they been willing to participate in the elections which were held in December, 1955. The Commission had agreed on a resolution calling on the Royal Government to take the necessary measures to bring about integration of the Pathet Lao forces into the national community but this resolution had not been implemented because of the resistance of the Pathet Lao. It had therefore been necessary to refer this matter to the Co-Chairmen, and the situation in Laos was also being discussed in London by Mr. Gromyko and Lord Reading. The Minister stated that the responsibility for the failure to bring about a political settlement in Laos lay with the Communist forces in the north. He went on to say that in the absence of a political settlement it would probably be necessary for the Commission to remain in Laos for some time if peace were to be maintained in that area. The Canadian Government had been urged to continue its work on the Commission and Mr. Pearson stated that he believed it should do so.

Cambodia

The Minister said that elections had been completed in Cambodia in September 1955. The former members of the resistance movement had been

reintegrated into the community and had taken part in the election campaign. The third interim report of the Commission in Cambodia had stated that the government had fulfilled its obligation with regard to elections. There were residual tasks which still remained to be done, but the Minister hoped that the Commission could be dissolved in a short time. He stated that all the inspection teams in the field had been withdrawn from Cambodia and that the Commission's establishment had been reduced. Although he saw no reason why the Commission should stay much longer in Cambodia, Mr. Pearson said that it might be necessary to maintain a token Commission there because of the relation of the three Commissions to each other under the Geneva settlement.

Mr. Patterson enquired whether or not the inspection teams had been faced with the same obstructionist tactics that they had encountered earlier. In reply the Minister stated that recently conditions in Vietnam had been less difficult because the military clauses of the armistice which were concerned with the regrouping of forces and similar questions had been implemented. Because of this the military teams had not experienced quite so much difficulty recently, but they had not always found it easy to secure the co-operation of the Communist Government in the north or indeed, of the government in the south. Both of the governments in Vietnam had blamed the other for all the difficulties which the Commission had encountered, but the Secretary of State for External Affairs considered that it was fair to say that the major difficulties facing the Commission had been caused in the beginning by Communist obstruction in the north.

Mr. Patterson asked whether or not there had not been some obstruction by certain members of the teams themselves at one time. Mr. Pearson replied that this difficulty had diminished recently because there had been less necessity for investigations by mobile teams than in the earlier days of the Commission; consequently the opportunities and incentive for delay action had been less.

Mr. Fleming, M.P. for Eglinton, said that he assumed there was now little or no prospect that the elections originally envisaged would take place in Vietnam this year. The Minister confirmed that, under the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, elections should have been held in the summer of 1956, but that there was now no prospect of this happening. There had been no consultations between the two governments of Vietnam with regard to preliminary arrangements. Mr. Fleming enquired whether or not there had been any protest from the Communist Government in the north because of this. Mr. Pearson replied that the Communist Government had made continual protests that the south had failed to bring about the elections promised by the Final Declaration. However, the Government of South Vietnam maintained that, as it was not a party to the Geneva settlement, it had no responsibility for bringing about such elections and no obligation to consult with the north to make arrangements for elections. Mr. Fleming asked whether or not there was any indication that there might be an attempt to carry out this part of the settlement by force. The Minister replied that there was no indication that the Communist Government in the north would attempt to use force to carry out this part of the settlement. Mr. Fleming then asked if the border between the north and south had been effectively closed to prevent any further entry of refugees from the north into the south. Mr. Pearson replied that there had been very little movement of refugees from north to south in the last six months.

39th Conference of ILO

THE 39th Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) met at Geneva from June 6-28, 1956, under the presidency of Mr. Mohsein Nasr, the Iranian Minister of Labour. Founded in 1919, and originally associated with the League of Nations at Geneva, the ILO in 1946 became a Specialized Agency of the United Nations whose main purpose is the improvement of working and living conditions throughout the world. The admission of six new members this year—Jordan, Morocco, Rumania, Spain, Sudan, and Tunisia—brings the total membership to 76 states.

The constitution of the ILO contains a unique provision for "tripartite" participation by representatives of governments, employers, and employees from each member state. Canada was represented at the 39th Conference by Mr. Arthur H. Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour, and Mr. P. Goulet, of the Department of Labour, who served as Government delegates, Mr. W. A. Campbell, Vice-President and Secretary of Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd., who represented Canadian employers, and Mr. C. Jodoin, President of the Canadian Labour Congress, who represented Canadian workers. The delegates were accompanied by advisers.

Representation of Communist States

Ever since 1954, when the U.S.S.R. returned to the ILO after being expelled in 1939, controversy has been growing about the right of Communist states to be represented by tripartite delegations. Many ILO members assert that employer and worker representatives from many of the non-Communist countries (Communist countries in the ILO) have no freedom of action and are subservient to their respective governments, and in previous years the credentials of many of these delegates were challenged unsuccessfully. With the admission of Rumania, the controversy was renewed at the 39th Conference, and employer and worker representatives from many of the non-Communist countries objected to the seating of the Rumanian employer and worker delegates. These objections were voted down by the Conference, as was a similar challenge to the credentials of the Spanish worker delegates.

In 1955, the ILO Governing Body had set up a three-man committee, with Lord McNair, former President of the International Court of Justice, as Chairman, to examine the "Freedom of Employers and Workers Organizations" in all ILO member countries. The McNair Report, issued in March 1956, was before the 39th Conference, but for an exchange of views only as it is to be studied in detail in November by the ILO Governing Body.

Speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Governing Body, Mr. Brown, the leader of the Canadian delegation, described the dilemma with which the ILO is faced in wishing both to support the principle of universality of membership and also to maintain effectively its tripartite system of representation. Many divergent views were expressed on this subject at the Conference: some delegates said that the ILO constitution should be amended to bar government-dominated employers and workers; others maintained that the ILO should

recognize the variety of political and social structures which exist in the world today and that the ILO constitution should not be amended to recognize only one (i.e. the free enterprise) economic system; several speakers stressed the need for ILO to take cognizance of the increasing nationalization of economies in many countries, and one delegate argued that the ILO could not solve the problem of co-existence between free enterprise and Communist economies by removing the points of contact between the two and by transforming the ILO into an organization which would serve only one political ideology or economic system.

Chinese Representation

In spite of objections put forward by a number of delegations, the Conference decided to accept the credentials of the Chinese Nationalist delegation and to grant them voting rights, notwithstanding the fact that Nationalist China has arrears of more than one million dollars. A two-thirds majority is required by the ILO constitution on a vote of this kind, and the final vote was 138 for, 63 against, with 24 abstentions, the affirmative votes being only four more than the minimum required to secure the two-thirds majority. (The two Canadian Government delegates abstained. The Canadian employer and worker delegates voted to grant voting rights to China.)

Conventions and Recommendations

The Conference reached agreement on two new international labour instruments—a recommendation to promote vocational training in agriculture and a recommendation on welfare facilities for workers. The Conference also took preliminary action on five other instruments with a view to final discussion next year—a convention on forced labour, a convention and a recommendation on weekly rest in commerce and offices, and a convention and a recommendation on the protection and integration of indigenous peoples, including tribal and semi-tribal populations in independent countries.

The proposal for a convention on forced labour had been referred to the ILO by the Economic and Social Council. Although its primary purpose is to outlaw forced labour as a means of political coercion, the proposed convention contains clauses aimed against other types of forced labour as well. Delegates from the democratic countries noted with interest that the Communist governments have apparently decided to give this convention whole-hearted support.

The Conference adopted resolutions on automation, reduction of hours of work, abolition of wage discrimination based on sex, and disarmament. The first three of these resolutions were designed mainly to pave the way for more formal activity by the ILO on these subjects.

The Conference also conducted its annual review of the manner in which member states are applying ILO conventions and recommendations.

Technical Assistance

The Conference examined carefully the technical assistance work of the ILO during 1955. Although some of this work is carried out under the regular budget of ILO, funds for a great part of it are put at the disposal of ILO by the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. It was noted that at the end of 1955 the ILO had 165 experts working in the less-

developed areas of the world. These experts were helping to set up training centres in Indonesia, India, Libya, Turkey, the Gold Coast, Gambia, Haiti, Egypt, and Bolivia; working with the governments of Afghanistan, Guatemala, Haiti, and Thailand to develop handicrafts and small cottage-type industries; and assisting in the organization of various types of co-operatives in Burma, Iran, Federation of Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sarawak, and Vietnam. During 1955 the ILO awarded 573 fellowships and study grants as compared with the 496 awarded in 1954.

The ILO spent a total of about \$3 million in 1956 on various kinds of technical assistance in order to provide vocational training, rehabilitation for handicapped workers, or other improvements in the use of manpower. Reviewing this work, the Director-General, Mr. David A. Morse, noted that where people have shockingly low living standards their primary objective is, of necessity, higher material welfare. He appealed to all members of ILO to give greater economic and technical aid to countries of Asia, the Near and Middle East, Africa, and Latin America so that economic development in those areas could be accelerated.

The Conference approved a budget of slightly more than \$7.5 million for ILO in 1957. Canada's contribution will be about \$275,000.



UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

(Continued from page 237)

shadows of the past. We have witnessed remarkably frank expositions by the present leaders of the Soviet Union of the errors, the injustices, the miscalculations and the obscurantism of the years of Stalin's dictatorship. If these things in fact occurred in the Soviet Union, and we have the testimony of the 20th Party Congress to show that they did, did they affect only the Soviet Union's internal policies? Or did they not also affect the Soviet approach towards the outer world over those long years when the insecurity within Russia was spread to the rest of the world? And if this is possible, might they not also have affected the Soviet Union's approach in those years to disarmament, seeing in it, not a real pathway to agreement and reduction of world tensions, but a means of weakening the free world, of posturing for propaganda purposes, of maintaining inviolate within the vast area of Stalinist power the secret places and origins of potential conflict.

In their approach to disarmament today, the Soviet leaders face a test of the new spirit, which we are told, and which we deeply hope, is alive in the Soviet Union. The new "openness" which has recently been expressed in high level visits and increased contact with the outside world of which Mr. Gromyko spoke on Tuesday stands in remarkable contrast to the closed doors of the past. Let us hope this principle will now be applied, on the limited, reciprocal and collective basis on which it is so vitally needed, to permit us to begin an effectively supervised disarmament programme. Without this openness, we face a common future based on fear, and the possibility of a common destiny based on mutual destruction. With it we can move forward from precarious co-existence to co-operation in the common tasks which mean a brighter future for mankind.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. A. C. Smith, Commissioner, posted from the International Supervisory Commission, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1956.
- Mr. H. M. Robertson, DFC., posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1956.
- Mr. J. E. Hyndman transferred from the Canadian Legation, Vienna, to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective July 6, 1956.
- Mr. J. H. Taylor posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective July 6, 1956.
- Mr. C. C. E. Chatillon posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 10, 1956.
- Mr. T. B. B. Wainman-Wood posted from the National Defence College, Kingston, to Ottawa, effective July 20, 1956.
- Mr. H. T. W. C. B. Blockley posted from the Canadian Embassy, Santiago, to Ottawa, effective July 20, 1956.
- Mr. A. R. Kilgour, MBE., posted from the National Defence College to Ottawa, effective July 20, 1956.
- Mr. K. P. Kirkwood, Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, appointed Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand, effective July 26, 1956.
- Mr. F. Hudd, CBE., posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective July 27, 1956.
- Mr. C. J. Woodsworth posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective July 27, 1956.
- Miss L. Côté, Mr. W. T. Delworth, Mr. W. E. Fulton, and Mr. E. G. Lee appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers 1, effective July 3, 1956.
- Miss E. P. MacCallum posted from Travel and Sick Leave (London) to Ottawa, effective June 8, 1956.
- Mr. C. E. Bourbonnière posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective June 23, 1956.



TREATY INFORMATION

Bilateral

Current Action

Belgium

Exchange of Notes concerning an amendment to paragraph 4 of the annex to the agreement for air services signed at Ottawa August 30, 1949 between Canada and Belgium.
Signed at Ottawa May 25 and July 20, 1956.
Entered into force July 20, 1956.

Federal Republic of Germany

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes in income.
Signed at Ottawa June 4, 1956.

Honduras

Agreement for the establishment of a commercial *modus vivendi*.
Signed at Tegucigalpa July 11, 1956.
Entered into force July 18, 1956.

United States of America

Amendment to the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for co-operation on the civil uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Washington June 26, 1956.

Multilateral

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.
Signed at Geneva May 23, 1956.

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol.
Signed at Washington July 5, 1956.
Entered into force July 5, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

a) Printed Documents:

World Economic Survey 1955. E/2864; ST/ECA/38. N.Y., Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, April 27, 1956. 201 p.

Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1954-55. Supplement to World Economic Survey 1955. E/2880; ST/ECA/39. N.Y., Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, 1956. 151 p.

Economic Developments in Africa, 1954-55. Supplement to World Economic Survey 1955. E/2881; ST/ECA/40. N.Y., Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, 1956. 100 p.

Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. A/520/Rev.4. N.Y., March, 1956. 45 p.

United Nations Children's Fund. Financial Reports and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 1955 and Report of the Board of Auditors. A/3129. N.Y., 1956. 64 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 6A.

Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report. A/3127. N.Y., 1956. 24 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 15.

Economic Commission for Europe. Annual Report (31 March 1955-21 April 1956). E/2868; E/ECE/237. N.Y., April 23, 1956. 59 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 6.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Annual Report (8 April 1955-14 February 1956). E/2821; E/CN.11/43. N.Y., March, 1956. 62 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 2.

Statistical Commission. Report of the Ninth Session (16 April-2 May 1956). E/2876; E/CN.3/225. N.Y., 1956. 30 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 7.

Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Summaries and

Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary-General During 1955. ST/TRI/SER.A/10. N.Y., 1956. 172 p.

Analytical Bibliography of International Migration Statistics, 1925-50. Population Studies No. 24. ST/SOA/Ser.A/24. N.Y., Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, October, 1955. 195 p.

International Labour Organisation. International Comparisons of Real Wages; a Study of Methods. Studies and Reports: New Series, No. 45. Geneva, 1956. 89 p.

Unesco. Political Science in the United States of America; a Trend Report by Dwight Waldo. Documentation in the Social Sciences Series. Paris, 1956. 84 p.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Technical Assistance Committee. Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee; Second Part of the Eighth Report. E/TAC/REP/68. April 30, 1956. 425 p.
The First Part has been Published as Supplement No. 5 to the Official Records of ECOSOC, Twenty-second Session.

The Single Convention. Second Draft. (Commission on Narcotic Drugs). E/CN.7/AC.3/7. 29 March 1956. 103 p. and Annexes A and B.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council pursuant to the Council's Resolution of 4 April 1956 on the Palestine Question. S/2596. 9 May 1956. 30 p. and Annexes I to VIII.

Eighth Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Latin America (10 May 1955-15 May 1956). E/2883, E/CN.12/AC.34/9/Rev. 1. 15 May 1956. 57 p. and Appendices I & II and Annex.

Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements. 1956 Review of International Commodity Problems. E/2893, 7 June 1956. 47 p. and Annexes A & B.

* Printed documents may be produced from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Canada's Post-War Financial Assistance Abroad

FROM the end of the Second World War through the fiscal year 1956-57, Canada will have provided more than \$4 billion of assistance to other countries. Included in the Canadian programme are post-war reconstruction loans (made between 1945 and 1947), relief credits, contributions and subscriptions to United Nations programmes and other international financial contributions and military aid to NATO allies. Funds on an increasing scale have also been made available for capital and technical assistance to under-developed countries and relief to distressed areas.

Canadian military aid to NATO countries, including the amounts which Parliament has approved for 1956-57, totals more than \$1.4 billion. The bulk of this aid has taken the form of air crew training and equipment.

Canada has provided increasing amounts of capital and technical assistance to under-developed areas through the Colombo Plan and the United Nations and its various agencies. Since the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1950, Canada has contributed more than \$128 million. For 1956-57, the amount which Parliament has approved for the Colombo Plan has been increased by \$8 million to \$34.4 million. Some projects assisted by Canadian funds are:

- (a) An atomic reactor in India which also will be available for use by other Colombo Plan countries;
- (b) 120 steam locomotives for India to help re-equip the transportation systems;
- (c) The Canada Dam in West Bengal to provide flood control to the Mayurakshi River, generate hydro-electric power, and irrigate some 600,000 acres of land;
- (d) The modernization of the Bombay Transport System;
- (e) A cement plant in the Thal development in Pakistan;
- (f) Electrical equipment and engineering services for the Warsak Project near the Khyber Pass in Pakistan which will provide 160,000 k.w. of installed electric power capacity for use in West Pakistan;
- (g) Aerial surveys of the resources of Pakistan, India, and Ceylon;
- (h) A fisheries research and development scheme in Ceylon which will materially assist the development of the fishing industry and thereby provide a more balanced diet for the population.
- (i) A hydro-electric project on the Kundah River in the State of Madras, India, to improve conditions for more than 30,000,000 people.

To help under-developed countries train their citizens to make the most effective use of all forms of capital aid and their own resources, Canada has contributed more than \$8.9 million to the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme. Canadian contributions to this programme have doubled since 1953. The contribution which Parliament approved for 1956 totals \$1.8 million.

Canada strongly supports the use of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to augment the supply of funds for investment in the

under-developed areas. To this end, Canada has made its entire 20 per cent capital subscription (\$65 million) available for lending and has authorized the Bank to obtain additional capital by the sale of bonds in Canada.

To encourage the investment of private funds in under-developed areas, Canada supported the formation of the International Finance Corporation and purchased 3,600 shares of stock at a cost of \$3.6 million. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the access of foreign borrowers to Canadian capital markets, and Canadian tax laws do not impede investment abroad. Canadian investors receive credits against their Canadian tax for income tax paid to foreign governments and Canadian corporations are exempt from tax on dividends they receive from foreign investments in which they own 25 per cent or more of the voting stock.

Canada's financial contribution is reinforced by the provision of training facilities in Canada for United Nations fellows and by the sending abroad of Canadian experts. From 1950 to March 31, 1956 Canada provided training for 340 United Nations trainees, while at least 77 Canadians served overseas as United Nations experts. In addition to these United Nations fellows and experts, training was also provided for 410 students under the Colombo Plan from 1950 to March 31, 1956. During the same period 69 Canadian Colombo Plan experts served abroad.

CANADA'S POST-WAR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ABROAD, 1945-57

(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

Expenditures and Allotments, March 31, 1945 to March 31, 1957

Reconstruction Loans:

Belgium	68.8
China	65.0
Czechoslovakia	16.7
France	253.4
Netherlands	123.9
Indonesia	15.5
Norway	23.7
United Kingdom	1,185.0
U.S.S.R.	15.2
TOTAL	1,767.2

Military Relief:

Balkans, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway	105.2
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Grants:

a) <i>To UN Agencies and Programmes —</i>	
UNRRA	154.0
Post-UNRRA Relief	12.1
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees2
IRO	18.8
ICEM10
UNHCR41
UNICEF	10.05

UNKRA	7.75
Palestine Arab Refugees	4.54
UNETAP	7.2
TOTAL	215.15
b) <i>Colombo Plan</i> —	
Capital and Technical Assistance	162.3
c) <i>Special Relief</i> —	
Greece (wheat)85
Korea (fish)75
Pakistan (wheat)	5.05
Greece (earthquake relief)50
India, Pakistan, Nepal (floods)23
Haiti (fish)03
Japan (flood relief)04
Yugoslavia (fish)05
British West Indies (hurricane relief)05
European Flood Relief (1952)	1.00
India (flood relief)20
TOTAL	8.6
d) <i>NATO</i> —	
Mutual Aid (transfers from Canadian stocks, new production items, NATO aircrew training, etc.) and infrastructure	1,417.9
Other International Organizations:	
IBRD	70.9
IMF	300.0
IFC	3.6
GRAND TOTAL	4,050.8

The following are the full names for some of the abbreviations used on this table:

- UNRRA — United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
- IRO — International Refugee Organization.
- ICEM — Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.
- UNHCR — United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- UNICEF — United Nations Children's Fund.
- UNKRA — United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.
- UNETAP — United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme.
- IBRD — International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- IMF — International Monetary Fund.
- IFC — International Finance Corporation.

Tenth Assembly of ICAO

THE TENTH SESSION of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization met in Caracas, Venezuela, between June 19 and July 16, 1956 under the presidency of Dr. Santiago Pérez Pérez, the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations. The Canadian Delegation, led successively by Mr. George C. Marler, Minister of Transport, and Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, included Mr. C. S. Booth, Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport, Mr. J. A. Irwin, Canadian Representative to ICAO, and officials of the Air Transport Board and the Departments of Transport, Finance, and External Affairs.

Organization of ICAO

ICAO is a Specialized Agency of the United Nations in which the governments of sixty-nine states are now participating. Fifty-six member states sent delegations to Caracas while three non-contracting states and nine international organizations were represented by observers. The Organization was established by the Chicago Convention of 1944. Its aims include the development of the principles and techniques of international air navigation and the encouragement of the planning and development of international air transport, so as to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient, and economical air services while protecting the rights of all contracting parties.

ICAO has its permanent headquarters in Montreal, where it maintains an international secretariat of some four hundred persons. The executive body of the Organization is the Council, which consists of twenty-one member states chosen by the Assembly every three years; Council states main-

tain permanent representatives at the headquarters in Montreal and also participate in the work of subordinate bodies, the Air Navigation Commission, the Air Transport Committee, the Joint Support Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Finance Committee. In the past a number of assemblies have been held in Montreal, but in recent years "major" assemblies have only been held every three years and it has become the practice for these meetings to take place away from Montreal.*



Mr. George C. Marler

*The last such Assembly was held in Brighton, England in June 1953: see "External Affairs", September 1953, p. 274.



CANADIAN DELEGATES

Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who followed Mr. George C. Marler, Minister of Transport, as leader of the Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of ICAO, is seen above with three members of the Delegation.

From left to right: Mr. Macdonnell; Mr. C. S. Booth, Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport; Mr. J. L. G. Morisset, Member of the Air Transport Board; Mr. J. A. Irwin, Canadian Representative to ICAO.

First Plenary Meeting

The first Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Assembly was attended by General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, President of the Republic of Venezuela, and members of his Cabinet, and was held in the magnificent Aula Magna of the University of Caracas. Later Plenary Meetings and meetings of Assembly Committees were held in conference rooms of the library building which, together with virtually the entire facilities of the University City, had been generously placed at the disposal of the Organization by the Government of Venezuela.

In opening the tenth session, Dr. Edward Warner, President of the Council of ICAO, struck the keynote of later deliberations when he drew attention to the phenomenal growth of civil aviation in the last decade; the world's air passenger traffic has quadrupled, air freight traffic has increased ten-fold, and future prospects are still enormous. Never, Dr. Warner declared, has it been as important as it is now, on the threshold of the jet age, for ICAO "to look well ahead and to plan both boldly and imaginatively for the future". This

theme was also dwelt on by a number of delegations in their opening statements to the Assembly. After the election of officers the Assembly appointed an Executive Committee and Technical, Economic, Legal, and Administrative Commissions to deal with the wide variety of topics on the agenda.

Air Navigation Facilities

Probably the most important of the items considered by the Executive Committee was a proposal by the United States for the establishment of a special "task force" of highly qualified individuals to consider present and future deficiencies in international air navigation facilities and recommend measures designed to meet the technical and financial problems arising out of new developments in international air transport. Although there was general agreement that the onset of jet transport on international routes made the question of improved facilities a vital one, a number of delegations took issue with the form of the United States proposal. The Canadian Delegation took the position that the question of air navigation facilities was properly the responsibility of the Council and that the United States proposal, if adopted in the form submitted, would circumvent Council's authority. The Delegation submitted for consideration by the Committee a draft resolution referring the matter to the Council for urgent consideration and suggesting that the Council appoint a special committee and consider employing a panel of experts to deal with the technical and economic aspects of the problem. The United States and Canadian proposals, together with resolutions subsequently submitted by Belgium and France, were referred to a working group for further examination; the final resolution adopted by the Assembly directed the Council to study these problems as a matter of urgency in consultation with the states most concerned and recommended that the Council appoint a special panel of experts. At its post-Assembly session the Council acted on this recommendation and appointed the panel, to serve under the chairmanship of Dr. Warner.

European Civil Aviation Council

The Assembly had before it a proposal for regularizing the relationship between ICAO and the European Civil Aviation conference, the regional organization established under the auspices of the Council of Europe to consider the special problems of civil aviation in the European area. A proposal was submitted under which ICAO would provide secretarial and other assistance to ECAC but would be reimbursed for certain direct out-of-pocket expenses arising out of meetings of the regional body. There was considerable discussion on the question of whether ECAC should not be established as a regional affiliate of ICAO rather than as a separate body, but it was finally agreed that in the special circumstances the compromise arrangement was a reasonable one and it was consequently approved.

The Executive Committee examined proposals by the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Peru, and Bolivia for settlement of their outstanding financial arrears to the Organization. Although many delegations disliked the principle of a retroactive change of assessments which had been carefully screened and approved in past years, it was agreed that special circumstances prevailed in the case of all three of the countries concerned. The proposals of all three countries, involving the scaling down of arrears in varying proportions, were

adopted by the Committee and subsequently approved by the Assembly. The Assembly also as a consequence voted to restore voting rights of Czechoslovakia, Peru, and Bolivia.

The Committee reviewed a report by the Council on the participation of ICAO in the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, and heard the representatives of many recipient states express their appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Organization. A debate developed over a proposal by the delegates of Portugal and Mexico for establishment of an ICAO Technical Assistance Fund separate from that of the United Nations. It was generally agreed that ICAO's technical assistance was making an important contribution to the progress of civil aviation in under-developed countries and should be expanded considerably; on the other hand it was the view of many delegations that since the total funds available from donor governments for technical assistance were limited, it would be most undesirable for ICAO to initiate a separate fund and perhaps lead other Specialized Agencies to do the same, thus forcing donor governments to allocate their contribution among competing programmes. It was agreed to recommend an increase in the contribution by member countries of funds for technical assistance but to leave the question of allocation to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, the body most competent to resolve the problem.

Administrative Proposals

In later sessions, the Executive Committee dealt with a number of proposals concerning the administration of ICAO itself and its constituent bodies. An amendment to Articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the Chicago Convention to eliminate the requirement for annual Assembly sessions had received 38 of the required 42 ratifications when the Assembly met; the Committee therefore assumed that by January 1, 1957 the amendment would be effective and authorized the Council to call only a limited Assembly in either 1957 or 1958 before the next major Assembly in 1959. A proposal which had also been on the agenda of the two previous Assembly sessions called for changes in the number and length of sessions and the working methods of the ICAO Council so as in particular to eliminate the requirement for a permanent Council with full-time representation at the headquarters. The Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution approving sequential sessions of the Council and its committees so as to streamline the activities of these bodies as much as possible.

Toward the end of the session the Committee received the report of the Council on privileges and immunities granted to ICAO by the Canadian authorities. Following announcement of arrangements made with the Organization by the Federal Government and the Government of the Province of Quebec on a number of outstanding questions involving provincial taxation, the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution thanking both the federal and provincial authorities for the goodwill shown to ICAO and the efforts which had brought about a solution of the various problems in this field.

New Council

The Assembly met in plenary session to elect a new Council for the Organization to hold office for a three-year period. The twenty-one Council

member states are elected at each major Assembly meeting and are chosen on the following basis:

- a) Eight states of major importance in air transport;
- b) Seven states providing important facilities for international civil aviation;
- c) Six states chosen from geographical areas of the world which are otherwise unrepresented.

This year there were twenty-three candidates for the Council, Japan and Chile seeking election for the first time and Sweden standing for the "Scandinavian seat" in place of Norway. When balloting was completed the following states had been elected:

Category (a): United States
United Kingdom
France
Canada
The Netherlands
Australia
Sweden
Brazil

Category (b): Argentina
India
Egypt
Italy
Belgium
Japan
Mexico

Category (c): Ireland
Lebanon
Portugal
Spain
Union of South Africa
Venezuela

Commission Meeting

While the Executive Committee was in session there were concurrent meetings of the Economic, Technical, Legal, and Administrative Commissions. The Economic Commission briefly considered the question of a multilateral agreement for non-scheduled air services and approved the action taken by the Council for collaboration with the European Civil Aviation Conference in a study of a possible multilateral agreement in the European area. There was also discussion of possible multilateral agreement on international air cargo, and the Commission noted the progress achieved in this field by the ECAC. A final resolution on this question directed the Secretariat to gather information on the movement of air cargo in other areas in addition to Europe which would be of interest to all contracting states. Although there was a large measure of agreement on the desirability of a multilateral accord it was recognized that, even in a compact region such as Europe, many differences of viewpoint remain. It was clear that many of the high hopes at earlier Assemblies

for a universal multilateral air agreement had been dissipated and that no such agreement could be expected in the near future.

There was also discussion of a possible Air Mail Multilateral Agreement but the Commission decided that the views of the Universal Postal Union and contracting states should be sought before any attempt was made to draft such an Agreement. The Commission devoted some time to a discussion of Facilitation, ICAO's programme of eliminating red tape and unnecessary delays in international air travel, and approved a resolution calling on contracting states to give attention to their obligations under the Convention and conduct periodic reviews of national requirements so as to bring them into line wherever possible with ICAO's recommendations.

The Technical Commission reviewed the work performed by ICAO in the technical field and approved a future work programme. The Commission approved a resolution giving high priority to the development of Regional Plans for provision of facilities and devoted particular attention to the question of airport specifications and length and strength of runways to be required by new types of heavy jet aircraft. The proposed introduction of new types of aircraft also induced consideration of existing deficiencies on international air routes; the Commission approved a resolution directing the Council to make greater efforts to remove these deficiencies by several methods including, where possible and appropriate, utilization of the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.

The Legal Commission, in reviewing the work of the Organization in the field of international air law, took note of the slowness of ratification by contracting states of such agreements as the Geneva Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (1948), the Rome Convention on Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (1952), and The Hague Protocol to amend the Warsaw Convention (1955), and called upon signatory states to complete the process of adherence as soon as possible. The Commission then discussed and approved a work programme for the Legal Committee of the Council, giving priority to problems of the hire, charter, and interchange of aircraft, and the legal status of the aircraft (with particular emphasis on the question of crimes committed on board an aircraft outside the territory of the state of registration).


Budget

The budget of the Organization for 1957 and draft budgets for 1958 and 1959 were submitted to the Administrative Commission. There was general recognition of the fact that ICAO has been successful in stabilizing its budget for a number of years, but the Commission nevertheless approved a small number of reductions recommended by the Budget Working Group which it believed could be effected without serious impairment of the work programme. As a result of the approval by the Executive Committee of the recommendation to Council for establishment of the special panel for the study of air navigation facilities and services, the Commission voted to add an amount of \$100,000 to the budgets for 1957 and 1958 and authorized the Council to approve additional expenditures in each of these two years of up to \$100,000 to finance the implementation of other recommendations of Assembly bodies, the precise costs of which could not be established immediately. With these

changes the Commission approved budgets for 1957 and 1958 but, in view of the decision to hold a minor Assembly in one of these years, took no action on the draft budget for 1959. A new scale of assessments made necessary by the admission of additional states to membership in ICAO was examined by the Working Group on Contributions and subsequently approved by the Administrative Commission.

Final Plenary Meeting

At the final Plenary Meeting, which took place on July 16, the Assembly approved the resolutions submitted by the Executive Committee and the Commissions and welcomed the accession of the Republic of Sudan as the sixty-ninth member state of ICAO, effective July 29, 1956. There was a general feeling among national delegations that the Assembly, faced with a number of new and important questions, had accomplished its work expeditiously and well. This had been the first session held in Latin America, and thanks in large measure to the excellent arrangements made by the host government of Venezuela, for which the Assembly expressed its gratitude, it had been a great success.



FISHERIES MINISTERS

Mr. A. A. Ishkov, left, U.S.S.R. Minister of Fisheries, and his Canadian counterpart, Mr. James Sinclair, arrive in Ottawa for a stopover en route to the West Coast. Mr. Ishkov and a party of fisheries experts toured fishing grounds and research stations on the Atlantic and Pacific seabords during a three-week visit which ended this month. They were escorted by Canada's Minister of Fisheries.

Economic and Social Council, 22nd Session

THE 22nd Session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations was held in Geneva from July 9 to August 10, 1956. Canada, which resumed membership in ECOSOC before the 21st Session, was represented by a delegation headed by Mr. P. A. Cardin, Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Delegation members were Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in New York, Mr. H. Allard, Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations, Mr. A. J. MacEachen, M.P., Dr. G. F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Welfare, and Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.

During the Session, in addition to attending the plenary meetings, the various delegations were represented at concurrent meetings of committees of the whole in which the preliminary and more detailed work is done—the Technical Assistance Committee, the Economic Committee, the Social Committee, and the Co-ordination Committee. As an exception at this session and in order to save time, the Technical Assistance Committee started its work on July 4.

The plenary session was presided over by Dr. Hans Engen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations and President of ECOSOC for 1956, while the two Vice-Presidents of the Council, Mr. Trujillo, of Ecuador, and Mr. Said Hasan, of Pakistan, acted as Chairmen of the Economic and Social Committees, respectively. Dr. Bannier, of the Netherlands, was Chairman of the Technical Assistance Committee, and Dr. Davidson, of the Canadian Delegation, was unanimously elected to the chairmanship of the Co-ordination Committee which was set up to insure closer co-ordination between the various economic, social, and human rights programmes of the ECOSOC subsidiary bodies and of the Specialized Agencies.

Although the 22nd Session, in the words of its President, Dr. Engen, was “more characterized by pausing and reflection than by decisive action”, its discussions were useful in several respects. Furthermore, as the President suggested, a pause is sometimes “a necessary stage through which we have to go in order to make further progress”.

The Canadian Delegation went to the 22nd Session with a full realization of the importance of ECOSOC as a means of improving living conditions throughout the world and consequently as a safeguard for peace. Although the World Economic Survey carried out by the U.N. Secretariat General in 1955 showed a substantial advance in world production and trade, in employment and levels of productivity, and in incomes, consumption, and investment, the progress has not been uniform in the various areas of the world. Indeed the gap between the standards of living in the industrialized and less-developed countries has increased and offers a challenge which still has to be met.

Economic Matters

It was, therefore, to be expected that the emphasis in the Council's discussions would be placed on economic development and related problems such as the development of natural resources, industrialization, and questions of financing. In the Economic Committee, which was concerned with the practical consideration of these topics, the Canadian Delegation tried to play a positive role and, without seeking compromise for the sake of compromise, was instrumental in some instances in reconciling conflicting resolutions. Controversy arose over the proposed establishment of a World Food Reserve, of a special organization (SUNFED) to promote the economic development of less-developed countries, and also of some machinery to speed up the industrialization of the latter group of countries. A U.S.S.R. proposal to establish an international trade co-operation machinery under the auspices of the United Nations was also discussed.

In accordance with a resolution of the 9th Session of the General Assembly, the Council had to consider the complex questions involved in the concept of a World Food Reserve as a means of attaining one or more of the following four main objectives:

- 1) Raising low levels of food production and consumption, and fighting chronic malnutrition;
- 2) Relieving famine and other emergency situations;
- 3) Counteracting excessive price fluctuations; and
- 4) Promoting the rational disposal of intermittent agricultural surpluses.

The working document before the Council was a study prepared by the FAO at the request of the General Assembly. The discussion led to the conclusion, which was recorded in the relevant Economic Committee's resolution, that the establishment of a food reserve was impractical at the present time. The remedy to the above-listed problems, it was stressed, lay rather in a rapid and balanced economic development and also in the disposal of food surplus in accordance with the principles established by the Food Agriculture Organization. At the request of spokesmen for the less-developed countries, however, the Council requested "the Secretary-General, in consultation with the FAO and other organizations and experts as he considers appropriate", to study further and to report on the possibility of further national and international co-operation to attain the objectives pursued, including the use of food reserves for meeting unforeseeable food shortages. The resolution which embodies these recommendations was the outcome of very laborious negotiations between what appeared at the time to be two irreconcilable bodies of opinion, and the Canadian Delegation was particularly active in seeking a solution which was generally acceptable to both camps. Further consideration of this problem will be required—especially when the Secretary-General submits his report at the 24th Session.

Since 1951, the less-developed countries have campaigned for the establishment of a United Nations fund which would assist them in making grants in-aid and long-term, low-interest loans. Canada, although it has so far reserved its position on this proposal, had agreed to participate in the work of an ad hoc committee of representatives of sixteen countries which met last May in

New York to examine the replies to a questionnaire which had been approved at the 10th Session of the General Assembly.

The ad hoc committee's interim report was considered at the 22nd Session and a resolution was passed which expressed "the hope that the General Assembly will consider what further steps may help to promote the early establishment of a special United Nations Fund for Economic Development". This decision obviously fell short of the hopes of the advocates of SUNFED, but it keeps the issue alive, while giving all United Nations member countries some breathing spell to consider all its implications. Canada, for one, considers that further study of the proposal will be required before a final decision can be made.

The connected problem of industrialization of less-developed countries was also on the agenda of the Council. At its 19th Session, ECOSOC had requested the Secretary-General to prepare and submit, in the light of an earlier survey he had made, a programme of work with a view to accelerating industrialization. At its 21st Session, ECOSOC adopted a resolution, in the formulation of which the Canadian Delegation played an important part, endorsing a programme of study on industrialization and productivity. As a result, the Secretary-General presented at the last Session new proposals which were endorsed by the Council, with the additional request, however, that the Secretary-General "consider further the question of machinery necessary in the field of industrialization of under-developed countries".

The U.S.S.R., which last year had proposed the resurrection of the International Trade Organization, submitted at the last Session a resolution calling for the establishment of a committee "to work out proposals for setting up an International Organization for Trade Co-operation". The Soviet proposal appeared of doubtful value to a majority of delegations because there is already a great deal of inter-governmental trade machinery in existence, particularly GATT, and what is needed is to make better use of these organizations. The Canadian Delegation promoted a compromise, which was adopted as an amendment to the Soviet resolution, stressing the valuable services of the United Nations regional economic commissions in connection with trade co-operation. In the same field, Canada agreed to serve on the United Nations Commodity Commission.

Technical Assistance

In the Technical Assistance Committee, Canada co-sponsored with the United States and Norway a resolution on currency utilization which aims among other things at inducing countries to make their contributions in currency rather than in kind, and stresses the multilateral basis of contributions.

The Canadian Delegation also suggested a series of amendments to an Egyptian, Netherlands, Pakistani, and Indonesian resolution on administrative and operational costs which called for the setting up of an administrative review group of eight members of the Technical Assistance Committee. The Canadian amendment restricted the review group's life until November of this year and also requested the Chairman of the Technical Assistance Committee to consult with the Chairman of the U.N. Advisory Committee on administrative and budgetary questions to determine how the latter's services could be used by the Technical Assistance Committee in examining the administra-

tive and operational services cost of the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. In addition, Canada supported a resolution on the "Forward Look" of the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme which urged continued support for the increased programme, with a long-term commitment wherever possible. As stated by Dr. Engen, the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance is perhaps the most important practical achievement of ECOSOC and it is not without significance that the Council has unanimously re-affirmed its confidence in the programme "as an effective instrument for promoting the economic development of the less-developed countries and strengthening the foundations of a prosperous and peaceful world."

Social Questions

Discussions in the Social Committee proceeded rather smoothly, and there again the Canadian Delegation displayed active interest. The efforts of the Canadian Delegation were directed towards greater co-ordination, particularly of the reports which were requested from governments in the field of human rights, and the programme of concerted practical action in the social field. Canada has already expressed its intention to stand for election next year to the Commission on the Status of Women.

An interesting feature of the 22nd Session was the Secretary-General's intervention in favour of the creation of a kind of international civil service. The Canadian Delegation took this opportunity to re-affirm Canada's interest in the possibility that the U.N. might recruit experts for its technical and other assistance programmes on a long-term basis. The Secretary-General's views were slightly different, inasmuch as he favoured the strengthening of the administration of the less-developed countries through the appointment of administrators provided by the United Nations. This proposal is likely to be revived in future U.N. discussions.

The Council urged all governments to continue their support for the work undertaken on behalf of refugees. The Council also approved the admission of Morocco to UNESCO.

The Session finally approved a calendar of conferences for 1957. Although no definite date has been set, the resumed 22nd Session is likely to be held in New York before the end of December 1956.

Conclusions

The 22nd Session will have showed once more the importance and complexity of the tasks which were entrusted to ECOSOC. However, progress is gradually being made in dealing with these tasks, and particularly in the field of procedure. There is a fuller realization of the need for co-operation, and, quoting the President of ECOSOC again, "the debate on co-ordination has been more fruitful this year than ever before". Another development of consequence is the growing interest of Communist countries in ECOSOC, which not such a long time ago they ignored almost completely; it is gratifying to note that they are now less obstructive than in the past.

The 22nd Session reached no spectacular decisions. One must consider, however, that economic and social progress cannot be effected overnight. It is the result of long and patient efforts. This is particularly true at the inter-

national level, where aims and methods must be adopted to different political, economic, and social approaches. In spite of these obstacles, ECOSOC is year by year gaining knowledge and experience which bring it closer to its goal. It may sometimes give the impression of "pausing", but it is necessary from time to time to take stock of the progress already achieved and to make careful preparations before tackling the problems which lie ahead. The 22nd Session represents, therefore, one more modest, perhaps, but useful step in the right direction.



IMPRESSIVE CEREMONY HELD

A monument erected by the City of Mons, Belgium, to the memory of the 116th Canadian Infantry Battalion was unveiled in Casteau on July 10. Bearing a bronze plaque supplied by the 116th Regimental Association, the monument marks the spot where the 116th had an outpost located on November 11, 1918.

The unveiling ceremony took place in the presence of Major General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., M.P., Commanding Officer of the 116th in 1918, Mr. C. P. Hébert, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium, and a number of Belgian dignitaries. A Canadian tri-service detachment participated.

Mr. Hébert is seen above signing the Book of the City of Mons. Seen from left to right, standing, are Major General Pearkes, Mr. Maistriaux, former Burgomaster of Mons, Mrs. Hébert, Mr. Demarbre, Burgomaster f.f. of Mons, Mrs. Pearkes, and W/C E. L. Wurtele, Naval, Military, and Air Attaché at the Canadian Embassy.

Co-operation on the Seven Seas

Canada has a special interest in the work of organs and agencies of the United Nations which are concerned with the sea. Through the courtesy of the *United Nations Review*, *External Affairs* presents Part I of a two-part article, "A Chart for all the Oceans", which appeared in the *Review* earlier this year. The article presents aspects of the ocean which may be unfamiliar to many, and outlines how the United Nations and several of its Specialized Agencies help to foster international co-operation on the seas. Part II of this article will appear in the October issue.

A Chart for All the Nations

Part I

PUSHING forward across the unknown, primitive man came, again and again, upon the sea, a still greater unknown. To him it was a mystery and an obstacle. Beyond it, all unsuspected, lay the great empty lands. There were others, too, inhabited by men like himself but, because of the sea, his descendants might not hear of them until scores of centuries had passed.

Paradoxically, this same ocean, which for so long kept men apart, has come to symbolize the concept of one world. It is not only that men have found in the oceans a highway by which they can exchange their goods for those of distant peoples. Something in man's relation to the sea itself has affected his attitude. All men, irrespective of their origin, must be on guard against its violence and ready, as they seldom are on land, to help one another. "Faithful to no race after the manner of the kindly earth," wrote Joseph Conrad, "receiving no impress from valor and toil and self-sacrifice, recognizing no finality of domination, the sea has never adopted the cause of its masters like the land." It was inevitable that a feeling of solidarity, a kind of international understanding, should arise among sailors of all nations. Launching out upon the deep, men have recognized the need for a higher loyalty and a common discipline.

"All vessels must answer all calls of distress at sea and must render assistance to every person, even though an enemy, who is found at sea in danger of being lost."

That is one of certain rules of the sea, now generally accepted throughout the world, on which the International Law Commission of the United Nations is to report to the 1956 General Assembly. The commission consists of fifteen international jurists chosen by the Assembly. Every summer in Geneva, it meets to continue its task of developing and codifying a body of international law. Its session in 1955 was mainly concerned with the regime of the high seas and of the territorial sea. The distinguished lawyers have commented, one by one, on various points in international maritime law. It is an interesting fact that many rules of the sea which have won considerable, if not general, acceptance express a standard of conduct not related so much to the laws of individual states, as to the conscience or interests of mankind. Thus

"No State may endanger the safety of life at sea by issuing any regulations which are inconsistent with the regulations approved by a majority of seafaring States."

And again there is much support for the principle that ships without flag—or with more than one flag—may be boarded and searched by the public vessels of all states and, if suspected of piracy, may be forcibly brought to port for investigation.

The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations, a part of the Secretariat, co-operates with the International Law Commission in this task of codifying international law, including maritime law. Many intricate problems are involved, but a broad background of co-operation and understanding already exists. Certain navigational rules are universally accepted. The Plimsoll line might be called a worldwide acknowledgment of human rights at sea, since it lays down the principle of responsibility on the part of ship-owners for the lives and safety of those who travel under their flag. The greed of owners can no longer cause ships to be overloaded and so become death-traps for crews and passengers. When danger threatens, the captain of any vessel knows that his S.O.S. will be answered without thought of his ship's nationality or origin. Every day, some small ship with a case of sickness or injury on board, and no doctor, uses radio to seek medical advice from another. Very many lives must have been saved in this way not only across the waters, but across the so-called barriers of race. Every evening, as the advancing fringe of darkness brings the world's lighthouses and buoys into operation, each flashes a message which is independent of the trammels of language that separate man from man. The charts to which seamen entrust their lives embody the lessons of many generations and of many races. Their symbols convey to every seaman a warning without words. They are fruits of human experience, wrung from danger and made available to all.

And so the sea, unlike the land with its passionate local loyalties and associations, speaks to man in universal terms. We have come to recognize in what was once the principle obstacle keeping mankind apart one of the major instruments working to bring the human family together and to emphasize its inter-dependence.

This co-operation of the human family at sea has already been the means of saving several hundred lives in the North Atlantic through the work of a specialized agency. Those saved were the crews and passengers of more than half a dozen ships. The specialized agency concerned, the International Civil Aviation Organization, co-ordinated an agreement by which fifteen nations maintain nine floating ocean stations for weather reporting to countries on both sides of the Atlantic. For ICAO, life-saving at sea is quite subsidiary to its main work in civil aviation. Nevertheless, in a few years, these ships have built up an enviable, if obscure, search and rescue record in addition to the daily weather observations at sea level and by stratospheric balloons which are their crews' main function. The personnel of several aircraft in distress have also been rescued by the same means from Atlantic waters.

Weather Casualties

As little known, although it operates on a much wider scale, is the voluntary weather observation carried out internationally by the world's merchant

ships. The World Meteorological Organization, another specialized agency, estimates that thirteen per cent of recorded shipping casualties are directly due to the weather. This does not take into account other casualties such as collisions or strandings which in many cases are due indirectly to the same cause.

As there is at present nothing man can do to control the weather, the task of the weather men is to give as long and as accurate warning as possible of weather conditions likely to be hazardous for shipping.

Weather forecasts as well as gale, storm and hurricane warnings are issued to shipping by radio several times a day all round the world according to a scheme adopted by WMO.

In order to provide adequate warnings and forecasts it is indispensable to obtain information on the weather over ocean areas. The cost of operation of stationary "ocean weather ships" makes it impossible to establish more than a very limited number. Practically all the meteorological information obtained from the sea must therefore be provided by voluntary observers aboard merchant ships. A worldwide plan of WMO governs the recruitment of such voluntary observing ships. They are supplied with instruments and report regularly by radio to the nearest coastal stations



CANADIAN WEATHER SHIP

Regular duty at a point far out in the Pacific Ocean is shared by two Canadian weather ships. Operated by the Department of Transport, these floating meteorological stations provide a constant flow of information on weather patterns moving toward the West Coast.

There are at present about 2,500 such ships on the oceans as against thirteen stationary "ocean weather ships." The ships' officers who act as amateur weather men make observations which are accurate and scientifically recorded. Considerable credit is due to them for the painstaking way in which

they report their observations. These are of value not only to shipping but to users of meteorological information all over the world.

Arrangements have also been made by WMO for whalers to transmit weather reports. In these reports the ships' position is given in cipher, so as to avoid revealing it to competitors in the whaling grounds.

Ships also use weather forecasts for route planning with a view to avoiding contrary winds and thereby saving time and fuel. This aspect of the maritime uses of meteorological information is of considerable economic importance.

Fellowships in Meteorology

It is interesting to note that the first efforts towards international co-operation in meteorology were made by naval officers. These convened a conference in Brussels in 1853 to draw up a program of meteorological observations based on the collaboration of shipping belonging to most of the maritime countries. One of the first governmental weather services of the world, the French Meteorological Service, was founded as a result of a disaster that overtook the French Fleet in the Black Sea during the Crimean War in 1854.

In its technical assistance projects under the United Nations Expanded Program, WMO has not neglected the needs of maritime meteorology. Among projects in this field, a fellowship in maritime meteorology granted to Ibrahim Kulaksiz of the Turkish State Meteorological Service may be given as an example. Mr. Kulaksiz received training in the United Kingdom and learned not only about modern methods of maritime climatology, but also participated in taking meteorological observations aboard ocean weather ships and ships of the merchant marine.

Information and warnings about ice conditions are of paramount importance to winter shipping in the northern seas. The most effective ice service for winter navigation can be achieved only through intimate collaboration between an ice information service, an icebreaker service and—for forecasts—hydrological and meteorological services.

All these radioed messages and all appeals for help at sea reach their objective because of international radio agreements. Here again, a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Telecommunications Union, is the operative link among governments. This agency organizes the periodical conferences at which radio frequencies are allocated. Vital are those set for communication between ships and between ships and land. These conferences also draw up regulations for the use of frequencies intended for distress purposes and for routing distress messages to the authorities concerned.

In the United Nations, the Transport and Communications Commission of the Economic and Social Council, serviced by a Division of the same name in the Secretariat, has also been concerned with the prevention of loss of life at sea. At a conference in London in 1948, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea was opened for signature and the conference also approved several recommendations on safety matters, including International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

For some years, preparations have been in progress for another projected specialized agency, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-

tion. This agreement will come into being when the Convention opened for signature has been ratified by twenty-one states, of which seven must each have a total tonnage of at least one million gross tons of shipping. The Organization will deal with technical matters affecting international shipping and will encourage the highest standards of safety and efficiency of navigation. It will help to make shipping services available to the commerce of the world without discrimination and will include a Maritime Safety Committee, on which fourteen countries will be represented, including not less than the eight largest ship-owning nations.

The free passage of all these ocean-going vessels and the acceptance of certain international rules of the sea was not something which came about by itself. For a long time, countries staked claims on the oceans as on the land. In the second half of the Middle Ages, princes and principalities claimed entire seas as their own. Venice proclaimed her sovereignty over the Adriatic, Genoa over the Ligurian Sea. Portugal asserted her rule over the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic south of Morocco, while Spain claimed the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific. Early in the seventeenth century, the Dutch lawyer, Hugo Grotius, advanced arguments in favor of recognizing the freedom of the seas. "The sea cannot be physically possessed. It is free by the laws of nature," he wrote. "It must, therefore, be free also of the laws of man." This principle was vigorously contested and more than 200 years were to pass before nations silently withdrew most of their exclusive claims and, in so doing, accepted the principle of the freedom of the open sea.

Legal Interpretations

This absence of sovereignty over the high seas does not mean the absence of law. There are still a number of outstanding problems to engage the jurists of the International Law Commission. One of the disputed points now before them concerns what is called the continental shelf, an area of shallow water extending around the coasts of continents. In the case of North America, geologists have estimated that one small part of this continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico will yield, besides valuable minerals, perhaps as much as twenty-two billion barrels of oil—more than they can be sure exists beneath the soil of the continent itself. If such rich treasure lies buried under the sea, it is clear that some law must be formulated and generally accepted to provide for its exploitation and exploration. "The world needs these resources," wrote a Dutch jurist of our own time, Dr. M. W. Mouton. "A solution has to be found to regulate exploitation activities in such a way that a rush and grab policy will be forestalled, that each part of the world's population will get its share and that exhaustion and conflicts will be prevented." If the text drafted by the International Law Commission is approved, nations will exercise sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil near their territorial waters up to a depth of 200 metres, provided they do not interfere with free shipping and fishing on the high seas above.

In that text, the lawyers were careful to provide for fishing rights, because disputes about these rights are among the most frequent that arise in connection with the sea. Since the Second World War, disagreements involving fishing interests have been heard by another organ associated with the United Nations, the International Court of Justice at The Hague. In 1951, judgment was given by the Court in favor of Norway, following a dispute between that country

and the United Kingdom, regarding the delimitation of the territorial waters of Norway. In 1954, the United Kingdom won a case against France concerning jurisdiction over the islets of Minquiers and Ecrehos in the Channel Islands. The dispute arose chiefly because both French and British fishermen wished to have exclusive rights in the area. The Channel Islands, formerly part of the Duchy of Normandy, were brought to the English crown in 1066 by William the Conqueror and The Hague hearings were remarkable in that one of the documents cited went back as far as the year 1200—a record for the proceedings of the International Court.

When the International Law Commission discussed the problem of legal claims to the wealth of the sea, the lawyers found it necessary to turn to the scientists for technical information. In 1954, the General Assembly decided that the problem of territorial waters and marine rights was closely linked to that of the international protection of fisheries and other resources of the sea. The Food and Agriculture Organization is closely concerned with the conservation, development and controlled exploitation of the living resources of the sea, and has been engaged for some time in surveying the living aquatic resources of the world. For this reason, the General Assembly voted to convene an International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea at FAO Headquarters in Rome, April 18 through May 10, 1955. The recommendations of this conference were reported to the International Law Commission, which had already proposed the establishment of an international authority under the United Nations to regulate fisheries and to protect fishery resources.

How Great Its Resources?

Many of the subjects discussed at the Conference had already been considered in a number of FAO publications. According to FAO, the seas of the world could make a substantially greater contribution to world food supplies. To bring this about, however, it will be necessary to learn a great deal more about the sea's resources, to make further technical progress and to improve the organization of industries. In the long run, the maintenance of food production from the sea will be dependent, as it already is in particular cases, on international action.

This is made all the more necessary by developments taking place in the design and equipment of fishing vessels and in fishing techniques. The world's fishermen are now making bigger catches than ever. It is estimated that the world catch of fish, crustaceans and molluscs, which in 1938 totalled something over twenty-two million metric tons, had increased by 1953 to more than twenty-seven million metric tons. While this represents a very substantial increase (more than 20 per cent) in landings, it is only a fraction of what fishery biologists believe could be taken from the sea continuously and without impairing resources, provided there is efficient international control. The sixth FAO Conference endorsed the view that it should be possible to double production. On the other hand, without proper national and international conservation and development programs, another concern of FAO, it is possible that some important existing resources may be overfished and depleted, particularly in view of the growing efficiency of modern vessels, equipment and techniques. For example, the development of wartime submarine detecting devices into peacetime fish finding apparatus and the use of radiotelephony and telegraphy have



RICHS OF THE SEA

—FAO

Chilean trawler fishermen emptying a bag of hake onto the deck. Fish production holds an important place in the program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Fish can provide the proteins lacking in the diet of a large portion of the world population.

tended to concentrate fishing boats at points where fish are located. Before the days of echosounders and radar devices, the flair of some skippers for locating fish resulted in their regularly catching more than their competitors. Then came the use of radiotelephony and telegraphy, and the introduction of a policy, instituted by owners, whereby a skipper locating fish had to call up other vessels of the fleet so that all joined in. Continued development of echosounders and radar devices has made it easier for all skippers to make good catches, although of course a good skipper is still more successful than his less skilled colleagues.

One of the latest developments is the use of a device to enable fishermen to ascertain the strength and direction of currents at fishing levels. It has been used with considerable success by the Norwegian fishermen working the Lofoten cod fishery. The trend shows that, with modern echosounders, radar equipment and current meters, fishermen are making more and more use of scientific discoveries in their search for fish, and are able to estimate the density and depth of shoals as well as the direction in which they are heading.

Scouting for shoals by aircraft is another method by which fishermen can obtain guidance in their work. The Icelandic herring fleet relies to a great extent on its aerial scouting service, which is all the more important to it because echosounding is found to be of limited value in fishing off the north coast of Iceland. Experiments are going on in the use of underwater electric fields actually to control, and not merely to detect, the movements of fish and, of course, there has been the development of such nets as the midwater floating

trawl and of power equipment which makes for more efficient handling of traditional gear.

New Techniques

One of the latest developments in fishing is that of the factory ship, a very large vessel which is capable of staying at sea for, perhaps, three months at a time, and processing the catch as it is brought aboard. These ships—the British vessel “Fairtry” is one—are equipped with machinery and a processing plant which can produce consumer packs of fish, hold some of the catch in cold storage “in the round,” extract fish oil, and produce fish meal. There are other modern fishing vessels which, although not so elaborately equipped, can also stay at sea for considerable periods and land large quantities of fish in excellent condition.

Intensive biological study of the habits of fish, particularly in relation to their spawning and migration, has contributed greatly to increased catches. Biologists have studied the daily migration of fish and the movement of shoals, which seem to be connected with the depth of light penetration. For example, herring rise at dawn, but descend to deeper waters. Such information as this is of value to the fishermen, as is the knowledge resulting from studies of the influence of temperature on the growth of fish and the effects of sea currents, both horizontal and vertical, on the dispersal of eggs and of fry and fingerlings. The fishery biologist, indeed, has a most essential part to play in the future of the world's fisheries, because any given conservation program must depend on our detailed knowledge of the life history, ecology, population dynamics and behavior of the fish we seek to preserve.

Apart from these factors affecting the conservation and exploitation of fisheries, the problem of marketing and distribution of the catch is of great importance. Examination of this problem and developing of ways and means to solve it forms an essential part of the work of FAO. For example, little is known of the whereabouts of the Norwegian herring outside the spawning season, but if the fish could be located at other times of the year, much bigger supplies could be landed. While this appears at first glance to be highly desirable, it raises the problem of marketing and distribution, because means must be devised for efficient use of increased catches landed by fishing fleets. The problem naturally varies from country to country. For example, it might be expected that an extra supply of fish would be readily sold in countries where the mass of people suffer from lack of high-quality protein in their diet, but the matter is not so simple as that. The problems of distribution and sale, as well as socio-economic factors such as religious precepts and inadequate incomes, are often most complex and difficult.

These, then, are some of the problems on which FAO is constantly at work, and they also provided subject matter for the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea.

Organized Effort

An interesting fact is that most of the world's fishing at present takes place over only ten per cent of the marine area of the globe, the continental shelves, and more than ninety per cent of the world's catch is taken north of the equator. These will probably continue to be the richest areas, although

much research and fishing are being carried out elsewhere. Experts are also looking forward to the expansion in the cultivation of crustaceans and molluscs along the coasts, and experimental work is being done with regard to the use of seaweeds for food. An expert estimates that an annual harvest of one million tons of brown seaweed could be taken on the coasts of Scotland alone and the potential harvest throughout the world must be calculated in astronomical figures.

In dealing with the complex problem of development and conservation of the world's fisheries, which differ from country to country, there is need for continuous effort in organizing and directing the work involved. Valuable are meetings like the International Technical Conference, an established organization, such as the FAO Fisheries Division, is essential. To help in this aspect of the work, UNESCO has organized an Advisory Committee on Marine Science, the aim of which is to form a bridge between scientists working on various fundamental problems of the sea. In its task of promoting the orderly development of the world's fisheries resources and promoting fishery science, FAO works in co-operation not only with its seventy-one member nations, but also with other international organizations such as the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the United States International Co-operation Administration, the Colombo Plan, the International Council for Exploration of the Seas, and others.

This broad range of international co-operation is one of the most impressive facts to emerge from a study of the sea. The vastness of the waters, their peculiar demands as well as the wide variety of things they furnish plant and animal life all combine almost to force man to share the knowledge he has for living on the sea, for making use of its resources. This sharing has led to international exchanges of information in such fields as fishing methods, cargo handling and the health and working conditions of seafarers. In all manner of ways we come to realize how the oceans bring peoples and nations into closer realization of each others' problems through a common interest in the sea.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs, by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Some Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy

Excerpts from a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons, August 1, 1956.

. . . In the House, in January last, I made a fairly comprehensive statement on some of the major aspects of our policy. At that time I dealt more particularly with an analysis, in so far as we were able to make it, of the recent changes in Soviet leadership. I discussed the situation in the Middle East and also, at that time in January, the situation in the Far East.

So far as the latter subject is concerned, there has been no substantial change in the situation in the Far East since I spoke in January; nor has there been any change in Canadian policy with respect to it. That situation, particularly in and about the Formosan straits, remains potentially dangerous as long as two Chinese armies face each other only four or five miles apart, but it has not in recent weeks or even in recent months deteriorated.

The Middle East—Suez

So far as the situation in the Middle East is concerned, the long and bitter dispute between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours continues. That situation, while still tense, has not—and this is as far, I think, as anyone would dare go—has not grown worse since I talked about it last. Incidents, which continue on the frontiers and which are likely to continue in the present atmosphere, have not, at least, exploded into war. The United Nations Secretary-General in two visits to the area has made a useful and constructive effort to lessen tension in that area, and by his intervention he has, I think, succeeded in strengthening the truce. I know that on the cease fire and the truce which he has helped to strengthen he hopes to build an arrangement which will be more permanent.

I think we can also pay tribute at this time to the activities of the United Nations Truce Commission in Palestine, in which several Canadian officers are now serving. That Commission is playing a courageous and selfless part in difficult and indeed—as we know from the tragic incident of last week—often in dangerous circumstances. It is operating under the objective, patient and very efficient leadership of a Canadian, General Burns, whose work, I think, deserves the highest commendation on the part of all those who are genuinely interested in establishing security and a just peace in that part of the world. Certainly there is not peace there yet, for there has been no political settlement made between the contending parties. That must come if there is to be peace, because in the long run such a political settlement under the United Nations, rather than arms, will be the foundation of security for Israel and the Arab states.

In recent days a new situation—I was going to say “a new crisis”—has developed there in connection with the Suez Canal. A sudden arbitrary move

on the part of the Egyptian Government has aroused fears that the right to use this international waterway in peace and war without discrimination may be prejudiced, a right which, as Hon. Members know, is guaranteed by an international treaty. Far more than the nationalization, or, if you like, the expropriation, of the Suez Canal Company is at stake in this matter; it is the future use for all nations without arbitrary or unnecessary interference of an essential international artery of trade and of communications, a waterway which was constructed by international agreement and with international co-operation and is now maintained and operated internationally.

As Hon. Members know, steps are being taken at the moment in London, by three powers very directly and importantly affected by the Egyptian decision, to bring about a satisfactory solution to this problem, the problem created by this action of the Egyptian Government, by establishing some form of permanent international control for this international waterway, by which the legitimate rights of all countries can be protected. Until the results of this London meeting are available—and the meeting has not concluded yet—I think I should say nothing more about this matter, except possibly to express the support of our Government for the principle of such international control, with the countries having the greatest interest in the operation of the canal sharing in that control, preferably, if this turns out to be practicable, under the aegis of the United Nations.

Relations with Soviet Union

The third subject I dealt with last January is one which will occupy our attention and at times our anxieties, namely, the relations between the Soviet Union and the coalition of free states in which Canada is playing a part. In so far as the possibility of an all-out war is concerned, I think it can be said, as it has been said on more than one occasion, that we are now reaching, if we have not already reached, a deadlock of mutual deterrence through the certainty of mutual destruction. That is in a sense, I suppose, effective but it does mean reliance by both sides on the fear brought about by thermonuclear power used for destructive purposes. Therefore national security and international peace are becoming merely the probability and the hope that we will get through any year without being blown to bits.

At the very same time that we rely on this deterrence, and we have to rely on it, there is a frantic search going on on both sides for the intercontinental ballistic missile which will remove or certainly will minimize this mutual deterrence by the discovery of an annihilating weapon against which, if used aggressively, there may be no defence or, indeed, no warning. Therefore I do not think any of us can get very much permanent comfort out of a security resting on a balance of terror. Indeed, in that situation there are certain advantages possessed by the Soviet Union. With its despotic government, without the restraints of public opinion, it can, if it so desires, use this situation for political blackmail in peacetime and for what have been called brush fire wars which would throw on our side the responsibility of converting these limited wars into thermonuclear ones.

That possible situation certainly has a bearing both on our defence and on our diplomatic policies and it leads me to the conclusion that atomic defence and atomic deterrence are not enough. It also leads me to stress the importance of diplomatic defences, of political unity on our side, of economic strength, of moral purpose. These things are becoming more and more impor-

tant as developments occur, but while we seek them on our side the drive to extend Soviet influence by a wide variety of means still continues.

The emphasis now in tactics and perhaps in policy has been shifted, I think, since the new leadership came into power in Moscow, from the military to the economic and the political. How much this shift represents a change of heart and how much is a revision of thinking forced upon Moscow by the H-bomb and the strength and unity of NATO, I am not prepared to say. I think that the latter factor, our strength, may have been, if not the dominating, at least a very important consideration in any changes that have taken place.

But whatever the reason, the Soviet Union may now have decided to abandon for the time being at least the open and direct use of armed force for the extension of its influence lest this should lead to the outbreak of global and thermonuclear war. Yet while such a thermonuclear war is recognized by the Soviet Union, as it is by us, as a calamity of unthinkable proportions, nevertheless until such time as a condition of greater mutual trust has been established between the two worlds, any weakening in the defence capabilities of the free democracies might provide a serious temptation to the Soviet Union to revert to the use of armed force for the pursuit of policy. They certainly have the capacity for this. Their tactics may have changed but their military strength has been maintained. Indeed, their industrial strength has been greatly increased and that industrial and economic strength is now becoming an important agent of their foreign policy. The armed strength of the Soviet Union, which is now in process of being revamped and modernized, is a central fact which I suggest we cannot and must not ignore, especially when we consider our own defence plans and defence policies.

Mr. Khrushchev, speaking at the recent 20th party congress in Moscow, said:

We must resolve to take all measures necessary to strengthen further the defence potential of our socialist state.

It is well to remember this when we read of Soviet proposals to demobilize soldiers and when we receive appeals to take it easy and to throw away our arms because the danger has now disappeared. This strengthening, moreover, applies not merely to the Soviet state itself but to what the Soviet leaders call—and they never seem to weary of referring to it—the international camp of socialism, something which, of course, is quite peaceful and respectable although our own coalitions are always referred to by them as aggressive military blocs.

Must Remain on Guard

Therefore I think that all Members will agree with me that we in the Western world must remain on guard. But while all this is true, and it certainly is true, I think it is also true that since the death of Stalin the Soviet Government and the Soviet regime have begun to eliminate some of the more objectionable features of both their foreign and domestic policies. There have been relaxations at home, and as a result I believe that certain internal pressures may be developing in Russia which could have a restraining influence on the activities of the Soviet leaders. These Russian leaders may have started a train of events which, under normal conditions, should be welcome to the bulk of their population with whom the dynamism of revolution has probably run down. That process may become increasingly difficult to reverse at home if it is permitted to gain momentum there, but it is certainly not likely to lead. as

we sometimes hopefully think, to parliamentary democracy or to any kind of democracy as we understand it because that is impossible in a communist state and Russia under its new leaders remains determinedly communist.

Also it is too soon to say, I think, that irresistible forces of freedom have been set in motion and that this means a great triumph for the Western world. Indeed, these relaxations and their results, both at home and among their satellite communities, may frighten the new rulers who may try to reverse the trend, and out of this effort a new Stalin, Khrushchev or somebody else may arise as the old Stalin arose out of the ruins of the new economic policy in the twenties. This accession of one man to power is consistent both with the Slav tradition of autocratic rule and the communist doctrine of what they call democratic centralism.

So we would be wise, I think, to welcome and exploit any changes that seem for the better in both domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union without exaggerating their extent or being bedazzled or deceived by them. At the same time, we must not be too tightly bound by the analysis which we made of Soviet policy under the Stalin regime, nor must we leave the initiative in the present period always to the new Soviet leaders, and they are very adept, indeed, in taking advantage of the initiative.

But one thing we can be sure of, that any changes of this character, and there certainly have been some, are not the result of weakness or lack of confidence of the new rulers in the future of the Soviet system. They are certainly as fanatical on that score as ever Stalin or his contemporaries were. Let us not be deceived by the illusion—I think we are in the process of tearing it away—that the Soviets are a backward people, 150 million feudal, downtrodden peasants in an oxcart civilization because, as we know, nothing could be further from the truth. We are beginning to appreciate that fact as more of us visit the Soviet Union. It is true that in that country individuals have not the luxuries which we consider to be necessities nor often even the necessities which we take as a matter of course. But the regime there has converted the poverty of the people into the power of the state. On individual deprivation they have built great national strength and great national confidence and pride. Two United States commentators are not always too encouraging in their prognosis of what is going to happen. The Alsop brothers have warned us that we had better drop the favourite Western parlour game of searching for imaginary Soviet weakness. In an article which one of them wrote a few weeks ago he had this to say:

... it is one of history's little jokes that this demonstration of the Soviet society's superior efficiency, on its terms,—

That is the terms of centralized, autocratic, communist power and control.

—should come at a moment when the Western societies are also demonstrating their superior efficiency on their terms, in the form of Britain's all-embracing welfare society and America's gorged plenty. But history does not suggest, alas, that great power contests can be won by free false teeth or even by platoons of air-conditioned Cadillacs.

Essentials of Stalinism Remain

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, this strength and power of the Soviet under its new leaders has not been affected, as I see it, by the de-Stalinization of the regime. In fact, while Stalin has been repudiated, the essentials of Stalinism

remain. We know what they are: one party-despotic government; control of every expression of free thought and free action by that government; induced fear and hostility to every form of non-communist rule, especially through education; subordination of the individual to the ruling communist group; unqualified belief in the ultimate overthrow of free democracy by communism; and refusal of any form of political freedom to subject or satellite peoples who are incorporated into the Russian political system for power political purposes, except on the basis of complete acceptance of the rule of the communist junta in Moscow itself.

It may be of developing significance—I hope it is—that there have been signs of change in this latter situation in the satellite border states. But there is no sign of change in respect of the absorption of subject peoples like the Ukrainians and the Balts inside the communist centralized empire. While they and other subject peoples remain under the heel of Moscow, we certainly have the right to reject any protestations by the leaders in Moscow of their belief in self-government or the rights of peoples. Indeed, this Russian system is a new colonialism which is far more terrible, far more reactionary and far more widespread than was any form of colonial rule in history. Moreover, it is practised by men who have managed to get too many other men to accept them as champions of national freedom against the old colonialism which is now fast disappearing. Their claims to such a role in twentieth century development of national freedom represent one of the greatest perversions in history.

Then finally, Stalinism meant the use of communist parties in non-communist states as agents of Moscow policies. These parties I think have been shaken by the overthrow of their great god Stalin; but they are recovering from this shock and they are now beginning to rally with traditional submission—as so often in the past—to the new dictates from Moscow and to become its agents as before. Their attitude to this change that has taken place will be a conclusive test whether they have any claims to national allegiance or national status at all or whether they are merely, as they were formerly, the tools of Moscow for any purpose that Moscow may decide to follow.

Hence a question which has exercised us in the past is, I think, exercising us even more at the present time. The question to which I refer is this. Have the Moscow communist leaders abandoned the cult not only of personality, as they claim, but the cult of international revolution, of the violent overthrow of our system? They, of course, insist that there is no such cult, no such design, or no such danger. Khrushchev, Shepilov and the others, it is true, have admitted—indeed they have insisted—that the capitalist and the socialist-communist systems cannot be reconciled, that one or the other must go; and they are confident that it will not be the communist system that will go. But, they add, this can be done peacefully. As Mr. Khrushchev put it in the twentieth party congress in Moscow, and his words were repeated by other Soviet leaders on that occasion:

There is nothing more absurd than the fiction that people are forced to take the path of communism under pressure from without. We are confident that the ideas of communism will triumph and no “iron curtains” or barriers erected by the bourgeois reactionaries can halt their spread to more and more millions.

That is the fairy tale, namely that these things develop from within, peacefully and without force. The fact is, as we all know, that no single country in history

has become communist by the declared will of its people. In every case force was used and force was decisive. Mr. Khrushchev really let the cat out of the bag last February when he wrote—and some of his colleagues repeated it at the last party congress—as follows:

Of course, in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it has in its hands an enormous military-police apparatus, there the serious opposition of the reactionary forces is inevitable. There the transition to socialism will take place in conditions of sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

What this means, in plain English, is that communism will use force when it considers it necessary to do so, and if it can, in order to destroy parliamentary democracy and establish the dictatorship of the communist party. In effect, the new position in Moscow is exactly the same as it was when Stalin, some years ago, said that the communist parties would be quite happy to achieve power by parliamentary means, by peaceful means, but that they would use force if they had to and in any event they would achieve power peacefully for the same purposes as if they had achieved it by force.

A question arising out of this which concerns us in this country and in other countries, is this. Does this mean that Moscow is still willing and anxious to assist any and every foreign communist party in its revolutionary plans, in its determination to overthrow free parliamentary government? That, Mr. Chairman, seems to me to be a vital question, the test of Soviet sincerity. It is for them to demonstrate that they are not concerned now with international revolution. I do not expect—nor can any of us—that these people in Moscow and elsewhere should abandon their revolutionary slogans. That probably would be too much to hope for. But we can expect, and indeed we can insist as a test of good faith, that they show that in fact they are keeping out of our domestic affairs. We have no assurance on this score in this country or in other countries. Nor have we any reason to believe, changing to another aspect of Soviet policy, that they have abandoned or weakened in any respect what has been for some years now the primary objective of Soviet policy, the weakening and destruction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is still a major target for Soviet attack; that is still the greatest tribute to its value and strength. It certainly should counsel us to preserve that strength.

Reassessment in NATO

So far as the military side of this question is concerned it may well be, as has been indicated, that new developments both political and strategic may make a reassessment of NATO's plans and NATO's defence policies desirable. It may even make desirable some reassessment of plans and strategy to meet new circumstances. But that, I suggest, must not imply any weakening of NATO's deterrent and defensive forces.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important, indeed I think it is essential, that this reassessment and any changes which may result from it should be made inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should be the result of collective discussion and collective agreement. Unilateral decisions, without such discussion or agreement, would weaken and indeed might even destroy NATO. We must then work together as members of this coalition if unity and strength are to be preserved. That is the very essence of the NATO concept, and without it NATO is not likely to last very long. Yet, this kind of close and

continuous co-operation may be more difficult now in NATO than it has been, now that the fear of direct all-out military aggression against Western Europe seems to have lessened. That is one of the dangers confronting us. It is also, Mr. Chairman, the reason why the non-military aspects of co-operation are becoming more and more important. Indeed that form of co-operation, and we are beginning, I think, to recognize this more and more, is an important aspect of collective defence in the new situation.

I hope that the Committee of Three which has been set up by NATO will be able to make some recommendations in this field which will strengthen this side of NATO. This Committee hopes to be able to finish its work and make its report some time in October

The United Nations—Disarmament

But while, Mr. Chairman—this will be the last matter that I will be discussing in my general statement—NATO is important and is essential to our security and the development of the Atlantic community, *the United Nations, with all its disappointments and its weaknesses as well as with all its accomplishments and its strengths, remains the basis of our general international policy.* One of the most important things to be discussed through the United Nations now is, of course, disarmament. As members of the committee know, the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, of which Canada has for some years now been a member, met in London last Spring and the Western side did produce proposals at that meeting which provided for the limitation and reduction of armaments by stages under control in each stage. It is also true that at that time it was proposed on our side that at the beginning of the second stage there should be a limitation on nuclear tests, a matter which is of very great and understandable interest to all of us, a limitation of nuclear tests supervised by a special branch of the international control organ.

At the meeting comprehensive agreement was not possible, and therefore an effort was made to bring about a more limited agreement as the first stage to making a more comprehensive agreement. The more limited agreement would have dealt primarily with conventional forces, but there was also a provision dealing with nuclear tests. But agreement on that was also not possible. Therefore, the Sub-Committee reported in July to the full Committee in New York and its report, one must admit, was one of progress only in a strictly academic and possibly parliamentary sense. In July the full Committee met and at this meeting, at which Canada was represented by my colleague the Minister of National Health and Welfare, the four Western members of the Sub-Committee introduced a resolution reaffirming the six basic principles which they accepted for a disarmament convention. I think it is important, in view of the interest in this matter, that these six basic principles be put on the record. I believe they have been found acceptable by a great many other countries.

They are:

1. A disarmament programme should proceed by stages. Progress from one stage to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.

2. The programme should begin, under effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces to such levels as are feasible. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved.

3. The programme should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the build-up of stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear material would be devoted to peaceful uses. There would also be a limitation, before that took place, of nuclear tests.

4. The programme should provide for a strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measure.

5. Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system and could bring nearer a general agreement on a disarmament programme.

6. Finally, there should be provision made for the suspension of the programme in whole or in part, if a major state failed to carry out its obligation or if a threat of peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should occur.

Well that, Mr. Chairman, is the position taken by the West at the recent meeting. I emphasize that in that position, which we have supported, even a partial agreement must contain some nuclear components. The representative of the United Kingdom at this Committee in New York went even farther, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom repeated in essence, the other day in the House of Commons, what Mr. Nutting said on this point in New York. Mr. Nutting said:

If limitation of nuclear test explosions is not possible under a disarmament agreement, we are prepared to try other methods, without delay, and without waiting for agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme.

This means that while the abolition of tests would be part of a broader agreement, the limitation of tests could begin independent of the achievement of any such broader agreement. I can say, Mr. Chairman, that we warmly support that position taken by the United Kingdom. We feel that it is of the most vital importance to press ahead both with arms limitations and with political settlements wherever there is any hope of reaching such a settlement with the other side. To adopt any other policy would be to accept the proposition that security rests, and must continue to rest, merely on the fear of common annihilation. That policy—some people call it realism, but I think it is realism based on despair—is not a policy which I am sure will commend itself to the members of this committee, or indeed to the people of Canada. A substitute for that policy, which may be essential at the present time for the avoidance of war, something which is even more permanent and in the long run more satisfactory, would be a policy of mutual agreement, mutual trust and mutual co-operation. I hope that in the effort to reach that objective the Canadian Government will play a good part, and I am quite sure that if it succeeds in playing such a part it will have the support not only of all Members of this House but of the people of Canada.

To Regulate Lake Ontario Levels

The International Joint Commission, at its meeting in Montreal on July 2, issued a Supplementary Order to the Order it issued on October 29, 1952, approving the construction, operation, and maintenance of hydro-electric power works in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. In its 1952 Order of Approval, the Commission anticipated the need to develop the method of regulation of the flow of the St. Lawrence River in the light of further information to be obtained, and specifically retained jurisdiction to make such further order or orders as might prove to be necessary.

In the interval between the approval of the St. Lawrence River Power project in October of 1952 and the issuance of the Supplementary Order, the Commission conducted extensive investigations and studies, through its International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers, and held public hearings in both the United States and Canada, under the Reference from the two Governments, dated June 25, 1952, regarding the levels of Lake Ontario. As a result of these investigations, the Commission made recommendations to the Governments of Canada and the United States which were designed to protect interests of navigation and property both upstream and downstream, and within these limits to give substantial benefits to power. These recommendations were accepted by both Governments, and the July 2 Supplementary Order gives effect thereto.

The Supplementary Order provides that the levels of Lake Ontario will be regulated within a range of mean monthly elevations from 244 feet in the navigation season to 248 feet, as nearly as may be; prescribes detailed criteria for the regulation of the discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River; and prescribes a Plan of Regulation as the basis for calculating critical water profiles and designing the channel excavations in the river.

The Commission's studies looking to the perfection of a plan of regulation which will take advantage of progressive channel developments will proceed under the direction of the Commission's International St. Lawrence River Board of Control.

**APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS
IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE
DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1956**

- Mr. E. H. Norman appointed Ambassador of Canada to Egypt. Proceeded to Cairo, August 16, 1956.
- Mr. F. Hudd, CBE., retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service (London), effective August 6, 1956.
- Mr. R. W. A. Dunn posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Caracas, effective August 12, 1956.
- Mr. V. C. Moore posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective August 13, 1956.
- Mr. D. W. Fulford posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, effective August 17, 1956.
- Mr. T. M. du M. Pope posted from the School of Oriental Studies, London, to Ottawa, effective July 10, 1956. Proceeded to Hong Kong University, effective August 17, 1956.
- Mr. J. P. Erichsen-Brown posted from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, effective August 21, 1956.
- Mr. d'I. J. H. G. Fortier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective August 24, 1956.
- Mr. P. A. Howard posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective August 28, 1956.
- Mr. A. D. Small posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective August 31, 1956.
- Mr. A. C. Smith posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective August 31, 1956.
- Mr. K. A. McVey, Mr. M. F. Yalden, Mr. R. W. Clark, and Mr. J. L. McAvoy appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers 1, effective August 20, 1956.
- Mr. F. G. Hooton posted from the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 26, 1956.



**TREATY INFORMATION
Current Action**

Bilateral

India

Agreement respecting the reciprocal protection on a priority basis of patents of invention.

Signed at Ottawa August 30, 1956.

United Kingdom

Exchange of Notes extending the agreement of June 5, 1946 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income to Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar.

Signed at Ottawa August 2, 1956.

United States of America

Convention further modifying and supplementing the convention and accompanying protocol of March 4, 1942 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes as modified by the supplementary convention of June 12, 1950

Signed at Ottawa August 8, 1956.

Multilateral

Protocol to the international convention for the northwest Atlantic fisheries.

Signed at Washington February 8, 1949.

Opened for signature June 25, 1956.

Signed by Canada June 26, 1956.

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to International carriage by air.

Signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929.

Opened for signature September 28, 1955.

Signed by Canada August 16, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

a) Printed Documents:

United Nations. Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization, 16 June 1955 - 15 June 1956. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh session, Supplement No. 1. A/3137. 118 p.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the 11th session of the Commission held in Geneva from 23 April to 18 May 1956. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second session, Agenda item 13(a). E/2891; E/CN.7/315. 110 p. and annexes.

Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955. E/CN.12/421/Rev.1. May 1956. 176 p. Sales No.: 1956.II.G.1.

World Population Conference. Proceedings, 1954. Papers: Volume I (Meetings 2, 4, 6, and 8). Rome, 31 August - 10 Sept. 1954. E/CONF.13/413. 1040 p. (Eng.-French-Spanish). Sales No.: 1955.XIII.8 (Vol. I).

Economic Commission for Europe. Convention on the contract for the international carriage of goods by road (C M R) and protocol of signature done at Geneva on 19 May 1956. 23 p.

Bibliography of industrialization in under-developed countries. April 9, 1956. ST/

ECA/37; ST/LIB/SER.B/6. 216 p. Sales No.: 1956.II.B.2.

United Nations visiting mission to the trust territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration, 1955. Report of Togoland under French administration. T/1238. April 1956. Trusteeship Council official records: 17th session, Supplement No. 2. 44 p.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Geneva, 23 May 1956. 541 p.

International Labour Organization. Sixth conference of American states members of the International Labour Organization, Havana, September 1956. Report of the Director-General. Geneva, 1956. 99 p.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Financing of Economic Development. The international flow of private capital, 1953-1955. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2901. June 21, 1956. 78 p. and Annex.

Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from 23 July 1955 to 14 August 1956. S/3636. August 15, 1956. 97 p.

* Printed documents may be produced from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Agreement on the Saar

AN agreement of historic significance was reached last June 5 in Luxembourg, when M. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, and Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, succeeded in reconciling the divergent views of their Governments over the future of the Saar. The decisions of the two Ministers were confirmed in a more detailed and final form when they met in Bonn on September 30, 1956. This agreement is of particular importance from the point of view of Western European and Atlantic solidarity, as it resolves in a manner satisfactory to both parties the major source of irritation in recent years between France and Germany.

Importance of the Saar

The Saar is a border territory between France and Germany of about 1,000 square miles, whose population, largely German in race, is just under the million mark. The Saar is one of the world's richest coal and steel producing centres; it lies in the great coal basin of which the Ruhr is a part, and adjacent to the iron fields of Lorraine, on the ores of which the Saar steel industry naturally depends. The coal and steel production of the Saar, though considerably below that of France and Germany, is sufficiently large to constitute an important factor in the economic relationship between those two countries.

At the end of the First World War, as stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles, Germany ceded the Saar coal mines to France as war reparation, and the territory was placed under the government of an international commission responsible to the League of Nations. After fifteen years, a plebiscite was held on January 13, 1935, and it resulted—to a considerable extent owing to Nazi pressure on voters—in a 90 per cent vote in favour of reunion with Germany. This took place, accordingly, six weeks later, and the Saar subsequently proved to be a most valuable asset in the build-up of the Nazi war machine.

The Saar After the War

At the time of the unconditional surrender of Hitler's regime in the spring of 1945, it soon became apparent that France would ask for proof of Germany's willingness to guarantee the security of her neighbours and make amends for the damage she had caused during the War. France held the view that this proof should take the form of special arrangements for an economic union of the Saar with France. She considered that if the Saar coal and steel production was included in total French production, not only the economic disparity in basic industry between France and Germany would be much lessened, but Germany would also be deprived of war potential. This claim was fully supported by the Western Allies. As a result, and under the terms of the Inter-Allied Agreements of 5 June, 1945, the Saar was included within the French zone of occupation in Germany; and France immediately saw to it that a political and economic status different from that of the rest of her zone of occupation was applied to the Saar.



AGREE ON THE SAAR

—United Press Photo

Leaders of France and Germany chat following their agreement June 5 at Luxembourg on settlement of the Saar problem. Left to right are Mr. Guy Mollet, Premier of France; Mr. Walter Hallstein, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Heinrich Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister; and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

As the area of the Saar had been heavily damaged during the war, the population welcomed, at least as a temporary solution, the French plan for the economic union of the Saar with France, combined with regional autonomy for the Saar. To the Saarlanders, the proposal meant, among other benefits, profitable economic relations with Lorraine again, no refugee problem, and no post-war dismantling by the Allies, as in the rest of Germany.

Following the formation in the summer of 1945 of an Administrative Commission of the Saar under the French Military Government, the latter authorized in March 1946 the reconstitution of three local political parties, the Christian Democrats (CVP), the Social Democrats (SPS), and the Communists (KPS). Representatives of the Christian and Social Democrats, with a few Communists, were chosen in elections held in September 1946 and in October 1947 as members of the Municipal Councils and of a newly-created Saar Diet. A Saar Government responsible for the whole administration of the territory was then formed and the Diet approved in December 1947, by an overwhelming majority, a Saar constitution which, pending the final German peace treaty, provided for the political autonomy of the Saar under France's protection and for its economic union with France. On January 10, 1948, a French High Commissioner took over the authority previously exercised by the French Military Government; his functions were to be reduced in January 1952 to those of a diplomatic representative.

Jointly with these political developments, the franc was introduced as the monetary unit of the Saar in November 1947 replacing the Saarmark, a provisional currency created in 1945, and a customs union with France was definitely established as of April 1, 1948. In March 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and the Saar Prime Minister, Dr. Johannes Hoffmann, signed a series of inter-Governmental Conventions sanctioning formally the previous political and economic arrangements and granting France a 50-year lease on the Saar coal fields.

A Franco-German Problem

From 1948 on, however, the Saar situation was rendered more delicate as a result of radical changes in the position of Germany both internationally and internally, and to a lesser extent of a number of developments inside the Saar itself. During these years, the Federal Republic of Germany was formed and restored by the Western Allies to a position of equal partnership in the community of free nations. The Federal Republic thus became a member of the European Coal and Steel Community and of the Council of Europe, and in May 1955, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West European Union (WEU). Germany also made a most remarkable economic recovery and rapidly emerged to a position of importance in world affairs.

As a result of these developments it was only natural that Germany should take a growing interest in the political and economic situation of the Saar, which for so many years had been an integral part of her own national territory. It became apparent that some compromise solution would be necessary for the settlement of the Saar question. On several occasions the Federal Republic of Germany formally protested against the political and economic regime which was being established by the French in the Saar. It insisted that pending the peace treaty the Saar remained legally part of Germany, and that the Saar Nationality Law enacted in 1948 and creating a distinct Saar nationality was invalid. When Germany became a member of the European Coal and Steel Community, she demanded economic access to the Saar on equal terms with France. The French refused to jeopardize their customs and currency union with the Saar, but suggested that the Saar might be prepared for a special "European" status as European integration progressed.

The issue took on heightened importance with the proposal for a European Defence Community. The French, already unhappy over the prospect of German rearmament, were more determined than ever that the resources of the Saar should not fall into German hands. They made it clear that an agreement on the Saar which would safeguard French interests was a prerequisite to their consent to any German rearmament; and even after EDC was defeated, this condition stood as a necessary preliminary to Franco-German co-operation in defence, through NATO and WEU.


Proposal to Europeanize the Saar

After repeated and often abortive discussions M. Mendès-France and Chancellor Adenauer finally agreed, (as part of the Paris Agreements), in October 1954, on a statute by which, pending a German peace treaty, the Saar would continue to enjoy a semi-independent self-governing status under the ægis of the WEU Council of Ministers. This statute was to be presented

to the Saar electorate in a referendum to be supervised by a commission composed of representatives from the Benelux countries, Italy and the United Kingdom.

As for the Saarlanders themselves, they had generally supported the new regime since 1945, because of the economic benefits they derived from it. In the elections for the Saar Diet of 1952, in spite of strong nationalist appeals by leaders in West Germany, the supporters of autonomy and the French connection won by a substantial majority. From then on, however, the situation in the Saar began to change. With the German boom continuing, and with world conditions reasonably prosperous, the Saarlanders felt they had less reason to depend on France for their own living. Moreover, new forces then came to the fore. Until July 1954, no avowed anti-autonomy parties had been allowed. But the proposed statute stipulated free political activity before the plebiscite, though it barred outside interference. New parties emerged—the Saar Democratic Party and the German Social Democrats—which along with the Communists campaigned against the statute. Basically, their appeal was to an emotional German nationalism, and their campaign tactics tended to be rowdy. The readiness of these parties to brand their opponents, including Dr. Hoffman, the head of the Saar Government since 1947, as “bad Germans” had without doubt an effect, in spite of the fact that the Adenauer Government officially supported the Statute.

The Saar referendum was held on October 23, 1955, exactly one year after the original Franco-German agreement to Europeanize the Saar. It resulted in



a majority of over 65 per cent against the acceptance of the European Statute. Though the rejection of the Statute was a setback to the Franco-German policy of reconciliation, it was accepted calmly both in France and Germany. As a result, Dr. Hoffmann's Government resigned and an agreement was reached between the parties that new elections for the Saar Diet would be held on December 18, 1955. In these elections, the three pro-German parties, which had campaigned together as members of the Fatherland Union, polled 64 per cent of the votes cast and won 33 of 50 seats in the new Landtag.

The new Government formed under the direction of Dr. Hubert Ney as Prime Minister and of Dr. Heinrich Schneider as President of the Landtag immediately came out strongly in favour of the reunification of the Saar with Germany. They were, however, in no position to make a change in sovereignty. For one thing, the Saar Constitution could not be amended, as the pro-German representation in the new Saar Government was below the 75 per cent majority required for such amendment. Moreover, both the French and German Governments had recognized that the reunification of the Saar with Germany required the approval not only of the French Government but also of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, and that the economic regime in the Saar should remain unchanged until bilateral Franco-German negotiations following the elections would settle once for all the Saar's future.


Solution in Sight

Franco-German negotiations on the Saar opened in Paris on February 20, 1956, with a meeting of the two Foreign Ministers, and several sessions were held in the following three months. During these meetings, the French recognized that there was nothing they could do to prevent the ultimate attachment of the Saar to Germany, and the Germans recognized the French claim that on the basis of existing international agreements, any solution to the political problem should be linked with the need to safeguard French economic interests in the Saar. As a result, a number of points at issue were defined and discussed, and slowly but steadily a substantial body of agreement was reached by the two Governments; at all stages, the Saar authorities were kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

In an all-out effort to settle the remaining difficulties, top French and German delegations headed by Prime Minister Mollet and Chancellor Adenauer, and including the French and German Foreign Ministers, met in Luxembourg last June 5. After some serious discussion marked on both sides by a sincere spirit of conciliation and of European solidarity, complete agreement was finally reached on all points concerning the future political and economic status of the Saar. The two Governments thus agreed that the Saar would be politically annexed to Germany on January 1, 1957, and economically integrated with Germany three years later, after a transition period allowing for a gradual wind-up of the existing economic and monetary union with France. In return, the French obtained German agreement to building—at a fixed shared cost—a canal connecting the Moselle and Rhine rivers, thus giving French steel producers cheaper access to Ruhr coke, which is now transported by rail. France will also get, during the next twenty years, 65 million tons of coal from the Warndt mines which are under Saar territory with pitheads in French

Lorraine, and Germany will sell France 24 million tons of coal from other sources at cost price.

Having resolved all the major issues involved in the dispute of the Saar territory, the Ministers were able to draw up the text of common directives to the experts of the two countries for the drafting of treaties on the economic and political future of the Saar. In a joint communiqué published after they met in Bonn on September 30, 1956, Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister Mollet announced that they approved the detailed terms of agreement prepared by the experts, and that the latter's work was practically completed. They also indicated that the Franco-German Agreement on the Saar will be signed in October, and submitted to both Parliaments, for formal ratification, before the end of the year. The two governments are now negotiating with the Government of Luxembourg to obtain the latter's agreement for the building of the Moselle River Canal, as Luxembourg borders on the Moselle. By finally reconciling the divergent views of the French and German Governments, the Franco-German agreement on the Saar can be considered a gratifying victory for Western European solidarity. As pointed out by Prime Minister Mollet and Chancellor Adenauer, this agreement constitutes an essential step in paving the way towards the implementation of the important proposals for Western European integration which are currently under discussion.





RECEIVES NATO JOURNALISTS

Prime Minister St. Laurent, centre, is seen with journalists from 11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries who called on him last month before beginning a three-week tour of Canada. Countries represented were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

1956 NATO Journalists Tour of Canada

It has been the experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that perhaps the most effective of its information projects has been the series of journalists' tours in member countries. These tours have enabled publicists and others in NATO countries who are in a position to influence public opinion to see something of what their allies are contributing towards the combined defence of the NATO area and to learn more about their political institutions, economic development and way of life.

Last month a group of 17 leading journalists from 11 European countries spent three weeks in Canada on the third NATO "Maple Leaf" tour sponsored by the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence in co-operation with other Government agencies and a number of private organizations. This year's Canadian tour was designed to give the journalists a better understanding of the particular role Canada is playing in the Atlantic Alliance and to enable them to see at first hand recent economic and industrial developments in the Canadian West and Northwest. The journalists were also given an opportunity to meet with Canadians at various points between Montreal and Victoria and to visit with families who recently emigrated from Europe to Canada.

A review of Canada's role in NATO was given the journalists in Vancouver at an interview with the Minister of Defence, Mr. R. O. Campney, and in Ottawa at briefings conducted by General C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and by representatives of the three armed forces. As part of their study of Canadian defence, the journalists also visited service establishments at Gimli and Churchill in Manitoba, in Victoria, B.C., and in the Montreal area.

At the start of the tour the NATO party spent two days in Ottawa where they were received by Prime Minister St. Laurent and interviewed Mr. J. W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and Mr. Jean Lesage, Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources. The group also visited the Experimental Farm and the National Research Council.

After a stopover at the Canadian National Exhibition in Toronto and visits to the fruit belt in the Niagara Peninsula and to Niagara Falls, the journalists proceeded to Gimli, where they met airmen from their home countries who are receiving instructions under the NATO aircrew training programme.

On their way west, the journalists visited points of interest in Calgary and Banff. They then proceeded to Vancouver Island, where they inspected west coast military establishments and industrial plants and were given a demonstration of logging operations. In Vancouver, the journalists toured the Burrard Dry Dock and also visited in the homes of several families of postwar immigrants. On the return trip east the party spent two days in Edmonton, where they made a tour of the oil fields, refineries, and other industries in the area. After leaving Edmonton, the journalists visited the Giant Gold Mine at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories and defence installations, including a rocket launching site, at Fort Churchill, Manitoba. The tour ended with a two-day stopover in Montreal, where the most important item on the programme was a tour of the St. Lawrence Seaway installations near the city.

Official Visit to Iceland

MR. Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, was a guest of the Government of Iceland September 24-27. It was the first official visit to Iceland of a foreign minister of a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its establishment in 1949.

Iceland and Canada are closely linked by virtue of the number of Icelanders who have migrated to Canada and of the part played by Icelanders in the development of this country. Winnipeg is, indeed, the second Icelandic city in the world and Icelandic Canadians have played a prominent role in many branches of our national life. As members of the United Nations and of NATO, Canada and Iceland have both affirmed their faith in the same principles and their desire to live in peace with all people and all governments; by the same token, both countries have agreed to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, and to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the right of law.

It was therefore among close friends that Mr. Pearson landed at Reykjavik on September 24. Heading the reception committee was the interim Foreign Minister of Iceland, Mr. Emil Jonsson. Mr. Chester Ronning, the Canadian Minister to Iceland, and several members of the diplomatic corps at Reykjavik, including its dean, Mr. Anderssen-Rysst, the Norwegian Ambassador, were also present. The Icelandic Government kindly placed at the disposal of the Canadian Foreign Minister and Mrs. Pearson the official Government guest house, where the Icelandic and Canadian flags were displayed side by side throughout the visit.

The excellent arrangements made by the Icelandic authorities enabled Mr. Pearson to have full discussions with political leaders and other leading personalities of Iceland, as well as to visit a number of districts on the island. Mr. and Mrs. Pearson were particularly touched by the kind reception given in their honour by the President of the Republic of Iceland and Mrs. Asgeir Asgeirsson, who were also hosts at a formal dinner at the President's official residence at Bessastadir, a few miles outside Reykjavik. The residence is a charming home of traditional Scandinavian style, built on the shores of one of those peaceful, mirror-like lakes so characteristic of the Icelandic scene. Beside it stands an historic chapel, which proudly displays some of the most impressive stained glass windows ever made by a Scandinavian artist. The setting truly reflects the well-known characteristics of the Icelanders—a peaceful, sturdy and industrious people. It is of interest to note that three former Prime Ministers of Iceland attended the President's dinner and that Mr. Asgeirsson is also a former Prime Minister.

A place of particular historic interest visited by the Canadian Minister and his party was Thingvellir, the scene, a thousand years ago, of the first real parliament in action. Thingvellir, which is some twenty-five miles from Reykjavik, now consists of only two or three farms, with the traditional Icelandic chapel



VISIT TO ICELAND

The President of the Republic of Iceland, Mr. Asgeir Asgeirsson, right, is seen with the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in Reykjavik, the Icelandic capital. Mr. Pearson paid an official visit to Iceland on September 24, 25 and 26.

nearby. It is surrounded by hills and crevices formed of cold lava, vestiges of what was once a highly volcanic area. Here may be seen the stony ruins of what was the central meeting place of all the communities which made up the Icelandic nation. Once a year, according to the sagas, every tribe in Iceland and practically everyone in these tribes assembled at Thingvellir, regardless of the distance which had to be travelled. The elders of the tribe elected a speaker, who became the depository of all the laws of the land, and who saw to it that everyone with the right to speak could do so freely, and that the discussion was orderly. The speaker was also in many ways the supreme arbiter of the land, responsible for ensuring that decisions of the majority were respected. The sagas also tell of other parliamentary practices followed in Thingvellir, underlining how at this very early date the principles of our modern parliamentary system were in fact evolved by these people. The Icelanders are very proud, and justly so, that what is considered the first experiment in parliamentary government took place on their island.

The ministerial party was also greatly interested in the methods used by the Icelanders to exploit the geysers which dot the Icelandic countryside. By means of insulated pipelines and special power stations, practically the whole city of Reykjavik is now heated by water from these sources. This has proved of great benefit for the Icelandic economy, eliminating the need to import considerable quantities of coal and fuel which the Icelanders cannot obtain at home.

The informal talks with Iceland's political leaders were most useful and enabled Mr. Pearson and the members of the Canadian party to gather information which will make for a still better understanding in Canada of Iceland's problems and of the aspirations of its people. Government officials expressed confidence that Iceland could, with proper development, easily take care of a population double its present size, which is now more than 150,000. The people of Iceland are anxious to develop the resources available on the island, and hope in particular to be able in the near future to expand their hydro-electric facilities, to modernize and improve their agriculture, to build a fertilizer plant, and to initiate a vast reforestation scheme. (There are now very few trees left in Iceland, although ancient documents show that at one time the country was covered by extensive forests.) The country is enjoying reasonable prosperity and, in general, the Canadian party found the Icelanders confident of its future.

Icelanders are avid readers, with one of the highest rates of literacy in the world; few countries of its size can boast as long or brilliant a literary tradition, dating from the mediaeval sagas. In 1955, the great Icelandic epic writer Halldor Kiljan Laxnes was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature for his sweeping tales of the drama and poetry in the everyday life of the 150,000 Icelanders. It is of interest to note that there are four morning daily newspapers published in Reykjavik, a city with a population of 50,000.

Mr. Pearson concluded his visit to Iceland by holding a press conference at which all the Icelandic newspapers were represented. The journalists displayed great interest in the activities of NATO and in Canadian attitudes towards it and the United Nations. In reply to questions, Mr. Pearson said that Canada believes very firmly in both organizations and that, so long as the United Nations is unable to guarantee collective security, NATO will remain of vital importance to the defence of its members. He added that he did not think there was any weakening in support for NATO by the Canadian people and parliament.

Mr. Pearson referred to the role which Icelanders have played in Canada in the following words: "The people from Iceland who have come to Canada have played a great part in our development so far. There are about 25,000 Icelandic Canadians, and of all the racial groups that have come to Canada—and I am not saying this merely to be flattering to Icelanders—none have contributed more in proportion to their numbers than Icelandic Canadians: in government, in education and in the arts and science."

A Chart For All the Oceans*

Part II

WHILE research and international co-operation are vitally important to conserve fish in certain areas, there are many countries where the most urgent need is to increase the catch and consumption of fish, and to do it quickly. Although it is estimated that total food production has more than regained the prewar level, it is still a fact that over half the people in the world live at or near the minimum subsistence level necessary to sustain life. They lack sufficient good protein in their diet to keep them strong and healthy. The situation is already serious and future prospects are still more threatening. It is estimated that, at the present rate of increase, the world's population will have doubled in fifty years' time. Every four years, that population is being increased by a number equal to the present population of the United States, every ten years by the equivalent of the population of Western Europe, and every fourteen years by a number equal to the population of China.

While the population is increasing rapidly in areas where people have the greatest need for a better diet, the greatest increase in food production is taking place in highly developed countries, which is not where it is most urgently needed. For example, nearly half the increase in agricultural production since 1938 has taken place in North America, which supports only seven per cent of the world's population. In South-East Asia and the Far East, an area which supports fifty per cent of the world's population, food production has remained almost stationary, while the population has risen probably by twenty-five per cent. In these circumstances, the need for more food is becoming extremely urgent. At present, only some ten per cent of the animal protein in the world's diet comes from the sea, while great numbers of people cannot afford to buy meat. Hence, a concerted effort is necessary to increase the consumption of fish in many countries, especially where the supply of meat is limited. Modern techniques, such as refrigeration, make it possible to preserve and distribute large quantities of fish which might otherwise be wasted, and it also enables fish to be transported for sale inland. This development makes possible a new source of protein to many people who live far from the sea. In supplying such markets, the fishing industry, too, will benefit. FAO has given much advice on refrigeration, transport and distribution of fish to various countries, including Turkey and Yugoslavia.

Popularizing Fish Products

An interesting example of FAO's work is to be found in Chile, a country where fish is beginning to play a more important part in the national diet. Although the sea coast of Chile extends for 2,600 miles and there are abundant supplies of fish and shellfish, inadequate marketing facilities have limited distribution and sale. As a result, little of the catch has reached country districts where, because of low incomes, the people have insufficient protein foods. In

*Reprinted from *United Nations Review*. Part I of this reprint appeared in the September issue of *External Affairs*.

order to relieve this situation and to reduce costly imports of meat, the Government of Chile asked FAO for the help of a fishery biologist to appraise resources and for a fishery economist to promote fish marketing improvement. The latter launched intensive sales campaigns, talks and demonstrations, organized a program in over 4,000 schools for teaching children about fish and promoted pilot projects in selected centres to popularize cheap fish products.

This assignment provided an excellent example of effective government support for international technical assistance. The Chilean Government set up a co-ordinating office to organize the work of eight ministries concerned and provided it with a budget of five million Chilean pesos. In 1953, an experimental campaign was carried out in the province of Santiago, during which supplies of fish were made available at low prices, while an educational campaign was carried on with the enthusiastic co-operation of government services, press, radio, cinemas, schools, municipal authorities, voluntary organizations, trade unions, military units and hospitals. During August-October 1953, the largest district in Santiago showed an increase of forty-five per cent in the consumption of hake over the same period a year earlier. The fisheries campaign included provisions for the welfare of fishermen. One fishermen's co-operative was established south of Valparaiso and the Government plans to establish fishermen's co-operatives in other centres. As a result of the campaign, the possibilities for an important increase in protein consumption have been demonstrated, a new source of food at reasonable prices has been recognized by large sections of the population and the fishing community will benefit by increased sales. Similar methods have been employed with success in Yugoslavia and Mexico.

CANADIAN FISHERIES PROJECT IN CEYLON

The Canadian fishing project in Ceylon provides tangible evidence of the important role played by Canada in the practical application of Colombo Plan aid to Asian countries. Purpose of the project is to determine fish population potentials in the coastal waters of Ceylon and the most efficient method of harvesting the tropical seas, to demonstrate the effectiveness of a moderate degree of mechanization in fishing, and to assist in the modernization of the fish handling and distribution methods in Ceylon.

Canada's total aid for the pilot fisheries project, for which \$1,000,000 was made available in 1952-53, has been extended to the value of \$1,407,000. This is to provide for the construction of a cold storage plant, fish reduction and ancillary pilot plants, and related fishing equipment. To help meet local costs of the fisheries harbour in Mutwal, Colombo, Canada has agreed to supply flour to the extent of \$600,000 for which a rupee counterpart

fund equivalent to the Canadian cost will be established. Canada is also supplying laboratory, machine shop, and fishing equipment, including marine diesel engines, a mechanical fish drier, and a pilot fish cannery.

Part of the Canadian aid has taken the form of a deep sea trawler, equipped with a refrigerated fish hold, which has made a valuable contribution to the Island's fish supply. Canadian aid has also provided for the supply of a 500-ton cold storage building for holding fish, and for two multi-purpose fishing vessels complete with gear.

The cold storage plant, the new fishery harbour at Mutwal, a by-product factory, and other ancillary units are nearing completion, and the inland fisheries are being developed. A Canadian consultant on Fishermen's Co-operatives has completed and reported on a survey of the fishing villages in relation to co-operative development.



Fisheries Harbour at Mutwal, Ceylon.

FAO has also helped fishermen to improve fishing techniques and the design of boats, to mechanize vessels and to introduce modern gear. An example is the work of an FAO naval architect working in Bombay, Saurashtra, Madras, Andhra and West Bengal States in India, where he has helped in a mechanizing program and has designed and built a motor surfboat which may revolutionize fishing around the hundreds of miles of surfbound coasts of the area. At present, thousands of fishermen use log raft catamarans and these may be replaced—an immense task—by the new surfboat.

Other FAO fishery engineers have been busy in Ceylon, where there are some 60,000 fishermen. In 1951, the only mechanized commercial fishing vessels in the country were two trawlers and two motorboats but today there are many mechanized boats in operation as the result of an FAO fishery engineer's demonstrating the use of such craft. The fishermen soon found that they could go out more often and much further in search of fish and could be independent of the vagaries of the wind. Mechanization is now proceeding steadily in Ceylon, aided by arrangements made under the Colombo Plan for the fishermen to buy suitable engines on easy terms.

In 1953, FAO organized the world's first International Fishing Boat Congress, one session being held in Paris and a second in Miami. As a result of this Conference, a unique book, *Fishing Boats of the World*, with 600 illustrations, has been published under the editorship of FAO experts.

We have seen that various organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies have a good deal to do with the sea and the ships that sail it. Sometimes, countries have sought advice on the building of ships themselves. When a request of this kind from Ecuador was received by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, it proved to be quite difficult to comply with. Ecuador wanted to use her rich timber resources for the construction of wooden fishing boats, but the tradition of wooden boatbuilding has died out in many countries. Finally in Yugoslavia the United Nations found a craftsman whose family had long been engaged in this work and who put his knowledge at the disposal of the country in distant Latin America.

In South-East Asia

UNESCO has also provided advice on shipbuilding problems. India received from that agency a carriage, consisting of an electrically driven car built in Europe, to complete the equipment required for the first tank ever to test models of ship designs in South-East Asia. UNESCO also provided India with the services of a Danish navigation engineer, to work on the tests side by side with Indian engineers, under the direction of one of the latter who completed his scientific studies in Sweden and the United States. The installation of this tank called for a very high degree of skill, since the rails upon which the carriage runs are one and a half millimetres higher at one end than the other, to allow for the fact that water inside the 500-foot tank follows the curvature of the earth.

This Danish engineer and a Swiss colleague, also sent by UNESCO, were asked to assist in work being carried on by Indian engineers to solve various harbor problems at Madras, Calcutta and elsewhere. Indian engineers constructed models of these harbors, in which tiny cyclones tossed ships at their moorings in Madras and miniature sandbars choked the entrance to Calcutta harbor, just as in real life. The solution to harbor problems at Mangalore seemed to be the dredging of a deep-water channel, so a model was set up at the Research Station to find out whether the tides would allow this new channel to stay open and so justify the expense.

Meanwhile, a different kind of work on harbors was being carried out at the request of the Indian Government by a Dutch expert, formerly a naval officer, whose services were made available by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. His task was to give training in modern surveying methods along the coast of the State of Bombay, which owes its prosperity to Bombay's first class harbor and to a number of smaller ports in need of modernization and expansion. As a result of his mission, harbor facilities were extended and coastal traffic increased, many of the plans being drawn on the basis of work done by him and his pupils. This expert's farewell to his engineers and surveyors emphasized the way in which their common task at sea had bound them together. "The moment has come to leave you," he said. "When the United Nations asks me 'Has your mission served a useful purpose?', I can reply wholeheartedly 'Yes, it has,' for I have trained two teams so that they can now continue the work independently. A high degree of team spirit has grown, for which I am full of praise. Many did not understand each other's languages but the co-operation was splendid. Also those belonging to different religions—Brahmins, Hindus, Jains, Moslems and Christians—found that this was no

obstacle to good understanding. Indeed, often, when I was in your midst, I had a feeling that we formed a kind of United Nations of our own”

Another United Nations expert has been helping the Arab Kingdom of Jordan to transform the small harbor of Aqaba on the Red Sea into one of the best equipped seaports in the Middle East. The enlargement and modernization of Aqaba is expected to have a profound effect on the economic situation of Jordan. Since the partition of Palestine, Jordan's exports have been sent over land through Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean at a heavy cost to the national economy. Jordan possesses mineral resources for which a ready market will exist when she can export them directly through Aqaba on economic terms. Working with the Aqaba Port Authority, the United Nations expert has had the satisfaction of seeing more and more ocean-going ships take advantage of the transformations which are being wrought in this Red Sea harbor.

Seaports and harbors cannot be improved without capital expenditure. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has made loans for port improvement to Belgium, Turkey and Thailand. One of the most interesting examples of a seaport improved with the help of the Bank is Callao, through which passes about one third of Peru's total foreign trade, including seventy per cent of her metal exports. Although the docks and warehouses of Callao were modern, the lack of modern equipment used to mean slow and wasteful methods of handling cargo. Because of undue delays experienced by ships in this port, the European, South Pacific and Magellan Conference in 1951 ordered a twenty-five per cent surcharge on all rates between European ports and Callao. A Bank loan made it possible to import new equipment. This has speeded up the turn-around time of ships, put an end to losses of grain from spillage and effected sizeable savings in foreign exchange by the elimination of waste and by removal of the shipping surcharge.

Ships and harbors inevitably bring one back to the men who sail and work in them. Several countries have sought help from the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration in building up an efficient merchant marine. Indonesia has certain transportation problems connected with the geography of the new Republic. Her 3,000 islands are scattered over a breadth of ocean about equal to the width of the Atlantic. A merchant marine is essential both for her internal trade and for transporting the produce of the archipelago about the world. Through the United Nations, Denmark undertook to train ten selected Indonesian cadets for future service as deck officers and engineers in the Indonesian merchant marine. These young cadets are living in Denmark for two and one half to three years and will undergo training both afloat and ashore. Denmark's long experience of the sea will help to give them a sound education for their future career. This is a case where, through the United Nations, the sea has formed a link between two countries which in the past have not been intimately associated with one another

If these young Indonesians seem likely to act as personal links in the future with the distant country where they were trained, this is only a special case of the international aspect of life at sea. Sailors are natural links between continents. Their day-to-day business takes them about the world. They compete directly with, and frequently meet, “foreign” shipping and “foreign” crews. A considerable part of their time and earnings is spent far away from their own

countries. Hence it is both more important and easier to establish international standards for their conditions of work.

Until comparatively recent years, unsatisfactory conditions were typical of the seafarer's calling and since its origin in 1919 the International Labor Organization, in seeking to promote social justice, has paid special attention to the conditions of sailors. In both world wars, victory for the forces of freedom would have been impossible without the courage and self-sacrifice of merchant seamen belonging to many lands. On each occasion, when peace came it was felt that the seamen were entitled to a special degree of consideration and, also on each occasion, ILO conferences on maritime matters were held as soon as possible after the conclusion of hostilities.

Out of a total of 103 Conventions and ninety-eight Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference up to 1955, no fewer than twenty-five Conventions and ten Recommendations deal with various aspects of the seafarer's life. These instruments are often referred to as the "International Seafarers Code" and they have exercised a profound influence throughout the world.

Typical subjects covered by the Code are minimum age limits for entry to the seafaring profession, employment contracts, officers' certificates of competency, shipowners' liability in cases of illness, accident or death, sickness insurance, hours of work and repatriation in case of discharge abroad through illness, injury or shipwreck.

Other Conventions deal, sometimes in considerable detail, with standards of accommodation for crews, food and catering, including proper certificates for ships' cooks, pensions, paid holidays and regular medical examination. Some



NET GAINS SOUGHT

Mr. A. W. Lantz, former Director, Canadian Fisheries Project, Ceylon, examines with a group of Ceylonese one of the large nets used in fishing operations off the Island coasts. Extensive Colombo Plan aid is being furnished by Canada with a view to increasing Ceylon's annual production of fish, which now meets only about 25 per cent of national requirements.

of the Recommendations, while imposing less formal obligations on Member States than do the Conventions, have exercised a marked effect on seafarers' conditions. One of these, adopted in 1936, concerns the promotion of seamen's welfare in ports and has served as a model for the extensive developments that have taken place in this field.

Ever since 1920, the ILO has interested itself in fishermen's conditions, although the relatively local character of some fishing operations has made it impossible to treat problems in the fishing industry on the same scale as other shipping matters. A Recommendation of 1920 concerned the limitation of fishermen's working hours. The Seattle Conference in 1946 called for governments to be consulted on the possibility of establishing international standards for fishermen similar in scope to the International Seafarers Code, but there is as yet no instrument covering the life of fishermen, as the Code does that of other seafarers.

When it comes to the health of seafarers, the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization are both concerned in the measures to be taken and in 1949 they established a Joint Committee on the Hygiene of Seafarers. This Committee has discussed such questions as medical advice by radio to ships at sea, the contents of ships' medical chests and the prevention and cure of tuberculosis and venereal disease among seafarers.

Ships and their crews and passengers carry not only the benefits of international trade, but the fatal microbes of disease. This fact has played a considerable part in shaping the fortunes and destinies of people and the World Health Organization is constantly at work on the steps required to protect mankind against this menace. "I wish it were possible to translate into some currency or other material measure what the WHO epidemiological and quarantine services mean to the countries of the world," said Dr. H. S. Gear, Assistant Director-General of WHO. "If each country acted haphazardly in applying quarantine measures today, as they did in the past, the resultant losses due to the obstruction of aircraft and shipping, and the people and goods they carry, would undoubtedly reach huge figures. That this is not so is because the countries almost without exception have agreed to use the International Sanitary Regulations (WHO Regulations No. 2)."

When the anopheles mosquito was introduced from Madagascar to Mauritius, 32,000 people died during the resultant malaria epidemic. Brazil reported 300,000 cases of the disease when the mosquito traveled there by ship from West Africa. Whole regions may be invaded by animal diseases such as rabies in dogs, equine encephalitis, brucellosis in sheep and tuberculosis in cattle. All these are animal diseases which can be communicated to man. Rats are perhaps the best known disease carriers on ships and the so-called "deratisation" of ships' holds and of warehouses is an important part of the long battle against plague. Noxious insects are more difficult to detect—they may even travel in a bunch of flowers presented to a departing passenger.

Formerly, the progress of epidemics was announced through diplomatic channels and it was not uncommon for a ship transporting a contagious disease to pass on the infection to a new country before the latter had had news of the peril. The first efforts to reach international agreement on these matters go back to 1831 but it was 1907 before the International Office of Public Health

was founded in Paris. It later co-operated with the Health Section of the League of Nations, which set up a modern office in Singapore that still collects and broadcasts information regarding epidemics in Asia. Every day, from WHO Headquarters in Geneva, a world radio bulletin gives last-minute news to port authorities, ships at sea and aircraft in flight regarding the so-called "pestilential" diseases—cholera, yellow fever, plague, small pox and typhus. At times of epidemic or threatened epidemic, reports on illnesses such as influenza or polio are broadcast daily from Geneva. With this information on the pestilential diseases at their disposal, national health authorities can avoid delay in applying or relaxing the relevant quarantine regulations, for the lifting of irksome restrictions at the right moment is no less important than their swift application when necessary.

One of the achievements of WHO was the publication of the world's first epidemiological telegraphic code. This provides, in English or French, both for the necessary discretion and for economy in transmitting official messages about the progress of epidemics. It is a result of thirty years' experience, since the League of Nations broadcasts from Singapore started in 1925.

In a sense, the epidemiological code might be regarded as an extension of the International Code of Signals which has long given seafarers a common language enabling them to communicate in code, by radio or visually, between ships of many nations. Thanks to the epidemiological code and other measures with which WHO has been associated, the danger area of scourges like plague and typhus has been definitely circumscribed. The role played by ships in transmitting disease has steadily declined, as international co-operation in quarantine and the WHO radio bulletins reach across the seas to defeat the most insidious of man's enemies.

The Sea That Unites Us

The story of the sea in modern times has thus been one of increasing international co-operation. While the oceans are themselves a natural link between the scattered settlements of mankind, co-operation across the barriers of race and language is essential if full advantage is to be taken of that link. Slowly, under the relentless pressure of experience, man is learning that only by such co-operation can some of his greatest problems be solved. He is learning that he can grow to his full stature only if he himself does something for the common welfare and, with due humility, accepts the offering of others.

In this process, the influence of the sea on man's comings and goings, and even mental attitudes, will no doubt continue to play an important part. Perhaps, on a long view, its greatest gift to man will have been that it humbled him in his individual pride and so showed him one way to outgrow prejudice and limited thinking.

In more than one sense, the divided races of mankind meet across the great waters.

Atomic Energy Agreement

THE Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have entered into an agreement interchanging rights in inventions and discoveries in the atomic energy field on which patents were held or applied for by one government in one or more of the other countries as of November 15, 1955.

The agreement was signed by representatives of the three governments in Washington, September 24. The Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Arnold D. P. Heeney, signed on behalf of Canada.

The purpose of the tripartite agreement is to allow internal use of the inventions in each country by government and industry without interference of the other governments. This is done by a "cross assignment" of rights, under which each government assigns to the others the rights, title and interests owned by it in the other countries. Each assigning government retains a non-exclusive, irrevocable, paid-up licence on each invention for its own purposes and for purposes of mutual defence.

The exchange gives full rights to each government in its own country and permits it to grant licences to industry in accordance with national policy. A non-discrimination clause in the agreement binds each government to grant licences to nationals of the other governments on the same terms accorded its own nationals.

The agreement is expected to be of particular benefit to the growing private atomic energy industries in each of the signatory countries by eliminating questions of patent infringement. Firms engaging in home manufacture will need licences only from their own governments and, in view of the agreements anti-discrimination provision, firms of one country engaging in business in one or both of the other countries cannot be discriminated against by the governments of the other countries.

All inventions and discoveries which are the subject of government-owned patents or patent applications as of November 15, 1955, are affected. These are of two classes:

One group is made up of inventions known as "CPC" (combined policy committee) inventions which arose out of wartime collaboration among the three governments. In these cases, the inventors assigned their rights to the governments employing them and the patent rights obtained or applied for were held in trust pending settlement of the interests of the three governments.

The second affected group are inventions and discoveries which, though within the co-operative arrangement, were developed independently and are owned by one government.

The cut-off date of November 15, 1955, was selected as a matter of convenience. The intent of the agreement is that the interchange of rights shall cover the period during which atomic energy operations were largely a gov-

ernment monopoly in each of the three countries. The agreement does not commit the governments for the future.

"CPC" inventions total about 50, and patent applications have been filed on many of them in all three countries. The number of patents or patent applications relating to work carried on independently of the wartime co-operative arrangement amounts to several hundred. Many of the applications are still classified, and this consideration has limited the number of patents issued so far.



ROYAL VISITOR

HRH Prince Savang Vatthana, Crown Prince of Laos, paid his first visit to Canada September 21-23. He is seen above with Mr. Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Supplementary Convention on Slavery

PLENIPOTENTIARIES of 51 countries attended the conference held August 13-September 9 in Geneva to draft a Supplementary Convention on Slavery. Eight other nations were represented by observers.

The conference had been recommended by an ad hoc committee appointed in 1949 by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to report on the existence of slavery or similar institutions and practices. In its report, issued in 1951, this committee found that slavery in various forms continued to flourish in certain areas and recommended that a supplementary convention be drafted to abolish the still existing crude form of slavery and, as well, analogous practices not covered by the International Slavery Convention of 1926. (The 1926 Convention was ratified by 46 countries, including Canada. This country had also been one of the 30 countries which ratified the Protocol of 1953 transferring to the United Nations the functions exercised by the League of Nations under the 1926 Convention).

Mr. Calderon Puig, of Mexico, was President of the conference, Mr. Marc Somerhausen, of Belgium, First Vice-President, and Mr. K. V. Padmanabhan, of India, Second Vice-President.

During the course of the conference an article published in *The Times* (London) aroused some controversy. The article, using figures supplied by the United Kingdom Anti-Slavery Society, claimed that there were approximately 11,000,000 persons in the world in a state of slavery, of whom half a million were chattel slaves in the Arabian Peninsula and eight million were living in a state of serfdom in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The principal source of contention, however, lay in two clauses contained in the draft convention (submitted in its original form by the United Kingdom) which was the basic working document considered by the conference. These clauses provided for (1) the right of search of vessels suspected of carrying slaves in the waters around the Arabian peninsula, and (2) application of the Convention in all the non-self-governing, trust, colonial, and other non-metropolitan territories for whose international relations any state is responsible, *except* where the previous consent of a non-metropolitan territory is required by the constitutional laws or practices of the Party or of the area.

Both clauses came under attack from communist, Arab, and some Asian countries which argued that the former clause was discriminatory against certain Arab states, and that the latter relieved metropolitan countries of responsibility for immediate implementation of the Convention in dependent territories. The United Kingdom and France maintained, on the other hand, that the Convention would be deprived of much of its effectiveness if the right of search was excluded, and that provision for gradual implementation was necessary since they could not arbitrarily order social reforms in states under their protection or in dependencies possessing a substantial measure of self-government in domestic affairs. In the end a compromise was reached whereby the right of search was dropped and provision was made for metro-

politan countries concerned to endeavour, within twelve months of signature of the Convention, to obtain the consent of non-metropolitan territories. The metropolitan party signing the Convention is committed to declare to which non-metropolitan areas the Convention shall apply *ipso facto* as a result of signature.

The Supplementary Convention finally adopted by the conference contains the following substantive provisions:

- 1) States Parties to the Convention shall take all "practical and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible" an end to such practices as debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and the exploitation of adopted or quasi-adopted children;
- 2) Ratifying countries shall prescribe, where appropriate, minimum ages for marriage;
- 3) Conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another shall be made a criminal offense;
- 4) Any slave taking refuge on board any vessel of a State Party to the Convention shall *ipso facto* be set free;
- 5) Branding, mutilation, and the act of enslaving another person, or of inducing another person to give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, shall be made criminal offences;
- 6) Disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention, not settled by negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute.

The Supplementary Convention was signed on September 7 by plenipotentiaries representing 30 countries. Mr. R. H. Jay, of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the European Office of the United Nations, signed for Canada.

NATO Meetings

COUNCIL CONSIDERS GERMAN CONSCRIPTION

Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, called the North Atlantic Council to a meeting September 28 to consider as a matter of urgency the implications of the decision by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to limit their period of conscription to 12 months.

A communiqué issued after the meeting read in part as follows:

The Council were concerned at the effects which this decision might have on the ability of the Federal Republic of Germany to meet their accepted commitments and on the military effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole. The complexity of modern weapons and the anticipated speed of modern war require trained forces continuously ready to deter aggression. The NATO military authorities have made clear the difficulty if not the impossibility of accomplishing this objective with a service period of only 12 months. The Council has always been in accord with the military authorities on this matter.

The German Representative emphasized to the Council the determination of his Government to meet their accepted commitments of forces to NATO both as to the quantity and as to quality. He explained that in order to compensate for the diminution in effectiveness which only 12 months' conscript service would entail, they intended, *inter alia*, to raise the regular content of their military forces from 230,000 to 300,000.

The Council noted that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany recognized the problem, and took cognizance of the measures by which they were attempting to meet it. They also noted the declaration of the Federal Republic that it proposes to maintain in both quantity and quality its previous commitments regarding its contribution to NATO forces. The Council therefore assume that the Federal Republic will take whatever additional action is necessary to carry out its commitments and that it will keep the Council advised of its plans. Nevertheless, they remain disturbed at the possible consequences of the action by the Federal Republic. The Council requested the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic to inform his Government at once of the concern of the Council.

COMMITTEE OF THREE PREPARING REPORT

On September 22 the Committee of Three of the NATO Council, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, Mr. Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway, and Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada, concluded a series of consultations with the representatives of all other NATO governments.

Following is an excerpt from a press release issued by NATO on September 24:

These consultations were one stage in the task set the Committee by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in May 1956 when the three Ministers

were asked 'to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community'.

The governments invited to consult with the Committee of Three, most of which were represented by their Foreign Ministers, gave most valuable assistance to the Committee and reflected in their views the serious and constructive attention which governments are giving to the work of the Committee. They were unanimous on the need to reach a broad measure of agreement on the practical means of achieving the objective set out in the Committee's terms of reference.

The Committee has also been fortunate in receiving the help and guidance of the International Staff of NATO and of a number of consultants with special knowledge of certain fields of non-military activities covered by the consultations.

On the basis of their own investigations, of the written replies from governments to the questionnaire which the Committee had circulated, and of the consultations now concluded, the Ministers have begun the preparation of a report which they expect to have completed when they meet again in New York in November, prior to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The report will then be submitted to NATO governments and the three Ministers will seek Council approval for it at the annual meeting in December.

STATEMENT ON SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL

The following statement was made by Prime Minister St. Laurent September 21 on the sale of 24 aircraft to Israel.

After full and useful discussion with certain friendly governments, the Canadian Government has now decided that it would not be justified in refusing the request made some time ago by the Government of Israel for permission to purchase interceptor planes from Canadian production for use in the defence of that country. The Government has been greatly influenced in this decision by the fact that Israel's neighbour has recently received large numbers of jet fighters from the Soviet Union and, even more important, a considerable number of modern jet bombers, of which Israel possesses none.

Assurances have been received from the Government of Israel that the interceptors in question will be used solely for defence against aggression.

This approval of Israel's request for 24 F86's covers a period of six months, during which the planes would normally be made available and shipped. If at any time during this period political circumstances should change in a way which would warrant a cancellation or postponement of the outstanding part of this order, such action will be taken.

Report from South Korea

by T. F. M. Newton

Canadians will be interested in this account by Mr. Newton, Minister-Counsellor at Tokyo, of a visit he and Mrs. Newton made to two orphanages and a school in South Korea. British Columbia school children contributed to the building fund for the school, and a Canadian missionary heads the staff of one of the orphanages.

Buk-han-san Orphanage

Buk-han-san Orphanage, on the outskirts of Seoul, has already gained a degree of post-war fame as a nursery for youthful musical virtuosity. In a set of modern classrooms constructed with funds donated by American units in Korea, a group of 50 to 60 lively children are given special training in three-part choral harmony and, on a somewhat tinny piano, everything from *Arirang* to Bach. A special concert was arranged for our benefit. The singing was earnest, full-throated and remarkable, and our gratitude was expressed both in remarks to teachers and students and in the form of a gift of confections.

Help From Children of Canada

Of particular Canadian interest, however, was the Song Nim Children's School on the outskirts of Inchon. Ken Marshall, the Canadian Secretary of the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies, says of this school:

In looking for the needy projects during her trip to Korea, Dr. Lotta Hitschmanova, Executive Director of the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, decided that Song Nim was worthy of assistance and sparked the campaign back home which resulted in the children of British Columbia schools contributing \$3,500 towards the initial building costs. This was at the suggestion of the B.C. Minister of Education. Each classroom donated 50 cents.

In addition, the Public School Board of Ottawa is conducting or has conducted a campaign to raise money to help re-equip four other Korean "free schools".

The school, in a run-down section of the port, is actually operated by the Salvation Army, whose officials supervised the original construction. On Sundays, its single large room is used as an interdenominational church. Since the Republic of Korea Government imposes educational fees for all children in its own public schools, the competition for acceptance by the few "free" schools, such as Song Nim, is keen. The selection of the children for this small Inchon school, however, is made chiefly on the basis of financial need. Had the impoverished little group of children whom we visited not been accepted for Song Nim, they would probably have been unable to obtain any formal primary education.

Both Korean and foreign Salvation Army officials had been alerted for our visit and when we arrived with Captain A. Neguchi, a brilliant Canadian Nisei medical officer with the Canadian Medical Detachment at Inchon, the teacher, an earnest young man whose welcome was profuse, had arranged his charges



CANADIANS IN SOUTH KOREA

Six Canadians are shown above with a South Korean nun on the occasion of a visit to the Seoul orphanage of St. Paul de Chartres paid by Mr. T. F. M. Newton, Minister-Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, Mrs. Newton, and Mr. Ken Marshall, Canadian Secretary of the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies. The three other Canadians are missionaries serving in South Korea.

From left to right, above: the Korean nun; Rev. Sister Bernadette; Rev. Father Bellerose; Mrs. Newton; Rev. Sister Marie Pauline, and Mr. Marshall.

The Newtons are holding gifts presented to them by the children of the orphanage.

in double file in the schoolyard. After the traditional choral contribution, I expressed our pleasure, and, on behalf of the school children of British Columbia, told them that Canadian children far across the Pacific had been so anxious to help them with their education that they had contributed the money to build this school. After a Korean Salvation Army officer had translated, we inspected the interior of the deskless one-room building and queried the teacher about his work. Mrs. Newton mingled with the children preparatory to the presentation of a personal gift for their welfare. Both officials, teacher, and children seemed exceedingly grateful for our brief visit, and my wife and I were glad of the opportunity to remind them of Canadian interest in their well-being.

St. Paul de Chartres Orphanage

On a subsequent morning Marshall escorted us in his jeep on a pre-arranged visit to the Roman Catholic orphanage of St. Paul de Chartres. Here were gathered not only a large assemblage of Korean and mixed blood (i.e. children of American G.I.'s and Korean mothers) orphans, but, for this particular occasion, the only three French-Canadian missionaries in South Korea—Rev. Sister Bernadette, formerly of Beauceville, Que., who has charge of the Seoul orphanage, Rev. Sister Marie Pauline, who had made the difficult journey from Taegu, 150 miles away, and Rev. Father Bellerose, who had come from Taejon, about 100 miles from Seoul. Sister Marie Pauline, formerly of Carleton, N.B.,

has charge of another St. Paul de Chartres (France) orphanage at Taegu. Father Bellerose, formerly of St. Ambroise, Que., has a church at Taejon.

With considerable formality, Mrs. Newton, Marshall and I were led to a platform in one of the orphanage's larger classrooms to witness a special programme of songs, speeches and Korean dances by the children. Subsequently, the unexpected presentation to Mrs. Newton of flowers, of a scroll, and of a piece of Korean needlework was made by two little girls in Korean costume. Our expressions of gratitude were translated by Sister Bernadette.

In the course of a pleasant conversation with Sister Bernadette, I learned the details of an incident which redounds to the credit of the late Lt.-Col. W. R. I. Slack and the Canadian Medical Detachment. During the deep cold of last December, Father Bellerose at Taejon found himself in dire need of coal and other supplies. Learning of this, Sister Bernadette begged help from Col. Slack, who managed to secure 10 tons of coal from some unknown source, and volunteered to send officers and men on "a field exercise" which would transport the fuel through Seoul and thence to Father Bellerose at Taejon, about 100 miles farther on. Two officers and nine men manned three trucks and two jeeps one week-end before Christmas, breakfasted with Sister Bernadette and the other nuns in the Seoul orphanage, and, full of their mercy mission, persuaded Sister Bernadette to accompany them on their onward course. Although strict military protocol might have demurred at calling this expedition a "field exercise", it was a kindly humanitarian gesture on the part of Col. Slack, his officers and men, and the gratitude of Father Bellerose and Sister Bernadette glowed with Canadian pride.

Our brief stay with these children and the three devoted Canadian missionaries from scattered parts of South Korea brought us great personal satisfaction. Our reception was impressive, and the pleasure they seemed to derive from a visit by the representative of the Canadian Government made the effort very worth-while. I shall not miss paying a further call on Sister Bernadette on the occasion of some future visit to Seoul.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Lt.-Gen. M. A. Pope, MC, CB., Ambassador to Spain, retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service effective September 20, 1956.
- Mr. J. M. Teakles posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective September 2, 1956.
- Mr. K. B. Williamson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Santiago, effective September 3, 1956.
- Mr. H. T. W. Blockley posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. J. R. McKinney posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. C. E. Glover posted from the Canadian Embassy, Caracas, to Ottawa, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. R. Y. Grey appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 4, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. R. S. MacLean appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. C. C. E. Chatillon posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 4, 1956.
- Mr. V. G. Turner posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective September 7, 1956.
- Mr. d'I. H. G. Fortier posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective September 10, 1956.
- Mr. L. H. B. Peebles posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective September 12, 1956.
- Mr. J. A. Beesley appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 17, 1956.
- Mr. O. G. Stoner posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective September 20, 1956.
- Mr. M. P. F. Dupuy posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective September 22, 1956.
- Mr. P. G. R. Campbell appointed Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Vientiane, effective September 22, 1956.
- Mr. J. R. Maybee posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective September 27, 1956.
- Mr. J. R. Francis posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective September 28, 1956.
- Mr. J. R. Cadwell posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective August 23, 1956.
- Mr. J. L. Delisle posted from the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, to Ottawa, effective August 29, 1956.
- Mr. E. R. Rettie posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Ottawa, effective August 29, 1956.
- Mr. D. C. Reece posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective August 31, 1956.
- Mr. A. D. Ross posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective August 31, 1956.

TREATY INFORMATION

Bilateral

Denmark

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

Signed at Ottawa September 30, 1955.

Ratified at Copenhagen September 5, 1956.

Entered into force September 5, 1956.

France

Exchange of Notes concerning burial arrangements in France for members of Canadian Forces and civilian components.

Signed at Paris September 4, 1956.

Entered into force September 4, 1956.

Turkey

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Turkey respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visa fees.

Signed at Ankara August 21, 1956.

Entered into force September 21, 1956.

Union of South Africa

Agreement for the prevention of fiscal evasion and the avoidance of double taxation with respect to income tax.

Signed at Ottawa September 28, 1956.

Agreement for the prevention of fiscal evasion and the avoidance of double taxation with respect to succession duties.

Signed at Ottawa September 28, 1956.

Multilateral

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as to disposition of rights in atomic energy inventions.

Signed at Washington September 24, 1956.

Entered into force September 24, 1956.

Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery.

Signed at Geneva September 7, 1956.

International Wheat Agreement, 1956.

Signed May 16, 1956.

Instrument of Acceptance of Canada deposited September 26, 1956.

In force July 16, 1956 except as to Part II which entered into force on August 1, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

Printed Documents:

Budget estimates for the financial year 1957 and Information annex. A/3126. N.Y., 1956. 104 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 5.

United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. Annual report. A/3146. N.Y., 1956. 22 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 8.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly. A/3151. N.Y., 1956. 35 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 12.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Second report to the eleventh session of the General Assembly. A/3160. N.Y., 1956. 48 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 7.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Report of the tenth session (18 April to 12 May 1955). E/2768/Rev.1, E/CN.7/303/Rev.1. 55 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 8.

International Trade 1955. The contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Geneva, May 1956. 229 p. \$1.50. Sales No.: GATT/1956-2.

International Labour Organization:

Tenth Report of the International Labour Organization to the United Nations. Geneva, 1956. 87 p. (E/2879).

Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts. Geneva, 1956. 179 p. \$1.50. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 46).

Publications of the International Labour Office 1944-1955. Geneva, 1956. 48 p.

UNESCO:

Reports of Member States presented to the General Conference at its Ninth Session, New Delhi, November-December 1956. 9 C/4. Paris, September 1956. 272 p. \$7.00.

The problems of transmitting press messages. A study submitted by UNESCO to the International Telecommunications Union to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Paris, 1956. 95 p.

Sociology in the United States of America; a trend report. Edited by Hans L. Zetterberg. Paris, 1956. 156 p. (Documentation in the Social Sciences Series).

World Health Organization:

Executive Board, 18th session, Geneva, 28-30 May 1956. Resolutions, Annexes. Geneva, 1956. Official Records of the WHO, No. 73.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



November 1956

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Canada's Position in World Crisis

IN a radio and television address November 4, Prime Minister St. Laurent made the following summation of Canada's views on the two grave world problems and reviewed actions taken up to that time in the United Nations by Canada:

Middle East

I think it my duty to speak to you tonight about the very grave events of the last two weeks. I should like first to talk about the Middle East crisis. I would like to explain to you the Government's recent actions in the context of our general policy in the Middle East. For the last few years peace has been precarious in this area, especially around the borders of Israel, whose creation as a state was recommended by the United Nations General Assembly with Canada's support in November 1947.

While the tensions arising out of the situation in the Middle East have continued, Canada has steadily encouraged efforts to secure a fair settlement based on the principle that Israel should live and prosper—but not the principle that it should expand at the expense of its Arab neighbours.

A recent communist intervention in the Middle East has contributed directly to the present crisis. By supplying offensive weapons in large quantities to Egypt the communist world threatened to upset the balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In order to help redress this potential imbalance Canada agreed a few weeks ago to authorize the export of 24 F-86 jet fighter planes to Israel over a six-month period. We realized however that a permanent settlement between Israel and its neighbours arranged by the United Nations was the only way in which peace could be preserved in the long run.

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company increased the dangers inherent in the Middle East situation. The Egyptian action introduced a threat to the trade on which the economic life of many countries depends. It placed the control of shipping in the Canal in the hands of a government which for some years has been denying access to the Canal for Israeli ships in defiance of a Security Council resolution.

In the crisis which resulted from the nationalization of the Canal Company, the Canadian Government has followed a definite and consistent policy in public statements and in private discussions with the nations concerned. We have advocated that a settlement of the issues relating to the Canal which directly affect so many countries should be achieved under the auspices of the United Nations and that there should be no resort to force. The Canadian Government welcomed the 18-power proposals agreed to at the London Conference in August as a sound basis for negotiating a settlement. We have stated our belief that this settlement should respect the legitimate sovereign rights of Egypt. It should also safeguard the right of ships of all nations to pass through the Canal. At the same time it should protect the international waterway from arbitrary and unjustified intervention by any country, including Egypt. We have stated our belief that this settlement should be embodied in co-operative arrangements with which the United Nations should be associated in an appropriate manner.

Because we believe that a permanent settlement of Israel's relations with its neighbours and of the future of the Suez Canal should be reached by peaceful negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations, the Canadian Government regrets that Israel proceeded last week to use force against Egypt, although we recognize that Israel has been subject to grave threats and provocations during the last few years. Though we recognize the vital importance of the Canal to the economic life and international responsibilities of the United Kingdom and France, we could not but regret also that, at a time when the United Nations Security Council was seized of the matter, the United Kingdom and France felt it necessary to intervene with force on their own responsibility.

Your Government has acted promptly in this crisis. We have taken immediate steps to further the safety of Canadian civilians in the Middle East. We have suspended the shipment of jet interceptor aircraft to Israel. The Canadian Government voted for consideration of the Israeli attack at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on November 1 which was called after Security Council action was made impossible by the negative votes of two of its permanent members.

A United States resolution was introduced which called for an immediate cease-fire, the prompt withdrawal of forces and the end of military shipments to the area. On Friday morning this resolution was carried by 64 votes in favour to 5 against, including the United Kingdom and France. Canada and five other nations abstained in the vote on this resolution.

In explaining the reasons for this abstention, I should like to quote part of what Mr. Pearson said in the General Assembly.

I regret use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about that kind of cease-fire which will have enduring and beneficial results.

He later added:

I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution . . . authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.

We have swiftly followed up this suggestion. At another special session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last night Mr. Pearson introduced a resolution on behalf of Canada which requests the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours a plan for a United Nations force to secure and to supervise the cease-fire arrangements which were referred to in the United States resolution. Mr. Pearson explained that no members of the United Nations are to be asked to provide forces without their previous consent. The Canadian Government is ready to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force if it is to be established and if it is thought that Canada could play a useful role.

The Canadian resolution was passed by the General Assembly early this morning without a single dissenting vote although there were a number of abstentions. At the same time the General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by 19 nations; it reaffirmed the United States resolution about cease-fire arrangements and authorized the Secretary-General to arrange with the nations concerned the implementation of this resolution and asked him to report on their compliance.

The establishment of the United Nations force will be to ensure an effective cease-fire in the affected area. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have signified their willingness, under certain conditions, to suspend their military intervention if a United Nations truce force is given responsibility. According to present information, Israel and Egypt have stated their willingness to accept cease-fire arrangements provided other parties also co-operate.

We have strong reason to believe that a United Nations command will be established within the 48 hours set in the Canadian Resolution. This is only the first step toward a permanent settlement of Middle East problems. In the General Assembly last night the United States introduced two new resolutions which seek to establish United Nations committees to consider the future of Israel's relations with its neighbours and the future of the Suez Canal. We believe these resolutions represent a constructive approach to these problems. We will actively participate in efforts to make progress on the lines which the Assembly has approved.

We have spent anxious days of late and I am sure you all share our anxiety. The present crisis has strained both the Western alliance and the bonds of the Commonwealth more than any other event since the Second World War. If we can use it as the opportunity to dissipate the black cloud which has hung over the Middle East these many years, the present danger and strains may prove to have been a price worth paying.

Eastern Europe

I have spoken at length about the momentous events in the Middle East, but I must refer also to the grave and tragic events which have led to turmoil and bloodshed in Eastern Europe. For the first time since the end of the war a real hope appeared, in the last two weeks, that some at least of the countries which have contributed so much to the civilization of the world might secure some measure of independence from Moscow.

In Poland, a form of national communism has been established which appears determined to demand as a minimum the right to develop along its own lines, and not according to a Moscow pattern. Not least encouraging was the release of the Roman Catholic Primate of Poland.

We were also encouraged by a statement from Moscow which said that the Soviet leaders were prepared to negotiate their relations with Eastern Europe on the basis of equality and non-interference in their neighbour's internal affairs.

Even before this announcement, the brave Hungarian people had risen to demand the freedom so long denied them. The Hungarian revolution was a passionate and significant outburst of national feeling, both strongly anti-Russian and anti-Communist. We rejoiced in the release of Cardinal Mindszenty and other religious leaders and we shared the hopes, as well as the anxiety, of our fellow countrymen of Hungarian origin.

Today, these hopes seem to have been shattered. Soviet action has made a mockery of Soviet statements. According to the latest reports, Soviet armed might is being applied against the gallant and practically unarmed people of Hungary. Moscow has announced that it will crush the Hungarian revolt and re-impose its will on Hungary by brute force.

Last night, in an emergency session, the Security Council met in response to an appeal from the Hungarian Government and considered a U.S. resolution

condemning Soviet military interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The matter was then referred to a special session of the General Assembly which is now meeting and which provides the opportunity of condemning in the most forthright terms the callous disregard by the Soviet Union of the elementary rights of the Hungarian people.

Our aim is that the people of Eastern Europe should be free to choose their own form of government, a basic human right they have not enjoyed for years. The Soviet Union's resort to military force against a neighbouring nation is a most serious threat to the peace which we have solemnly pledged ourselves to preserve and defend in signing the Charter of the United Nations.

The one encouraging aspect of the events of the last few days has been the almost unanimous action of the nations of the world in endeavouring to implement their obligations under that Charter.

And, in conclusion, I wish to assure my listeners that all the members of their Government have been in full agreement at all times as to what should be done and what could be said and when it should be done and when it could be said. And I am sure that, if and when any action of ours requires, according to our practices, the approval by Parliament, that approval will be given in no uncertain terms.

Let us all hope that this approach to unanimity of men of good will of so many nations may help to realize that part of our daily prayer to a Power greater than any here below: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven".

PRIORITY ACCORDED HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

The following statement was issued November 6 by Mr. J. W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration:

With the approval of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the general policy of the Government respecting refugees, the Canadian Immigration office in Vienna has been instructed to give priority to applications from refugees from Hungary. Assisted passage loans will be available to such immigrants on the same terms as to other immigrants from Europe.

CONTRIBUTION TO UN REFUGEE FUND

Prime Minister St. Laurent announced November 7 that the Government has decided to make a special contribution of \$100,000 to the United Nations refugee fund.

The Government will also make a contribution of \$100,000 to the Canadian Red Cross to assist it in providing basic relief supplies and services to the refugees who have been crossing by the thousands into Austria since the Russians moved in to crush the Hungarian freedom fighters.

The contribution to the UN Refugee Fund, the Prime Minister's announcement said, will be in addition to the \$200,000 Canada will be giving the fund in 1957 for assisting refugees generally.

Canada last week sent a plane-load of drugs and medical supplies to Vienna for the embattled Hungarians.

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FORCE


Prime Minister St. Laurent made the following announcement November 7 on Canada's participation in the United Nations force for the Middle East:

To comply with the resolutions of the United Nations, the Canadian Government has agreed to make an offer of a Canadian contingent to the Emergency International United Nations Force for the Middle East. This proposal is subject to adjustment and/or re-arrangement after consultation with the United Nations commander. Arrangements have already been made for a group of Canadian officers to be available today for consultation with the UN commander in New York as soon as he arrives.

It is proposed to offer a Canadian contingent of battalion strength, augmented by ordnance, army service corps, medical and dental detachments to ensure that the battalion group is self-contained and can operate independently from a Canadian base. The size of the contingent is expected to be over 1,000 men.

Canada will be prepared to have this force lifted by the RCAF to the Middle East.

It is proposed to provide this contingent with a temporary mobile Canadian base for the first phase of its policing operations. The Canadian Government is prepared to use HMCS Magnificent for the purpose of transporting vehicles and stores to the Middle East and for use as a temporary mobile Canadian base for rations, medical supplies, ammunition, fuel and limited accommodation stores. HMCS Magnificent will also provide a small hospital to accommodate the sick and injured in the force; accommodation for a force headquarters; and communications between the force and Canada.



VISITS PRIME MINISTER

—Capital Press

Mr. R. G. Casey, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, left, is seen with Prime Minister St. Laurent, on whom he paid an official call during a recent visit to Ottawa.

Middle East and Hungary

Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Among the most important measures approved during the session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1950 was the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which endowed the Assembly with authority to deal with threats to international peace and security in cases in which the Security Council, because of the veto of a permanent member, has been unable to act. It was this "Uniting for Peace" resolution which, six years after its adoption, made it possible to call the General Assembly into its first Special Emergency Session, convened on November 1 to consider the situation in the Middle East arising out of the Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory.

The following is a report on the main developments immediately preceding and during the Special Emergency Session which was concluded on November 10. On that date the Assembly voted to refer consideration of the Egyptian and Hungarian questions to its 11th regular session which opened in New York on November 12.

The Middle East

On October 29, Israeli forces launched a major attack against Egypt and advanced deep into the Sinai Peninsula. On October 30, Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom and Premier Mollet of France called upon Israel and Egypt to cease hostilities and announced that unless at the expiration of 12 hours the combatants had complied with this ultimatum and withdrawn their forces ten miles from the Suez Canal, British and French military forces would intervene "in whatever strength may be necessary to ensure compliance".

The Security Council, at the request of the United States, met on October 30 to consider steps for "the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council had before it a United States resolution calling upon all parties involved in hostilities to agree to an immediate cease-fire and to halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. The resolution also urged parties to the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreement of 1949 to withdraw their forces behind the armistice lines and to observe the provisions of the Agreement. Although a majority of the Council supported this resolution, it was not adopted because of the dissenting votes of two permanent members, the United Kingdom and France.

Although unable to take effective action to halt hostilities, the Security Council adopted a resolution which led to the convocation on November 1 of the first Emergency Session of the General Assembly to be called under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1950. At this Emergency Session, the Assembly had before it a United States resolution essentially similar to the cease-fire resolution presented earlier in the Security Council. This Assembly resolution was adopted on November 2 by a vote of 64 in favour, 5 against and 6 abstentions (including Canada). Following is the

statement made by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in explaining Canada's abstention:

I rise not to take part in this debate, because the debate is over. The vote has been taken. But I do wish to explain the abstention of my delegation on that vote.

It is never easy to explain an abstention, and in this case it is particularly difficult because we are in favour of some parts of this resolution, and also because this resolution deals with such a complicated question.

Because we are in favour of some parts of the resolution, we could not vote against it, especially as, in our opinion, it is a moderate proposal couched in reasonable and objective terms, without unfair or unbalanced condemnation; and also, by referring to violations by both sides to the armistice agreements, it puts, I think, recent action by the United Kingdom and France—and rightly—against the background of those repeated violations and provocations.

We support the effort being made to bring the fighting to an end. We support it, among other reasons, because we regret that force was used in the circumstances that face us at this time. As my delegation sees it, however, this resolution which the General Assembly has thus adopted in its present form—and there was very little chance to alter that form—is inadequate to achieve the purposes which we have in mind at this Assembly. Those purposes are defined in that resolution of the United Nations under which we are meeting—resolution 377(V), uniting for peace—and peace is far more than ceasing to fire, although it certainly must include that essential factor. This is the first time that action has been taken under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, and I confess to a feeling of sadness, indeed even distress, at not being able to support the position taken by two countries whose ties with my country are and will remain close and intimate; two countries which have contributed so much to man's progress and freedom under law; and two countries which are Canada's mother countries.

I regret the use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing, but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about that kind of ceasefire which would have enduring and beneficial results. I think that we were entitled to that time, for this is not only a tragic moment for the countries and peoples immediately affected, but it is an equally difficult time for the United Nations itself.

I know, of course, that the situation is of special and, indeed, poignant urgency, a human urgency, and that action could not be postponed by dragging out a discussion, as has been done so often in this Assembly. I do feel, however, that had that time, which has always, to my knowledge, in the past been permitted for adequate examination of even the most critical and urgent resolution, been available on this occasion, the result might have been a better resolution. Such a short delay would not, I think, have done harm, but, in the long run, would have helped those in the area who need help most at this time.

Why do I say this? In the first place, our resolution, though it has been adopted, is only a recommendation, and its moral effects would have been greater if it could have received a more unanimous vote in this Assembly—which might have been possible if there had been somewhat more delay.

Secondly, this recommendation which we have adopted cannot be effective without the compliance of those to whom it is addressed and who have to carry it out. I had ventured to hope that, by a short delay and in informal talks, we

might have made some headway, or at least have tried to make some headway, in securing a favourable response, before vote was taken, from those governments and delegations which will be responsible for carrying it out.

Resolution Inadequate

I consider that there is one great omission from this resolution, which has already been pointed out by previous speakers—more particularly by the representative of New Zealand, who has preceded me. This resolution does provide for a cease-fire, and I admit that that is of first importance and urgency. But, alongside a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops, it does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a cease-fire will be only of temporary value at best. Surely we should have used this opportunity to link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement in Palestine and for the Suez, and perhaps we might also have been able to recommend a procedure by which this absolutely essential process might begin.

Today we are facing a feeling of almost despairing crisis for the United Nations and for peace. Surely that feeling might have been harnessed to action or at least to a formal resolve to act at long last and to do something effective about the underlying causes of this crisis which has brought us to the very edge of a tragedy even greater than that which has already taken place. We should then, I think, have recognized the necessity for political settlement in this resolution and done something about it. And I do not think that, if we had done that, it would have postponed action very long on the other clauses of the resolution. Without such a settlement, which we might have pushed forward under the incentive of fear, our resolution, as I see it, may not make for an enduring and real peace. We need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace.

I believe that there is another omission from this resolution, to which attention has also already been directed. The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to withdraw, or if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where presumably, if this is done, they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? are we to return to the *status quo*? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations Armistice Commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate.

I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution—and this has been mentioned by previous speakers—authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration to this matter. My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.

We have a duty here. We also have—or, should I say, we had—an opportunity. Our resolution may deal with one aspect of our duty—an urgent, a terribly urgent, aspect. But, as I see it, it does nothing to seize that opportunity which, if it had been seized, might have brought some real peace and a decent

existence, or hope for such, to the people of that part of the world. There was no time on this occasion for us to seize this opportunity in this resolution. My delegation therefore felt, because of the inadequacy of the resolution in this respect, that we had no alternative in the circumstances but to abstain in the voting.

I hope that our inability to deal with these essential matters at this time will very soon be removed and that we can come to grips with the basic core of this problem.



—UN Photo

EXCHANGING VIEWS

Sir Pierson Dixon, left, United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and Mr. L. B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, chat prior to a special emergency session of the General Assembly on the Middle East situation.

On November 3, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, reported to the General Assembly that information concerning compliance with the resolution had been received from Egypt and the United Kingdom. The Egyptian Mission to the United Nations reported that their government accepted the General Assembly's resolution "on the condition, of course, that it could not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continue their aggression". The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom continued to:

Maintain their view that police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities which are now threatening the Suez Canal, to prevent a resumption of those hostilities and to pave the way for a definite settlement of the Arab-Israel war which threatens the legitimate interests of so many countries. They would most willingly stop military action as soon as the following conditions could be satisfied:

- (1) Both the Egyptian and the Israeli Governments agree to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace;
- (2) The United Nations decides to constitute and maintain such a force until an Arab-Israel peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangements have been agreed in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the United Nations;
- (3) In the meantime until the United Nations force is constituted, both combatants agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Anglo-French troops to be stationed between the combatants.

Canadian Proposal

The Secretary-General's report was considered at another meeting of the Emergency Session on the night of November 3-4 at which the Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote (although there were 19 abstentions) a Canadian proposal that Mr. Hammarskjöld should submit within 48 hours a plan for the establishment of an international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. In introducing this resolution, Mr. Pearson said:

The immediate purpose of our meeting tonight is to bring about as soon as possible a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, in the area which we are considering, from contact and from conflict with each other. Our longer-range purpose, which has already been referred to tonight and which may ultimately, in its implications, be even more important, is to find solutions for the problems which, because we have left them unsolved over the years, have finally exploded into this fighting and conflict.

So far as the first and immediate purpose is concerned, a short time ago the Assembly passed, by a very large majority, a resolution which is now a recommendation of the United Nations Assembly. And so we must ask ourselves how the United Nations can assist in securing compliance with the terms of that resolution from those who are most immediately concerned and whose compliance is essential if that resolution is to be carried out. How can we get from them the support and co-operation which is required, and how can we do this quickly?

The representative of India has just read to us, on behalf of a number of delegations, a very important resolution which deals with this matter. In operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, certain specific proposals are made with a view to setting up machinery to facilitate compliance with the resolution. I ask myself the question whether that machinery is adequate for the complicated and difficult task which is before us. I am not in any way opposing this resolution which we have just heard read. I appreciate its importance and the spirit in which it has been put forward. But I do suggest that the Secretary-General be given another and supplementary—not conflicting, but supplementary—responsibility: to work out at once a plan for an international force to bring about and supervise the cease-fire visualized in the Assembly resolution which has already been passed.

For that purpose my delegation would like to submit to the Assembly a very short draft resolution which I venture to read at this time. It is as follows:

The General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with the resolution (A/3256) of 2 November, request, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the above resolution.

I would assume that during this short period the Secretary-General would get into touch with, and endeavour to secure co-operation in the carrying out of the earlier resolution from the parties immediately concerned—whose co-operation, I venture to repeat, is essential—as well as endeavoring to secure help and co-operation from any others whom he thinks might assist him in this vitally important task.

This draft resolution which I have just read out, and which will be circulated shortly, has an added purpose of facilitating and making effective compliance with the resolution which we have already passed on the part of those whose compliance is absolutely essential. It has also the purpose of providing for international supervision of that compliance through the United Nations, and finally, it has as its purpose the bringing to an end of the fighting and bloodshed at once, even while the Secretary-General is examining this question and reporting back in forty-eight hours.

If this draft resolution commended itself to the General Assembly—and I suggest that it is not in conflict with the draft resolution which has just been read to us by our Indian colleague—and if it were accepted quickly, the Secretary-General could at once begin the important task which the draft resolution gives him. I apologize for adding to his burdens in this way, because they have already been added to in the immediately preceding draft resolution, but we know that he can carry burdens of this kind both unselfishly and efficiently.

Meanwhile, during this period of forty-eight hours we can get on with our consideration of and decision on the United States draft resolutions before the General Assembly which deal with this grave and dangerous situation which confronts us both in relation to its immediate as well as its wider and perhaps even more far-reaching aspects.

At this meeting the Assembly also adopted a resolution proposed by 19 Asian and African delegations authorizing the Secretary-General to arrange a cease-fire and to report within 12 hours on compliance. The vote on this resolution was 59 in favour (including Canada), 5 against and 12 abstentions.

Plan for Force Endorsed

On November 4, the Emergency Session was convened again and approved, by a vote of 57 in favour, none against and 19 abstentions, a resolution sponsored by Canada, Colombia and Norway which endorsed the Secretary-General's plan for a United Nations police force and appointed Major General E. L. M. Burns as Chief of the United Nations Command with authority to take steps to organize an international force.

On November 7, in explaining to the Assembly Canada's vote in favour of another resolution proposed by 19 Asian-African delegations which affirmed

the Assembly's determination to implement its previous resolutions and called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, Mr. Pearson said:

I merely wish to speak for a minute in order to explain the vote of my Delegation on Draft Resolution A/3309. In this connection, my Delegation supports the view which has been expressed by the representative of Peru and others as to the interconnection between the two resolutions which are before us—the close relationship between the two of them—and the impossibility of separating one in its implementation from the other. In that sense we give an interpretation to the word “immediately” which has been given by others as meaning as quickly as possible. In our minds, there is a relationship bearing on this word “immediately” between the withdrawal of the forces referred to in the resolution and the arrival and the functioning of the United Nations force,

At the same meeting of the Emergency Session on November 7 the Assembly considered a second report by the Secretary-General on the plan for the international United Nations force. Expressing its approval of Mr. Hammarskjöld's recommendations regarding the principles on which the United Nations emergency force should be based, the Assembly established an Advisory Committee composed of representatives of Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Iran, Norway and Pakistan, with the Secretary-General as Chairman, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the force and which are not within the area of responsibility of the Chief of Command. The relevant resolution which had been sponsored by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden, was adopted by a vote of 64 in favour, none against, and 12 abstentions. Following is the text of a statement made by Mr. Pearson prior to the vote:

I wish to give the full support of our Delegation and the Canadian Government to this resolution setting up the United Nations emergency force, and to endorse the report of the Secretary-General, which is related to it. I would like also to echo the appreciation and gratitude expressed by the Danish Delegation to the Secretary-General for his tireless energy and skill, without which we would not have this resolution before us.

My Government has been proud to offer a contribution to this force and steps are now being taken by us to organize it as a matter of urgency.*

With the acceptance of this resolution—and surely it can be unanimously approved—the ending of hostilities can be confirmed and safeguarded and work of peace-making begun on a solid United Nations foundation. Indeed, it has begun, but much remains to be done before it is finished. This is a moment for sober satisfaction, but certainly not for premature rejoicing. Yet it is hard not to rejoice at the thought that we may have been saved from the very edge of catastrophe—and saved, let us not forget, not by threats or blusters, but by the action of the United Nations. If we draw the necessary conclusions from the manner of our escape and act on them, perhaps we will not in the future have to get so perilously close again.

I repeat, however, that much remains to be done, even in the first stage which is now underway. The organization of a United Nations force from other than permanent members of the Security Council is bound to be a task of great

*On November 7, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced in Ottawa that the Canadian Government had agreed to offer a Canadian contingent of battalion strength to the international United Nations force for the Middle East.

complexity and difficulty. We are breaking new ground, we are pioneering for peace, but if we take full advantage of this opportunity, I feel sure we can reap a rich harvest from that ground in terms of peace and security in the area concerned and, indeed, in wider terms as well.

We must now press on with the greater and perhaps even more difficult task of a political settlement; which will be honourable and just, and provide hope for security and progress for millions in this part of the world who have not known them in these troublous and distracting years. This is implicit in the resolution before us and that of November 3, (A/3276), which establish the conditions within which the United Nations force must operate. Until we have succeeded in this task of a political settlement, our work today, and the ceasefire of yesterday—though they give us reason for hope and encouragement—remain uncompleted.

Nevertheless, the fighting has ceased, the process of restoration is to follow, and the work of peaceful settlement pursued in one part of this distracted and dangerous world. We cannot fail to be relieved and pleased about this, and to rejoice in the fact that the United Nations has made the essential contribution to such a good result.

If we had not acted swiftly and, I think, effectively here, we might have been facing today a conflict which perhaps would have engulfed us all.

I hope that we can pass this resolution quickly so that the United Nations force can be organized promptly and effectively and moved to the spot without delay.

Surely that is the most urgent and immediate duty for us to discharge at this moment, and I hope that we can do it without delay.

The Special Emergency Session was concluded on November 10 when the Assembly voted to refer consideration of the Middle East question to its 11th regular session beginning November 12.

Hungary

On October 28, the Security Council debated a protest filed the previous day by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—and supported by Canada—against Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

On November 3, the Security Council was again convened in response to an appeal from the Nagy Government in Hungary to consider a resolution condemning Soviet military interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The matter was then referred to the Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly, where, on November 4, the United States delegation put forward a resolution condemning the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to re-assert their rights, and requesting the Secretary-General to investigate the situation and to report as soon as possible to the Assembly. Following is the text of Mr. Pearson's statement in support of this resolution:

Mr. President, notwithstanding the words of the Soviet delegate, in the past twenty-four hours we have witnessed in Hungary one of the greatest and grimmest betrayals in history. This is a sad and desolate moment for all who have been striving for the extension of freedom and justice throughout the world.

It is, first of all, and above all, the people of Hungary who have been betrayed—the students, the peasants, the workers, whom the Soviet Union so frequently professes to champion. For ten years all the resources of a great empire were used to weaken and destroy all feeling for national and personal freedom in Hungary and the other countries of Eastern Europe on whom communist regimes had been imposed after World War II by foreign forces. But events in Hungary—and elsewhere—have dramatically revealed the results of these ten years of suppression and indoctrination to be failure—often concealed behind a smiling facade of propaganda, but failure. In Hungary the mask of a “people’s democracy” was stripped away; the myth of the monolithic unity of the communist empire was destroyed. With incredible courage the Hungarian people proved once again that man, once free, will never finally accept oppression and slavery, even though he may be forced to submit to it for long periods. Armed at first only with burning patriotism and a dauntless spirit the plain people of Hungary rose against the oppressor. And the world watched their struggle hopefully, as the new head of the government, Mr. Nagy, promised free elections, the abolition of the secret police, and negotiations for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Hungary. It seemed only a few days ago that the resolution and the sacrifices of these men and women would yield them freedom at last and bring them a government of their own choice. It was the dawn of a new day—the people had risen and their will would prevail, or so it appeared.

The Great Betrayal

Then came the great betrayal. At the very time that, we have been told, negotiations were beginning between Soviet and Hungarian military leaders on a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, the Soviet Union was moving large new forces into position in Hungary where they could stamp out the rising flame of freedom and re-impose a ruthless and savage oppression. As the Soviet representative put it, the Nagy Government “fell apart”. The Soviet Union’s shameless disregard of its obligations under the Charter by its armed intervention has done more than kill Hungarians. It has betrayed the principles and ideals of our United Nations.

We have heard a great deal from the representative of the Soviet Union in the past few days about the iniquities of aggression, the unpardonable sin of force exerted by large countries upon small countries in order to bend them to the “imperialist” will, as he put it. There is no need for me to dwell now on the hypocrisy of the Soviet concern for one small nation when its own tanks and bombers are compelling an even smaller nation, which had briefly but gloriously raised its head, to put on the chains again. The Soviet delegate has made the parallel between the situation in Egypt and the situation in Hungary. I would reply first, that the United Nations should judge each situation on its merits; but also, that there is no parallel between the intentions of free democratic nations with a long history of respect for the rights of other nations and those of a dictatorial regime which has not shown the slightest understanding of international collaboration or consideration for the rights of others. That difference is, I think, very clearly revealed in the present situation. The Governments of the United Kingdom and of France have stated firmly and publicly that they are prepared to hand over what they claim to be solely their police role to a United Nations force; a force which we are now trying to organize. It is quite true that there remain differences between the British and the French on the one hand, and a majority of this Assembly on the other, on the conditions in which this transfer can take place. Nevertheless, a transfer has been accepted as necessary and desirable and a promise has been given that it will take place.

Will the Soviet Union give us the same promise with respect to the military operations against Hungary. I put this question directly to the Soviet representative. He has told us that his government has intervened in Hungary for a purpose, and that this purpose is ostensibly to protect the interests of the Hungarian people, so he says, from a reactionary fascist clique. No one in this Assembly has any desire whatsoever to see the long-suffering Hungarian people delivered from the tyranny of one clique into that of another. All we ask in this resolution which is before us is to let them form the kind of free national government they want. How can this best be done? Surely by an impartial and disinterested international authority which can hold the ring and enable all the Hungarian people, without fear or reprisal, to establish a free and democratic government of their own choice. We have before us a proposal that the Secretary-General investigate the situation. Where else can such an authority come from than the United Nations? Will the Soviet Government recognize that? If not, why not?

Asks UN Mission

Yesterday my government proposed the intervention of a United Nations force for peaceful purposes in the Middle East, and that proposal secured the overwhelming support of this Assembly; no single vote was cast against it. Why should we not now establish a United Nations mission or United Nations supervisory machinery of an appropriate kind for the situation in Hungary? I ask the Soviet Union to accept this chance, perhaps this last chance, to prove its good faith to the world. It is not only the Hungarian people who will be the victims of a refusal. It is a Soviet claim—very often repeated—to be the only true champion of peaceful co-existence; the only real foe of imperialism; the opponent of colonialism. If they refuse this United Nations investigation and examination into conditions in Hungary, never again will they be able to talk about colonial oppression or imperialism except in terms of the most blatant hypocrisy, recognized by everyone as such.

This is also the last chance of the USSR to show that their collective security system in Eastern Europe is something more than a collection of master and satellites. In this respect, what a contrast it is to an association of free states banded together on a basis of free co-operation, any one of which may withdraw if it wishes. Their system, if they persist in this aggressive intervention, stands exposed for all the world to see, resting on nothing but brute force and despotic control.

Mr. President, we owe it to the people of Hungary, we owe it to the United Nations, we owe it to freedom to condemn in the strongest terms what we know has happened and to investigate through the United Nations what is happening now.

Surely Mr. President, no single member of this Assembly will refuse to join in that condemnation, and in the request for this investigation.

Perhaps at this moment we cannot do more than this, but we surely cannot do less.

The United States resolution was adopted by 50 in favour, 8 against (the Soviet bloc) and 15 abstentions (Libya, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Finland).

The Hungarian situation was again taken up in the Emergency Session on November 8 when the United States representative reported that the attempts

of the Red Cross to send relief supplies to Hungary had been blocked by the Soviet Union.

On November 9, the General Assembly considered a resolution submitted by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru which again called on the Soviet Union to withdraw her forces, requested free elections under UN supervision and the appointment of a UN investigating committee. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 48 in favour, 11 against (the Soviet bloc, India and Yugoslavia) and 16 abstentions (Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen). On the same day, the General Assembly debated a resolution proposed by the U.S.A. calling upon the Soviet Union to cease its actions against Hungary and to co-operate in facilitating the supply of food and medical aid to the Hungarians, and requesting the member countries' assistance to Hungarian refugees. This resolution was adopted by 53 in favour, 9 against (Soviet bloc) and 13 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia). The representative of the Hungarian Kadar government and other Soviet bloc delegations opposed these resolutions on the usual grounds that they dealt with a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

Before the vote was taken on these two resolutions, Dr. R. A. MacKay, Canada's Permanent Representative at the UN, explained as follows the Canadian attitude:

My intervention will be very brief.

Within the past two days this Assembly has been heartened by the replies received from the governments recently engaged in military operations in the Near East. A cease-fire and withdrawal have been agreed to by all concerned. They have agreed to the entry of a UN force, pending a general settlement. What a contrast to the situation in Hungary. Not all the facts of the situation in Hungary are available, but more than enough to prove the continued brutal interference by force of arms of one great country in the internal affairs of a small neighbour. I would ask once again the questions asked of the Soviet Delegation by my Minister, the Honourable L. B. Pearson, earlier in this debate. For obvious reasons I address these questions to the Soviet Delegation rather than to the delegation which purports to represent Hungary.

Will the Soviet Union give similar undertakings for a cease-fire and withdrawal, I repeat and withdrawal, with respect to Hungary?

Second, will the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government admit a UN mission of observers to report back to the Assembly as approved in the resolution of this Assembly of 4 November?

Further, United Nations machinery appropriate to the situation in Hungary is no less required than is United Nations machinery in the Middle East. Where, except from the United Nations, can an impartial and disinterested authority be obtained to hold the ring and thus enable the Hungarian people to form the kind of free national government they desire, without fear of reprisal? Is the Soviet Government prepared to accept any such solution for Hungary? Here is its chance, perhaps its last chance, to prove its good faith.

I regret that I can find no evidence in the statement of the representative of the U.S.S.R. in this morning's debate that his government has any intention

of permitting the Hungarian people any freedom of choice or that it has any intention of withdrawing its forces from Hungarian territory. This from the government that has made such loud protestations these last few days about intervention by other governments in the Middle East.

With respect to the draft resolution put forward by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru (Document A/3316) my delegation can do no other than vote in favour.

We shall also support the resolution just now introduced by the representatives of the U.S.A. (Document A/3319).

This resolution is solely concerned with the humanitarian aspects of the situation in Hungary. Surely this purpose, and this resolution, can be supported by all delegations genuinely interested in human welfare and the relief of suffering.

Announcing the Canadian Government's desire to provide humanitarian assistance to the Hungarians, Dr. MacKay added:

In this connection, I have been authorized to state that Canada is ready to give priority to applications for immigration from Hungarian refugees; to contribute an additional \$100,000 to the High Commissioner for Refugees, specifically for the aid of Hungarian refugees; and to contribute a further \$100,000 to the Canadian Red Cross for Hungarian relief.

On the same date the Assembly adopted by 67 votes, none against and 8 abstentions (Soviet bloc countries) another resolution proposed by Austria urgently requesting member countries to provide humanitarian assistance to Hungary. Hungary later on agreed to accept assistance and it was reported on November 14 that Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld might possibly go to Budapest for discussions with the Hungarian authorities on this matter.

In pursuance of the above mentioned resolutions, the Secretary-General created on November 12 two ad hoc United Nations groups, one to make a full study at the United Nations on the Hungarian political situation, the other one to proceed to Hungary and carry out a similar investigation on the spot. Two messages from the Secretary-General to the Hungarian Government asking it to admit into Hungary the latter United Nations group were rejected by the Kadar government on the grounds that circumstances did not warrant an investigation by United Nations political observers. Nevertheless the Secretary-General sent his official request a third time and urged the Hungarian Government to revise its negative decision. The Kadar government's reply to Mr. Hammarskjöld's third message had not been received as of November 15. A similar communication was addressed to the Soviet Government requesting its support and assistance; the Soviet Government replied that the admission of, and extension of facilities to, United Nations observers was a matter within the sole competence of the Hungarian Government.

Eye Witness Story from Hungary

by A. F. Hart

Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Belgrade

On Tuesday, October 23, my wife and I, in our car, crossed the Hungarian border just beyond Subotica. It was an afternoon of bright, warm sunshine and the golden brown tints of autumn gave the countryside a peaceful, tranquil appearance. All appeared to be well in this part of the world. A comment to this effect to the Hungarian Customs officer drew, however, only a short pessimistic reply.

Fifteen minutes after completing the frontier formalities, we passed through Szeged, one of the larger industrial towns on the road to Budapest. Here on the streets there was nothing to excite our curiosity, and good-natured students, wandering aimlessly on the streets, cheerfully directed us on to the Budapest road.

By the time we entered Budapest, or rather the Pest section of the town, darkness had descended. The initial impression of the city, which the poor lighting accentuated, was one of gloominess and depression. As we got closer to the heart of Pest, traffic became thicker and dense crowds spilled over on to the road itself. Finally in the centre, we ran into complete confusion: large bodies of students were marching in chaotic fashion here, there and everywhere. We attempted to cross over into Buda only to meet other marching groups on the bridges, all converging upon Pest.

As each succeeding group of students surrounded our car, our licence plates instantly became the focus of attention. The red star on the plates drew prompt criticism but our "YU" plate on the back of the car softened the blow. Yugoslavia, after all, was synonymous with anti-Stalinism and we were allowed to turn round and escape further inspection. As they marched, the students shouted slogans which it was impossible for us to understand. Motorcyclists were distributing mimeographed student manifestos. These remained unintelligible to us until we obtained a translation the next day. They embodied demands for the reorganization of the Government and Party; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; freedom of opinion, press and radio; a multi-party parliamentary system based on free elections; recognition of the right of workers to go on strike; rehabilitation of all political prisoners wrongfully condemned and the repatriation of all Hungarians deported to the Soviet Union.

Towards eight o'clock in the evening, we were passed by one group of very determined-looking young men who were shouting words which sounded like "radio hoz". A passerby informed us that this meant "on to the radio station"! At this point we found ourselves outside the British Legation and went inside to make enquiries. There was still apparently no feeling that any unusual developments were in store. Hungarian soldiers, we were informed, had associated themselves with the student demonstrations in the demands which they were presenting to the Government and nothing more unusual than the present manifestations of ebullience was expected. Since we had now spent

several hours trying to find our hotel on Margaret Island, we gladly accepted an offer from a member of the Legation to guide us to the hotel. Once installed there weariness induced us to leave further sightseeing of Budapest to the morning.

Full-Scale Battle

Next morning we awoke to the noise of full-scale battle from the direction of Pest. A state of martial law had already been declared, a curfew was in force and we were told that we could not venture out on the streets. We were thus more or less isolated on the island which lies in the river between Buda and Pest and extends from the Margaret Bridge near the centre of the city to the Stalin Bridge further along the river. From the island we could hear and see something of the general turmoil but not distinguish clearly what was going on. Part of the Margaret Bridge was under fire occasionally because it lay close to AVO, the political police headquarters. Over the nearby Stalin Bridge traffic consisted only of military vehicles and urgent screaming caravans of Red Cross ambulances.

From various sources we gathered that the developments of late Tuesday night and Wednesday morning had unfolded as follows: the students marched first to the Polish Embassy to demonstrate their solidarity with the trend of events in Poland. They then went to pay their respects at the foot of the statue of General Bem, the Polish hero whose struggle in Poland had made the Kossuth rising possible in Hungary in 1848. From there they went on to the Parliament Buildings, where they presented their demands to the Government. Gero, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, who had just returned from Yugoslavia, chose somewhat arrogantly to ignore these demands. In an evening broadcast he attacked the demonstrators and defended Hungary's ties with the Soviet Union. These rejoinders served only to inflame the demonstrators and they headed off in the direction of Stalin's statue which, through the efforts of a number of trucks and great masses of students, was toppled over and dragged a couple of blocks to one of the main squares. There it reposed in crumpled ignominy in the following days undergoing repeated acts of desecration on the part of the irate inhabitants of Budapest. A group of students next broke into military barracks and with the soldiers looking on helped themselves to arms and ammunition. This enabled hostilities to begin in earnest with an attack first on the radio station which lies near Rakoczi Street. This area in which the newspaper offices and National Museum are also located was to be the scene of the most bitter fighting throughout succeeding days.

In the early hours of Wednesday morning, the brunt of the opposition to the insurgents was borne by the political police. A little later, Hungarian troops were brought in, followed by Soviet tank components. These forces we learned had been stationed just on the outskirts of Budapest the evening before in preparation for any trouble. A Dutch traveller at our hotel, a Mr. deLange, who had attempted to reach Budapest from Vienna on Tuesday evening, had been turned back by troops and told to return to Vienna. Instead, he took a detour along the Danube and entered the city from that direction.

During the course of Wednesday, the noise of battle in Pest continued without much interruption. On the island we were dependent for precise

information on events on telephone calls to the various Embassies in town and to the news being broadcast every few minutes over Budapest radio. On two occasions small groups of Red Cross workers and youths armed with revolvers, who were passing by, gave us their version of the campaign.

Radio transmissions, telephone and power facilities continued to operate fairly continuously but all other phases of the normal life of the city were suspended while we were there. Radio Budapest transmissions remained under Government control but the studio building itself was largely demolished in the course of the fighting. Broadcasts were made, we were informed, from the cellar of the Parliament Building and were transmitted from technical facilities in Government hands outside the city.

Throughout the night the Government and the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party sat in emergency session in the Parliament Building. With the deterioration in the situation they remained indefinitely in session, assuring inviolability for their deliberations by posting a cordon of Soviet tanks around the building.

Soviet Tanks in City

Among Wednesday's early-morning announcements over Radio Budapest was the news of the admission of Nagy to the Government as Prime Minister. This was the only change made at this stage and Gero was still First Secretary. Since announcements about martial law and the request to the Soviet Union for military help were made about the same time it looked as though Nagy had assumed responsibility for these unpleasant and drastic measures. In fact, Soviet tanks had already started fighting within the city several hours before the request was announced. A telephone conversation with the U.S. Embassy reported that fighting was going on outside the Embassy and one badly-wounded Soviet tank crew member had been brought inside the Embassy. From eye-witness accounts, it appeared that the Soviet tanks were being used against the strongholds of armed groups of insurgents and for protecting the main Government buildings such as AVO, the large political police building near the Margaret Bridge. One report indicated that some Soviet crews had abandoned their tanks and were fraternizing with the civilians. Eye-witness accounts have subsequently become available to indicate that on one occasion on Wednesday Soviet tanks fired into an unarmed crowd of demonstrators outside the Parliament Building. The number of dead resulting from this incident was estimated officially at about 200 persons.

During the day Radio Budapest kept broadcasting appeals to the insurgents to lay down their arms. An ultimatum set two o'clock in the afternoon as the deadline for compliance and also as the end of the curfew. The Government's hopes, however, proved unavailing and in both cases new deadlines had to be set as control over the situation continued to elude the Government's grasp. From these broadcasts in the afternoon, it was clear that large numbers of workers had joined the students and were holding out in factories in one industrial section of the town.

Thursday opened fairly quietly in the morning and, although the curfew was still in effect, deLange, our Dutch friend, accompanied by an American decided to drive into the town to obtain petrol coupons from the auto club

in preparation for the drive to Vienna. Shortly afterwards some others of us were about to set off on foot into town. But these intentions were dissipated by the early return of deLange and his passenger, both looking visibly pale and shaken. Two automobiles in front of them, they said, had been shot up and their occupants killed in a tank sortie just beyond the Margaret Bridge. Abandoning their car, they temporarily sought shelter in a nearby doorway and, when the tanks had passed by, they got back quickly into their automobile which fortunately had escaped undamaged.

Mass demonstrations, we learned through our telephone contacts, continued throughout the day in the town. Members of the American Embassy brought us reports of large crowds appearing outside their Embassy to appeal for military assistance against their Soviet masters.

Alarming Picture

Towards noon on Thursday only sporadic outbursts of machine gun fire could be heard and it appeared that the uprising was almost over. Various events immediately conspired, however, to render this conclusion premature. Mr. ——— presented us with an alarming picture of the situation at that point. He said in effect that the uprising was just in its early stage and would probably soon assume wider proportions. Hungarian Army units and even some Soviet tank crews had abandoned voluntarily their equipment to the insurgents; the city was now ringed by Soviet forces and, as the Hungarian Army was extremely restive, it was possible that pitched battles might take place between the two armies. It was expected that the Soviet Air Force would bombard Budapest in the afternoon. (A squadron of jet fighters did fly over according to schedule but nothing happened.) This information was conveyed to us in a way which left no doubt as to the sympathies of the young man himself. It was ———'s impression, after some weeks in Hungary, that the presence of Soviet forces was bitterly resented and the Communist regime itself heartily and generally disliked.

After Mr. ———'s stimulating remarks, we went outside to salute the arrival of a young French journalist from Pest. She brought a story of bloody fighting around the railway station and also the lamentable news that the political police had just fired into a massed crowd of demonstrators causing casualties which were later set officially at 300 dead. She also seemed to think that the battle was far from over. Indeed her remarks were punctuated by an outburst of firing for the first time in the Buda section nearby.

In the early afternoon Radio Budapest gave the significant news of Gero's replacement by Kadar as First Secretary of the Party. A further concession to the insurgents was contained in the announcement that the Government intended to open negotiations with the Soviet Union on a basis of equality and to have Soviet forces withdrawn once order was restored. The impact of these statements was weakened, however, by complimentary references to the fraternal Soviet Army units, and, in a disappointing inaugural address which followed, Kadar chose to dwell largely on the need to restore order.

These evidences of the Government's weakness and vacillation encouraged the insurgents to stiffen their demands. A new manifesto was distributed on Thursday evening which confirmed both that a prolongation of the struggle

was anticipated and that the insurgents were developing an organization. The manifesto, a translation of which has already been sent on from Vienna, repeated previous demands and went on to call for the formation of a new temporary revolutionary national government. The insurgents were prepared to accept Nagy and Kadar in this new government. They demanded also the ending of martial law, the cancellation of the Warsaw Pact, a general amnesty, the disarming of the AVO (political police) and the establishment of Hungarian socialism on real democratic foundations. On Friday morning early heavy fighting broke out. The Margaret Bridge was under fire again and over the Stalin Bridge more tanks were pouring in from out of town to take part in the battle. For the next few hours there was a full complement of sound effects from machine guns, cannons and mortars. Although this all seemed to be going on very close at hand, we learned subsequently that the major battle was taking place in the ninth *rejon*, an industrial sector lying just beyond the area in which are found the Parliament Building, main squares and radio and newspaper offices.

The increased intensity of the fighting induced a number of foreigners in the hotel to think about getting out in spite of the curfew and a total of fifteen cars were quickly enrolled for a convoy. There were fortunately enough vacant seats for those without their own cars. In our car we were able to accommodate an Indian engineer, an Israeli diplomat, and a Canadian of Hungarian origin. Petrol coupons, however, were required and here our Dutch friend volunteered to make another attempt to reach the auto club. This time he was successful. On his return he described the centre of the town as a scene of complete shambles and desolation with overturned carts, buses and trams lying on the streets, buildings on fire—the National Museum was gutted—and bonfires which people were stoking with the contents of Communist literature from the bookshops.

At noon our convoy headed slowly out towards Buda by way of the Stalin Bridge. This bridge was now fully occupied by Soviet tanks but no attempt was made to stop us and, as we passed, each tank seemed to be the scene of a curious crowd of Hungarian people.

Normal Activity Paralysed

The paralysis of all normal activity which was noticeable in Budapest also characterized the areas through which we passed en route to Vienna. People seemed to be out en masse on the streets aimlessly wandering around or queued up before closed food shops. Some were avid for news of the progress of the fighting in Budapest; others begged us to get help to them from the West in their struggle for freedom. Flags were much in evidence, the Hungarian tricolour alternating at times with a solid black flag. In their lapels, people were also wearing ribbons of the Hungarian colours surmounted by a black patch. Nowhere did we see any of the symbols of Sovietization and Communism. All had been torn down, including the Communist centrepiece from the Hungarian tricolour. The Hungarian Army barracks which we passed flew only the unadorned Hungarian tricolour with the telltale off-colour patch in the centre where the Communist centrepiece had formerly reposed.

As we had heard that the main Vienna road for some distance from Budapest was clogged with tank components, we took a detour for the first 100

kilometres along the Danube River. We passed innumerable truckloads of men headed in the direction of Budapest obviously with the intention of joining the struggle. All along the road it was clear that the normal organs of authority had abandoned their functions. There were no police officers to be seen at any point. Occasionally we had to stop to identify ourselves to groups of insurgents who were obviously conducting themselves without interference from the normal authorities, if indeed these still existed. At one of these points just fifteen kilometres outside of Budapest we were stopped by insurgents who were exercising their supervisory powers on traffic in front of military barracks from which the soldiers, apparently Hungarians, looked on either with apathy or approval. The red star on the licence plates of my car was promptly noticed and in the next few uneasy moments we faced the distinct prospect of being heaved into the ditch by irate Hungarians. Fortunately our fellow refugees were able to intercede successfully on our behalf and we were allowed to proceed. Before we approached the next town, however, I took the precaution of covering over the red stars with sticking plaster.

The most sensitive area we had to pass through before reaching the border was the large industrial town of Győr. About a kilometre before reaching the town, units of the Hungarian Army including artillery, tanks, and infantry were drawn up in full battle array on a small ridge commanding the approaches to the town. Artillery and tanks were both deployed in the direction of Budapest. This deployment might have been devised for fleeing groups of insurgents from Budapest but, on the other hand, since Győr was clearly in the hands of anti-Government groups which were not being molested by the troops, another explanation offered was that these were anti-Government Army units drawn up to protect the town against possible intervention from Soviet forces.

As I look back on our Budapest sojourn, the predominant emotions which remain apart from well-remembered feelings of anxiety and concern, are astonishment and admiration—astonishment that an uprising of such proportions could take place in a Communist-controlled state occupied by Soviet forces, and admiration at the remarkable heroism of the people who participated in the insurrection. A full explanation of the failure of the Communist regime in Hungary to cope with the situation must await the efforts of people who are better-informed on Hungarian politics than I am. On the surface, it appeared that the Government badly misjudged the temper of the people on that fateful Tuesday evening. The early arrival of Soviet forces which had been conveniently stationed in readiness nearby suggests, however, that Hungarian leaders were not too sure of themselves. Perhaps what they did not expect was the remarkable unity and courage of the people in the crisis. In the face of such staunch opposition, the Government clearly lost its nerve and continued in the following days to fumble its way towards some kind of solution which would enable the Stalinists in its midst to retain power.


“Liberty and Independence”

In Budapest and in the countryside generally, the rising was both anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. People obviously did not differentiate between the two evils. The predominant theme was “Liberty and Independence” and these words were inscribed on the flags which covered the bodies of those who had fallen in one of the main squares. The manifestos which the insurgents issued

also laid the stress heavily on objectives which were basically nationalist: equality in relations with the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the use of the Kossuth symbols and the restoration of traditional Hungarian Army uniforms. They brought out clearly that, in the eyes of the Hungarian people, the leadership of the Communist Party was completely discredited. Demands for a multi-party parliamentary system and socialism based on real democratic foundations were put forward as avenues of escape from the all-embracing monolithism of Communism.

My impression, however, was that the insurgents were realistic enough to appreciate that they could not eradicate Communism immediately. Acceptance of Nagy and Kadar, in the absence of other less offensive Communist leaders, was put forward in their manifestos, providing of course that they were not merely stooges of the Stalinists and that other demands were conceded. But these two men, I am sure, are merely regarded as stopgaps. They will undoubtedly in the future have to answer to the Hungarian people for their share of responsibility in the use of Soviet forces against the people of Budapest.

It was impossible to say when we left Budapest on Friday what the outcome of the struggle would be. All that we could take away definitely with us from this tragic event was the conviction that if the Hungarian people could be freed of Soviet forces and the hated political police they would probably then seek to go further and discard all traces of Communism.



AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT

Dr. E. H. Norman called recently on President Gamal Abdal Nasser, of Egypt, to present his letters of credence as Canadian Ambassador to Egypt.

Seen left to right above are Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Foreign Minister of Egypt; President Nasser; a military aide to the President; and Dr. Norman.

International Atomic Energy Agency Statute



Mr. M. H. Wershof

THE Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was brought to a formal close on October 26 when the representatives of 70 countries signed the Statute providing for the establishment of the Agency. (Other countries whose constitutional processes required some delay are expected to sign in due course.) The Conference was convened at United Nations Headquarters in New York on September 20 by a group of 12 powers (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United

States) which had prepared a draft statute at a "Working Level Meeting" held in Washington during the spring of 1956.*

Canada was represented at the Conference by Mr. M. H. Wershof, Q.C., Assistant Under-Secretary of State and Legal Adviser in the Department of External Affairs, and Mr. W. J. Bennett, O.B.E., President of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and of Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd. Mr. Wershof acted as Chief Delegate.

The Statute of the Atomic Energy Agency is now subject to ratification by governments and will come into effect when instruments of ratification have been deposited with the Government of the United States by 18 countries, of which three must be drawn from among Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Signature of the Statute at New York brought into being a Preparatory Commission consisting of the 12 powers which had drafted the Statute together with six others (Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan and Peru), elected by the Conference, which will carry on preliminary arrangements for the establishment of the Agency. The Preparatory Commission began organizational meetings on October 26 in New York. In accordance with the recommendation of the Conference the Agency is likely to select Vienna as the site of its permanent headquarters and no doubt the Preparatory Commission will transfer its work to that city at an appropriate time.

Background*

Canada has been actively associated with the proposal for the establishment of the Agency from the beginning, at first as one of eight powers (Aus-

*Background information on negotiations leading up to the Conference and on the draft statute are given in Volume 8, No. 7, of "External Affairs" (July 1956).

tralia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) which carried out preliminary negotiations. Upon the addition to this group of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the Soviet Union it developed that Brazil's position was similar to that of the eight while the other three differed from these nine on a number of points. Nevertheless, Canada co-operated closely and fruitfully with India as well as with the other eight, and indeed the entire group of twelve sponsoring powers worked effectively together despite the differences of approach which have been mentioned.

During the general debate Mr. Wershof, the Chief Delegate of Canada, gave the following explanation why the Canadian Government believes that the proposal to create the International Atomic Energy Agency is so important. Mr. Wershof said:

It is probable that the benefits to be derived from atomic energy have only begun to be comprehended by the peoples of the world. The application of this new source of energy holds out hopes for economic development and social progress on a scale and variety undreamed of only a few years ago. History has shown that almost any scientific discovery of importance to mankind will sooner or later become available throughout the world, and no doubt this is true of atomic energy. The benefits to which I have referred can be expected ultimately to reach all corners of the world whether or not the Agency which we propose is established.

But this is not the whole question. The importance of bringing these benefits as rapidly as possible and as widely as possible to the service of national economies and of individual human beings, not in one country, not in a few countries but in all countries, is so great that the process of gradual diffusion is too slow and at least initially too inequitable. Means should be found of avoiding the delay, extending perhaps to generations, which would be involved if we were to rely only upon that process. At the same time we should try to ensure that the benefits we look for will in fact be accessible to all

The genuine and effective collaboration of all governments, which can be fully realized only in a formal treaty partnership, is necessary if the potential benefits of atomic energy are to be rapidly and fully realized. Such a partnership, with its acceptance by all of explicit obligations, can alone provide an environment in which those things necessary to the exploitation of atomic energy will be available to all nations. In the absence of such full multilateral collaboration, countries will tend to go their separate ways, having at their disposal only the limited knowledge and resources directly available to themselves or their close friends; the result is bound to be duplication of effort, and consequent waste and delay. Without real collaboration, and the acceptance by all nations of obligations and commitments in the common interest, the spread of knowledge and resources will be hindered and diminished by the lack of agreed objectives, standards and safeguards.

The kind of partnership we have in mind would be provided by an Agency having the particular features proposed in the draft Statute. The draft Statute recognizes the complexity and the importance of atomic development and makes effective and flexible arrangements to facilitate co-operation between countries with widely divergent requirements and in varying economic circumstances. It recognizes that some countries are more advanced industrially and technologically than others and are in a position to make a greater contribution in skills, materials and equipment. At the same time other countries with more limited resources will necessarily look to the Agency for advice, information and direct assistance. Whether a country is a net contributor or a net beneficiary

under Agency programmes, all members will share a common desire to contribute to the extent of their abilities and to see the affairs of the Agency conducted on a basis which will ensure responsible and effective utilization of resources. Without sound direction and satisfactory Agency policies, countries proposing to undertake worthwhile projects may be unable to obtain needed assistance; countries capable of providing assistance may lose confidence and fail to make the fullest use of the Agency as a channel for helping atomic development. Under the Statute heavy responsibilities for sound direction will be delegated to the Board of Governors subject to the general guidance of the membership as a whole as expressed through the General Conference. On a Board entrusted with these responsibilities those countries on whom the Agency must mainly depend for assistance must exert sufficient influence to retain their continuing confidence and support which will be essential to the achievement of the Agency's high purposes.

At the same time those countries likely to be net beneficiaries must be satisfied in their turn that in establishing its programmes the Agency will take full and informed account of their interests, requirements and problems. These countries also must have adequate representation on the Board, and the General Conference in which their influence is likely to be widely felt must fill a role of effective expression and discussion, without, however, implying unduly on the executive responsibilities of the Board of Governors.

Plenary Session

Following the unanimous election of Ambassador Muniz of Brazil as President and Ambassador Winkler of Czechoslovakia as Vice-President, the Conference in plenary session debated in some detail the general concepts underlying the Agency and the broad implications of the provisions of the draft Statute.*

At the outset, the Soviet bloc, firmly supported by India, Yugoslavia and many of the Asian countries, argued at length that the Conference would suffer from the exclusion of Communist China and that the Agency would be incomplete and not fully effective until Communist China should be admitted to membership and to a seat on the Board of Governors. India led the same group of countries in criticizing the control provisions of the draft Statute, alleging in particular that they would give the Agency far too great power to interfere in the atomic programmes and hence in the economic development of countries receiving assistance from the Agency. The argument was advanced that the imposition of unduly burdensome or offensive controls would impede or even defeat the primary purpose of the Agency by forcing the countries most in need of assistance from it to refrain from accepting such assistance.

A number of representatives from a variety of countries opposed the provisions of the draft Statute concerning the composition of the Board of Governors and the relative powers to be assigned to the Board and to the General Conference, but the great majority recognized to a greater or lesser extent the force of the argument put forward by the twelve powers that on these points a delicate balance had with great difficulty been achieved at the working meetings earlier this year and that regardless of its merits the success of the Conference would be greatly threatened if that balance were to be disturbed.

*Volume 8, No. 7, of "External Affairs".

Functions of the Agency

When the Conference moved into committee to examine the individual articles of the draft Statute, the first main debate, and the first significant amendment, arose in connection with Article III dealing with the functions of the Agency. The general lines of debate reflected the points of view expressed in the plenary discussions of which mention has been made above. An important amendment to Article III, proposed by Thailand and adopted in committee, was one designed to permit the extension of Agency safeguards not only to bilateral or multilateral transactions outside the Agency but, at the request of the country concerned, to individual national programmes. While it was not expected that it would have immediate application, this amendment was generally regarded as valuable in providing an opportunity for the eventual evolution of the Agency system of safeguards into a universal system which could contribute to or possibly be the vehicle for a future general agreement on the control or elimination of atomic weapons.

The Canadian views on the role of the Agency were expressed by Mr. Wershof in the following words:

. . . the main purpose of the Agency shall be to facilitate, encourage and assist in the development and application of peaceful uses of atomic energy in all countries . . . In carrying out this task the Agency shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the assistance which it will provide to individual countries or groups of countries shall in fact be used for the beneficent peaceful purposes intended, and *not* diverted to other purposes which the collective membership of the Agency would be unwilling to support. The Agency will require certain powers and rights to ensure against such diversion, but these powers will be limited to those necessary for the purpose. While the achievement of this purpose will no doubt help to ensure the observance of any agreement concerning atomic weapons, that is not a task for this Agency. Its role in this field will be restricted, in relation to all member countries, to the activities necessary to the fulfilment of the Agency's functions in connection with assistance given by it.

It is, I think, obvious that all members of the Agency ought to have equal rights within it; perhaps it is not so obvious that the *functional* role of all members should in principle also be equal. Thus my Government considers that *all* members should enter the Agency expecting both to make contributions to it in one form or another and to derive benefits from it. In some cases no doubt the contributions will be greater than the direct benefits received, and in other cases the reverse will be true. Nevertheless, these will be differences of degree; the Agency should not operate in such a way that certain members are considered solely as contributors (whether of material resources or of experience and information), and other countries solely as recipients. We submit that the Agency should work on a co-operative basis, as a partnership to which each member brings something and from which each member derives something.

Safeguards and Controls

It was evident from the outset that the problem of safeguards (Article XII of the draft Statute) was by far the most important and difficult facing the Conference, since it necessarily raised in sharp form conflicts between differing objectives and points of view, all of which were deserving of sympathy and consideration.

At a meeting of the main Committee on October 12, Mr. Wershof set forth the Canadian view that it was not only desirable but essential to have safeguards against the diversion to military purposes of fissionable materials. Mr. Wershof said:

We believe that the export of equipment or materials for military purposes, if that takes place, must be treated as an export of arms and regulated as such. We think it is highly desirable that the export of equipment and materials for peaceful purposes should not be mixed up with this difficult question of the export of arms. Indeed, if it is so mixed up, we are quite sure that such equipment and materials will move less freely among nations.

I should like for a moment to mention this question of military uses, since the question must be in our minds when we consider the problem of safeguards. Surely, the widespread availability of atomic weapons is highly undesirable. If any countries *are* to produce or have atomic weapons, it is the view of my Government that they should be *known* to have them, and should not acquire them clandestinely with the aid of international transactions that appear to be for peaceful uses.

If the peaceful development of atomic energy to which we all look forward is to be as rapid and widespread as it should be, the Agency in the opinion of the Canadian Government must provide a mechanism whereby all countries will be in a position to obtain what they need for peaceful atomic programmes with assurance for all that resources or assistance so obtained will be used only for peaceful purposes. We believe that the control provisions in the draft Statute are well designed to meet this purpose, and we also believe that they would not serve the purpose effectively if their scope should be reduced . . . We all recognize that these measures cannot of themselves prevent individual nations from obtaining nuclear weapons. We recognize, moreover, that if the control measures were applied unreasonably they might force countries to turn away from the Agency. But we should also look carefully at the reverse of the coin—the situation which exists now and could continue indefinitely in the absence of a generally acceptable system of adequate Agency safeguards.

Because the Agency and its safeguards do not now exist, countries having resources and information to dispose of are necessarily selective in making them available. The criteria they use differ from one country to another. Some nations requiring material, equipment and assistance have difficulty in obtaining suppliers. When assistance is given it is, naturally enough, often channeled in accordance with political judgments which, although quite understandable under the circumstances, unquestionably tend to distort normal patterns of trade and impede the equitable development of atomic power.

It seems to us that the indefinite continuation of this situation would have several bad effects. Firstly, it would reduce the amount of resources furnished by exporting countries to the many countries needing to import them for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, because the risks in this field are too serious to accept even for worthy reasons. Secondly, it will result in continued discrimination based upon judgments of the political alignments or attitudes of countries wishing to import atomic resources, discrimination which could be avoided if there were proper safeguards. Thirdly, we are almost certain to see, as attempts to overcome these two effects, bilateral systems of safeguards created by *ad hoc* agreements which are more likely to be discriminatory in effect and more of an affront to the sovereignty and dignity of nations than are safeguards worked out and carried out by an independent international agency. In the creation and operation of this Agency we will all have a hand,

and in it proper international scrutiny can be applied to see that the safeguards are administered as it was intended that they should be.

The two features of the safeguards article which were attacked by those who considered them too extensive were, respectively, the requirement that controls should apply without formal distinction to both "special fissionable materials" (in practice plutonium and uranium 235) and "source materials" (natural uranium and thorium) and the assignment to the Agency of authority to control the future use of special fissionable materials produced in Agency projects. Of these two points, the one which most concerned delegations in opposition to the draft Article was that relating to disposition of fissionable materials produced. Their original position was that the Agency should not have any authority to control such future use, although they admitted from the outset that the Agency should be in a position to control the utilization of special fissionable materials which it might supply to a country.

There was considerable discussion and negotiation on the safeguards Article and at one stage it appeared that agreement on a suitable text could not be reached. However, the deadlock was broken after the Swiss and French representatives presented a compromise text which found general acceptance. Agreement was reached on a formula which, while providing for Agency control of fissionable materials produced in an Agency project, established the right of the country concerned:

- (a) To determine for itself the peaceful uses to which such products might be put;
- (b) To withdraw such materials for uses which it might determine following their initial deposit with the Agency.

Financial Arrangements

The financial arrangements proposed in the draft Statute submitted to the Conference owed much to the efforts of Canadian representatives during the drafting conference in Washington. They were designed to ensure prudent and responsible financial administration on the one hand, while on the other hand providing sufficient flexibility and adequate revenues for the Agency to be able to carry out an effective programme in fulfilment of its principal objective of assisting countries to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These features, and the means whereby they are to be achieved, were completely retained in substance in the Statute as adopted by the Conference.

From the Canadian point of view the Conference was a noteworthy success in that the Statute as approved provides a Charter for the new Atomic Energy Agency conceived in a spirit of compromise and co-operation and one which commands world-wide support.

The Statute was signed on October 26, 1956 on behalf of Canada by Mr. Wershof, Mr. Bennett and Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations. The question of its ratification now becomes a matter for consideration by the Government.

Aspects of Canada-United States Relations

IN addresses delivered October 15 at Chicago and October 16 at Milwaukee, Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, urged United States business corporations to treat branch plants in Canada as thoroughly Canadian enterprises, and to remind themselves more often that Canada is a separate nation, not a state of the Union.

Speaking at a meeting of the Canadian Club of Chicago, Illinois, on the topic "American Investments in Canada", Mr. Howe said that because of Canada's closeness to the United States, and the similarity of institutions and ways of life in the two countries, Americans often treat Canada, for business purposes, almost as a part of the United States. This, he said, has its dangers if it leads American businessmen to treat branch plants in Canada just as if they were located in the United States.

At a meeting of the Milwaukee Association of Commerce, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Mr. Howe said that his views on the operations of United States controlled plants in Canada could be applied to other aspects of economic relations between the two countries.

In his Chicago speech, the Minister pointed out that Canada welcomes the inflow of capital from south of the border, and that he had a number of suggestions to make to United States businessmen with a view to underpinning the friendly and harmonious economic relations that now exist between Canada and the United States.

Partial text of Mr. Howe's address at Chicago follows:

... I suggest to you a very simple rule. Other things being equal, it is good business for a Canadian subsidiary of a foreign company to become as Canadian as it can, without losing the benefits of association with the parent company. In many countries, of course, there are rigid laws applying to foreign controlled companies, requiring them, for example, to give local inhabitants a share in the enterprise and requiring them to employ a minimum proportion of local labour and so forth.

There are no such laws in Canada. I hope there never will be. I believe that those who are prepared to share with Canadians in the risks of developing our country should be as free as Canadians themselves in deciding how to conduct their enterprise.

Nevertheless, anyone who does business in Canada should reckon with the pride and the legitimate pride of Canadians in their country. In other words, they should reckon with the normal feelings of nationalism which is present in Canada, just as it is in the United States. Canadians do not like to be excluded from an opportunity of participating in the fortunes, good or bad, of large-scale enterprise incorporated in Canada but owned abroad. They may not buy many shares, but they resent the exclusion. They do not like to see large-scale Canadian enterprises entirely dependent upon foreign parents for their research and top management. They do not like to see the financial results of large-scale

Canadian enterprises treated as if they were the exclusive concern of the foreign owners.

I make bold therefore to offer three suggestions for the consideration of United States corporations establishing branch plants in Canada or searching for and developing Canadian natural resources:

(1) Provide opportunities for financial participation by Canadians as minority shareholders in the equities of such corporations operating in Canada;

(2) Provide greater opportunities for advancement in U.S. controlled corporations for Canadians technically competent to hold executive and professional positions;

(3) Provide more and regular information about the operations of such corporations in Canada.

I am pleased to say that an increasing number of American companies are *now* giving Canadians an opportunity to participate in the equity holdings of Canadian-operated enterprises. This is an encouraging trend. Canadians welcome this development, not just because it is in Canada's national interest, but also because we think it makes good business sense from the point of view of the American parent corporation.

Obstacle Removed

I was told that Canadian taxation discouraged Canadian participation in Canadian subsidiaries. If it did, that particular obstacle has been removed, at least insofar as Canadian law is concerned.

The agreement for the avoidance of double taxation between the United States and Canada provided for certain tax advantages for parent companies controlling 95 per cent or more of the equity of the subsidiary corporation in the other country. Last summer the United States and Canada reached an agreement, subject to ratification by your Congress and our Parliament, whereby the percentage of share ownership, entitling the parent company to a reduced rate of 5 per cent on dividends from its subsidiary operating in the other country, has been reduced from 95 per cent to 51 per cent. This amendment of our taxation agreement with the United States has since become law in Canada. It is still awaiting ratification by the U.S. Congress. Our Government made it quite clear, in proposing this amendment to the Canadian Parliament, that the new tax arrangement was designed to encourage U.S. parent corporations to give Canadian investors opportunities to buy share ownership in their subsidiary companies in Canada. Hence, as far as Canada is concerned, the tax disadvantage that used to exist for a U.S. corporation offering Canadian minority equity holdings in U.S. branch plants has been removed.

Undoubtedly, there are other difficulties, difficulties about exchange of research between parent and partially-owned subsidiaries, difficulties of control of subsidiaries with minority shareholders. That these are very real difficulties, I would be the first to admit. I ask only that they be weighed in the balance against the advantages in terms of goodwill of giving Canadians a sense of identity with the United States-controlled enterprises.

My second suggestion is that Canadians should be given greater opportunities for advancement in subsidiary enterprise controlled by United States parents. I am pleased to report that more and more U.S. corporations operating in Canada are hiring Canadians for responsible positions, when well-qualified people can be found, and that young Canadians are being advanced as rapidly as their ability and experience will warrant. Responsible Canadians are being

invited to sit on Boards of Directors. If this trend continues, there will be little for Canadians to complain about.

Inform Canadian Public

My third suggestion is that U.S. corporations should report the results of operations of their subsidiaries in Canada. As you are aware, the S.E.C. requires regular reporting by all the large corporations in the United States. We do not have similar regulations in Canada. Nevertheless, the Canadian public is interested in knowing how these large Canadian corporations are getting on in Canada. Since many of our large corporations are U.S.-controlled, the demand for the release of such information at regular intervals, say in the form of annual reports, has been increasing

One U.S. corporation, with a 100 per cent controlled subsidiary operation in Canada, added a supplement to its last annual report outlining the extent of its operations and its achievements in Canada. This endeavour to let Canadians know how this company is doing with respect to operations in Canada was well received. It could serve as a useful guide to those who feel as I do that it is good business to treat branch plants in Canada as thoroughly Canadian enterprises.

These are my three specific recommendations. I believe they are worth careful consideration. I believe their adoption will be in the interests of United States corporations with subsidiaries in Canada. There may be other ideas equally good which serve the same purpose. Be assured of one thing, that my purpose is to improve business relations between the United States and Canada by giving Canadians a greater interest and a greater stake in the success of United States companies operating branch plants across the border.

Before leaving this subject, there is one other point very close to my heart as Minister of Trade and Commerce which I put before you for consideration. Branch plants are usually established to do business in the area they serve. But I ask you again to bear in mind that a branch plant in Canada is not the same thing as a branch plant in California or Louisiana. A Canadian branch plant is situated in a country that depends for its very existence upon international trade. It is situated in a country which maintains an external trade service which others tell us is second to none and which is ready to serve any Canadian enterprise, whoever owns it.

Too often, I regret to say, our trade representatives abroad turn up export opportunities for a subsidiary company operating in Canada only to find that the United States parent does not permit the export business to be done from the Canadian plant. Mind you, we do not object to doing occasional export promotion for United States corporations, but you will agree that it is rather difficult to justify the expense to the Canadian taxpayer!

Asks Re-examination

Once again I recognize that there are problems. But I do plead for a careful re-examination of export policies affecting Canadian branch plants. Canada as a nation is an efficient producer. Given sufficient volume, Canadian plants can often produce as cheaply as United States plants. Sometimes, too, Canada has an advantage in duty in supplying goods to countries of the British Commonwealth; indeed, many plants have been established in Canada just to take advantage of this preference. I am not suggesting that United States corporations should act contrary to their interests. I am suggesting that they may be overlooking a good bet by not allowing their Canadian plants to take on more export business. By being prepared to accept export business United States-controlled subsidiaries will also act more like good, solid Canadian enterprises.

Excerpts from Mr. Howe's remarks at Milwaukee follow:

... What I have been saying about the operations of United States controlled plants in Canada is capable of application to other aspects of our economic relationships. Consider, for a moment, trade between Canada and the United States. Canada is the best customer of the United States. The United States is the best customer of Canada. Trade between our two countries is greater than between any other two countries, amounting last year to \$6 billion.

But, too often, or so it seems to us in Canada, Americans take it all for granted. They take it for granted, for example, that Canada will continue to buy every year a billion dollars more from the United States than the United States buys from Canada. Americans apparently take it for granted that they will continue to be able to bring raw materials from Canada while placing high tariffs against imports of Canadian manufactures and threatening still further restrictions.

Now I am not saying that Canada is about to retaliate against the United States by raising barriers to imports from this country. I belong to a Government that has moved steadily in the direction of freer trade, which we believe to be in the Canadian interest, and in the interests of a peaceful world. Nor do I overlook the progress that has been made by the United States in the same direction in recent years.

A Separate Nation

It is just that I am convinced that Americans who sell goods to Canada and appreciate the value of the Canadian market would do well to remind themselves more often that Canada is a separate nation, not a state of the Union, a nation which in the long run can import only as much as it exports. If Americans think more often of their Canadian market in that sense, there will, I am confident, be greater support in this country for the kind of trade policies that will put United States-Canadian trade on an even more secure footing, and that will at the same time result in greater markets for United States goods in Canada.

When I think of how Americans and Canadians can work together as citizens of separate countries, living side by side, each respecting the legitimate interests of the other, I think immediately of the St. Lawrence Seaway which is of such vital interest to the city of Milwaukee. For many, many years Canada tried in vain to get the agreement of the United States to proceed with that great project. Finally, Canadian patience was exhausted. If the United States was not prepared to join in an international navigation project, Canada stood ready to do it alone.

Fortunately, that did not become necessary. Thanks to the unfailing support from communities such as your own, the opposition was overcome, and our two countries reached agreement and began work. I take this occasion to congratulate you on the success of your efforts.

Only a comparatively short time ago, the idea of Canada building the deep waterway by herself would have seemed absurd. But not today. This is a measure of the advance in recent years. That Canada stood ready to go it alone is another instance of the growing confidence of the Canadian people in their own capacity.

An international project was greatly to be desired, however, and Canadians have joined with enthusiasm in the construction of both the power and navigation aspects of the work. In fact, most of the navigation improvements are in Canada and will be paid for by Canada. We look forward, as you do, to an

immense development following upon the completion of the improvements that will bring the ocean to the heart of the Continent.

I have been most interested to learn about and now to see at first hand the enterprise in preparing for the Seaway that is being shown at American ports along the Great Lakes such as right here at Milwaukee. Thanks to the foresight and perseverance shown by the authorities of your city, Milwaukee is in a unique position to reap the full benefits to be derived from the completion of the Seaway. Your port is generally conceded to be the best equipped of all lake ports to handle Seaway traffic as the result of almost thirty years of preparation for the day the Seaway would be a reality.

Our ports along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence are preparing, too, to handle a greater volume of business, some of which will come from the United States. As far as Canada is concerned, we hope that the Seaway not only means a new era for us, but that it more than justifies the hopes of those in the United States who supported it. We know that in this project, as in so many others, what is truly in the interest of the United States is also good for Canada.

Large ocean going ships will, of course, use the Seaway connecting inland United States and Canadian ports directly with ports in overseas countries. This in itself will be a great step forward in the history of both countries. I am inclined to think, however, that the really outstanding benefits of the Seaway will arise from large lake freighters being able to traverse the Seaway all the way from ports like Milwaukee, Chicago and Duluth and Fort William and Port Arthur at the one end to Montreal at the other, without having to trans-ship from larger to smaller freighters which can navigate the present channels. The benefits will come partly from this saving in trans-shipment costs and partly from the economies which are inherent in the use of large lake freighters, one of the most economical methods of transportation in the modern world. We can look forward, I believe, to substantial reductions in freight costs between lake ports and the Atlantic Ocean.

I have sought today to plant a few ideas that will help you to understand perhaps a little better what is happening in Canada and what Canadians think about their economic relations with you here in the United States. They are simple, not profound ideas. They may be summed up in a few words. If you operate a business in Canada, give Canadians an interest and a stake in its success. If you export to Canada, remember that Canadians can buy only if they have an equal opportunity to sell.

Most of all, I suggest that in your business dealings you do not take Canada for granted. Much better results are obtainable if Canadians are treated as people with as much pride in their country as you have in this great country of which you are citizens.

United Nations Day

ON October 24, Canada celebrated the eleventh anniversary of the ratification of the United Nations Charter. In Ottawa and in communities throughout the country appropriate ceremonies were held, and press, radio, and television programmes were arranged for the occasion.

Prime Minister St. Laurent issued a special United Nations Day message in which he reiterated Canada's resolve to realize the ideals of the United Nations Charter and stated that the United Nations is being welded into an instrument of progress for the whole of mankind.

Canadian non-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Association in Canada and several other national associations, collaborated in the preparation of non-official celebrations. Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, served as honorary chairman of a special United Nations Day Committee formed by the United Nations Association.



—Capital Press

ACCEPTS INVITATION

Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, left, shown with Mr. Marvin Gelber, President of the United Nations Association of Canada, upon whose invitation Mr. Pearson agreed to act as Honorary Chairman of the National UN Day Committee.

In Ottawa, the United Nations flag flew atop the Peace Tower, and the flags of the 76 member countries were displayed in front of the Parliament

Building. The anthems of several member countries whose nationals are officers of the principal organs of the United Nations were played on the Peace Tower carillon during a special afternoon concert.

Text of the Prime Minister's message follows:

October 24 will mark this year the 11th anniversary of the ratification of the United Nations Charter.

Although it may have become a commonplace for member countries to express on United Nations Day their loyalty to and support for the principles and purposes of the world organization, it remains as important as ever to reiterate our faith in the ideals of its charter and our resolve to realize those ideals. Developments during the last year or so have only strengthened my belief that the United Nations and all that it stands for in the way of peace and good relations between peoples must remain an important basis for Canadian foreign policy.

Recent developments provide evidence of the usefulness of the Organization. The cumulative experience derived from the mediation of political disputes, and from the formulation and implementation of economic and social programmes, is welding the United Nations into an instrument of progress for the whole of mankind which, we must hope, will become more effective as the years go by.

During the past year, Canada has continued to work towards the attainment of the goals of the United Nations. In one of the more significant events of the 10th session of the General Assembly, Canada joined other countries in sponsoring a resolution which resulted in the admission of sixteen new members and made the Organization more broadly representative. Following our election to the Economic and Social Council, we sent delegations which participated actively in the two regular sessions of the Council. We also continued our active participation in the work of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programmes.

Impatience and wishful thinking must not be allowed to obscure the need for a reasoned, practical approach to complicated issues. The United Nations is not a universal panacea for the troubles of mankind, nor should it be expected to supersede all other means of mediation, conciliation and resolution of the problems which confront the world in which we are living. If it is to render even greater service in the future, the United Nations must continue to lay emphasis on what is feasible and necessary rather than on what may look ideally desirable. The foundations of this advance have been established, in the first eleven years of its existence. Today, therefore, let us renew our pledge of support for the United Nations and our determination to do all we can to foster and strengthen its development to the end that the nations of the world may, with God's grace, move forward in unity of purpose towards the realization of peace and freedom for all.

Open Consulate at Hamburg

THE Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce announced on November 15 the opening of a Canadian Consulate at Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, and the appointment of Mr. E. H. Maguire as Consul. Mr. Maguire will be assisted by a Vice-Consul, Miss Olive Hobbs.

A Canadian office was originally opened in Hamburg in 1913, but it was transferred to Berlin in 1937. The Consulate will have responsibility in the provinces of Hamburg, Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony for promoting trade between the two countries and for rendering assistance to Canadian citizens.

Canadian trade with the Federal Republic of Germany has increased steadily within recent years and that country is now Canada's fourth largest market, after the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. Exports to the Federal Republic last year reached \$91,000,000. The Federal Republic has been Canada's fourth ranking supplier, being surpassed only by the United States, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. Imports from there to Canada amounted to \$51,000,000.

Canadian exports to the Federal Republic include wheat and grain, non-ferrous metals, synthetic rubber and other chemical products, newsprint, pulp and other wood products, asbestos, hides, liquors and a variety of manufactured products of iron and steel. Imports include machinery, iron and steel products, textiles, chemicals, optical apparatus and jewellery.

German import controls have been relaxed to the point where they are no longer a serious barrier to the sale of most Canadian industrial products, although restrictions on many agricultural products remain in force. With a high and rising purchasing power, together with strong foreign reserves and earnings, the Federal Republic is likely to become an increasingly important market for Canadian exports.

In 1955, the Federal Republic achieved the highest rate of production and trade ever reached by that country and a rate of expansion unsurpassed in Europe. Her foreign trade was at an unprecedented level during the year, with exports valued at \$6.1 billion and imports of \$5.8 billion, a rise over the 1954 figures of 16 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. Returns for recent months indicate that this record may well be surpassed in the current year. In volume, the foreign trade of the Federal Republic is now far in excess of the trade of the larger pre-war Reich. Hamburg, and its surrounding area, forms the most important merchandising, importing and shipping region in Western Germany and should prove an ideal centre for the promotion of Canadian export trade by the Consulate.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. J. S. MacDonald, Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Austria. Proceeded to Austria October 13, 1956.

Mr. M. D. Copithorne appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective October 1, 1956.

Mr. R. Maybank appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective October 1, 1956.

Mr. R. A. S. MacNeil, O.B.E., appointed to the Department of External Affairs as an Administrative Officer 3, effective October 1, 1956.

Mr. S. F. Rae posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective October 2, 1956.

Mr. A. de W. Mathewson posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective October 5, 1956.

Mr. A. R. Potvin appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective October 9, 1956.

Mr. J. J. McCardle posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective October 15, 1956.

Mr. J. C. J. Cousineau posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective October 16, 1956.

Mr. G. P. de T. Glazebrook posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective October 19, 1956.

Mr. P. A. Bridle posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective October 19, 1956.

Mr. E. G. Drake posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, effective October 20, 1956.

Mr. V. G. Turner posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective October 25, 1956.

Mr. C. F. W. Hooper posted from the Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, to Ottawa, effective September 27, 1956.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and Abroad:

No. 56/16—*International Co-operation and a new NATO*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Commencement Exercises, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 3, 1956.

No. 56/17 — *Recent Developments in Disarmament*, excerpts from an address by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, made to the Annual Convention of the Ontario Retail Pharmacists Association, Windsor, Ontario, June 18, 1956.

No. 56/18—*Some Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy*, excerpts from a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons, August 1, 1956.

No. 56/19—*Survey of World Economy*, a statement given July 18 by Mr. Lucien

Cardin, M.P., Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the 22nd session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, in plenary meeting in Geneva. Mr. Cardin spoke on Agenda Item 2(A), "Survey of the Question of Full Employment and the Expansion of World Trade".

No. 56/20 — *American Investments in Canada*, excerpts from an address by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, to The Canadian Club of Chicago, October 15, 1956.

No. 56/21—*Canadian-U.S. Economic Relations*, excerpts from an address by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, to The Milwaukee Association of Commerce, Milwaukee, October 16, 1956.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Special Session of Parliament

World Crisis Debated

As stated in the Speech from the Throne given by the Governor General, the Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey, C.H., Members of the Senate and House of Commons were summoned to Ottawa for a special session, which opened November 26, "because of the serious international situation arising out of hostilities in the Middle East and the events in Hungary".

The Throne Speech informed the members of the House of Commons that they would be "asked to provide expressly that the provision for defence expenditures in the Appropriation Act No. 6, 1956 be used for the purpose of Canada's participation in the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East in fulfilment of our country's obligations to the United Nations Organization under the Charter", and in addition, "to authorize the provision of relief for the victims of the recent tragic events in Hungary".

The debate, which opened on November 26 with a motion of non-confidence in the Government moved by the Hon. W. Earl Rowe, Acting Leader of the Opposition, continued until November 29, when the motion was defeated by a vote of 171 to 36. The House then approved without discussion the expenditure of \$1,000,000 for the relief of Hungarian refugees and, finally, the financing of Canada's contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force from appropriations of the Department of National Defence. Parliament was then adjourned until January 8.

The following are excerpts from the addresses of the leaders of the three opposition parties, Prime Minister St. Laurent and Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Hon. W. Earl Rowe (Acting Leader of the Official Opposition)

... I know that the people of this country and hon. members of this House, especially members of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, were shocked over the last week-end on two different counts. The first was the strange attitude taken by the United States of America in the United Nations when despite the rather vigorous attitude of Canada's representatives the week before we had the almost embarrassing silence on Saturday night in connection with the issue then before the United Nations. As has been mentioned by the hon. member for Springfield (Mr. Weselak), some of the British and French troops have been moved from the Near East, but I understood that when the cease-fire agreement was concluded the one main and fundamental condition of that agreement was that there was to be an effective police force in the Near East before the British and French troops would move. Yet now they are asked to move forthwith ...

Right Hon. Mr. Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain, has said that the British-French invasion of Egypt has blocked a communist plot in the Middle East, a plot which would have led to "the loss of countless lives and more other evils than we can even estimate". The record of the last few years truly gives us more reason to trust the Prime Minister of Britain than President Nasser of Egypt.

We are of course committed now to the United Nations and all its wide areas of operation. While there are grave differences of opinion in the United Nations Organization, nevertheless all who are honestly striving and struggling for world peace are earnestly hoping that the worthy intentions and aspirations of that Organization may not be sacrificed by abandoning the basic principles behind its creation. The fundamental and most important of these principles to prevent aggression and preserve peace was the principle of collective action. The United Nations

Organization of today seems at times to be united in name only . . .

If our Canadian troops are to be used as part of UN police forces, it is our duty to see that they are given a possible function toward a sound objective. We must never ask them merely to clear a course and police a route for Colonel Nasser and his Russian comrades to pursue quietly and cunningly toward the diabolical purpose they have so boldly emphasized.

During the last session of Parliament repeated requests were made by the Opposition for information on Canada's interest in the Mediterranean crisis . . .

At that date, as evidence that the Government had certainly not given careful consideration to the policy to be followed if the Suez Canal crisis increased, there is the statement made by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) on August 3 in Vancouver:

This is primarily a European matter. It is not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don't use the canal for shipping.

. . . If our Government had been following the course of events in the Middle East, as we would expect it to do, it would surely not have been as "distressed and dismayed" as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said it was when he gave his press conference on October 31. An ostrich raising its head from the sand might have felt the regret and shocked surprise which apparently rent our Cabinet. I do not think a well-informed government, conscious of the implications of Soviet strength in the Middle East, would have been so surprised.

Whatever the division of opinion within the Cabinet as a result of the British and French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel on October 30, the idea put forward by the Opposition through the hon. member for Prince Albert ten months ago in this House was hastily revived at last in the proposal to send an international emergency force to the danger area, even though it was merely scoffed off ten months ago. I submit it might have been better to organize it ten months ago than to wait until after the trouble had occurred.

I believe there is no disagreement among us regarding the desirability of forming a UN police force to police the Suez Canal area pending a final settlement both between Egypt and Israel and also concerning the international status of the Suez Canal. This party has over and over again emphasized the importance of the underlying and fundamental principle of the League of Nations as

well as the United Nations. We have been on record to that effect time and time again. In the United Nations we need more than platitudes or bluffing. We need more action . . .

When it was finally announced 10 days ago that Canada was sending an administrative staff to the United Nations force, there was considerable surprise throughout Canada. This surprise turned into anger and dismay when it became clear that the United Nations, through its Secretary-General, was allowing the Egyptian President Nasser to dictate or at least to exercise a veto over the exact composition of the United Nations Emergency Force. Surely the realization that Colonel Nasser was specifying what we might or might not contribute to the United Nations must have brought a feeling of humiliation and embarrassment to the members of this Government . . .

Whole Story Wanted

I believe it is the solemn duty of the Opposition in this House to insist that the whole story of Canada's participation in the United Nations Emergency Force be told. Canada's pride has been wounded by pretense and evasion. Surely we have not stumbled and blundered into a position in which our contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force is no longer dependent upon our own generous instincts and desire to preserve peace in the world . . .

I have mentioned the dangers which the free world is facing in the Middle East through Soviet aggression there. I know I need not remind the House that Soviet activities in the Middle East are all part of a pattern with the tragic events which have been taking place in Hungary during the past few weeks. Soviet domination of all its satellite countries is maintained only by force. Those at the head of affairs in the Kremlin are following the practices of Stalin's regime to dominate and extend the Soviet empire . . .

We have joined with the great majority of members of the United Nations in condemning Soviet aggression in Hungary, and particularly the removal by Soviet troops of thousands of Hungarians who had dared to fight for the freedom and independence of their country from foreign rule. It may be that the expression of strong United Nations disapproval of Soviet acts in Hungary will produce an ameliorating effect on the men in the Kremlin, but so far the Soviet Union does not seem to have been much impressed by the United Nations condemnation of its actions. No matter how strongly we have talked against them they have not even listened, and have only laughed at the suggestion.

I notice that our Government has not been claiming very great credit for its role in helping Hungary through the United Nations. I do not know how it could. Having regard to the principles governing our security throughout the world in the past, surely we should realize that the interests of Canada in the Middle East and in Hungary are closely tied together. The attempt by the United Kingdom and France to limit Soviet expansion in the Middle East was crippled through what I believe to be the inept diplomacy of the United States in the role it played in the Suez Canal crisis . . .

I hope that voices will be raised in this House to urge the Government to take a substantial bloc of refugees as our contribution toward the relief of the great sufferings of the Hungarian people in their noble struggle to free their ancient country. Anything less than this would be an insult to the people of Hungary and an embarrassment to people all across this dominion, because people from that country have contributed greatly to the development of this young country of Canada.

Many thousands of these brave people are today flooding Austria, those who are not shot and chopped down by the Russian army along the border, no doubt emphasizing the tragedy in that district. All one has to do is read the papers, and the contents of those papers are too terrible to repeat here. It should be within the knowledge of everyone here . . .

It is not my intention to delay this debate by speaking at great length. I do not look upon this as an issue concerning which we can come to Parliament and rush in and rush out for the convenience of the Government. This is a vital issue which touches the heart

of every Canadian. It concerns the lives and hopes of these people and their children and their children yet unborn. I do not look upon this as a political issue, but Canada is disturbed, Canada is alarmed and Canada is shocked at the vacillation and complacency of this Government in relation to this as well as many other matters. It is useless to hide behind the great shield of the United Nations. The United Nations is no stronger than the countries it embraces. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Canada has failed dismally in its representation at the United Nations . . .

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I move on behalf of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, seconded by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green):

That the following be added to the address.

That this House regrets that Your Excellency's advisers

(1) have followed a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France which was designed to prevent a major war in the Suez area;

(2) have meekly followed the unrealistic policies of the United States of America and have thereby encouraged a truculent and defiant attitude on the part of the Egyptian dictator;

(3) have placed Canada in the humiliating position of accepting dictation from President Nasser;

(4) have failed to take swift and adequate action to extend refuge to the patriots of Hungary and other lands under the cruel Russian yoke.

Prime Minister St. Laurent

. . . There has been some suggestion that Canada has been humiliated by Colonel Nasser. Canada has had no dealings whatsoever with Colonel Nasser. Canada has dealt with the United Nations and the United Nations in this instance have been represented by the Secretary-General and by another gentleman who is a very distinguished Canadian in whose patriotism as well as in whose wisdom this government has practically unlimited confidence. I refer to General Burns.

Originally there was this motion proposed which has been construed, and I think rightly so, as placing some blame on the Israelis, some blame on the French and some blame on the British for having taken the law into their own hands when what had to be dealt with was already before the Security Council of the United Nations. These gentlemen who

utter these high-flown phrases seem to forget that the nations of the world signed the Charter of the United Nations and thereby undertook to use peaceful means to settle possible disputes and not to resort to the use of force.

I have been scandalized more than once by the attitude of the larger powers, the big powers as we call them, who have all too frequently treated the Charter of the United Nations as an instrument with which to regiment smaller nations and as an instrument which did not have to be considered when their own so-called vital interests were at stake. I have been told, with respect to the veto, that if the Russians had not insisted upon it the United States and the United Kingdom would have insisted upon it, because they could not allow this crowd of smaller nations

to deal decisively with questions which concerned their vital interests.

An Hon. Member: Why should they?

Mr. St. Laurent (Quebec East): Because the members of the smaller nations are human beings just as are their people; because the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world has and is coming pretty close to an end . . .

United Nations Force

It has been said that Canada has been humiliated by the action of Colonel Nasser and has been made to submit to the requirements of Colonel Nasser. That is just one of those wild assertions for which there is absolutely no foundation in fact. The original resolution provided that the United Nations in its efforts to make peace in the world would not start their efforts to make peace by making war. It was going to introduce a police force to supervise the observance of the cessation of hostilities, but it was going to do that with the consent of the country in which those forces were going to operate. It was not going to fight its way into that country. That was the resolution which was adopted without any opposition, although with a certain number of abstentions.

At that time the Secretary-General of the United Nations gave us the chance to participate in this force, and gave it to those who were willing and anxious, as we have been willing and anxious since 1945, to have a United Nations force ready to deal with recalcitrants in the fulfilment of their obligations under the Charter. The suggestion was made that each nation should supply something like a battalion or other self-contained unit.

We consider that every battalion in the Canadian forces would feel it an honour to be called upon to perform this duty, but there was one battalion which was next in line in the rotation of service in connection with the Canadian contingent to the NATO forces in Europe, and that was the Queen's Own. It seemed to us that all the other battalions would recognize that that battalion, having been groomed and being on the point of being called upon to replace another battalion in Europe, would naturally be the one which we would consider and which we would think of first to take on this new duty in pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations. That battalion happened to be the Queen's Own Rifles. It was suggested, I am told, although we were not present at the negotiations, that Colonel Nasser said that that would be regarded by the Egyptians as being a battalion of the Queen of England.

An Hon. Member: What is wrong with that?

Mr. Green: What about the Queen of Canada?

Mr. St. Laurent (Quebec East): In my view nothing is wrong with it except it is the Queen of Canada's Own Rifles. No Colonel Nasser nor anything that is said here, unless it amounts to a successful vote of no confidence in this Government, nor anything published in the papers which are trying to belittle the actions of Canada in this instance, is going to persuade us that we have no right to have that glorious battalion continue to be called the Queen's Own Rifles . . .

Now, we felt that the sending of a battalion over into the Sinai desert was not just the right thing to do for men who had the training and who were anxious to perform the service for which we were sending them there. We did not think we should dump 900 or 1,000 men into a desert and think they were going to be looked after properly and were going to be kept in fit condition to perform the services for which they were going there. So we decided at once that in readying the Queen's Own Rifles for that expedition there would be added supplementary forces that could ensure for them the establishment that would be necessary for them to carry out their functions properly and, to make assurance doubly sure, we said we would have the *Magnificent* loaded with provisions; that we would have a hospital unit on it and that it would serve as a floating base so our men would be sure that until proper army services were organized on a land base in Egypt there would be the possibility for them to get the right kind of treatment, the treatment necessary in order to enable them to fulfil their mission. It was pretty effectively demonstrated, in spite of what has been said by hon. gentlemen in some parts of the House about a lot of money having been spent on our forces with nothing to show for it, that within a very short time we were able to move everything required to put a battalion in the field, and indeed, we could put several battalions in the field if it were necessary to do so.

Whether that turned out to be the ultimate requirement of the commander of the United Nations force, we felt that something of that kind would be just as effective and as good an exercise as some of these simulated exercises that are constantly taking place to keep men in readiness to take the field if the occasion should require, because in this case there was something real for which the need for activity was being undertaken.

During that time there were negotiations going on, and there was some suggestion with

regard to the placing of infantrymen. This again is something we have by way of hearsay concerning Mr. Hammarskjöld's discussion with the Egyptian authorities when he went over there to secure their consent to the operation of this police force in their territory. It was suggested that the only place infantrymen could go at that time would be to Port Said; that there they would be coming to a place where there were large numbers of United Kingdom troops wearing the same uniform worn by our men; that our men might be taken for reinforcements being brought in for the British troops there instead of a part of the police force of the United Nations, and that this might give rise to incidents which would, at the outset of this operation, be an unfortunate occurrence.

That was something that had to be considered by the Secretary-General and by the commander of the United Nations force, and when he arrived in New York we were immediately informed that he felt he did not have in Egypt a proper base to administer at once any considerably increased number of infantrymen, and that what would be most useful to him at first would be a group of 250 to 300 engineers and signallers whom he could use in organizing and establishing his base. He also said that another thing that was urgently required was air transport. He had only three civilian planes chartered from Swiss owners, and they had thought they could make two round trips per day but had found they could only make one. He said that was holding up the organization of the effective force that should be and that will be on Egyptian territory. We did have the air transports.

Again I say that, even had the commanding officer not been a Canadian we might have said as others might have said, "Here is our contribution. Make the best possible use you can of it." But it so happens that the man who is going to have the responsibility of command is of course a United Nations officer but is nevertheless a Canadian, a great Canadian who is regarded as such by the majority of our people, and we felt that it was our moral duty, in addition to our general duty to the United Nations, not to let that great Canadian down. We felt that if there were requirements he was not getting from others and which he needed to put himself in a position where he felt he could carry out the responsibilities he was taking on, we should assist him in every way.

May I say here that he did not have to accept this responsibility. He has been working for the United Nations under pressure for quite a long time and did not have to accept this new responsibility, but he is not a man

who has ever shirked anything put up to him as a duty that would be of service to his own countrymen and to the free nations of the world. He accepted the responsibility and we felt that we should do our best to see that he got everything required to enable him to discharge his responsibilities in the manner in which he felt they should be discharged.

The original resolution provided that there had to be consent of the government of the country where the United Nations force was going to operate. But that is all that requires the consent of the government of the country where the force is to operate. It is a United Nations operation. It is the United Nations that is going to determine the composition of the force going there. It is the United Nations that will determine where in that country the force will be stationed and when and how long it will be there.

Having accepted the condition in the resolution, it is our view, and I think the view of practically everyone at the United Nations, that the other modalities of the operation of this force are things to be determined, independently of Colonel Nasser or of anyone else in Egypt, by the United Nations on its responsibility to discharge the undertaking it has assumed in the interests of peace in the world.

The amendment before us reads in part as follows:

... this House regrets that Your Excellency's advisers have followed a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France which was designed to prevent a major war in the Suez area ...

No Gratuitous Condemnation

There has been no gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom. On the first resolution that was introduced by the United States and supported by a very large number of members of the United Nations, the Canadian Delegation abstained and declared it was abstaining because it was an insufficient resolution. It provided merely for a cease-fire and nothing more. That was not good enough, because just as soon as that might become spent we would be back in the same position we were in before. There was abstention by the Canadian Delegation because there was applied there something which hon. gentlemen opposite have very violently resented when it was applied here in a very modified form. The United Nations Assembly applied closure and determined that there would be three speakers supporting the resolution, three speakers opposing the resolution and that the vote would then be taken. As we were neither supporting nor opposing the resolution, we could not be one of those

three; and there was no move to amend the resolution . . .

On that resolution there was no gratuitous or other condemnation by Canada but there has been an expression of regret that certain members of the United Nations had felt it necessary to take the law into their own hands when the matter was before the Security Council; and there was an expression of regret that what took place in the Middle East was used as a screen to obscure the horrible actions, the horrible international crimes, that were being committed in mid-Europe at the same time. Events in the Middle East made it more difficult to marshal world opinion in unanimous and vigorous condemnation of what was taking place in Hungary at that very moment.

That is what we regretted. We feel that there can come out of this situation one that will be better than that which existed previously. It is our hope and it has been our objective to get all those in the Western alliance to which my hon. friend referred working together toward the common objective of a settlement of the mid-Eastern situation that will be lasting and that will involve the recognition of the existence of Israel as a state set up by the United Nations and something which the United Nations is in honour bound to defend and to see maintained. It is our hope that there will be some kind of a lasting settlement—I will not say a permanent one because permanence is rarely found in any human activities or human achievements—though it is difficult to find with whom in all those Arab nations a settlement could be made that would take into account the real interests of the population of each of those countries. It is difficult to find anyone who can form the kind of government which would take the over-all broad view of the interests of the whole population and not the interests of a small group of the population.

But difficult as it may be, we cannot expect that the North African nations or some of the Asiatic nations will achieve in a decade the kind of democracy that it took many centuries for the United Kingdom, France and the other western democracies to achieve. You cannot bring about in that short order that which has been the product of not always successful and wise efforts, but of a process of trial and error that went on over a long period of time and brought about an attitude that changed the form of administration of the European countries from medieval feudalism to popular democracy; and it is not going to be easy to bring that about in any short time, though we possibly now move faster, especially in moving from one physical place to another, than we ever moved previously . . .

The next paragraph of the amendment reads:

have meekly followed the unrealistic policies of the United States of America and have thereby encouraged a truculent and defiant attitude on the part of the Egyptian dictator.

Well, on two occasions resolutions supported by the United States Delegation have failed to get our support. If that is meekly following the unrealistic policies of the United States, then my understanding of words is not the same as the understanding of those who wrote this paragraph of the amendment to the motion for an address in reply.

The third paragraph reads:

have placed Canada in the humiliating position of accepting dictation from President Nasser.

I believe I have dealt sufficiently with that to show that this is not a statement founded on fact, and whether there has been dictation to anybody from President Nasser there certainly has been none to us and there will certainly be none to us. The representations that have been made to our diplomatic representative in Egypt, whether they be sincere representations or not, are that Colonel Nasser was most anxious to maintain good will with the Canadian Government and was most appreciative of the suggestions the Canadian Government had made to deal with this situation. Whether or not that be true I do not know, but that is what he has said to our representative, who is not quite as gullible as this laughter from the other side of the House when I mention it would indicate.

Hungary

The next paragraph reads:

have failed to take swift and adequate action to extend refuge to the patriots of Hungary and other lands under the cruel Russian yoke.

I am now going to disclose some correspondence that was not confidential correspondence. When these events in Hungary were at their unfortunate height I asked to have the Russian Ambassador call upon me. I had a message conveyed to him that I thought it would be in the interests of his country as well as in the interests of this country that he come and see me. He did. I told him what I thought of what was going on. I said relations had been improving, you know, with your country. I had not met the two of your Ministers who were over here but I had met one of them and I got a very favourable impression of the kind of man that

your Minister of Fisheries, who came over here to repay the visit by our Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair), last year, happened to be. After all, I said, it is none of our business what kind of government you have in your country if that is the kind of government your people want, and it is none of your business to determine what kind of government there should be in any other country if that does not happen to be the kind of government the people of that country want.

I said I would be glad if he would convey the following message from me to Mr. Bulganin. It was dated November 13, and I make it public at the present time because it was only yesterday that an answer came from Mr. Bulganin. You will hear the answer in a moment and you will see, with that kind of answer, there is no reason for me not to disclose the representations with which I had attempted to have him comply. This is dated Ottawa, November 13, 1956:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I consider it my urgent duty to let you know that the people and the Government of Canada have been profoundly shocked by the reports we have received of the actions your Government has taken in Hungary during the last few weeks. We have made our attitude clear in the position taken by Canada in voting for the United Nations resolutions on this subject. I wish to add my plea not only for rapid compliance on the part of the Soviet Government with these resolutions, but for a display even at this late date of moderation towards the unfortunate victims of these tragic events.

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I speak for the whole people of Canada in expressing our horror at the suffering of the Hungarian people as a result of their efforts to obtain the freedom to choose their own type of government. It is not, however, my present purpose to attempt to pass judgment on the actions that have been taken but to ask you, in the name of humanity, to use your influence to alleviate the sufferings of the Hungarian people and to permit competent international agencies and organizations to help in the urgent work of distributing food and caring for the sick. In this humanitarian work the Canadian Government and people are already giving material support wherever it is within their power to do so.

The Government and people of Canada have no desire to influence the form of government chosen by the peoples of Eastern Europe. Our only aim is that they should be free to do so, and that the governments so

chosen should steer their own independent courses, respecting the equal rights of all their neighbours and bearing in mind only the needs and wishes of their own people in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) Louis S. St. Laurent.

Later I got this answer, dated November 24. This, of course, is a translation which, I am told, is an official translation.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of November 13. The contents of your letter and also of your recent statements and of speeches of Canadian officials about situation in Hungary show that the Canadian Government seem to have one-sided, tendentious and unobjective information about developments in Hungary and about position of Soviet Union on this question.

I would like to note that revolutionary workers peasants Government of Hungary have shown in their statements that reactionary forces inside Hungary with active support of certain circles outside tried to overturn peoples' democratic regime in the country and establish a Horthy-fascist regime. The inner patriotic forces of Hungary came out in defence of peoples' democratic regime asking for help of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty.

As concerning position of the Soviet Government on question of relations of Soviet Union with Hungary this has been fully set forth in "Declaration of Soviet Government on foundation for development and further strengthening of friendship and co-operation between Soviet Union and other Socialist States", published October 31, 1956.

In your letter Mr. Prime Minister you raise the question of Soviet Government giving assistance to international organizations to make it possible for them to render assistance and help to Hungarian people in food and medicine. This question is fully within competence of Hungarian Government. As far as we know Government of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic has already positively solved this question and Hungarian Government has formally informed Secretary-General of United Nations about this.

Yours sincerely,
N. A. Bulganin.

This last statement has been, I think, verified by representatives of the United Nations, who have recently informed us that repre-

sentatives of the Red Cross would now be admitted within Hungary to distribute food and medical supplies to those in need of such food and medical supplies.

That answers this other matter raised by the hon. gentleman now leading the Official Opposition. He says that \$200,000 was a paltry sum and that we have raised it from \$200,000 to \$1 million. The original recommendation was for \$1 million, of which \$100,000 was to go to the Red Cross and \$100,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to be used in the alleviation of the sufferings of refugees once they became refugees outside of Hungary. But at that time we were not disposed to ask Parliament to appropriate any of the taxpayers' money to be placed in the hands and under the control of any communist-controlled Hungarian Government to be used for the support of whatever democratic qualifications they choose to give themselves. We have had some experience, but not much, in seeing how supplies from other countries have been used in communist countries as propaganda for the regime that was bringing about the misery that we and other free nations were seeking to alleviate. As soon as we heard that supplies could be distributed under proper auspices, we went back to the original sum of \$1 million. The estimate that has been distributed, and that is now before the House, is for \$1 million to be applied, subject to the decisions of Treasury Board, and that is so Treasury Board will be able to make absolutely sure that everything coming from the use of that \$800,000—because \$100,000 is going to the Red Cross for the use of refugees outside of Hungary and \$100,000 is going to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—will be expended either by the Red Cross or by a United Nations agency that will have our full confidence in its desire and its ability to see

that the assistance goes to those who have really been the victims of the horrible crimes that have been perpetrated against that nation in the last few weeks, and to no others.

That is why the item reads:

To provide, subject to the approval of the Treasury Board, assistance to the victims of the recent tragic events in Hungary, \$1 million.

Well, I have dealt at greater length with this matter than I expected and at greater length than either the hon. gentleman who spoke before I did or I expected would be appropriate on this occasion. But since we have found that it was not agreeable to some hon. members to proceed at once to have all this discussion on the estimates where questions could be put and answers given, well, it probably has to be at this time; but whether it be now, or whether it be on the estimates, I hope it will be a decision of which the majority of the people in Canada would say that those who took part in it were able to rise above political partisanship in dealing with this question which is one of interest not only to our own free people but to the people of the whole free world.

I expect that there will be criticism as to the manner we have felt, in our lack of wisdom, to be the best way to do these things; but I hope there will be agreement that it is proper that we should discharge this obligation to the United Nations by an appropriate participation in the United Nations force and that it is proper that we should do our best to see that the Canadian who has been chosen by the United Nations to be the commander of that force is not let down, if we can prevent him from being let down by supplying him with what he thinks he requires and that he is not apt to get from other contributors to this United Nations force.

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Leader of the C.C.F. Party)

Mr. Speaker, I think we are all aware that Parliament is meeting today under the shadow of a great international crisis, perhaps a greater crisis than the world has witnessed since September 1939. The issues involved today are of such a nature that they might bring about even a third world war and therefore one is constrained to ask oneself, what does the country expect of this Parliament at the present time?

I think the people of this country expect that we should give unanimous and speedy approval to the further supplementary estimates that have been introduced this afternoon, and that this shall be done in order to meet the needs of our armed forces which are

proceeding overseas and to meet the dreadful situation from which the refugees from Soviet terror in Hungary have fled . . .

I do not think I have ever felt more sorrowful than I felt as I watched the events following the adventure in the Suez area. There was not only the question of African and Asian opinion, there was the danger to the Commonwealth. I was relieved when I read a few days ago that Nehru had refused in the Indian Parliament to agree to a proposal that India should leave the Commonwealth. I think it would have been a tragedy if India left the Commonwealth, or if Pakistan or Ceylon withdrew.

This action has undermined the United

Nations. As I have said on a number of occasions, it was with the deepest regret that I saw this action being undertaken in the manner in which it was. Certainly there was provocation, but that provocation should have been taken to the United Nations and pressed there. It is true also that the United States has some responsibility. I am not going into that at any length tonight because there is not sufficient time to do so. The changing and tortuous policies of the United States certainly contributed to what has happened in the Middle East.

It will be said that the genesis of the recent moves on the part of Britain and France was the attacks made by Israel on Egypt. As one who has been interested in following the chain of circumstances in Israel over the last several years I for one can understand the position in which that country found itself on October 29. As we know, this was the culmination of a long dispute. Israel had suffered considerable provocation, as we all know. None the less I am sorry that the action was taken because it did bring about a situation that today is causing grave concern all over the world . . .

Suggestions for UN

There are certain constructive suggestions that I think Canada should now be endeavouring to place before the United Nations in order that the Middle Eastern situation may be cleaned up once and for all, over a period of time, of course, and peace established in that area. If there is, as we have, a cease-fire and a United Nations force there, then we should endeavour to suggest ways and means to prevent an outbreak in the future.

In the first place, we feel that the unstable conditions which led to the outbreak of fighting between Egypt and Israel are not confined to that section on the borders of Israel. The dangers of a similar outbreak occurring can be found on the frontiers with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. We believe that some action should be taken now by the United Nations to extend police force action to those areas to provide an effective guarantee against the violation of peace there while a general settlement of the outstanding problems of the

area is being arrived at. Let us not again be in the position of sending in a police force to stop the fighting after it has started.

That is the weak position in which we are today. If we had had a United Nations police force as was envisaged under the Charter of the United Nations, that police force could have stepped in at any time there appeared to be the possibility of war in any area. We have not that force. We are building up a force now through the Assembly instead of through the Security Council because the Security Council failed to act.

But, we believe that this police force must be followed by some comprehensive economic settlement. A settlement must provide first of all for the recognition by the Arab States, including Egypt, of the State of Israel, and for the signing of a peace treaty with Israel under which Israel's borders will be guaranteed. The blockade of Israel should be lifted and free passage through the canal, when passage is restored, should be available to Israeli shipping. We feel that no solution to the Suez Canal problem can be achieved unless this is done.

We also realize that there are a good many other aspects of the economic situation in the Middle East. Egypt herself, with a population which is under-fed and under-privileged, requires help in the irrigation of that area. As a matter of fact, I believe that the United Nations might consider setting up an international authority in agreement with the countries involved such as the Sudan and right down through Ethiopia, Egypt and so on, comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States, in order to use the waters of that area for watering the desert and feeding the people of Egypt and the adjacent countryside just in the same way as I believe that, once peace is attained among Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, a similar authority might be set up to utilize the waters of the Jordan. Those of us who have seen the waters of the Jordan and know how they could be utilized if only an agreement could be reached among the nations along the river know perfectly well that the waters could be used to bring food, prosperity and so on to the people of that general area. These are some of the things that need to be done.

Mr. Solon E. Low (*Leader of the Social Credit Party*)

Mr. Speaker, I consider this to be one of the most serious matters that has ever come before this Assembly. I look upon the present situation as one that is fraught with grave danger, not only to our own country but to the other countries of the world. Because of the fact that this is a most serious time, I

approach the present assignment with some diffidence. I would not want anything that I say to complicate matters, either for our own country or for the United Nations in the tremendous task that faces it at the present time . . .

Although there are many vexatious domes-

tic problems that face our Canadian people, problems demanding early solution, yet uppermost in their minds is the Middle East problem; the rape of Hungary and the bestiality of Russia; the about-face that we have seen that country make in these last few weeks. The people in all parts of Canada expected Parliament, without delay, to get down to the business of taking action that is carefully calculated to bring peace to the Middle East, to provide the much-needed assistance to the oppressed and persecuted people of Hungary, and to do our utmost to relieve the suffering and uncertainties that have been heaped upon so many of these Hungarian patriots who have demonstrated that they love liberty more than they love life.

World Watching Canada

I contend that the eyes of the world are upon Canada today, and upon this Parliament. . . . As the nation that took the lead in moving the resolution in the United Nations to set up an international police force, the actions of this Parliament are being watched with more than common interest and expectation. Under the circumstances, Mr. Speaker, it would seem to me to have been better for this Parliament to show by actions, not by millions of meaningless words, that we do indeed want fast, effective action to provide a solid foundation for peace and security in the years ahead. I think this is no time for playing politics. This is a time for statesman-like soul searching and truth seeking of the most intensive kind. In my judgment we ought to be setting party politics aside in an effort to find the maximum of common ground for swift action in the interests of our own country and of all mankind.

My colleagues and I firmly believe that the only way out of the present confused, dangerous and complicated set of circumstances is to seek earnestly for God's guidance to enable us, the Parliament of Canada, to find what is right; and then to have the courage to do it when we find it. If ever there was a time in man's knowledge when vision and understanding have to be buttressed by faith and humility, I think that time is now. So Mr. Speaker, it is not our intention at this session to carp or to be unduly critical or to strain to find fault. We want to be critical where that is required in the interests of good government and good business, but certainly we are not going to inject party political manoeuvring into these proceedings, because this is not the time for it.

Some criticism has been levelled at the Government regarding the calling of Parliament . . . My own judgment is that there can be little criticism levelled at the Government

on the ground of not having called Parliament earlier than it did.

There are some criticisms that can be levelled at the Government in connection with their actions to date. I think it would be unwise for us to withhold them. As I said before, it is not political criticism that I want to level. I think it is a pity that the Government did not find it possible to provide Britain and France with moral backing when they intervened in the Middle East. I said so on the very day that Britain and France intervened . . .

Well, this afternoon the Prime Minister said that his Government was critical of Britain and France. I am not sure he used the word "critical", but at any rate it amounted to that. It amounted to criticism of Britain, France and Israel because, he said, they had signed the Charter of the United Nations agreeing not to take the law into their own hands. I think that is true. Is it not also true that the United Nations signatories pledged themselves to speedy intervention to stop aggression wherever it raised its head? Have they done it? When there seemed to be no hope whatever that they would do so or were equipped to do so, then under the circumstances the question arose what other alternative was left to Britain and France? I think we have to keep that in our minds as we proceed.

What has the United Nations done to clear away the problems and the provocations, indeed the aggressions, in the Middle East, Mr. Speaker? I remind the members of this Assembly that the United Nations did nothing until Britain and France moved to protect their interests and to keep Israel and Egypt apart. It seemed to take a shock to move the United Nations to take any action that was worth while. I would not brand Britain and France as aggressors . . . as many have done.

Rather than blame those countries I believe we should seek for the fundamental causes of deterioration in the world situation, and in the Middle Eastern situation that is our immediate concern now, in the weaknesses and the frailties of the United Nations. The Prime Minister said this afternoon that he believed what was happening in the Middle East was used as a shield by Russia to cover its horrible rape of Hungary. I remind the Prime Minister that the Russian turn-about from her decision to remove her troops from Hungary came only when Western solidarity was shattered by the bitter and angry rebuke of Britain and France, first by the United States, followed by the United Nations. It was only when Russia saw that solidarity had broken down that she decided to move in and to take advantage

of it. She has always done so.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs has warned us time and again that that is exactly what Russia will do, and he has appealed to us, therefore, to work for the solidarity of the Western nations in the hope that through strength we could stop Russia's advance. That is the only thing she understands. But here Canada was rebuking Britain and France, placing ourselves on the side of Russia and following a very foolish United States when she was locked in the throes of an election, when she could not do anything effective. We allowed ourselves to help the U.S. shatter Western solidarity, the very thing we ought to have been buttressing and bolstering with all our strength.

I repeat, the weaknesses and the vacillations of the United Nations have caused the free world, step by step, year after year, to retreat steadily before a completely aggressive Russian imperialism, one that will not be stopped except by a show of solid force . . .

Well, where do we stand with regard to the proposal of the Government of Canada to provide a unit of approximately battalion strength to the emergency police force for the Middle East? I think, Mr. Speaker, it was the only alternative that could be found to action by individual nations, and I have to give the Secretary of State for External Affairs credit for having suggested that the United Nations set up a police force for emergency action in the Middle East . . .

That is the attitude we have toward the police force, but there is one thing I do want to say in regard to such a force. I would warn the Government of Canada never to part with the right to commit or to withdraw such forces, according to their discretion; never to grant to the United Nations the actual sovereignty over this force, and as long as you do that you are going to have our support . . .

We would like to see bolder action. We do not want to see this debate extended too long. We would like to see the thing done and get the force committed when the United Nations Commander wants to have them . . .

So far as Mr. Nasser is concerned, I want to warn the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his colleague the Minister of National Defence, that Mr. Nasser should not be allowed to dictate the terms, not by any means. I think Mr. Hammarskjöld should be stiffened up in that regard. I am just a little bit afraid, from what I have read about his negotiations thus far, that he has been a little too timorously diffident about dealing with Mr. Nasser.

Views on Force

If the United Nations is going to set up a police force in Egypt, then they ought to set it up and get it in there at once. They should say "This is the way it is going to be handled", and it should be stationed along the entire length of the canal. It should stay there until the difficulties over the canal have been settled and some international supervision has been settled that will be satisfactory to the shipping nations of the world. Until such time as a right good start has been made on a complete solution of the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab nations in the East, I say it should not be withdrawn.

But there is one other thing, Mr. Speaker, that we should be careful about. The United Nations should be prepared to allow Britain and France to retain their forces in Egypt until such time as the United Nations police force has been completely established there and put in full possession of the Canal Zone. Nothing else can possibly solve the difficulty. Whether or not Mr. Nasser likes it completely, we have to remember that about all the United Nations has done thus far has been to buttress Nasser's threatening position. That is about all, and he is coming off the victor and he is beginning to feel that he is the victor. Therefore let us be mighty careful about it. I am not satisfied that 6,000 men, as has been suggested, is a large enough force. My own feeling is that it would require not less than 18,000 or 20,000 men to do the job as it ought to be done, so let us not be thinking in terms of a mere 6,000.

May I suggest that Canada as a member of the United Nations must bear some responsibility for allowing the Middle East situation to drift along as it has, with no really serious effort being made to solve the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab countries. May I remind the House, Mr. Speaker, that in 1947 Canada went along with an insistent United States leading a half-reluctant United Nations. I use the word "reluctant" for the reason that about half of them were taking a stand against the establishment of Israel under the circumstances which then existed and half of them were more or less willing to go along. It was a difficult situation, I know, but Canada went along with an insistent United States in 1947 in establishing Israel without granting the people in that area the right to self-determination. I would also remind the House that the right to self-determination is the very cornerstone upon which the principles of the United Nations are based.

When Israel was established Canada went along with it and, of course, we angered the Arab states right then and there and they determined they were going to destroy Israel. When we did go along with the establishment of Israel I say it was the responsibility of the United Nations to see the thing through, and when I say that I mean this. When trouble arose between Israel and Egypt and the other Arab nations in 1948 and the war of extermination, from the point of view of the Arabs, was visited upon Israel, the United Nations left the problems hanging straight in the air, left them dangling. Nothing whatever was done to bring to a sensible conclusion the outstanding problems and points of dispute between those nations.

Points of Dispute

There were four main points of dispute, and I think they have been mentioned here today. You will remember that in 1947 Egypt took the position that Israel should never be allowed to have a vessel pass through the Suez Canal, and they never have since that time. That was a direct violation of the international convention of 1888. Although it was not right, nothing was done about it. What did the other nations do to see that Israel had a fair chance to use the canal? They did nothing. This situation drifted from bad to worse.

What did they do concerning the question of the armistice lines? Some of the silliest lines were drawn by the armistice commission of that day, and they have just been allowed to stand there. For instance, armistice lines were drawn that divided the city of Jerusalem into two parts in such a fashion that the Jewish University on Mount Scopus was included in Jordan. I could name a score of other very foolish things that were done in connection with armistice lines, but nothing has been done to settle these outstanding problems and they have been a source of irritation since 1947.

What has been done about finding a solution to the refugee problem? Originally approximately 700,000 or 750,000 Arabs were either thrown out of Israel or went out because of fear, or were urged to go out because of propaganda. They found themselves in refugee camps on the site of the ancient city of Jericho and in the Gaza strip. They have just been sitting there demoralized for all these years. Nothing has been done to settle these people permanently.

Finally, what has been done about the necessary economic build-up of the Arab states where the standard of living is so low? What has been done about finding a solution to the Jordan waters problem? All these prob-

lems need to be given very careful consideration, and until they are settled there can be no hope for peace in the Middle East...

It was fortunate, in my judgment, that something happened to shock the United Nations into action at the time these events occurred, because since that time we have discovered a terrific Russian build-up in the area. We know what are her long-range ideas. Russia needs oil. Russia's vast industrialization programme makes her need imperative. She wants the oil in the Middle East. The oil in Baku and other areas accessible to her is not going to be sufficient for her needs. At the same time Russia wants to weaken NATO and destroy it if possible. One of the best ways to accomplish this is to cut off the oil supply from the Middle East... I think there is no question about that at all.

It was fortunate in the extreme that the intelligence of Israel, Great Britain and France indicated the fact of the Russian build-up; and something has happened, it seems to me, which in the long run will be of great benefit to the world.

Let me say very quickly a few words about Hungary. I think we ought to be doing everything we possibly can to relieve the suffering of those Hungarian people who have been dislocated and driven from their homes, and who are suffering for want of food and medical supplies. I think Canada should open her doors wide to these people.

This is one thing—and I address my remarks to the attention of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration—that could have been handled more effectively. I think we should have sent into the areas around the borders of Hungary receiving teams that could have quickly given help to any of these refugees who found their way across the borders of Hungary. They should have been brought into this country, as the hon. member for Rose-town-Biggan mentioned, under a completely open-door policy. These people are patriots and in the eyes of the world they have given a demonstration such as few people in the world have given. We should move to their aid as quickly as we possibly can.

As has already been said, the million dollar appropriation for assistance to Hungary is a good start. I think we should be prepared to give much more when it is required...

In conclusion I would like to sum up how I view the situation at the present time and in doing so I cannot find better words than those which were used by Selwyn Lloyd. These are the words he used:

British American differences over the Middle East should not be taken too tragically.

I think that is right.

On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to minimize them and pretend that there is not a job to be done in restoring the intimacy of our alliance.

The crisis may have created a situation of great opportunity which may not recur again. A war has been rapidly stopped: an international force has been created; the Russian penetration has been unmasked. The situation can be turned to good account by the free world. Whatever may be the thought of the past let us, the United States and the countries of the Common-

wealth, now press forward with firmness together and with resolution, to use that opportunity and to preserve the gains. Thus our friendship and co-operation will once more prove the great hope of the world.

The history of Britain and France has been one of a long succession of demonstrations of sacrifice and noble ideals devoted to the achievement of justice and freedom in this world. I have not lost faith in those countries as yet, and I think we ought to be doing everything we can to bolster their determination once more to re-establish the solidarity of the free world wherever we possibly can.

Mr. L. B. Pearson

... We are facing today a situation of gravity and danger, far too serious a situation to be dealt with from a purely partisan point of view. The hon. gentleman who has just taken his seat talked about Canada being the chore boy of the United States. Our record over the last years, Mr. Speaker, gives us the right to say we have performed and will perform no such role. It is bad to be a chore boy of the United States. It is equally bad to be a colonial chore boy running around shouting "Ready, aye, ready". A well-known Conservative newspaper, the *Ottawa Journal*, in commenting on the policy of the Government at the United Nations in recent days, a policy of care and restraint as it was characterized, a policy of consideration for its friends, ended an editorial on this subject on October 31 as follows:

At best, we are going to be in very great danger of all-out war for some time now. We must learn to think before we chatter.

Chattering instead of thinking—if we fail because of idle chatter and not enough thought in our efforts to resolve the problems that face us today in this country and in the world, it will not make much difference who has the halos or who has been humiliated.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we have an amendment to the motion. I might as well say at once—and this will be no surprise to the House—that I think it is an amendment worthy of no support at all. It is inaccurate in its facts, as I shall hope to prove, and it is wrong in its conclusions.

Hungary

Before I deal with the matters referred to in the Speech and in the amendment on the Middle East, may I say just one word about Hungary. The Canadian Government has already expressed its views in Ottawa and at the United Nations Assembly on this matter. We have witnessed as brutal and as grim a betrayal of a people as history has ever seen,

a people who were asking only for freedom from communist colonial domination and the right to run their own affairs. The recent actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary throw a lurid light on the protestations we have heard that Stalinism is now dead and peaceful coexistence is here. But there has been no more significant exposure of the underlying, and I am afraid enduring, purpose and methods of Soviet power. Soviet tanks and Soviet guns have killed Hungarian freedom fighters, but they did not and they cannot kill Hungarian freedom.

What can we do here in Canada and at the United Nations? Well, we can help the victims of this terror, and we learned last night of what we are doing in that regard. We can keep, through the United Nations as we are trying to do, the spotlight of world public opinion, the conscience of the world, the moral force of world opinion, on the savage actions of the Soviet Union. We can do our best to help Hungarians in that way and to bring the United Nations into Hungary in the role of observers and investigators. We must continue our efforts toward that end; but we would not be helping the Hungarian people—I think we might be hurting them—if we held out promises of liberation by force which at this time we would not be able to fulfil. There is, however, I think, some hope in the growing evidence that Eastern Europe is now beginning to free itself from the shackles of Russian slavery and oppression, and that development is expressing itself at the United Nations Assembly at this time.

The Middle East

Now, Mr. Speaker, I come to the Middle East. The debate in this House—and we have been meeting for only a few hours—has already shown that a very real difference on policy has developed between the Government and the Official Opposition. The speeches of the Acting Leader of the Oppo-

sition and the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra, who has just preceded me, have made that quite clear. The Official Opposition—and I think we can assume that the speakers in question had the support of all the members of the Official Opposition; they should have to judge from the applause they received from their colleagues—now apparently support every move made by the United Kingdom and France in their intervention in Egypt after the attack on Egypt by Israel, an intervention brought about with army, navy, and air forces after a 12-hour ultimatum. They claim, I have the right to conclude, that we as a government should have approved of those moves at once and should have backed up the United Kingdom and France at the United Nations even on those matters and on those resolutions where not a single member of the United Nations supported the resolutions in question . . .

Now, Mr. Speaker, we did not follow that particular line of policy in this matter, and I shall try to explain why. To do so it is, I think, relevant to give, as other speakers have given, some background which may help us to understand recent events. It is, for instance, important in order to keep things in perspective to understand the policy of the Egyptian Government in recent months. That policy has been unfriendly to the Western powers. It was arbitrary and was denounced in this House as arbitrary in the seizure of the Suez Canal Company. That policy has witnessed a gradual increase of Russian influence in Egypt and the Middle East, and it did culminate in the seizure of the canal. We recall that after weeks of effort and frustrations to bring about an international solution by international means no such solution was brought about.

It is quite obvious—it was quite obvious by the summer—that there was no meeting of minds between Washington and London and Paris in these matters. And of course, the fault was not by any means entirely on the side of London and Paris, and no one on this side of the House has ever tried to take a one-sided view of this situation. The vital importance of the Suez to Western Europe is perhaps not appreciated in Washington, and it might have been better appreciated there if this situation could have been related by them to the Panama Canal.

Now, our own attitude in this matter was—and we expressed this attitude in the House of Commons and in a good many messages to the United Kingdom Government during the summer—that we did not stand aloof and indifferent, and we did appreciate the importance of this development not only to Western Europe but to Canada itself. Our attitude

was that this question should be brought as quickly as possible to the United Nations and a solution attempted there; that at all costs there should be no division of opinion, no division of policy, between Washington and London and Paris on a matter of such vital importance, and that there should be no action taken by anybody which could not be justified under the United Nations Charter; otherwise the country taking that action, no matter how friendly to us, would be hauled before the United Nations and charged by the country against which the action had been taken. That is something that has happened, and it is something we tried to talk over with our friends before it happened.

It will be recalled that eventually the matter was taken to the Security Council of the United Nations, and it will also be recalled that not long before the use of force by Israel against Egypt certain principles for a settlement of the Suez question had been agreed on at the Security Council. One of those principles which had been accepted by Egypt at that time, was that the canal should be insulated from the policies of any one nation, including Egypt. Therefore at that particular moment, through those conversations at the Security Council, and what is more important through conversations going on in the Secretary-General's office, we had some hope that an international solution might be reached which might be satisfactory to all concerned.

At that time, and I am speaking now of a period of only a week or two before the attack by Israel took place, we had no knowledge conveyed to us of any acute deterioration of the situation, nor did we have any knowledge or information about anything which could be called a Russian plot to seize Egypt and take over the Middle East. At that moment, and against that background, the Israeli Government moved against Egypt.

The Threat to Israel

Here also, to put the matter in perspective, it is necessary to understand the background. The people of Israel have lived for years in a state of unrest and insecurity against this threat of extermination by their neighbours. With that unrest on their borders, with no stability of any kind, with a military balance changing against them, and in the face of those continued threats on October 29—and it is interesting to realize that that was less than a month ago; events have moved with such bewildering and dramatic speed—the Israeli Government took the situation and the law in its own hands and moved against Egypt for reasons which seemed very good to it at the time.

I admit—and I am sure all members in this House must admit—the provocation which may have prompted this move. We in the Government tried to understand that provocation; nevertheless we did at that time, and do now, regret that the attack was made at that time and under those circumstances. Then, as the House knows, the United Kingdom Government and France intervened in the matter on the ground, so they claimed, that it was necessary to keep the fighting away from the Suez Canal and thereby keep the canal open. They wished, so they said in Paris and in London, to keep a shield between the opposing forces.

That was the only purpose they put forward at that time, or indeed have put forward formally since, to explain their intervention—to stop the fighting and put a shield between the opposing forces. No other purpose was alleged; and when the United Kingdom representative to the United Nations spoke at the first emergency meeting of the General Assembly on Thursday, November 1, he explained the purpose of the United Kingdom and French action in these words:

The first urgent task is to separate Israel and Egypt and to stabilize the position. That is our purpose. If the United Nations were willing to take over the **physical task** of maintaining peace in that area, no one would be better pleased than we. But police action there must be, to separate the belligerents and to stop the hostilities.

That was their purpose, merely to separate the belligerents and to stop the hostilities.

Well, to carry out that purpose, as we know, the French and British Governments sent an ultimatum to Egypt and to Israel, a 12-hour ultimatum that was accepted by Israel whose forces at that time had come within ten miles of the Suez Canal, but was rejected by Egypt which had been asked to withdraw its forces beyond the Suez Canal; and following that rejection the United Kingdom and French forces intervened by air and later on the ground.

At that time, far from gratuitously condemning the action, the Canadian Government said through the Prime Minister and indeed through myself, that we regretted the necessity for the use of force in these circumstances; and these circumstances, I confess, included an element of complete surprise on our part at the action taken.

There was no consultation—and this has been pointed out—with other members of the Commonwealth and no advance information that this very important action, for better or for worse, was about to be taken. In that sense consultation had broken down between

London and Paris on the one hand, the Commonwealth capitals and—even more important, possibly—Washington on the other.

Nevertheless, instead of indulging then or since in gratuitous condemnation we expressed our regret and we began to pursue a policy, both here by diplomatic talks and diplomatic correspondence, and later at the United Nations, which would bring us together again inside the Western Alliance and which would bring about peace in the area on terms which everybody could accept.

Canadian Policy

Our policy, then, in carrying out these principles, was to get the United Nations into the matter at once; to seek through the United Nations a solution which would be satisfactory to all sides. In adopting that policy it was obviously impossible for us to act at the United Nations Assembly in any way which we could not justify under our obligation as signatories to the United Nations Charter . . .

Our policy with regard to this matter as a member of the United Nations was to try to stop the fighting through the United Nations. How could we follow any other course without betraying our obligations under the Charter? But we were also anxious, as were many other delegates to the United Nations although not all of them, to avoid the creation of a vacuum of chaos in that part of the world after the fighting had stopped; and we realized if that test as well as the test of stopping the fighting could not be met, the United Nations would have failed.

Also at the United Nations we were anxious to make sure—we mentioned this in our statements down there—that the situation leading up to the aggression should be given due consideration, and that constructive action should be taken to prevent such a situation recurring again, that we should go deeper into this matter than merely into the facts of military action. I hope that will be done quickly at the United Nations Assembly. There are already two resolutions on the order paper for that purpose.

And then, Mr. Speaker, we were also anxious to do everything we could down there to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors under the Charter, any demand that sanctions be imposed against them, and also to do what we could to help repair the lines of communication and contact between Washington, London and Paris and restore some form of continuous friendly diplomatic consultation between the Western Allies on these matters after its breakdown last October.

It was certainly a matter of urgent and distressing importance, especially to a Canadian,

and I expressed this also in public at the United Nations, that the United States should be on one side of this issue and the United Kingdom and France, our two mother countries, on the other. We were especially distressed at this because there were people down in New York, and they are still there, who are gleefully exploiting this division.

Having mentioned the breakdown of consultation, I think it would only be fair to add that this breakdown of consultation and agreement was not the fault exclusively of the United Kingdom and France over the preceding months. No other member, indeed no member of the Western Alliance, is free of some responsibilities and particularly the United States of America, which is the major and most powerful member of that group. Therefore we felt and we still feel that this is no time nor is this an occasion on which to adopt an attitude of superior virtue or smug complacency over the righteousness of our own position. We felt and we still feel that the thing to do is to get out of this crisis without a war and without violating the United Nations principles and Charter, and then to draw the necessary conclusions from the crisis so that the Western coalition will not collapse again in the days ahead when other problems will arise, as they are bound to do.

Strain on the Commonwealth

Then also, and this was a matter which was very much on our minds, we were anxious to do what we could to hold the Commonwealth together in this very serious test. It was badly and dangerously split. At one stage after the fighting on land began it was on the verge of dissolution, and that is not an exaggerated observation. The hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) is reported as having said on November 17 that Canadian leaders should bend their efforts toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the Commonwealth which, he went on to say, should have a common point of view on these matters. I could not agree with him more; but if we had followed at the United Nations the policy advocated by the Official Opposition we would have gone a long way not toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the Commonwealth but toward breaking it up. I am quite sure this is a purpose which no one in this House wishes to achieve.

In trying to follow those principles of policy how were we, as delegates to the United Nations and as the Government in Ottawa, to react to the critical situation which arose? We tried to maintain as objective an attitude as possible having regard to our Charter obligations and we certainly did try to maintain as

close and as friendly contact as was possible with the United Kingdom and French delegations. We did not automatically support the United States in every move. We thought the United States was wrong at the very beginning of the Assembly in rushing a resolution on the record at the outbreak of hostilities recommending that they should be ended at once. We thought they were wrong in trying to rush that through without sufficient consideration. We did not vote for it; we abstained, as I will explain later.

We thought the United States was wrong last Saturday, at the last session of the Assembly which I attended and which in some respects was a depressing session. A resolution was before the Assembly at that time which, with a Belgian amendment, should have received the unanimous support of every member of the Assembly. With that amendment the resolution would have received the support of the United Kingdom, but the amendment was defeated and the United States was one of those who voted against it.

As I have pointed out, we were not able to support the United Kingdom in all the moves it had taken, in all the attitudes it had adopted at the United Nations Assembly. Distressed though we were, we could not support the United Kingdom and French stand on this matter although we did try, as Canadians should and as a Canadian delegation should, to give the most friendly consideration to the United Kingdom and French position.

As to the charge that we have been lining up with the Russians, that is just nonsensical chatter. If a resolution is right down there we vote for it whoever may be among our companions in the voting. That seems to me to be the only possible course for a Canadian delegation to follow.

There are those in this country and there are some whose views have been expressed in this House who feel that we should have automatically supported the United Kingdom and France, either because of the ties of friendship, indeed of kinship with the countries concerned, or because they were convinced the United Kingdom and France were right in the course adopted and in the methods followed. Those who feel that way will be disappointed at the action we have taken. We thought it was the right action for a Canadian delegation to take.

It was an objective attitude, it was a Canadian and an independent attitude. Believe me, the Arab and Asian countries, including the Asian members of the Commonwealth, were watching us as they were watching others very carefully to see if our policy was

based on those considerations I have mentioned or whether we were just following automatically any other power. If we had given any evidence that would have justified the impression that we were supporting without reservation the United Kingdom and France in all their tactics and attitudes toward this matter we would not have been of any help to our friends subsequently, nor would we have been able to play the part which we at least tried to play and which I shall refer to later.

If, for instance, we had voted at the first meeting of the special Assembly against the proposal to put this item on the agenda when no other member of the Assembly voted against it except the United Kingdom and France I think we would have lost any influence which we had at that time and which we may have hoped to use later on for constructive purposes.

Our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could be. Believe me, that attitude has been appreciated in London even if it has not been appreciated by my hon. friends opposite. Far from criticizing us in private or in public in London or Paris for our gratuitous condemnation of their course we have had many expressions of appreciation for the line we have been trying to follow, and which has been helpful in the circumstances to the United Kingdom and France.

Sequence of Events in the General Assembly

The sequence of events at the Assembly and our relation to those events will show what we tried to do, and why. I should like to give that sequence, if I may, because I feel it will be useful to the House to know exactly what happened and the attitude we took in regard to every stage of development at the Assembly.

We met on Thursday, November 1, in the first emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which had been passed in 1950 and which was designed to get around the veto in the Security Council by transferring to the Assembly matters on which the Security Council could not agree because of the veto. When this Assembly was called and this item was put on the agenda it was objected to on legal grounds by the United Kingdom and France, legal grounds which we did not think had very much validity, and so we voted for the Assembly meeting.

That was the occasion on which we were attacked by my hon. friend as lining up with the Russians. We lined up with 62 members of the United Nations in agreeing to the

proposition that the United Nations should try to deal with this matter. Immediately after that resolution the United States, without very much consultation or very much opportunity for consideration, introduced the cease-fire resolution.

We felt, as I have already said, that this had two defects. Of course it was designed to bring the fighting to an end at once and it was designed to prevent military aid going to either side in the conflict. It was designed, in one of its clauses, to restore freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for all governments. These purposes we, of course, supported; but we felt that there had not been sufficient time for consideration to force a vote through before others who wished to speak could speak. We also felt that it was inadequate for the purpose which we had in mind because it did not recognize the background, the previous problems which had brought about this situation, and made no provision for the absolute necessity of a peace settlement. Nor did it make any provision for a United Nations police force to supervise and secure the cessation of hostilities. We were anxious not to give our support at that first meeting of the Assembly to a resolution which might seem to bring the fighting to an end but to do nothing else, or even to recognize the importance of doing something else. We expressed that feeling in the first statement the Canadian delegate made . . .

In the first statement we made in New York around 2 a.m. that morning I ventured to suggest that we would not be completing our work at the Assembly if we did nothing about the prevention of a recurrence of the violence which had preceded this outbreak and if we did nothing about the establishment of a United Nations force in this crisis.

This was an idea, Mr. Speaker, that we had discussed in Ottawa before I went to the Assembly that afternoon. Indeed, it had been previously mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement as something that might be desirable in the circumstances, and immediately after I made reference to it the United States Secretary of State took up the matter and asked our delegation if they would put this idea in the form of a resolution. I returned to Ottawa the next day to discuss with my colleagues whether this would be a desirable thing to do, having first had the opportunity of discussing the matter in New York with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We were anxious to keep in close touch with our friends in Washington and our friends in London on this matter, and as soon as it was decided here the next morning that

this might be a useful and helpful Canadian initiative under certain circumstances we cabled London and Washington at once and asked them what they thought about the idea; because, while a good many of these things are desirable in principle, there is not much point putting them forward at the United Nations if they are going to be opposed at once by all of our friends or some of our friends. Therefore we were anxious to get the views of both London and Washington in respect of this particular matter . . .

Then on Saturday, November 3, Mr. Speaker, after consultation with my colleagues in Ottawa I returned to New York where the Assembly was to meet at 8 p.m. that evening. On that occasion I did produce a Canadian resolution for the setting up of a United Nations Emergency Force for this particular situation. It may be interesting, though it does take a little time, to go into the background of this idea of the United Nations force. Of course there was nothing new in either this idea or in its proposal, and no one on this side of the House, I am sure, wants to take any credit for having put forward a novel and valuable proposal. I hope it was valuable but it certainly was not novel; except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect.

Security Measures Since 1946

As far back as October 1946, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), at the very first Assembly of the United Nations, made a plea for the organization of enforcement procedures under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter which provides for such enforcement procedures through the Security Council. Nothing was done, as we know, and nothing could be done in the Security Council under Article 43 because of the disunity among the big powers.

Then four years later came Korea, and the Canadian response to this challenge to peace and security in 1950 reflected our desire to bring about something more permanent than merely collecting forces for an emergency. As hon. members who were here at the time will recall, a Canadian infantry brigade was made available for United Nations service generally, and I think it was the only force in the United Nations at that time which was offered in those terms, for general United Nations service and not merely for Korea. I do not think any other member of the United Nations went as far as we did at that time. Certainly no one went farther. As I said in the House of Commons when explaining our action in September 1950:

We hope that other countries will make their contributions to the Korean force in

that form (that is, for use anywhere subject to constitutional procedures), so that next time this kind of aggression takes place there will be forces in being to deal with it.

On October 11 of the same year I said before the General Assembly:

The action of the Security Council in June showed how unprepared most members of this organization were to implement quickly the recommendations which they accepted. We were frankly not organized for this purpose. We had to improvise. We hope that next time we may not have to improvise.

No progress was made in bringing about this kind of organization for security. The Security Council frustrated all efforts to that end, and that was why in 1950 we passed a Uniting for Peace Resolution which could transfer to the Assembly the responsibility for collective security in these circumstances of frustration and failure in the Security Council. On that Uniting for Peace resolution we had this to say at the United Nations Assembly on November 3, 1950:

It will not be enough for a few countries to take action. We must all, within measure of our capacities, contribute to implementation of this resolution.

Certain other smaller governments took the same stand but over the years nothing was done, and there was no real organization in being when we were faced with this most recent crisis. A collective measures committee was set up by the Assembly but its activities were not very effective.

Then on January 31, 1956 the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up in this House the question of an international police force, and it was a very pertinent question.

Mr. Diefenbaker: Just for the Israeli-Arab situation.

Mr. Pearson: Yes, he was limiting the value of this force at this time to a particular situation on the Israeli-Egyptian border. In response to this intervention—I had just come back a few months previously from the discussions in Egypt—I said this in the House as reported at page 777 of *Hansard* of February 1, 1956:

As I said the other day, I have had talks with the leaders of the Arab Governments and the Israel Government, and I had talks with General Burns when I was out there and at the United Nations. I think there is a great deal to be said for trying to bring that kind of police force into existence in this disturbed area at this time as a pro-

visional measure to keep the armies apart while peace can be secured. If that proposal were made—and I know the Secretary-General has been considering it, and from press reports to which my hon. friend has referred I understand that it has been discussed in Washington in the last few days—and if it became a matter for United Nations consideration, I am sure this country as well as other countries would want to do what they could to carry it into effect.

And following that—

Mr. Rowe: In view of that fact, as our representative, did the minister not bring it before the United Nations for consideration?

Mr. Pearson: That is just what I was coming to, Mr. Speaker. I have been looking up the record in the last day or two in order to see what we had been able to do in this matter. We did follow it up. We followed it up with the governments most particularly concerned, namely the Israel Government, the British Government, the French Government and the United States Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and again with General Burns, the truce commissioner.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What date was that?

Mr. Pearson: This began in February and went on for the next two or three months. These were ordinary diplomatic discussions to see whether it could be useful initiative on our part at that time to put forward a proposal for a United Nations force, not a truce commission, to patrol the boundary between Israel and her Arab neighbours in order to try to prevent the incidents which were building up and which had a great deal to do with the ultimate explosion last October. We were discouraged by the response given to this proposal. We received very little support for it from any governments concerned. Indeed, we received no active support from any of the governments concerned, because they felt it was not timely to introduce a United Nations force of that character into Palestine when the boundaries had not been determined, when a political settlement had not been reached and when the parties to the conflict—and it was a conflict—were opposed to such a force.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What countries raised that objection?

Mr. Pearson: There was not a country with which we discussed the matter that actively supported the idea. When we get into committee I will be able to give more details, I hope, with regard to this matter. Certainly in our view it was important to have a police force of that kind operate with the consent

and the active co-operation of the governments most concerned.

That then was the situation, Mr. Speaker, when our United Nations force resolution was introduced, and that is the background to our initiative in this matter. At the time our resolution was introduced the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution had already been introduced, which reaffirmed the earlier United States resolution which had been carried by this time and which insisted on a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops, and which asked the Secretary-General to report within 12 hours on the compliance with that injunction. That night of November 3 and 4—and the session went on all night—tempers were rather high. The talk was strong and the danger of a rash—as we would have thought it—condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors was very real. The situation was deteriorating and the communists were working feverishly and destructively to exploit it.

In these circumstances and having, as I have said, canvassed the situation carefully with our friends and having studied Sir Anthony Eden's speech, we moved this resolution concurrently with the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution which was an attempt to get British, French and Israeli forces out of Egypt...

It was a very short resolution, and it asked the Secretary-General merely to submit, within 48 hours, something we had been unable to do anything about for ten years, namely, a plan for setting up an emergency international United Nations police force with the consent of the governments concerned. If we had not put in that phrase "with the consent of the governments concerned" we might not have been able to secure a majority for our resolution. As it was, the resolution passed unanimously, as hon. members know. Steps were taken immediately by the Secretary-General to report back what he was able to do in 48 hours in the setting up of this force to supervise and secure a cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the earlier resolution of November 2, one of which was to ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal.

We obtained 57 votes as sponsors for the resolution. There were 19 abstentions. Nobody voted against us. The United Kingdom and France did not find it possible to vote for that resolution at that time but they have indicated, both privately and publicly, their great appreciation of the initiative which resulted in its being adopted and they have also stated their support for it since then. At the same time—and this is related to the first resolution—the Asian-Arab resolution was put to

the vote and carried by a large majority, 59 to 5 opposed.

Mr. Churchill: How did Canada vote?

Mr. Pearson: Canada voted for that resolution asking for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the forces from Egypt. There were 5 opposed. There were 59 in favour, including Canada. Then on November 4 we started to work, and we had something to do with this because we were the sponsors of the resolution and had a certain obligation in connection with helping the Secretary-General carry it out. We started to work on organizing a United Nations police force or at least to form the basis of the organization and report back in 48 hours.

As it happened the Secretary-General, who has played a magnificent part throughout all these difficult days, was able to make a first report within 24 hours. Offers of contributions to the force began to come in within that 24-hour period. That Sunday night when we were working on the establishment of the force the United Kingdom and French ground forces landed at Port Said. The situation at the United Nations immediately began to deteriorate. Things became very tense. The Security Council was called into emergency session and refused to consider a Soviet proposal for Soviet and United States intervention because the matter was before the United Nations Assembly. Then in the midst of rumours of Russian intervention, rumours that there would be a determined demand by the Arab and Asian members of the Assembly to brand the United Kingdom and France formally as aggressors under the Charter and to invoke sanctions against them, the Assembly met on Tuesday morning, November 6. It had before it the Secretary-General's final report on the organization of the United Nations force. At that time he was able to report progress with regard to the composition of the force. He was able to lay down certain principles and functions for that force but not to go into detail, for two reasons. He did not have enough time, in the first place; and in the second place if we had attempted to do it in detail, we would still be arguing about what those functions should be. There was however one important detail, namely that the force should exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council. The significance of that detail is obvious.

A draft resolution was drawn up supporting this report and authorizing the Secretary-General to go ahead on that basis to discuss participation with other governments. It set up also an Advisory Committee of seven members of the Assembly to help him in this

task. Canada is one of the members of that committee. It is interesting to note in passing that four members of that committee are members of the Commonwealth of Nations. While we were trying to get this resolution through and get it through quickly and with a big majority—it was finally passed unanimously—another resolution, in the atmosphere of the fighting that was going on at that time in Suez, was introduced demanding the immediate withdrawal of forces, and that the Secretary-General should report that this had been done in 24 hours. Both these resolutions were being considered together.

Advisory Committee

In so far as the force was concerned, as I said, the resolution passed unanimously after we had managed to vote down—and it was a very important vote indeed—an amendment to put Czechoslovakia on the advisory committee of seven. The resolution was then passed by 64 to 0, with 10 abstentions.

Mr. Churchill: Would you name the advisory committee?

Mr. Pearson: The advisory committee in this matter consists of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Colombo, Norway and Canada, with the Secretary-General as the chairman of the committee . . .

The same evening, Mr. Speaker, a 19-power resolution demanding immediate withdrawal was passed by a vote of 65 with only one opposed, Israel, and with 10 abstentions. The United Kingdom and France did not oppose that resolution, they abstained on it. We voted for that resolution after having stated our interpretation, which was accepted by a good many other delegations, of the word "immediate". If that interpretation had not been stated and accepted by many we would not have voted for it. By "immediate" we said we had in mind that the United Kingdom and French forces would withdraw from Egypt as soon as the United Nations forces had been moved there and were operating satisfactorily. By getting our United Nations force resolution through and by accepting this Arab-Asian resolution of withdrawal, which had in it no element of sanctions, we were able to reject extreme demands which are being made, and which would have led us into grave danger indeed.

We think that the resolutions that night were a wise move, and we think also that they helped the United Kingdom and French in accepting the cease-fire, which they did either just before or shortly afterwards.

Now, Mr. Speaker, there has been a good deal of talk, though not very much in this

House as yet, as to whether the United Kingdom and French Governments were pressed into the acceptance of this cease-fire by United Nations action, and whether we should not have let them go ahead, not pressed them and resisted moves to press them in respect of this resolution on cease-fire and withdrawal. If we had done that, and the United Nations had kept out of this at that particular moment, it is said the British and French forces would have been able to complete the military job of clearing the canal of Egyptian forces from Port Said to Port Suez.

I suggest with diffidence, because this is a matter which is of primary concern to the United Kingdom and French Governments, that they were very wise indeed in stopping military operations at the time they did. After all, they had indicated that they were going into that area to stop the fighting at the canal and to prevent the conflict continuing between Israel and Egypt in such a way that it would interfere with the operation of the canal.

By this time both Israel and Egypt had accepted the cease-fire. Therefore the original reason given by the United Kingdom and French forces for intervening had been removed. If the United Kingdom and French forces had continued fighting at that time, after the Egyptian and Israeli Governments had accepted the cease-fire, I suggest that the Commonwealth might not have been able to stand the strain; that the Asian members of the Commonwealth might not have been able to remain in it in those circumstances. There is evidence from New Delhi, Karachi and Colombo to support that statement. I suggest also that continuation of the fighting, even if it had had immediately successful military results, would have created even a deeper and more permanent split between the Western European and Arab world. It might well have led to the occupation of Egypt, which was not an original objective of British-French intervention. It would have been a standing invitation to the Egyptian Government to invite in at that time, when the fighting was going on, Soviet volunteers. Whatever the reasons may have been, and I think they were good ones, the United Kingdom and French Governments did accept the cease-fire and we entered a new stage of developments.

There were only two more resolutions subsequent to the one I have just mentioned. The one last Saturday asked for withdrawal once again. We did not support it because we felt that the withdrawal had begun. We had confidence in the good faith of the British and French when they told us that the withdrawal would be completed. We felt at that time that

to support another resolution of withdrawal would be to assimilate the position of the British, French and Israelis to that of the Russians in Hungary . . .

Then the final resolution carried Saturday night approved an aide memoire which gave the Secretary-General further authority to organize the United Nations police force. By a very important paragraph in that resolution he was told to get ahead with the clearing of the Suez Canal. In spite of efforts by Soviet and certain Arab-Asian countries to hold up the work on political grounds, he has now authority to go ahead with the vitally important work.

Functions of UN Force

Now, Mr. Speaker, we have the United Nations force in being and I am sure the House would like me to say something about the functions, operations and composition of that force, and Canada's contribution to it . . .

The function of this force which is now in being is to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, as I pointed out this morning, and carry out its task in accordance with directions received from the United Nations, not from any one member of the United Nations. The force—and it is interesting to recall that the resolution authorizing this force was passed not much more than three weeks ago—is now in being in Egypt where it will be stationed, or any place else where the United Nations considers it necessary to be stationed, in order to carry out the functions which I have just mentioned. The most important function is, of course, the policing of the zone between opposing forces in Egypt in order to prevent the recurrence, if possible, of the fighting. At the present time the headquarters of the force is along the Suez, but it may of course be moved.

It is not a fighting force in the sense that it is a force operating under, say, Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which deals with enforcement procedures. It is not a United Nations fighting force in the sense that the force in Korea was; it is operating under a different chapter of the Charter dealing with conciliation procedures. Therefore the alarmist interpretation, the alarmist possibility, mentioned last night by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra, that Canadian elements in this force might find themselves in conflict with British soldiers is, I suggest, merely a figment of his imagination. It is not the purpose of this force to be used in fighting operations against anybody. It is not that kind of force. If the hon. member had read the United Nations document concerning the function and organization of this force, which have already been agreed on, he would, I think, have understood that.



CONFERENCE ON UN FORCE

Major-General E. L. M. Burns, of Canada, Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East, confers on organizational problems with (left) Major-General A. E. Martola, of Finland, a military adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General, and Mr. Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary of the United Nations.

This force will stay in Egypt until the United Nations decides that its functions are discharged, or, of course, until the governments participating in the force withdraw their contingents. It must, of course, not infringe on the sovereignty of the government of the territory in which it is operating. That is obvious. But the exercise of that sovereignty in the case of the Government of Egypt where the force is operating now must be qualified by the acceptance by Egypt of the resolution of the United Nations concerning the force. Egypt has already agreed to the admission of this United Nations force to its territory; and it seems to me to be obvious, because it is not an enforcement action of the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the Charter, that every effort should be made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by the United Nations itself, to secure and maintain the co-operation of the Egyptian Government in the functioning of this force, and the co-operation of the other governments concerned, including the Government of Israel.

But that does not mean, as I understand it—and I assure you, Mr. Speaker, this has been made very clear in meetings of the advisory committee—that Egypt or any other government can determine by its own decision where the force is to operate, how it is to operate or when it must leave. Furthermore, the right of Egypt to consent to the admission of a United Nations force to its territory does not imply the necessity of consent to the admis-

sion of, or the right to reject, separate units or elements of that force. That is a stand, Mr. Speaker, which the Canadian representative on the advisory committee has taken. I have already made it clear to the other members of the Committee and to the Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General has agreed to this statement. I said at the second meeting of the committee—I was referring to the Government of Egypt—

If their position is that they at any time could decide that the United Nations force had finished its work and should leave, that, I think, would be quite intolerable; and there is also an interpretation of the United Nations resolution which says that the force must be sent to Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian Government, which means that the Egyptian Government would exercise a veto over every contingent in that force. That, I think, would be equally intolerable, because what kind of a United Nations force would you have? What principle would you be acting on in the United Nations if that country—

I was referring to Egypt.

—which the United Nations was trying to assist in organizing and sending forward this force should decide who would take part in it? That is something, of course, that has to be worked out between the Assembly and yourself—

I was referring to the chairman of the committee.

—as the representative of the Assembly, and the Egyptian Government, but to admit for a minute that the Egyptian Government will decide that a force from country A is admissible and a force from country B is not is something, of course, that I could not accept.

We have made that stand clear at other meetings of the committee of seven. That, Mr. Speaker, brings me to the negotiations undertaken by the Secretary-General in regard to the composition of the force and particularly in regard to Canadian participation in it.

The Canadian Contribution

The first resolution dealing with this force was passed in the United Nations Assembly on November 4. We had already said by the time that resolution was passed—and by “we” I mean the Government in Ottawa—that we were in favour of it and that we would recommend a contribution to it. The day after the resolution was passed I met the Secretary-General as the sponsor of the resolutions and discussed with him the question of putting some United Nations troops into the area at once. He considered it to be a matter of the most immediate urgency. So I said I was authorized to state that the Canadian Government was willing to participate, and later in the day I wrote a formal communication to him to that effect, saying that we had decided to make an appropriate contribution subject to the required constitutional action being taken in Canada.

The next day I also talked with the Secretary-General about the force and he was then also emphatic, for the obvious reason that the situation seemed to be deteriorating, that we must proceed quickly. We discussed the nature of our contribution that afternoon, I by telephone with my colleagues in Ottawa, when the question of a battalion came up. Meanwhile General Burns had been appointed as commander of the force and he will do a distinguished job in that position, I am sure, as he has been doing so in that area in the last two years in the face of very great difficulties indeed.

General Burns was asked to come to New York, and those countries that had already announced their desire to contribute were asked to send military advisers to New York to discuss the problem with the Secretary-General, his staff and General Burns. The Canadian Department of National Defence sent three officers down immediately and the next day, Tuesday, November 6, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would offer, and I quote:

Subject to adjustment and/or rearrange-

ment after consultation with the United Nations commander—

—a self-contained battalion group with HMCS *Magnificent* as a temporary mobile base.

The consultations which we had had in New York up to that time led us to believe that would be a most welcome contribution, and we were urged to press ahead with it. The Secretary-General told me he was most anxious for us to get our battalion to a place where it could be embarked without delay.

General Burns reached New York a little later than we expected because he had to go to Cairo en route. The possibility then was mentioned that one country might provide all the administrative and air support at least in the initial stages. General Burns had found that difficulties were already developing because the infantry that had arrived, mostly from the Scandinavian countries and also from Colombia, were reaching the base without the necessary services and there was no headquarters organized to receive them.

These reports were sent by me to Ottawa. I returned to discuss them with my colleagues over the week-end, and while I was in Ottawa the Secretary-General through his executive assistant phoned me on Saturday, November 10, about another difficulty that was developing and which has been referred to already in this discussion, namely that the Egyptian authorities were concerned about the possibility of Canadian troops being mistaken for United Kingdom troops and that incidents might take place especially if the proportion of Canadian troops to the total force were high, as would be the case if the Canadian infantry battalion had arrived at that time.

We in New York, and indeed in Ottawa on advice from New York, felt that these difficulties would be overcome, and in discussing them with the Secretary-General he once again asked us to make no changes in our plans pending further discussions and he hoped satisfactory arrangements could be made. So the Government went ahead with the arrangements as originally contemplated.

Composition of Force

These difficulties I have been talking about, difficulties of administration and difficulties of composition, were not unique to Canada. Indeed they were not surprising considering the fact that the United Nations was starting from nothing in organizing this force; with the political situation so difficult both at the United Nations and in Egypt, and considering also the fact that under the resolution au-

thorizing the Secretary-General to organize this force he was instructed to work out—the phrase that was used was a “balanced force”—a balanced force militarily for police work and a balanced force, as he interpreted it, geographically and politically if possible.

Perhaps I should interject at this point, in connection with this particular difficulty, that among the countries that have offered contributions are Roumania and Czechoslovakia. Countries other than Canada have made offers of contributions which have not been dealt with, and they are waiting to hear from the Secretary-General also. The problem now was a very difficult and complicated one, all the more so as the greatest need at that time was to get more people to the spot.

Well, then, I think it was on Tuesday, November 13 when back in New York from Ottawa, that I had another talk with the Secretary-General in relation to the new difficulties which had occurred. I emphasized to him at that time that we felt it absolutely essential to the success of this effort that neither Egypt nor any other country should impose conditions regarding the composition of this force. I told him that on this matter we would negotiate only with him, the Secretary-General, although we recognized, of course, that it was right and proper that he should discuss these matters with Egypt in order to avoid, if possible, subsequent difficulties.

Nevertheless, on that Tuesday I asked him again about composition in view of the developing difficulties, and whether we should proceed with our plans for moving the regiment. The Secretary-General said—this was Tuesday, November 13, and I quote from his statement to me which I took down—that he hoped we would go right ahead with our plans.

He also discussed with me the question of composition on the next day, Wednesday. Then later we had a meeting of the advisory committee on the matter and I have already read from the minutes of that meeting. Following that the Secretary-General flew to Cairo. He left New York in the hope that these difficulties would all be cleared up before he had returned. As we were having diplomatic discussions about them and as it seemed that these discussions might end in a satisfactory way, we did our best, I quite admit, to discourage any premature publicity about difficulties which might be settled and concerning which, if the publicity were inaccurate, we would have even greater trouble in clearing up. Therefore on Thursday, November 15 the Prime Minister said at Toronto:

Units of Canadian contribution to the UN force are ready and the order in council placing them on active service under UN command will be passed and Parliament summoned as soon as we can ascertain from General Burns what elements he needs and cannot get from other countries.

During that week-end when General Burns reached New York and the Secretary-General was in Cairo I was in touch with the Secretary-General by telephone and cable through our Embassy. I stated to him that I had had word about his discussions with the Egyptians; and while I appreciated the difficulties which had arisen and while naturally we wanted to help the Secretary-General, already so overburdened with problems, in any way possible, nevertheless we could not accept the principle that any one government could determine what contribution or whether any contribution would be made by a member state in connection with the United Nations force. I am glad to say that the Secretary-General has taken the same position.

Then we discussed the difficulty on the Secretary-General's return. I know my hon. friends want to have all the facts in connection with this matter. We have had wild rumours and exaggerations which have appeared in the press about Nasser's farce, as the Acting Leader of the Opposition called it yesterday . . .

As a result of these discussions the Secretary-General had sent a communication to me from Cairo which I shall put on the record:

The question of when and where ground troops shall be used—

That is Canadian ground troops.

—can best be considered when the UNEF can assess its needs at the armistice lines. The present situation seems to be one where it is not a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities to bring them over and maintain their lines of communications.

That was a message from the Secretary-General, not from the Egyptian Government. He also emphasized that in sending it neither he nor anyone else was laying down conditions for Canadian participation because he felt that that would be improper. On his return and after further discussion with General Burns it was agreed that for the time being we should concentrate on getting these other forces to Egypt and hold the infantry battalion in reserve. General Burns himself said he agreed that it was even more important at the present moment to have an air transport headquarters, administration units, signals, engineers, army service, medical units and forces

of that type; which were later to be sneered at by some excitable persons as constituting a typewriter army, something that will not I think commend itself to the members of these very gallant Canadian regiments.

We agreed then to this change in plans, although regretting it—it is indeed our desire to fit in our plans with those agreed upon by General Burns and the Secretary-General and keep the rest of our forces available for transmission to the area—and on Tuesday, November 20 the order in council was passed to that end. I ask whether we could or should have proceeded otherwise. I am sure that most members of the House will agree that we would have been wrong if we had not made the offer we did in the first instance without delay, an offer which at that time seemed most appropriate and was considered as such by the Secretary-General.

To have made no offers or to have made no plans; to have held back our offer until everything was cleared up; to have permitted no movement of troops of any kind, would I think have left us open to criticism, to the charge that we were dragging our feet in connection with a proposal which we ourselves had put forward. I think also that we would have been wrong to have interfered with our plans until we were certain that their implementation or the timing thereof was to be changed.

When we were asked to make that change, not by Colonel Nasser but by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the commanding general of the United Nations forces, we could have either accepted or rejected the request. The latter would have meant delaying any action or, as has been suggested in a few extreme quarters, we could have withdrawn from the United Nations force completely. I am confident that if we had taken either of those courses, if we had delayed taking any action or withdrawn from the force, in view of the developments we would have been open to grave criticism and we would have got most of it from some hon. gentlemen opposite who have spoken already in this debate. I think the course we took was the right course, and it was considered the right course by the United Nations officials concerned.

It did not seem to me to be the time—I am talking now about the time we were confronted with the necessity of changing our plans, at least temporarily—or the occasion for national pique or peevishness or sneering at this new United Nations force as being Nasser's farce. It seemed to me that the situation was far too serious for that. What was required from every member of the

United Nations was to back up the United Nations force to the best of its ability after receiving the best advice it could. After receiving such advice from the United Nations itself we took that course, and as a result there is now a United Nations force which within between three and four weeks of the resolution authorizing it now includes on the spot—at least this was two days ago and there have been additions since that time—1,700 troops of which 20 per cent or 350 are Canadians. There will be soon more Canadians on the spot. Twenty-three nations have offered contributions to that force and eight of them, including Canada, have seen their contributions embodied in the formations on the spot which are now working together under the United Nations blue flag of peace.

Immediate and Long-term Objectives

May this force succeed in its task. If it does we may have started something of immense value for the future. We may have taken a step to put force behind the collective will of the international community under the law. That is our immediate task, to make this force work, to prevent fighting in the area and to establish conditions there through the operation of this force so that the United Nations itself can work out speedily an enduring and honourable settlement for that area, including relations between Israel and her neighbours and the international supervision and control, if that can be done, of the Suez Canal.

While that is our immediate objective we have another objective which is just as important and I suggest just as immediate, and that is to restore unity among the allies. The Western coalition, which is essential for peace in these disturbed times and which requires close consultation and co-operation among its members if it is to succeed, especially among London, Washington and Paris, has been subjected to strains and stresses in recent months. This has caused all lovers of peace in the free world great anxiety.

May I in conclusion repeat something I said on this point the other night to the American Assembly of Columbia University, when I said:

The inability to bring about a reconciliation of interests inside a coalition has resulted in a collapse of Western co-operation in the Middle East; a collapse which has brought distress to everyone except those who see in such co-operation the strongest barrier to the attainment of their own imperialist and reactionary power objectives. This collapse is, I am convinced, only temporary; but temporary is too long.

It must be a primary obligation on all of us to speed and make effective the work of repair and restoration. Indeed, we must do more than this. We must strengthen and deepen the foundation for such co-operation so that a collapse will not take place again in the face of the pull between the requirements of national and international policy. At the moment that is the primary task and responsibility of all who believe in freedom and security.

Then I went on to say: *

It is less important at the present moment to dwell on the difficulties of the task than on ways and means of avoiding them in the future. A Canadian may, I think, be pardoned for emphasizing that this is particularly true in the case of consultation and co-operation between Washington and London and Paris. It is imperative, in our dangerous and disturbed world, that the lines of contact between these three capitals be repaired and renewed and reinvigorated.

Apart from the actual preservation of the peace, and indeed, related to it, there is no more important objective for Western policy than this, and every possible effort must now be devoted, with understanding, with good will and with energy, to its achievement.

Jordan and Syria

Mr. Diefenbaker: Would my hon. friend allow a question at this time? I have mentioned the matter to him in advance. It has to do with the grave situation that arose today in Jordan and also the even graver situation in Syria. Would he, before concluding, say something with respect to the situation over there which today has become so critical, and also whether in view of what is taking place there the United Nations force will have to be increased over and above the numbers provided for under the present arrangements?

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend was good enough to tell me before I came into the House that this matter was very much on his mind and that he proposed to ask a question about it. I am anxious not to say anything, without pretty careful consideration, about a matter which is of immediate gravity because, as I understand the reports we have received, this is a matter of immediate gravity. I do not want to be panicky or unnecessarily alarming about it, but there are reports that Russian penetration is going on in Syria to an alarming extent and that there are moves inside Syria which might result in the domestic control of that country by a

group which seems quite willing to work with the Soviets in this matter. That is not a prospect that can cause anything but alarm. There are the same elements in other Arab countries, but we must hope that these countries themselves will take some steps to prevent that kind of development.

As for the other part of his question, whether the United Nations force should be increased to take care of a situation of this kind, the numbers of that force are not yet determined. I suspect that before long we will find it very greatly increased over its present number, but it has been set up to deal with a situation arising out of a cessation of hostilities between Israel on the one side and the United Kingdom and France and Egypt on the other, and its present terms of reference would not authorize it to intervene in any other dispute between any other two countries. But the United Nations Assembly is in session, and if we can set up a United Nations force for one purpose surely we can extend its functions and activities for another desirable purpose. I would hope that if the situation began to deteriorate beyond the point which required that kind of extension it would be done at this Assembly very quickly.

All I wish to say in my closing words is that the question of strengthening co-operation among the Western democracies, especially among the United States, the United Kingdom, France and, of course, Canada, is one which must be kept in our minds behind all the present emergencies that have strained and weakened that co-operation. We must do what we can without recrimination to bring it back.

It is in that spirit, Mr. Speaker, that we shall continue our efforts at the United Nations to find solutions to problems which remain difficult and dangerous and have created situations which, if they are allowed to persist, can indeed be a very real threat to peace . . .

Mr. Nesbitt: Is the Secretary of State for External Affairs in a position to give us any idea as to the extent to which Russian arms were accepted by Egypt prior to the immediate trouble, and also by Syria?

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I assume that when we get in committee I will have the opportunity of trying to answer a number of questions of this kind, but on the direct question I might say that we knew, of course, as was mentioned in the House last summer, that Russian arms and Russian equipment were going into Egypt. That was well-known. It was also known they were going into Syria, though not in the quantities in which they have been going there in recent weeks. It was our impression at that time that the Russian

arms going into Egypt were for the purpose of strengthening the Egyptian Army. It is probably also true that Russian technicians went in with those arms. We did not know

and we had no reason to believe that these arms were going into Egypt for any other purpose at that time than to strengthen the Egyptian Army for use in military operations.

Mr. L. B. Pearson (November 29)

... During the earlier discussion of this subject I was asked to enlighten the House in respect to several matters. One matter was the reason we had not previously taken action in regard to a United Nations police force in this particular area. Another was—and this has been brought up again by the hon. member for Greenwood—the relationship of our action to Commonwealth unity...

The hon. member for Prince Albert asked particularly for enlightenment, as he put it, in regard to our previous attitude toward a United Nations emergency force for this particular area. I think he is satisfied with what I said earlier about our general attitude toward putting forces under the United Nations for general purposes and the difficulty of doing that under the Security Council organization as it is at present. I am sorry he is not able to be here this afternoon to decide whether or not what I am going to say about this matter is enlightenment. I would point out, and I have made a pretty careful survey of our record in this regard, that it was as early as 1953 that we discussed, with representatives of the United Kingdom Government in the course of our diplomatic exchange of views, the possibility of replacing the truce supervisory organization in the Palestine area with a police force which would have greater powers, and greater authority, and be able to do things which the truce organization could not possibly do, thereby making the situation easier and making war more difficult.

At that time, in 1953, the matter also came up, though not in public discussion, at the General Assembly of the United Nations. We had previous discussions with the British and took the matter up with the Secretary-General, who had himself been considering it. We were told at that time that in his opinion it would not be a desirable move to make publicly at the United Nations General Assembly.

That was in 1953. Then later, in 1955, when I happened to be in Cairo, I discussed this question with General Burns who came over from Jerusalem to see me, and we went over the question of the advisability of making a proposal at the next Assembly—that would have been the Assembly we are at now—for a United Nations force to patrol the boundary not only between Egypt and Israel, but be-

tween Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and Israel. On my return to Ottawa we brought this question up again when Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd visited us here, I think in January 1956. We also took the question up in Paris with the French Government. At that time the governments which I have mentioned, the British Government and the French Government, did not feel that this was a practicable proposition.

One reason they did not feel that way was that they themselves had been discussing it with the United States and the United States was hesitant about the wisdom at that time of trying to introduce a police force on the borders, with a demilitarized zone. Behind all this hesitation and objection, if you like, was the fact that—neither the Government of Israel nor the Government of any one of the Arab states was in favour of that kind of force. I can assure the Committee we have received arguments from the Government of Israel which indicate why they did not favour that kind of force.

What it was thought might be done at that time was to increase the truce observation organization. That was done, and Canada did send additional officers to it. It was with that background that the discussion was introduced in the House here last January or February—I forget the exact date—by the hon. member for Prince Albert, and it was with that background that I expressed some hesitation as to whether it was a wise move to make at that time. But I did mention the matter again in the Committee on External Affairs... on April 17, 1956:

The idea of an international force for Palestine—which a few weeks ago got a good deal of attention—

I was referring to the debate in the House. —does not appear now to be regarded on either side, the Jewish side or the Arab side, or by the others most concerned—as practicable.

I meant the United Kingdom, the United States and the French Governments,

That was my statement to the Committee, and no reference was made by any member of the Committee to that matter subsequently. Therefore I assumed that they accepted that statement of the impracticability of this move at that time.

As I think I said on an other occasion, what the three countries most concerned, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, apart from Israel and the Arab states, desired to do was to use the tripartite agreement for the purpose of preventing an outbreak in that area. And it is one of the unhappy aspects of this tragedy that this agreement fell by the wayside in the events of last summer.

So much, then, for the origin of the idea of the United Nations force. There was an occasion, however, a few weeks ago, when a resolution of this kind, under the circumstances which then existed, could be taken up and made effective by the United Nations Assembly, and that was done. But I would point out to my hon. friends opposite who have all, I think, without exception expressed themselves as being in favour of the idea of a United Nations force and even felt that it should have been in existence long before the crisis, that if the Canadian Delegation had taken the action at the first meeting of the United Nations Special Assembly which some of them have suggested we should have taken, to support the United Kingdom and France in their efforts to prevent the consideration of this question at the United Nations Assembly in that action, and if that support and that of other members of the Assembly had been effective, there could have been no consideration of any United Nations force at this time, or possibly at any other time in the future.

I think that is a valid point to make, because when the Canadian Delegation voted against the United Kingdom and France on that first measure before the Assembly I was charged by some hon. members opposite as lining up with Russia and the United States. But if we had not defeated that move we would never have been able to introduce a resolution for a United Nations force, and when that resolution was first introduced it got—

Mr. Brooks: Did not Great Britain and France ask for a United Nations force?

Mr. Pearson: Well, I shall try to explain that. What I am talking about now is the first session of the Special Assembly of the United Nations after everything had collapsed in the Security Council. When that Assembly met the first item before it was the putting of this Middle Eastern question from the Security Council on the agenda of the Assembly. If it had not been put on the agenda we could not have discussed the question at all, and the Special Assembly would have dissolved and there would have been no opportunity to bring up the United Nations

force proposal at that time. The United Kingdom and France, for reasons which they thought were quite good, did attempt to keep this matter off the agenda. A few days later, when the proposal was made for a United Nations force, it got a very large vote and no member of the Assembly voted against it. But the United Kingdom and France again—and I am not criticizing, because they felt this to be the proper course for them to follow—abstained with regard to the proposal for a United Nations force which they have subsequently found, I think, to be very helpful to them in the solution of the difficulties we are all in now. That abstention on their part, from their point of view, was a perfectly reasonable one, just as abstention on our part under certain circumstances seems to us also to be perfectly reasonable.

United Nations Control

The hon. member for St. Paul's and others have asked me a good many questions about the functions of this Force, how it is going to operate, what is the chain of command, and what is the relationship of this Force to the government of the country in which it is operating. It is not easy to answer all these questions at the present time because the organization, the function and the principles under which the Force is to operate, its relationship not only to the government of the country in which it is operating but to the governments which have sent troops to the Force—all these things we are now trying to work out. I assure my hon. friend that that work is certainly not completed. The Force is operating under the resolution to which I referred earlier, which is now in effect and which authorizes it to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of a previous resolution, the resolution which was passed two or three days before, and which in general does lay down the functions of the Force.

Those functions under that earlier resolution were to bring about a cease-fire, and that has been done; to bring about the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line; to desist from raids across the armistice line into neighbouring territory; to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreement, and to take steps to re-open the Suez Canal and to restore and secure freedom of navigation.

The Assembly has ordered all these things to be done, and the Force itself is to police the doing of them. In line with certain principles and functions which have been approved by the Assembly and which are put

out in detail in a United Nations document which has been tabled (A-3302 of November 6) this is the final report of the Secretary-General on the plans for this Emergency Force, and especially paragraphs 6 to 12 which outline his idea of how it should function.

Now, it is of cardinal importance that in this functioning the Force should be under United Nations control and not under the control or dictation of any one member of the United Nations, including Egypt. I tried to make it as clear as I could the other day, and I have tried to make it clear at the United Nations General Assembly, that we would not accept any other interpretation of the functions, the tasks and the duties of this Force.

I know that in this debate some very hard and harsh words have been used against the dictator of Egypt, and I certainly am not here to defend him. But I think it is also well to remember there is a relationship between this Force and the Arab peoples, and we certainly do not want to divide ourselves completely from the Arab peoples in these matters. Therefore we have to recognize, I think, that those peoples, especially the people in Egypt as represented for better or for worse by their government, do have a special relationship with a force which is operating in their territory. I can assure the Committee again, however, if assurance is needed, that we would not accept any principle of action at the United Nations, or participate for long in any force, if that force is in danger of being controlled and dominated by the leader of the Government of Egypt. That has already come up in the advisory committee of seven and it will come up again. I can give the Committee an assurance that that is the stand we will take, and I am quite sure we will have the support of practically all the members of the Committee in that stand and the support of the Secretary-General himself.

I have listened in previous discussions, Mr. Chairman, to a good many statements to the effect that the action of the United Kingdom and France has saved the world from Russian domination and control of the Middle East. Well, I am not going to go into that at this time, but there is another side to this question. We should also ask ourselves in considering all sides of the question whether the action that has been taken has weakened or strengthened the position of the U.S.S.R. in this area by giving the U.S.S.R. a special relationship to Egypt and to the Arab and Asian states, which has been illustrated by some of the alignments in the United Nations at this time. I do not for one minute criticize the motives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in intervening

in Egypt at this time. I may have thought their intervention was not wise, but I do not criticize their purposes.

It has been suggested, and this is one of the questions that was asked me in the previous debate, whether by our own actions in not aligning ourselves on all occasions at the United Nations with the United Kingdom and France we had not contributed to the weakening and division of the Commonwealth and the weakening and division of the Western Coalition.

Commonwealth Division

Mr. Chairman, I have just one thing to say about that. That division within the Commonwealth resulting from the British action would have occurred whether or not we had voted on every occasion with the British delegation down there. We did not create the division. It certainly would have existed between the Asian members of the Commonwealth and the other members whether or not we had lined up with those other members, and I think we have to be very careful when we talk about the unity of the Commonwealth and co-operation within the Commonwealth—and it is something we should not only talk about but should do what we can to bring about—never to forget there are three Asian members of that Commonwealth. However, our efforts to bring them into closer association with the Commonwealth and to keep them there surely should not mean that even within this association we have not got a very special relationship of intimacy and friendship with the old members of the Commonwealth including above all our mother country in the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom.

All I am trying to point out now is that our actions at the United Nations, criticize them if you like, did not bring about a division in the Commonwealth. Indeed I am compelled to say that our actions and the attitude we adopted did help and are still helping to heal the divisions which are within the Commonwealth at this time. If we had not taken the position we did take on these matters at the United Nations we would not have been in the position where we could have performed what I think to be a constructive role by bringing not only the members of the Commonwealth closer together again, but, and this in some respects under the present circumstances is even more important, by bringing the United States, the British and the French closer together again.

No Canadian at the United Nations who has to get up and declare the policy of his Government can feel anything but an agoniz-

ing regret when he finds himself on the other side of an issue from the representative of the United Kingdom. Over the years since we have had to take charge of our own foreign affairs we have had ample reason to respect and be grateful for the wisdom and experience of the United Kingdom at international conferences and in international matters, and over the years we have nearly always found ourselves in substantial agreement with the United Kingdom. At times we have been in agreement with the United Kingdom but not in agreement with the United States, but on this occasion in some of these measures before the United Nations and indeed in respect of the original cause of this meeting of the United Nations we could not support 100 per cent the actions of the United Kingdom and France.

Believe me, Mr. Chairman, that does not mean we are weakening in any respect in our feeling of admiration, respect and affection for the mother country of the Commonwealth. It was in that spirit, even when we disagreed at the United Nations, that we tried to be as helpful and constructive as possible, and to bring about a situation where disagreement would not be necessary in the future; I think, Mr. Chairman, that has happened. I am optimistic enough to believe that in so far as co-operation within the Commonwealth and co-operation within the Western coalition is concerned we have gone through the hardest of our experiences in the last two or three weeks, that the situation is changing and that we will come closer together again. The speech made this afternoon in the House of Commons in London by the Foreign Secretary of the Government of the United Kingdom gives some indication, I believe, that this is true. We must all devoutly hope, and I am sure all hon. members of this House do hope, that it will be true. If there is anything any of us can do to bring about this work of restoration and reinvigoration within the Commonwealth and within the Western coalition all of us, I know, will be very proud indeed to do it.

The hon. member for Prince Albert said this morning when he made the interesting proposal that there should be a high level conference in Quebec to pursue this objective that Canada was in an enviable position in these matters, and that because of that position we have special privileges and special responsibilities.

I agree that we have in many respects an enviable position, but it is also a position of some responsibility. If it is enviable I venture to suggest that our actions at the United Nations in the last three weeks have not made it less enviable.

Leaving these controversial aspects of the question aside for the moment, I know I am speaking for every hon. member in the House when I say we can now look forward to the time when there will be a closer and more intimate relationship in the Commonwealth, which includes three great nations of Asia, and in a Western coalition which must have as its core the closest kind of co-operation and intimacy among the United States, the United Kingdom and France. That is the job for us to do from now on, and I hope we will all be able to pursue it so that we will bring about a better state of affairs in the world than we have been experiencing in these last months.

Mr. Hansell: On page 64 of *Hansard* of November 27 the Minister is reported as having said:

Twenty-three nations have offered contributions to that force and eight of them including Canada, have seen their contributions embodied in the formations on the spot which are now working together under the United Nations blue flag of peace.

Could the Minister enumerate the 23 nations and also indicate who the 8 are so that we can be brought up to date? I am interested in knowing how many of what are usually called the Russian satellite states are interested in this force.

Mr. Pearson: The following eight countries have offered contributions which are now embodied in the United Nations Emergency Force in one form or another: Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

There are 15 countries which have offered contributions which have not yet been taken up, though they have not been rejected. If hon. members will follow this list carefully they will realize that the Secretary-General has a delicate and difficult task in bringing about what he called a balanced composition in the Force. This may help to understand the delicacy of his relationship to the Government of Egypt. In connection with the composition of this Force, he is the man who with the advice of the advisory council and in the last analysis the full Assembly determines the composition. He is trying to bring that about in a way which will secure the maximum co-operation from the government of the country in which the force is operating. The following are the countries which have not yet been asked by him to send forward contingents to this force: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and Roumania.

Mr. Bandaranaike Visits Ottawa



DISTINGUISHED VISITOR

The Hon. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, spent several days in Ottawa early this month. He was met on his arrival in the capital by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, with whom he is seen above.

The Prime Minister of Ceylon, the Honourable S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, arrived in Ottawa on Monday, November 26, for a short visit as the guest of the Government of Canada. The Prime Minister and his party, including the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. Gunasena de Soya, and his private secretary, Mr. Duncan de Alwis, landed at Uplands Airport and were met by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce.

His Excellency the Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, C. H., invited the Prime Minister and his party to be his guests at Government House and entertained on Monday evening at dinner in honour of the visitors. Mr. Bandaranaike called on Prime Minister Louis S. St. Laurent on Tuesday morning and was the guest of the Prime Minister later at luncheon in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister of Ceylon also called on the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

While in Ottawa, Mr. Bandaranaike attended the opening of Parliament on Monday afternoon and the morning session the next day.

Canada and the United Nations

ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THE Eleventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations opened in New York on November 12.

The composition of the Canadian Delegation is as follows: *Representatives*—Mr. Lester B. Pearson, M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs (Chairman of the Delegation); Mr. Roch Pinard, M.P., Secretary of State (Vice-Chairman of the Delegation); Mr. Lucien Cardin, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Senator D. A. Croll, Toronto, Ontario; R. A. MacKay, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York; *Alternate Representatives*—Mrs. M. A. Shipley, Member of Parliament for Temiskaming; Mr. Gérard Legaré, Member of Parliament for Rimouski; Mr. John Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. F. H. Soward, Associate Dean, Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of British Columbia; Mr. S. Pollock, Department of Finance; *Special Adviser*—Miss Kathleen E. Bowlby, National Secretary, United Nations Association in Canada.

Advisers for the Delegation are drawn from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Finance and the Canadian Permanent Mission to United Nations in New York.

Elections

Prince Wan Waithayakon, of Thailand, was unanimously elected President of the Assembly, succeeding José Maza, of Chile. Representatives of El Salvador, the United States, United Kingdom, India, France, the U.S.S.R., China and Italy were elected Vice-Presidents.

The following were named Chairmen of Committees: First Committee—Political and Security, Mr. Victor Andres Belaunde, (Peru); Ad Hoc Political Committee, Mr. Selim Sarper, (Turkey); Second Committee—Economic and Financial, Mr. Mir Khan, (Pakistan); Third Committee—Social, Humanitarian and Cultural, Mr. Hermod Lannung, (Denmark); Fourth Committee—Trusteeship, Mr. Enrique de Marchena, (Dominican Republic); Fifth Committee—Administrative and Budgetary, Mr. Omar Loutfi, (Egypt); Sixth Committee—Legal, Mr. Karel Petrzelka, (Czechoslovakia).

Admission of New Members

Immediately after his election, the President brought before the Assembly the applications for membership of three new states, the Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco, whose admission had previously been unanimously recommended by the Security Council. Resolutions endorsing the Security Council action, and sponsored by twenty-two countries, were promptly introduced and passed unanimously, whereupon the delegates of the new members took their seats in the Assembly Hall. The admission of these three states brought to a total of 79 the number of member countries of the United Nations.

Adoption of the Agenda

On November 13, the General Assembly endorsed a recommendation by the General Committee that the Assembly take up in plenary, without reference to a Committee, the questions of the Middle East and Hungary which had been referred to it at the conclusion of the Special Emergency Session of the Assembly on November 10.¹ Thereafter, the course of the General Debate, which opened on November 16, was interrupted from time to time to allow discussion of these two subjects. The Canadian statement in the general debate² was delivered on December 5 by the Secretary of State, the Hon. Roch Pinard. (The text is given below).

Consideration of the rest of the agenda was completed by the General Committee on November 14 and on the following day the General Assembly accepted its recommendation to consider a total of 69 items, including the controversial questions of Cyprus, Algeria, West Irian and two items relating to South Africa. The General Assembly also endorsed a recommendation by the General Committee to change the name of the Ad Hoc Political Committee to the Special Political Committee, and decided to recess on December 23, to reconvene on January 2, 1957 and to set February 15, 1957 as the target closing date of the Session.

Partial Boycott by South Africa

Canada voted in favour of the inscription of both the item on the treatment of Indians in South Africa (No. 24) and the item on Apartheid (No. 61). Mr. Louw, the South African Minister for External Affairs and leader of the South African Delegation, vigorously opposed inscription of these items and in the course of his intervention in the General Assembly asserted that this would be the last occasion on which a South African Delegation would state its objections to the inscription of these items on the agenda.

In the general debate on November 27, Mr. Louw stated that, as a result of the inscription of the South African items, his country would maintain a partial boycott of the United Nations, including a reduction of the staff of its Permanent Delegation, until the world organization stopped what he alleged to be interference in South African internal affairs. Mr. Louw indicated that his government's decision was based on the contention that, with respect to the two South African items, the United Nations had eleven times violated Article 2 (7) of the Charter on matters of purely domestic jurisdiction. He concluded: "We are not willing any longer to be even an unwilling party to the continued interference in the Union's domestic affairs."

Chinese Representation

After lengthy debate the General Assembly decided by a roll-call vote of 47 to 24 with 8 abstentions not to include in its agenda the item proposed by India on the "representation of China in the United Nations." The vote was a resolution recommended by the General Committee, and originally proposed by the United States, under the terms of which the Assembly decided not to

¹"External Affairs", November 1956.

²A report on the Middle Eastern and Hungarian items will be included in the January issue of the Bulletin.

consider, at this Session, "any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China".

Following is the text of Mr Pinard's statement on December 5 in the general debate:

Mr. President, in the brief but turbulent history of the United Nations, there was surely never a time when we stood in more obvious need of the humane and objective viewpoint represented, if I may say so, Mr. President, by your own qualities of calm intelligence and broad understanding. The Assembly is fortunate indeed to have you as our President as we seek the rational and peaceful solutions which we must find if we are all to avoid the "universal disaster" you spoke of in your address of welcome to the new members.

I should like to add my own word of sincere welcome to our new members. We can rejoice that our organization now more faithfully represents the world as it is in all its diversity. We look forward to the early admission of those who have not yet taken their rightful place among us—notably Japan, whom we confidently expect to welcome before this session is ended—a welcome too long delayed. Nor can we be satisfied until the German people are properly represented here—and the unhappily divided nations of Korea and Vietnam. Then we hope soon to have among us new states like Ghana, the former Gold Coast, which, thanks to the energy and initiative of its people and enlightened colonial policy, are now taking their place as stable members of the world community.

This expansion of our organization does, however, present us with some new problems. There is danger that we might dissipate our energies in the confusion of voices and stagger under our own weight into anarchy. We cannot continue to act as we did when, though certainly never streamlined, we were a smaller company. We shall require enormous self-discipline if we are to meet the increasing necessity for swift, effective and above all, responsible action.

Increasingly, also, we are dividing ourselves as members of the United Nations into smaller groups. I think that this is in many respects a healthy phenomenon. It can be a partial solution to the problem of size I have just mentioned. When there is not time to hear every voice, there is a good deal to be said for choirs. Most of our groups, moreover are not hard blocs. They are flexible and they are fortunately not exclusive. It is natural and fitting that like-minded countries should work together; but it is neither natural nor fitting

when a group is forced to become so superficially at least united that it automatically votes as one, on even the most unimportant procedural issues. Fortunately for the work of our organization, there is only one such bloc—and even here there have of late been hopeful signs of a restless intelligence at work. May the rest of us refuse to move backwards, because the only result of the ossification of blocs will be that the United Nations will grind to a stagnant halt; with the veto of the single state in the Security Council replaced by the veto of the voting bloc in the Assembly.

Perhaps some will say, Mr. President, that this is today more than ever a Great Power world—a world of the super-powers—in which the freedom of action and influence of the lesser, the non-atomic powers is circumscribed as never before. While the greatest powers have the obligation to do what they can to see that the big issues are dealt with through the United Nations, and not only when it suits them, we of the smaller powers have the no less direct imperative to make it possible, by our actions and attitudes in the United Nations, for the great powers to have no excuse for bypassing it. If we lesser powers act with discretion and a recognition of our responsibilities, we are not powerless. If we do not, if we concern ourselves only with our own national, or group or racial interests, then the United Nations will soon cease to be a place where the bigger powers co-operate with us and with themselves for any common purpose.

At this late stage in our general debate, Mr. President, there are only two or three topics on which I should like to comment. The Chairman of my Delegation has already outlined the position of the Canadian Government on developments in the Middle East and in Hungary.

About the Middle East I wish only to state my belief that the success or failure of the experiment which we have set in motion here may well determine whether in our lifetime the influence of the United Nations will grow or wither. Nothing remains static for long. New challenges arise in new forms; and if we cannot meet the central challenge of organizing—as the distinguished Foreign Minister of Norway put it the other day—peace with justice through the United Nations, that

attempt will be made outside the United Nations and with less and less regard for the common standard to which we have all subscribed in the Charter. It is my conviction, and that of my Government, that our best hope for attaining peace with justice is to work through the United Nations. In the long run this will be possible in practical terms to the extent that we can organize ourselves within the United Nations in order to be able to do more than pass resolutions calling for cease-fires or condemning aggressions.

Now, I would not for a moment underrate the enormous moral effect which such resolutions of the General Assembly have in mobilizing public opinion, at least in the countries where such pressures act directly upon governments. But can we not go further? I feel that the time may be ripe for taking the next step in international co-operation to secure the peace.

The distinguished representative of Iran, whose long experience and wise judgment are respected by every member of this Assembly, pointed out to us on November 29 that the force which the United Nations has placed in Egypt is not an international army as those who framed the Charter intended the United Nations to have. Mr. Entezam went on:

Nonetheless, the establishment of this international police force represents a great step forward and it is such as to facilitate at a later stage the organization of this international army without which, despite the moral influence of our Organization, the implementation of its decisions could never be fully assured.

Experiment Must Succeed

The United Nations is a collectivity of fully sovereign states. We must recognize that up to the present time we have not been successful in organizing in advance a United Nations police force ready for action anywhere at any time. Since the Korean experience, we have tried through the Assembly to have member governments earmark units of their armed forces for United Nations police action. Although I think the Canadian Government went at least as far as any others in this respect, no government was prepared without any qualification to place its forces at the disposal of the United Nations in advance for such a purpose.

If, for the time being, we must accept this as a fact, we need not, I think, be thrown back wholly on the moral effect of what we say here and the resolutions which we adopt. As the Middle Eastern experiment has already shown, we have the possibility of using an

intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and fighting a war. The United Nations Emergency Force is not so much a fighting force as a police contingent endowed with international authority which the United Nations has interposed between forces which have themselves accepted a cease-fire and the obligation to withdraw on the understanding that the United Nations would put its own independent forces into the area to secure and supervise the cease-fire. This experiment must succeed because we all recognized in this Assembly that it would be much too dangerous to allow it to fail. It is our hope and expectation that no country, large or small, would withhold co-operation either in making contributions, if requested, to this international Force, or in letting it operate in its own territory, for the alternative would be to risk a local conflict developing into something more general and dangerous.

If our experiment works—and that is, of course, the first prerequisite—it may be that the United Nations might usefully consider some means of having units of armed forces of the smaller countries made available at short notice for such supervisory duties, on the call of the United Nations. The United Nations might also think of a permanent organization available to the appropriate United Nations authority to provide the necessary central machinery which would organize their contributions and put their forces effectively into operation when the need arises. I want to make it clear that I am not hinting necessarily that the present United Nations Emergency Force be made into a permanent force, although we should build upon the experience of that experiment. Shall we go back once again to the situation in which the United Nations found itself both in June 1950 and in November 1956, when everything had to be improvised, when there were no units, and no financial and administrative procedures to which the Secretary-General could turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate situation.

If the Secretary-General had had such an organization available in September and ready for use in our time of emergency many of the difficulties and delays which arose might have been avoided. The Secretary-General's truly amazing energy and devotion brought something together out of nothing with remarkable speed. But we have not the right, in all prudence, to expect the same miracle to be accomplished next time with the same success and speed. And next time—if there is one—we would wish to make sure that a cease-fire would be sustained and the United Nations forces would arrive in time, so that there

would be no danger of a local outbreak of fighting growing into a general conflagration. That is the nub of our problem for the future. If we do not begin to think about a longer term solution of this problem, we may miss the psychological moment when national governments may perhaps be prepared, under the impact of recent events, to commit themselves to such procedures in advance for the sake of increasing the collective authority of our organization.

Even while considering how we can best organize collective security through the United Nations within the limitations of our situation, we must not neglect, Mr. President, the parallel efforts which have to be made to reach solutions of the points of most acute friction and danger. We must not imagine, needless to say, that the creation of this or any other international force will solve the acute problems we face. Such a force is a most useful instrument for ensuring a negative kind of peace. But peace to be lasting must be positive.

As Israeli, French and United Kingdom forces are withdrawn in accordance with the General Assembly's cease-fire resolution, and as the United Nations Emergency Force is moved into the area, a momentum for peace is created which should not stop short of a political settlement of both the Palestine and Suez questions. A cease-fire is better than fighting; but it is precarious at best and must be used to begin work here and now on a political settlement which will provide an honourable and secure basis for the lasting peace of the area. This is not a settlement which can be imposed by the international force. It must be a settlement on which all interested parties agree. The Force is the instrument of the settlement, not its creator. An international force to hold the ring can be useful, and in the short term necessary; but it is no substitute for grappling with the more intractable political problems before the sense of urgency and danger has gone out of them, leaving the same old tinder exposed for the next explosion. The world, the United Nations, cannot afford another such explosion.

It might be asserted by some that in the present circumstances of increased international tension there is little point in expecting serious discussion of disarmament at this session of the General Assembly. While it is true that progress towards agreement on disarmament cannot be divorced from the international situation in general, nevertheless the need to make a start, however modest, towards disarmament grows steadily more urgent. The rate of scientific development, particularly in the field of nuclear and thermo-

nuclear armaments, and in the means of delivering them, and the growing realization of the terrible consequences of the use of such weapons compel us all to continue the effort to agree at least on the beginnings of a disarmament programme.

Soviet Proposals

Two weeks ago the U.S.S.R. made public proposals on disarmament and on methods of negotiation. This move was made in sinister circumstances indeed. It came at a time when almost all governments in the world were condemning Soviet savagery in Hungary. The Soviet Government statement was followed within a few hours by the cynical announcement of a large-scale nuclear explosion, and their proposals were also accompanied by boasts about the vast military might of the U.S.S.R. In such circumstances we must consider carefully how much credence we can put in the assertions of the same Soviet leaders of their peaceful intentions. As prudent men who have a responsibility to our several peoples we must make certain that our desire for peace does not expose those who have given us office to the same dark power of tyranny which stalks Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless the Canadian Government are prepared to show their faith in the United Nations by approaching these proposals of the U.S.S.R. for an examination of their merits as though they had been put forward in less equivocal circumstances.

Some of the proposals are quite familiar. Indeed the general framework appears to us to be the same as recent Soviet plans. The main new element is an apparent readiness to accept the principle of aerial inspection. If this acceptance proves to be real it will represent an advance which we could regard with satisfaction. It would be the one spark of hopefulness to come from Moscow in these gloomy weeks of crisis. But although the value of aerial inspection appears to be gaining acceptance among the Soviet leaders they seemingly have yet to grasp its principal merit. It would be an advantage if the secret manoeuvres of the Red Army could no longer be executed threateningly right on the borders of the Western world. But the greatest danger to mankind lies in the massive surprise assault with all the modern apparatus of mass destruction. The Soviet proposals still would afford no means of gaining assurance that forces of destruction were not being prepared in the vast regions of the Soviet Union.

Having said this, I would repeat that we are prepared to join in the examination of the Soviet proposals. It has always been our view that the United Nations offers the proper

framework for achieving disarmament. But we have never thought that the substance of the problem could be brought nearer solution by increasing the number of the negotiators. We therefore look with scepticism on the Soviet suggestion for a conference based upon the participation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. And while we in Canada would welcome any advance which might be initiated by exchanges between the great powers, we are doubtful that in the present tense situation any helpful results could be hoped for. It is no use pretending that confidence has not been severely shaken and that an improved political context has not become necessary.

Insofar as we may draw conclusions for the general terms in which the Soviet proposals are presented, we fear that these proposals, like too many of their predecessors, may be aimed simply at the weakening of the non-communist world, particularly by the disruption of NATO, and at continuing the division of Germany and of all Europe. We shall continue to hope, however, that there is some more constructive approach to the problem of Germany and of Europe involved. On the crucial question of control the proposals give no sign of readiness to clarify the Soviet attitude, which has never come from behind its veil of obscurity. Nor do they reflect the difficulties, which the Russians acknowledge to exist, of detecting concealed stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we will study these Soviet proposals with great care. We will never refuse any opportunity to seek after even the germ of an agreement on disarmament.

Nuclear Tests

My Delegation was much impressed, as I am sure others were, by the suggestion of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Norway last week that there should be some kind of United Nations registration of nuclear test explosions. In my opinion, it is neither necessary nor realistic to contemplate an immediate ban on all such tests. That is our conclusion after weighing the best scientific evidence which we have. But the scientists are the first ones to admit that their evidence is by no means complete or conclusive. They are somewhat reassuring about the present level of radiation in our atmosphere but while the averages appear to be comforting, an overdose in one small locality might occur. Therefore, while we can take limited comfort from the absence of alarming conclusions—or indeed any conclusions—in the interim report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, it does not seem to me that we would be justified in looking

into the future with equanimity. My view is the United Nations should give close attention to the question of nuclear tests and I can assure you that we will support the Norwegian proposal for early and serious consideration of the whole matter.

It seems to me that any agreement on nuclear tests is likely to be in the nature of a compromise. We must be guided by two considerations: we must try to meet whatever may be competently estimated as the requirements of the objective scientific situation and we must enable the needs of defence in a dangerously divided world to be given reasonable satisfaction. Because both of these are indefinite quantities there can for the present time be no facile and final solution, and I do not think we can hope to find a satisfactory arrangement, even of a temporary character, which fails to take into account either consideration. So long as the nuclear powers continue to conduct tests at their own discretion there will be widespread agitation to change the situation, but so long as the proposed solutions exaggerate the importance of one of these two factors and wholly neglect the other they are unlikely to provide an acceptable basis for negotiation.

If we consider what we may hope to achieve in present circumstances, I think we may all conclude that we should try to help the nuclear powers in the first instance to agree that they should set, as a self-denying ordinance, some annual or other periodic limit on the volume of radiation to be generated by test explosions. There would have to be some agreed method of allocating quantities between the powers concerned. To maintain confidence there would also have to be some arrangements for notification of the proposed tests and for their verification—and this need not in my view give rise to insuperable difficulties. A system along these lines might serve for the near future during which it might be reviewed from time to time in the light of the data on radiation hazards which the UN Scientific Committee will be gathering. It would be my hope that in due course this interim measure would be supplanted by a disarmament agreement which would deal in a more definite way with nuclear weapons as well as other aspects of disarmament.

Mr. President, although our efforts these past few weeks have necessarily been directed toward a search for lasting solutions to the critical political issues which beset the international community, we must not permit our preoccupation with these problems to divert our attention from the need for increasing co-operation in pursuit of the economic and other objectives of the Charter. It has been suggested that the political problems with

which we are confronted are so serious that useful initiatives in other fields should not be attempted. However, it is the belief of my Delegation that, as the members of the international community demonstrate their ability and willingness to co-operate in finding constructive solutions in the political field, so our capacity and our responsibility for finding better and more dynamic methods for strengthening the international economic fabric are enhanced.

I believe also that we should consider the best methods for assisting the countries of the Middle East to restore their normal economic life following the present crisis and to make plans for continuing economic progress and growth. The United Nations should ensure that any political settlements in the Middle East crisis take account of the need for solution of the pressing economic problems of that area.

I believe also that the United Nations should continue to improve and strengthen the programmes which have been initiated to assist the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. To this end, my Delegation will propose in the Second Com-

mittee that the United Nations undertake a study of existing programmes of bilateral and multilateral economic aid in the expectation that such a study will result in better understanding of the scope and nature of the problems still to be resolved. This suggestion will be designed to promote, through an exchange of information, co-ordination of the economic aid programmes which are now being conducted under the United Nations' umbrella or outside it. A better understanding of the scope of existing programmes and of the experience acquired in implementing them would undoubtedly pave the way to more informed and realistic consideration of SUNFED and other programmes which will be under consideration.

In conclusion, may I say that although we may find this session somewhat frightening and discouraging, it has nevertheless accomplished useful work. Our concrete realizations as yet are few, but we do see the hope of progress which could change for the better the great experiment of this Assembly in international co-operation. We have all learned a great deal in the past few weeks, and the experience should make us wiser in the future.



—UN Photo

PLEDGING CONFERENCE

Dr. R. A. Mackay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, signs the Final Act of the 7th Technical Assistance Conference at which 63 countries pledged an amount equivalent to \$29,245,772 to the 1957 Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Subject to the approval of Parliament, Canada will contribute \$2,000,000.

Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation

THE latest report of the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation released November 1 records continued progress in the provision of technical assistance to the countries of South and South-East Asia and indicates the extent of Canadian participation in this co-operative undertaking.

CONTRIBUTION OF \$34,400,000 TO COLOMBO PLAN

Subject to Parliamentary approval, a Canadian contribution of an amount of \$34,400,000 will be made in the fiscal year 1957-58 to assist countries in South and South-East Asia participating in the Colombo Plan. The announcement was made at Wellington, New Zealand, December 6 by Mr. Paul Martin, leader of the Canadian delegation to the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Plan. A similar amount for assistance to Colombo Plan countries has been made available during the present fiscal year, 1956-57. This will mean that since the beginning of the Colombo Plan in 1950 Canada will have contributed by March 31, 1958 a total of \$198,800,000 to the Colombo Plan.

As in the past, Canada's 1957-58 contribution will continue to assist economic development projects in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Part of the Canadian contribution will also be devoted to economic development projects in other member countries. In addition to the capital aid provided, a percentage of the money will be devoted to the technical assistance programme.

Canadian assistance under the Colombo Plan has been to a large extent concentrated on power developments, on building up transport and communication systems and on surveys of natural resources.

The technical assistance has been in three forms: equipment for training and research; supply of experts to member governments to advise on the implementation of projects requiring technical skill and knowledge; and training of young men and women from South and South-East Asia in science and technology to enable them to undertake development programmes in their own countries. Up to June 1956, the total number of experts provided was 572; training facilities arranged were 4,227 and the value of research equipment supplied exceeded £2 million. The table below gives the number of experts and training facilities provided by the donor countries:

<i>Supplying Country</i>	<i>Experts provided</i>	<i>Training facilities provided</i>
Australia	175	1,610
Canada	101	504
Ceylon	2	23
India	20	462
Japan	23	17
New Zealand	53	307
Pakistan	—	30
United Kingdom	198	1,274

The Government of the United States of America and the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies had also supplied to the countries of the region 4,397 experts and 5,933 training places or fellowships during the period.

Symbol of This Age

These figures, however, the Report points out, are an inadequate index of the actual extent of international co-operation in technology that is evident in the area. Essentially, the Technical Co-operation Scheme of the Colombo Plan is "not entirely a matter of business" and cannot be covered by any verbal formula or statistical compilation. "Like some other institutions," the Report says, "that had made a mark on the world by moral force rather than by material strength alone, by unspoken understandings rather than by defined powers, the Colombo Plan has attained a greatness incommensurate with any formal constitution that its founders might have given it. In seven years it has become one of the sturdiest symbols of this age: a symbol of aspiration and hope".

This enthusiasm for the Colombo Plan in the member countries, the Report points out, is mainly because in the Plan there is "an implied recognition of nationalism, a movement never stronger anywhere than in Asia today". Observing that capital accumulation in its early stages has been preceded everywhere by hard work, hard thinking and real sacrifice, the Report says that "fine examples of this work and sacrifice are now to be seen in South Asia and in every instance they are inspired, mobilized and aimed towards a common end by the impulse to bring a nation into existence, or to make it great once it has been born".

Technical Co-operation Scheme

The Technical Co-operation Scheme of the Colombo Plan is supervised by a Council with its headquarters in Colombo. The Council derives its authority from the Consultative Committee consisting of ministers of the member governments. The Scheme started with an initial provision of £8 million assured by the participating governments. At the last meeting of the Consultative Committee held at Singapore, the Scheme and the Plan which are co-terminous were extended to June 1961. Apart from the initial £8 million promised, the United Kingdom announced at the Singapore meeting a technical assistance commitment of £7 million over the seven years beginning April 1956. Australia, Canada and New Zealand also pledged strong continuing participation.

By June 1956 the total expenditure incurred on technical assistance under the Scheme amounted to £5,616,511. Assistance took the form of provision of training facilities and experts and supplies of equipment. The statement below indicates the number of experts and training facilities *received* by the countries of the area from the inception of the Scheme up to June 30, 1956:

<i>Receiving country</i>	<i>Training facilities received</i>	<i>Experts received</i>
Brunei	6	—
Burma	247	11
Cambodia	10	7
Ceylon	710	211
India	765	110
Indonesia	578	31
Japan	3	—
Laos	2	3
Malaya	262	63
Nepal	303	—
North Borneo	61	13
Pakistan	792	101
Philippines	170	—
Sarawak	50	4
Singapore	102	12
Thailand	96	2
Viet Nam	70	4
	<hr/> 4,227	<hr/> 572

Of the total number of 4,227 training facilities provided till June 30, 1956 engineering (641) accounted for the largest number of trainees, followed by food and agriculture (638), administration (595), education (574), medicine and health (524), industry and trade (343), transport and communications (276) and power and fuel (163). Places were also provided in broadcasting, co-operatives, journalism, social services, fisheries, statistics, insurance, banking, accountancy, taxation, printing, photography, factory and labour inspection.

The training facilities availed of by the receiving countries also indicate the fields in which they are short of trained personnel at present. Pakistan, for example, had sent more trainees for administration than in any other field, India and Ceylon in agriculture, Federation of Malaya in medicine, health and education, Indonesia in engineering and Burma in industry and trade.

With the progress of the training programmes, new lines of training have also developed. Establishment of training institutions inside the area, greater exchange of training facilities among the countries of the region and organization of study groups of trainees covering more than one country are some of the special features recorded in the Report.

New Institutions

The countries of South and South-East Asia are increasing their efforts to build training institutions. The Canadian offer to establish an atomic research centre in India to further the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Report points out, is a spectacular instance to fight the Asian economic battle under the Plan. It also states that the United States recently sent a mission to tour the Colombo Plan area in connection with their proposal to establish an atomic training centre in the Philippines. Other centres are being established in Burma and Pakistan.

The institutions, however, which are being increased in the area in large numbers are not the atomic research centres, important though they might be, but the numerous schools of technology and scientific and research laboratories which have already started producing technicians to man the development projects that have been launched. The Report gives a number of instances of such activities in a special section devoted to the subject.

As regards experts, of the total number of 572 provided up to the middle of the year, 156 were in the field of medicine and health, followed by engineering (88), education (70), food, agriculture and forestry (67), transport and communications (65), industry and trade (46) and fisheries (29).

Special Equipment

Training of students or advice of experts will not be complete unless they are accompanied by the equipment necessary for demonstration or for actual work. Requests for equipment made under the Scheme include three broad categories, namely, laboratory equipment, training equipment and research equipment. Over £2 million worth of equipment has already been supplied or is on order or offer, by the Governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom. Of this over £600,000 has been for laboratory equipment, £1,300,000 on training equipment and £375,000 on research equipment.

Growth of Mutual Aid

Mutual aid by the countries of South and South-East Asia with a view to promoting national development is a remarkable feature in the progress of the Colombo Plan during the last five years. Out of a total amount of £5,616,511 spent under the Technical Co-operation Scheme from the inception of the Colombo Plan to June 30, 1956, the assistance given by the countries of the area to each other amounted to £376,182 or about 7% of the total assistance, the Report shows.

When the Colombo Plan started in 1950 technical assistance for economic development of the area was provided by the advanced countries outside the region, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The progress of development in the countries of the region has now brought about a welcome change in this pattern of assistance, namely that while assistance from the original donors is continuing some of the countries of the area have come forward with assistance to the others. Among such donors are Ceylon, India, Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya, Pakistan and Singapore. As of June 30, 1956 Ceylon had provided 23 training places and 2 experts to the countries of South and South-East Asia; India 462 training places and 20 experts and Pakistan 30 training places.

Ceylon has assisted *Nepal* in training nurses for *Nepal's* tuberculosis control programme. *Burma* and the Federation of Malaya have been assisted in the field of co-operatives, while *India* is being assisted by a Ceylonese zoologist to set up a National Zoological Park in New Delhi.

Of the 462 training places that *India* provided, 273 were filled by the nominees of *Nepal*, 99 went to *Ceylon*, while the rest went to *Burma*, *Indonesia*, *Pakistan*, *Philippines* and *Thailand*. Training facilities provided to *Nepal* cover civil, electrical and mechanical engineering, pure and applied sciences, medical,

education, veterinary training, aviation and ground engineering, telephone industry and geology. A Technical Aid Mission from India, functioning in Nepal, tenders advice on the implementation of development projects and assists in the co-ordination of Indian aid to Nepal.

For Ceylon, the facilities provided by India include assistance for cement, brick and tile industries, training in the manufacture of DDT, caustic soda and chlorine and study of India's co-operative institutions. North Borneo is being assisted by an agricultural officer from India who is to train personnel at the Central Agricultural Station at Tuaran. Singapore has been helped by an Indian officer in the establishment of an Organization and Methods Section in the Singapore Secretariat.

The International Statistical Education Centre in Calcutta, jointly sponsored by the International Statistical Institute, the Indian Statistical Institute and UNESCO, has been providing courses in statistical methods and their application to the trainees from South and South-East Asia. This Centre had by June 30, 1956 held nine semesters and provided 86 places to trainees of the region.

Indonesia has assisted Ceylon by providing training to the Honorary Secretary of the Council for Crippled Welfare in Ceylon at the Surakata Rehabilitation Centre.

The Federation of Malaya has helped Burma to implement the recommendations made by a firm of consultants for the production of industrial charcoal by offering training to forest officers from Burma in the management of forests. She has also provided training facilities to Ceylon for rubber research and canning work.

Pakistan has assisted Burma by offering training in port administration and Ceylon by providing facilities to the Ceylon Land Commission to study land tenure system and colonization work in Pakistan.

A Regional Railway Training Centre was established in Lahore in 1954 with the assistance of UNTAA, the United Kingdom, Japan and a number of European Governments for training junior executive officers from Asian countries in modern methods of railway signalling and operation. The Centre has facilities for training 25 to 30 students from other countries and has so far provided 9 training places to Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan and the Federation of Malaya. Pakistan has also assisted some countries of the region by providing training facilities in air traffic control.

Singapore has assisted India by offering training to two Indian customs officers in the detection and control of traffic in dangerous drugs and in smuggling. She has assisted Pakistan by providing training in road construction techniques, structural engineering and utilization of timber.

The New Map of India

UP to the time India and Pakistan attained their independence in August 1947, hundreds of political units of every shape and dimension were included in the territory which is now the Republic of India. Prior to 1947 there were in British India 12 governors' provinces ruled from the vice-regal capital of Delhi, although with some degree of popular local government; of these the United Provinces with over 60 million people had the largest population. In "Indian" India there existed a complex of 554 princely states and territories, some of great extent and population, others simply scattered parcels of land. The largest princely state was Hyderabad with a population of 17 million people living in an area of more than 80,000 square miles; a typical small state was Pataudi, with a population of only 22,000 people living in 53 square miles.



On November 1, 1956, only nine years after Independence, the number of political units in India had been reduced to thirteen states* and six small centrally-administered territories. In place of the old haphazard political fragmentation, India has been divided on primarily linguistic lines. Hindi, the

*The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is in a special category, is excluded from this article.

official language of India, is the sole official language of four states. Two states are bilingual, Bombay (Marathi and Gujarati) and the Punjab (Punjabi and Hindi). In seven of the new states, one of the number of languages recognized by the constitution is the mother tongue of the large majority of the people and the official language of the state.

Reorganization—First Stage

The Indian Government created these tidy compartments of administration in two stages. The first steps were taken at the time of and shortly after the partition of India in August 1947, with the accession of princely states to the Indian Union and their integration into the framework of the new country. Although most of the Indian States acceded shortly after Independence, integration was not completed until 1950, when Hyderabad came into the Union. Some princely states merged with former provinces of British India; others, such as the states which became Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin, united to form a larger unit; still others—Hyderabad, Mysore, Bhopal and Coorg—remained as separate entities.

The complicated process of accession and integration was carried through under the direct and vigorous leadership of the late Sardar Patel, then Deputy Prime Minister of India. The resulting twenty-eight states were divided into four categories, "A", "B", "C" and "D". The "A" states were the old governors' provinces of the pre-independence period. The "B" states were composed of territories ruled at the time of partition by the Indian princes, who now performed the functions of governors with the title of "Rajpramukhs". (For example, the Maharaja of Patiala became the Rajpramukh of PEPSU—Patiala and East Punjab States Union—an amalgam of princely states scattered like a picturesque ink blot across the Punjab plains). The "B" states had popular government, with local cabinets and elected legislatures. The "C" states were placed under the direct control of the central government represented in each state by a chief commissioner. The capital city of Delhi and a few miles surrounding it became one of these part "C" states, with a state government and legislature of limited scope. There was one "D" state, also under the direct control of the central government.

State governments were given responsibility for the administration of justice, public order, police, health and sanitation, prisons, education and forests and fisheries, and the power to tax agricultural incomes, professions, trades, luxuries and entertainment. The state governments also share with the central government responsibility for criminal law and procedure, marriage and divorce, contracts, pure food laws, trade unions, labour, social security, electricity, economic and social planning, price control, factories, newspapers, books and printing presses. The central government is responsible for defense, foreign affairs, transportation, posts and telegraphs, currency, coinage and external trade and commerce, and also has residuary powers in fields not specifically allocated to the states.

Reorganization—Second Stage

The second stage of reorganization began with the creation on October 1, 1953 of the new state of Andhra, which was formed out of the north-eastern segment of Madras State and has a largely Telugu-speaking population. At the



end of 1953 the Government created a states reorganization commission to consider further re-drawing of state boundaries. The Commission was composed of Mr. S. Fazl Ali, the then Governor of Orissa, as Chairman; Mr. K. M. Panikkar, former Indian Ambassador to China, who was then Ambassador to Egypt, and Mr. H. N. Kunzru, a member of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and a prominent liberal.

After an exhaustive programme of interviewing witnesses, studying briefs and touring the country, the Commissioners presented their 250-page report in October 1955. As a work of scholarship this document ranks high and its comprehensiveness and erudition will make it a standard text book in Indian political science for many years to come. It is a major state paper equivalent in importance to the Rowell-Sirois Report in Canada. By applying a mainly linguistic measure the Commissioners pared down the twenty-eight states set up in the post-partition period to sixteen states of equal status and seven centrally-administered "Union Territories". After some months of negotiations with political groups and consultations with state governments and legislatures, the Government accepted most of the Commission's recommendations and implemented them by legislation and constitutional amendments during the Monsoon Session of Parliament in 1956.

The Government made two major changes, affecting the States of Andhra and Bombay which had not been included in the Commission's recommendations. Instead of creating a separate state of Telengana for the Telugu-speaking portion of the former princely state of Hyderabad, as the Commission had recommended, the Government merged this portion of Hyderabad with the

existing state of Andhra, where the same language is spoken. The Commission had also recommended the creation of a new Marathi-speaking state of Vidharba; the Government finally decided to include Vidharba in an enlarged bilingual Bombay State with Marathi and Gujarati as the official languages.

With these exceptions, the Government accepted the main recommendations of the Commission, including one proposing the abolition of the distinctions in powers and status between "A" and "B" states. The Governors of the "A" states are now appointed by the central government in the same way the Canadian Government appoints the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces. In the "B" states the former princes of Rajpramukhs, now shorn of their former power but retaining some of their privileges, have been designated as governors. Thus, all states now have governors and equal powers. What were formerly "C" states were stripped of the few powers they had and became centrally-administered territories. With the abolition of the office of Rajpramukhs the last remnant of the princely power and office has disappeared.

The state of Hyderabad has now been dissolved into its linguistic components. A large new State of Madhya Pradesh, occupying the plains, hills and forests of Central India, has welded together the former states of Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal. The states of Uttar Pradesh and Bombay have populations comparable to those of the larger European nations while Bombay and Madhya Pradesh are about one-half the size of Ontario.

Following are the new states:

<i>State</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Language</i>
	(estimate for 1956) <i>Millions</i>	<i>Sq. Miles</i>	
Andhra Pradesh	34	110,000	Telugu
Assam	10	89,000	Assamese
Bihar	41	64,000	Hindi
Bombay	51	188,000	Gujerati and Marathi
Kerala	14	15,000	Malayalam
Madhya Pradesh	28	177,000	Hindi
Madras	32	50,000	Tamil
Mysore	20	33,000	Kannada
Orissa	16	60,000	Oriya
Punjab	17	47,000	Punjabi and Hindi
Rajasthan	17	132,000	Hindi
Uttar Pradesh	67	113,000	Hindi
West Bengal	28	38,000	Bengali
	<hr/> 375 <hr/>	<hr/> 1,116,000 <hr/>	

The six centrally-administered Union Territories are: Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Delhi; Himachal Pradesh; Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands; Manipur; Tripura. The total population of these territories is about 4 million.

Between the central government of the Indian Union and the state governments a further tier of administration has been inserted. The states have been



grouped in five zonal councils, which are advisory in character and deal with matters of common concern to the various states within the zones. It is hoped that these councils will be particularly useful in co-ordinating the planning and administration of development projects which cross state boundaries. In Punjab State another layer of government, also of an advisory nature, is composed of two regional councils, one for the Hindi and one for the Punjabi-speaking areas; this system was not introduced in any other state.

Before November 1 a formidable administrative task faced the state authorities. Midnight oil was burned in the secretariats primarily affected by reorganization, as civil servants, themselves soon to be divided and parcelled out, separated files and split assets. The wine of old administrations was poured into new bottles. After November 1 a delimitation commission rapidly drew new constituency boundaries for the next general elections.

A comparison of the three maps which illustrate this article reveals the enormous task which the Indian Government has successfully completed in creating large and viable administrative units for the modern Indian Union. Sardar Patel's work has been finished. The job has not been done without much difficulty. Passions of linguistic nationalism were stirred to the depths, and violence broke out in some areas. From now on, however, the benefits of the convenient new framework should become increasingly apparent. The Government has cleared its administrative decks for action in the vital task of economic development.

Maple Leaf Cement Plant

BUILT by Canadians and financed jointly by Canada and Pakistan under the Colombo Plan, the Maple Leaf Cement Plant in north-west Pakistan is now in full operation.

First of the large capital projects undertaken by Canada in Pakistan to reach completion, the plant has a capacity of 300,000 tons of high quality cement per year. Pakistan paid for all internal costs, including labour, with Canada contributing \$6,750,000 toward the external costs, including design and equipment, and sending out technicians to supervise construction work.

In the early years of Pakistan's existence the country's economic and industrial planners realized that projected developments in irrigation, housing, communications, in hydro-electricity and many other fields would require cement in quantities far exceeding that produced in Pakistan. In consequence, one of the first requests for aid under the Colombo Plan which was placed before Canada was for assistance in building a cement plant. Included in the group of Pakistan officials who visited Ottawa to discuss the request was Syed Amjad Ali, now Pakistan's Finance Minister, then Minister at the Pakistan Embassy in Washington.



MAPLE LEAF CEMENT PLANT

First of the large capital projects undertaken by Canada in Pakistan under the Colombo Plan to reach completion, the Maple Leaf Cement Plant in northwest Pakistan will speed the economic and industrial development of that Commonwealth country.

This request created problems since Canadian defence and industrial requirements made it difficult to allocate the substantial amount of iron and steel required in the face of domestic and international shortages at that time. However, because of the importance of the scheme to Pakistan it was agreed that the iron and steel could be spared. Consultants were chosen to design the plant and to survey possible sites in Pakistan, in conjunction with Pakistan officials and engineers.

The site chosen was in the north-west section of what was then called the Province of West Punjab; close to where the Indus River comes rushing out of the Salt Range Mountains into the Plains of the Punjab and to the north of a large, semi-desert, but potentially cultivable area called the Thal. Plans had been made and carried out to some extent for the irrigating of this large area for the increased production of food grains, the settlement of refugees from India, and for the establishment of planned towns and secondary industry throughout the area. All this meant that cement would be needed to build canals, roads, houses and factory buildings as well as barns and other agricultural buildings.

The plant site was conveniently close to the Indus River, where sufficient water was assured; it was also adjacent to the Salt Range, massive craggy, barren hills rising 3,000 feet above the plain, which contained ample supplies of gypsum, limestone and coal, all necessary for the production of cement.

An internationally-known Danish firm was commissioned to design the cement plant while fabrication and supervision of construction and erection were placed in the hands of Canadian Overseas Projects Limited, a newly-formed consortium of Canadian companies established to facilitate the undertaking by Canada of large-scale industrial projects abroad. The members of this consortium were The Dominion Bridge Company, Canadian General Electric Company Limited, H. G. Acres and Company Limited, and Fraser Brace Limited.

In the late summer of 1953, the first Canadian engineers, technicians and their families moved from Canada to the remote and arid site in the Punjab where the cement plant was to be built, near the small village of Daudkhel. They were joined by a larger group of Pakistan engineers, technicians, clerical staff and skilled and semi-skilled labour. An Italian contractor was appointed by the Pakistan Government to be responsible for construction. The group took on an international aspect, comprising Pakistanis, Canadians, Danes and Italians. A housing colony for the future workers at the cement plant was built under the direction of a German architect employed by the Pakistan Government. The Canadian supervisory staff of C.O.P.L. has been working in close conjunction with officials of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, the autonomous agency of the Pakistan Government under which the plant was built. Because of the difficulty of finding experienced technicians in Pakistan to run the plant completely, it is expected that two or three experts from Canada will be employed for a short time under the technical assistance scheme of the Colombo Plan to assist in the operation of the plant and to supervise the training of the necessary Pakistani staff.

In November 1955, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, visited the plant while it was under construction. He was shown

around the site and discussed the project with the Canadian and Pakistani engineers.

In tribute to the donor country the factory has been called the Maple Leaf Cement Plant and a large red maple leaf adorns all bags of cement produced by this industrial unit. The Maple Leaf Cement Plant has been in full production since March of this year, producing cement of a high quality.

Some technical difficulties were inevitably experienced in the construction of the plant but the Pakistani and Canadian engineers, and technicians working in close co-operation, were able to overcome all obstacles.

Since the cement plant was started, the P.I.D.C. have begun the construction of a large ammonium sulphate factory in an adjacent area which will go into production in 1957. A penicillin factory is also being built nearby. In three years, therefore, what was arid and unpromising ground has become the centre of an active industrial enterprise dedicated to the improvement of the Pakistan economy and the welfare of its people. Nearby the little village of Daudkhel (in translation, Village of David) has remained unchanged for many generations.

The Maple Leaf Cement Plant is an example of the type of project to which Canada is contributing under the Colombo Plan. Of the approximately \$163 million voted by Parliament for the Canadian contribution to the plan since its inception in 1950, more than \$146 million has already been allocated to projects in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. More than \$3,000,000, in addition, has been allocated to cover the costs of providing experts to give technical assistance in South and South-East Asia and to bring trainees from those countries to be trained in Canada. The balance of the sums voted by Parliament will be used for specific projects in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and other countries in the Colombo Plan area.

IMMEDIATE AID FOR HUNGARIANS

It was announced December 6 that the Government had decided to allocate immediately \$250,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and \$250,000 to the Canadian Red Cross Society, for assistance to the victims of the recent tragic events in Hungary. Both sums will be charged against the vote of \$1,000,000 recently approved for this purpose by the special session of Parliament. This allocation of half of the money voted by Parliament is without prejudice to the exact distribution of the remaining \$500,000, on which it was expected that a decision would be taken shortly.

In effect, this increases the amounts at present being made available to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to the Canadian Red Cross Society to \$250,000 each instead of the amount of \$100,000 each originally announced by the Prime Minister last November 7.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Mr. J. W. Pickersgill, had announced in the House of Commons November 28 that free passage to Canada would be extended to Hungarian refugees who wished to come to Canada. This policy, he said, would apply to those who had already arrived and to those en route.

Canada and ICAO

THE International Civil Aviation Organization is one of ten inter-governmental organizations which are linked with the United Nations through special agreements arranged by the Economic and Social Council and approved by the General Assembly and by the organizations concerned. The Specialized Agencies of the United Nations are expert in their respective fields: labour, health, education, food and agriculture, finance and banking, civil aviation, postal matters, telecommunications and meteorology.

Need for International Action

Civil Aviation offers to the world a means of moving people and goods at great speed and over long distances but it is an activity which has a peculiar need for international collaboration. Not only are aircraft themselves most complex machines but the equipment and services they require on the ground—for communications, weather forecasting, air traffic control, radio navigation and landing aids—are also complex and together form a tightly integrated system which requires experience and skill to operate. This characteristic of complexity would not of itself impose a need for inter-governmental collaboration, if it were not that civil aviation, in its present state at least, is predominantly a means of long-range transport; in most parts of the world air routes to be economically sound must cross international borders. Air services must be both safe and regular. Safety and regularity require that ground services be of a high order and that high standards be established in such matters as qualifications for pilot licences and airworthiness specifications for aircraft. All these matters require close international co-operation and standardization.

History

These facts of life for civil aviation received recognition as early as 1919 when a number of nations attending the Peace Conference at Versailles established the International Commission for Aerial Navigation. This body operated mainly in Europe where rapid progress in aviation and a multiplicity of national frontiers combined to make the need most great. Until 1939 there was no serious need for organization on a world-wide basis because the great oceans imposed formidable barriers to the largest aircraft of the day and made inter-continental air services uneconomic if not impossible.

The Second World War changed that situation. Within two or three years after 1939 streams of large aircraft were flying shuttle services across the Atlantic and Pacific, while tremendous technical advances were made under the stimulus of war. Chains of ground facilities were set up by the Allied forces to serve the main trans-oceanic routes and new routes into areas not previously served. At the end of the war all this technical development was available to the civil air operators. The kind of service they could offer was superior to their best pre-war efforts, and there was a vastly increased demand for their services. In 1946, the first full post-war year, world-wide air traffic was fully nine times greater than it had been in 1938. It has continued to

expand at a sensational rate, and in 1955 amounted to about four times the figure for 1946.

Before the war ended, the Allied governments realized that air transport had moved to a new plane of effectiveness and that aviation's new capabilities created additional requirements for inter-governmental co-operation. To deal with the whole complex of new problems and to create an environment in which civil aviation could make the maximum contribution in the post-war world, the Allied governments met in conference in Chicago in 1944.

The major results of the Chicago Conference were the signature of the International Civil Aviation Convention and the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is founded on the Convention. The Convention is an international charter for the control, regulation and peaceful exploitation of the air. It establishes the sovereignty of each government over its own air space, lists certain basic rights which its signatories accord to each other, governs the provision of the facilities needed for international air operations, provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization as machinery for the promotion and negotiation of the international agreement needed by civil aviation over a great range of legal, economic and technical problems. ICAO met first as a provisional body in Montreal in 1945. By 1947, when ratifications to the Convention brought it formally into being, it had already gone far in the achievement of its objectives.

Objectives

"The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to:

- (a) Ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;
- (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes;
- (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
- (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport;
- (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
- (f) Ensure that the rights of contracting states are fully respected and that every contracting state has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
- (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting states;
- (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
- (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics."

Structure

Sixty-nine governments are now members of ICAO. The machinery of the Organization consists of:

- (a) the Assembly, in which all member states participate, and which establishes the general policy of the Organization and approves its budgets;

- (b) the Council, consisting of 21 member states elected by the Assembly every third year. It has a permanent president who is the senior official of the Organization, and it sits in more or less permanent session at the Organization's headquarters in Montreal. The Council, the executive body of ICAO, carries on the day-to-day work of the Organization, supervises its administration and develops the ways and means of pursuing its objectives;
- (c) the Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General, which is the permanent staff of ICAO. It numbers about 400 employees, most of whom are at headquarters in Montreal but almost 50 of whom comprise the staffs of four regional offices established in other parts of the world.

The Council is assisted in its work by three subordinate bodies: the Air Navigation Commission for technical, the Air Transport Committee for economic, and the Legal Committee for legal matters. ICAO's work falls mainly within the three fields covered by these bodies. In the technical field it seeks international agreement on the requirements of international civil aviation for facilities and services, on the means of providing them and on standardization of equipment and procedures wherever standardization is necessary for safety and regularity. (In some important instances when international action was necessary to provide certain facilities and services ICAO had been concerned with negotiating and later with administering international agreements). The Organization also collects, analyzes and makes available to states a vast amount of information on technical aspects of civil aviation and provides assistance to member states in the training of personnel.

The Organization has not been involved directly in negotiations between member states of agreements to exchange rights for the operation of commercial air services, but it studies and seeks agreement on other questions of an economic nature whenever such agreement will facilitate the international operations of airlines. Similarly it deals with legal questions in cases in which the differing positions of national codes of law are likely to handicap air operations. The results of its legal work usually appear in the form of international conventions open for acceptance by all member states.

In addition to its own various kinds of assistance to member states, ICAO administers that part of the United Nation's Technical Assistance Programme which applies to civil aviation. Its missions to receiving countries have provided training in almost every branch of civil aviation and often have assisted temporarily in the administration of civil aviation affairs.

Canadian Participation

From the time they became usable commercially, aircraft have been of great value in developing the more remote parts of Canada and in bringing the various regions closer together. The size of the country provided unusual opportunities for the development of domestic services. At the same time Canada as a major trading nation has had to be interested in the development of fast international transportation, while her geographical position astride important air routes created considerable responsibilities. In consequence the Canadian Government was much interested in developments leading up to the Chicago Conference and took a significant part in its proceedings. The selection of Montreal as the permanent site for ICAO's Headquarters was partly in recognition of Canada's contribution at Chicago.

Since 1945 Canada has been a member of the Council and there has always been a Canadian member on the Air Navigation Commission. Our interest, as a major trading nation, in international air transport has been reinforced by the development within Canada of a large aeronautical engineering industry, and the development of international services by Canadian airlines. Canadian airlines now fly across the Pacific to Japan, Hong Kong and Australasia, across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom and points in Europe, and to points in South America. The recent opening of routes from North America to Europe across the polar regions offers new opportunities for Canadian airlines as well as new responsibilities for the Government.

Canada as host state to ICAO has undertaken a number of responsibilities vis-à-vis the Organization, including the granting of certain legal and fiscal immunities to foreign Council representatives and members of the Secretariat, and subsidizes the rent paid for office accommodation in Montreal so as to bring it into line with that paid by U.N. Specialized Agencies elsewhere. In addition Canada contributes on the same basis as other member states to the regular budget of ICAO which in 1957 will amount for assessment purposes to \$3,066,727; Canada's contribution will be 4.2 per cent of this amount.



—Capital Press Service

AGREEMENT ON TRAINEES

His Excellency Francis Lacoste, Ambassador of France, and Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, are shown October 4 signing an agreement between France and Canada for reciprocal employment of trainees.

The trainees of each country will be graduate apprentices in industrial, commercial, agricultural or professional fields taking training-employment in the other country for a limited time.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Miss D. E. Osborne appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 4, effective November 1, 1956.
- Mr. H. A. Scott, Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, appointed Consul General in New York. Proceeded to New York November 9, 1956.
- Mr. R. A. S. MacNeil posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective November 10, 1956.
- Mr. B. A. S. Crane posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, to Ottawa, effective November 10, 1956.
- Mr. H. B. O. Robinson posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective November 19, 1956.*
- Mr. W. H. Barto~~ra~~ posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Vienna, effective November 26, 1956.
- Miss M. A. Macpherson posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 30, 1956.

TREATY INFORMATION Current Action

Bilateral

France

Agreement on the admission of trainees to Canada.
Signed at Ottawa October 4, 1956.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes concerning the relocation of that part of the Roosevelt Bridge which crosses the Cornwall south channel.
Signed at Washington October 24, 1956.

Multilateral

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Signed at New York October 26, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

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| a) Printed document: | board of auditors. A/3206. N.Y., 1956. 22 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 6C. |
| <i>Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization</i> , 16 June 1955 - 15 June 1956. A/3137/Add.1. N.Y., 1956. 8 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 1A. | <i>Everyman's United Nations 1945-1955</i> . Fifth edition. N.Y., Department of Public Information, 1956. 444 p. U.N. publications. 1956.I.13. \$1.50. |
| <i>United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency</i> . Financial report and accounts for the year ended 30 June 1956 and report of the | <i>The institutional care of children</i> . ST/SOA/31. N.Y., U.N. Department of Social Affairs, 1956. 70 p. Sales No.: 1956.IV.6. |

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

a) Printed Documents:

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A/3123/Rev.1. N.Y., 1956. 70 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 11.

Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 6 August 1955 to 9 August 1956. A/3154. N.Y., 1956. 98 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 3.

Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from 16 July 1955 to 15 July 1956. A/3157. N.Y., 1956. 52 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 2.

Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session, 23 April-4 July 1956. A/3159. N.Y., 1956. 48 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 9.

Report of the Trusteeship Council covering the period from 23 July 1955 to 14 August 1956. A/3170. N.Y., 1956. 364 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 4.

Report of the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. A/3172. N.Y., 1956. 16 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 13.

Report of the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the period 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956. A/3195. N.Y., 1956. 34 p. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 6.

Resolutions of the Twenty-second Session (9 July-9 August 1956) *of the Economic and Social Council.* E/2929. Geneva, 1956. 24 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1.

Pollution of the sea by oil. Results of an inquiry made by the United Nations Secretariat. ST/ECA/41. N.Y., August 1956. 235 p. \$1.50.

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tion; together with related documents. T/ 1239. N.Y., 1956. 62 p. Trusteeship Council Official Records: Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 3.

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Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World. UNESCO, 1956. (Published by UNESCO, Paris, France and the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C., U.S.A.).

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The Old and the New World. Their cultural and moral relations. (International Forums of Sao Paulo and Geneva, 1954). UNESCO, Paris 1956. 365 p. \$4.00.

Social implications of industrialization and urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara. (Tensions and Technology Series). Paris, 1956. 743 p. \$11.00.

Travel Abroad. Frontier formalities. (A joint publication by UNESCO and The International Union of Official Travel Organizations).

Wind and solar energy. Proceedings of the New Delhi Symposium. (Arid Zone Research-VII). Paris 1956. 238 p. (English-French-Spanish). \$7.00.

WHO

Proceedings and reports relating to *International Quarantine* (Supplement of Official Records No. 71: Ninth World Health Assembly). Geneva, October 1956. 87 p. Official Records of the WHO, No. 72.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Interim report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the question of the establishment of Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). A/3134 (E/2896), 8 June 1956. 101 p. and Annex.

Report of the Third Session of the United Nations Refugees Emergency Fund (UNREF) Executive Committee (Geneva, 28 May-1 June 1956). A/AC/79/41. 12 June 1956. 33 p. and Annex.

The expanded programme of technical assistance. The programme for 1957. E/TAC/L.112. 29 October 1956. 248 p.

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